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2-   I 


PROFESSOR    LADD'S    WORKS. 


INTRODUCTION     TO      PHILOSOPHY.       An    Inquiry 

after  a  Progressive  Rational  System  of  the  Principles  of  the 
Particular  Sciences  in  their  Relation  to  Ultimate  Reality. 
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THE     DOCTRINE     OF    SACRED     SCRIPTURE.      A 

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THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  CHURCH  POLITY.  Crown 
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INTRODUCTION   TO   PHILOSOPHY 


Tlavres  &u6pwnot  rod  elSevat  opeywvTca  <pv<rei.  —  Aristotle. 

Tutti  gli  uornini  naturalmente  desiderano  di  sapere.  —  Dante. 

The  kind  of  philosophy  which  one  chooses  depends  on  the  kind  of  man 
one  is.  For  a  philosophical  system  is  not  a  dead  bit  of  furniture  which 
one  can  take  to  one's  self  or  dispose  of,  as  one  pleases ;  but  it  is  endowed 
with  a  soul  by  the  soul  of  the  man  who  has  it.  —  Fichte. 


Introduction  to  Philosophy 


AN    INQUIRY 


AFTKR 

A    RATIONAL    SYSTEM    OF    SCIENTIFIC    PRINCIPLES 

IN 

THEIR   RELATION  TO  ULTIMATE  REALITY 


BY 

GEORGE   TRUMBULL   LADD 

PROFESSOR     OF     PHILOSOPHY    IN     YALE     UNIVERSITY 


NEW    YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

1893 


Copyright,  1890,  by 
Charles  Scribnek's  Sons. 


^Rmbrottjj  $ress: 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge. 


PREFACE 


TT  is  not  easy  to  describe  the  precise  purpose  of  this  book  in 
the  few  words  of  an  appropriate  title.  I  have,  indeed, 
cherished  the  hope  that  it  may  serve  to  "  introduce  "  some  of 
its  readers  to  the  study  of  philosophy.  Undoubtedly  the  num- 
ber is  increasingly  large  who  recognize,  if  only  vaguely,  the 
existence  of  "  those  riddles  "  —  as  said  Lotze  —  "  by  which  our 
mind  is  oppressed  in  life,  and  about  which  we  are  compelled  to 
hold  some  view  or  other,  in  order  to  be  able  really  to  live  at  all." 
It  is  these  riddles  which  form  the  subjects  of  philosophical  in- 
vestigation. Among  the  persons  who  at  least  recognize  their 
existence  are  the  young  in  the  later  years  of  our  higher  in- 
stitutions of  learning.  I  have  therefore  had  them  in  mind  in 
writing  this  treatise. 

I.  have  not  thought  it  desirable,  however,  to  put  my  thoughts 
into  the  technical  form  of  a  book  of  instruction  for  beginners  in 
philosophy.  In  a  subject  that  deals  so  largely  with  problems 
inviting  to  reflection  and  ending,  at  best,  in  opinion,  there  seems 
to  me  something  unbecoming  and  even  repulsive  in  the  text- 
book form.  Yet  I  believe  that  the  skilful  teacher  of  philo- 
sophy will  find  this  book  helpful  in  bringing  its  problems, 
and  their  discussion  from  whatever  point  of  view,  before  his 
classes. 


viii  PREFACE. 

But  there  are  many  besides  the  students  in  our  colleges  and 
seminaries  who  thoughtfully  raise  and  earnestly  pursue  the 
philosophical  inquiries.  To  them,  too,  I  would  gladly  speak 
a  word  of  sympathy  and  cheer,  and  (if  possible)  hold  out  a 
helping  hand.  Of  no  other  pursuit  is  it  so  true  as  of  philosophy, 
that  it  has  no  "  royal  road."  The  profoundest  reflections  of  the 
mightiest  intellects  and  the  daily  musings  and  self-question- 
ings of  the  plainest  men  and  women  have  all  the  fundamental 
things  in  common  here.  Freedom  and  caution,  earnestness  and 
modesty,  are  alike  becoming  in  all.  No  costly  laboratory,  no 
expensive  apparatus,  no  tiresome  journeys  of  exploration,  are 
indispensable  in  the  pursuit  of  philosophy. 

This  book  is  therefore  addressed  to  the  laity,  at  large,  as  well 
as  to  those  who  are  in  processes  of  education.  Though  much 
of  its  language  is  somewhat  foreign  to  that  of  common  life, 
the  subjects  of  which  it  treats  are  those  which  lie  upon  the 
minds  and  hearts  of  all  the  thoughtful.  If  to  such  any  of  my 
thoughts  can  be  an  introduction,  or  a  vade-mecum,  in  reflection, 
my  purposes  will  thus  be  the  more  completely  attained. 

Though  this  book  is  called  an  "  Introduction,"  no  special 
pains  have  been  taken  to  simplify  or  popularize  its  treatment. 
For  those  accustomed  to  think  in  the  lines  it  follows,  its  views 
will,  I  hope,  always  be  found  clearly  and  candidly  expressed. 
It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  these  views  will  all  find  accept- 
ance with  those  most  competent  to  judge.  For  beginners  in 
philosophy  some  expressions  will  doubtless  seem  obscure,  or 
hard  to  be  understood.  But,  then,  reflection  is  the  indispen- 
sable method  of  philosophy  ;  and  he  who  does  not  learn  to 
reflect  over  the  meanings  which  the  words  employed  in  phil- 
osophical writings  bear,  cannot  hope  to  make  progress  in 
philosophical  study.  For  if,  when  entering  upon  this  study, 
the  plain   and    thoughtful   man    needs    no    special  equipment 


PREFACE.  ix 

besides  his   own  powers   of   reflection,  the  keenest  and  most 
showily  educated  mind  cannot  dispense  with  reflection. 

Finally,  the  expert  readers  —  if  such  the  book  should  find  — 
will  not  be  long  in  discovering  that  the  so-called  "  Introduc- 
tion "  is  by  no  means  a  perfectly  colorless  affair.  Doubtless  a 
system  of  philosophy  (or  at  least  the  sketch  and  protocol  of 
such  a  system)  lies  concealed  in  these  pages.  If  the  subject 
were  urged  to  the  point  of  a  confession,  it  would  appear  that 
the  author  has  views  of  his  own  to  which  he  wishes  to  intro- 
duce his  readers.  These  views  are  to  a  certain  large  extent 
positive  as  well  as  critical.  The  attempt  has  been  made,  how- 
ever, to  prevent  their  expression  in  a  form  unreasonably  and 
offensively  dogmatic.  Whether  they  are  sound  and  defensible, 
each  reader  must,  on  due  consideration,  judge  for  himself. 
But  a  "  system  of  philosophy  "  has  only  been  suggested  and 
sketched.  The  expansion  and  more  detailed  discussion  of  its 
separate  departments  by  the  same  hand  must  abide  their  time. 

GEORGE   TRUMBULL   LADD. 

Yale    University,  July,   1890. 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

Page 

Introductory  :    History    and   Definition   of   the   Term 
"  Philosophy  " 1-28 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Sources  of  Philosophy,  and  its  Problem       .     .     .         29-54 

CHAPTER   III. 

Relation  of  Philosophy  to  the  Particular  Sciences  .         55-83 

CHAPTER   IV. 
Psychology  and  Philosophy 84-111 

CHAPTER   V. 
The  Spirit  and  the  Method  of  Philosophy       ....     112-139 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Dogmatism,  Scepticism,  and  Criticism 140-162 

CHAPTER   VII. 
The  Divisions  of  Philosophy 163-177 

CHAPTER  VHI. 

The  Theory  of  Knowledge 178-217 


xii  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   IX. 

Page 

Metaphysics 218-253 

CHAPTER   X. 

Philosophy  of  Nature  axd  Philosophy  of  Mind  .     .     .     254-287 

CHAPTER  XI. 

Ethics 288-323 

CHAPTER   XII. 
^Esthetics 324-350 

CHAPTER   XIII. 

Philosophy  of  Religion 351-394 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

Tendencies  and  Schools  in  Philosophy 395-421 

Index 423-42S 


CHAPTER    I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

HISTORY   AND    DEFINITION   OF   THE    TERM    "PHILOSOPHY. 


>) 


THE  inquiry,  "  What  is  philosophy  ? "  cannot  be  answered 
by  a  direct  appeal  to  history.  This  is  true,  whether 
the  appeal  be  taken  to  a  widespreading  and  confessedly  un- 
scientific usage,  or  to  the  conceptions  and  terminology  of  au- 
thorities in  philosophy.  Popular  expression  has  much  misused 
the  word ;  it  has  thus  tended  in  no  small  degree  to  produce 
distrust  toward  the  particular  discipline  which  the  word  repre- 
sents. But  the  writers  of  philosophical  masterpieces  have  by 
no  means  been  at  agreement  on  this  point.  This,  too,  is  one 
reason  for  the  unfavorable  attitude  of  many  cultivated  per- 
sons toward  the  pursuit  of  "metaphysics,"  technically  so  called. 
Men  eminent  in  science,  literature,  or  education  are  accus- 
tomed to  identify  philosophy  with  metaphysics ;  and  by  the 
latter  term  they  understand  the  sum-total  of  unverifiable  onto- 
logical  speculations. 

If  the  fullest  reasonable  allowance  be  made  for  the  grounds 
upon  which  the  foregoing  misapprehensions  are  based,  a  claim 
to  honorable  mention  can  still  be  made  for  philosophy,  and  also 
a  claim  to  recognition  for  philosophical  study.  Nay,  more  ; 
we  should  not  despair  of  showing  that  this  "mother  of  the 
sciences''  has  been  scarcely  inferior  to  any  other  factor  in  the 
elevation,  ameliorating,  and  enrichment  of  the  life  of  literature 

l 


2  INTRODUCTORY. 

and  of  conduct.  But  even  the  beginnings  of  such  an  apologetic 
argument  must  be  for  the  present  postponed.  It  will  be  a  more 
economical  course,  first  of  all,  to  clear  from  obscurity  the 
conception  of  philosophy,  and  to  show  how  the  study  of 
philosophy  may  be  most  successfully  pursued. 

It  need  not  be  argued  in  detail  that  the  exact  and  com- 
prehensive definition  of  any  form  of  science  or  of  intellectual 
discipline  is  no  easy  task.  Life  and  reality  nowhere  draw  for 
us  perfectly  distinct  lines.  Even  the  physical  and  natural  sci- 
ences find  great  difficulty  in  separating  their  peculiar  spheres, 
and  in  limiting  their  particular  ends  and  objects  of  pursuit 
within  those  spheres.  Here  lies  at  least  one  reason  why,  if  we 
are  to  believe  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  "  the  sciences  cannot  be 
rationally  arranged  in  serial  order."  In  fact,  the  experts  of  the 
"  exact  sciences  "  are  still  at  disagreement  over  important  points 
relating  to  this  matter.  Meanwhile,  the  world  of  scholars  is 
inquiring  whether  clearer  conceptions  of  such  forms  of  knowl- 
edge as  logic  and  psychology  are  not  possible.  A  recent  writer x 
on  the  latter  of  the  two  has  maintained  that  "  psychology 
cannot  be  defined  at  all  by  reference  to  a  special  subject-matter, 
as  can  mineralogy  and  botany." 

Philosophy,  then,  is  not  necessarily  at  a  great  relative  disad- 
vantage, if  it  cannot  appeal  to  common  consent  in  limiting  its 
own  domain.  Satisfactory  definition  is  one  of  the  latest  and 
finest  achievements  in  the  pursuit  of  any  science.  Nor  is  it 
likely  that  finished  and  faultless  definition  will  be  reached 
until  human  knowledge  is  itself  finished  and  faultless. 

It  is  not  our  intention,  however,  to  deny  that  somewhat 
peculiar  difficulties  surround  the  attempt  to  formulate  a  pre- 
cise conception  of  the  nature  of  philosophy.  Nor  do  we  fear 
the  further  confession  that  the  reason  for  these  difficulties  is  in 
part  the  fault  of  philosophers  themselves.  For  the  reason  is 
only  partly  due  to  them ;  it  is  also  partly  due  to  the  nature  of 
the  subject.     If  we  speak  of  philosophy  as  a  "  science  "  at  all, 

1  Dr.  Ward  in  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica  (9th  ed.)  ;  art.  Psychology. 


DEFINITION   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  3 

it  can  only  be  to  lay  emphasis  upon  a  correct  method  for  its 
study,  and  a  certain  ideal  certainty  aimed  at  in  its  conclusions. 
It  will  be  one  result  of  our  inquiry  to  show  that  philosophy 
should  not  be  identified  with  any  form  of  positive  science. 

The  difficulty  of  fixing  upon  an  independent  domain  for  phi- 
losophy is  increased  by  the  recent  vigorous  growth  and  wonder- 
ful diversifying  of  the  particular  sciences.  Familiar  changes  in 
the  use  of  terms  illustrate  this  truth.  Intelligent  persons  are 
no  longer  inclined  to  speak  of  physics  as  "  natural  philosophy;" 
and  yet  this  term  has  a  legitimate  birthright.  For  the  specu- 
lative thought  in  whose  line  of  succession  we  are  standing 
to-day,  had  its  rise  in  crude  theories  as  to  the  ultimate  constit- 
uents of  the  physical  universe.  Some,  with  Thales,  said  that 
all  things  arose  from  and  consist  of  water;  and  some,  with 
Anaximander,  that  the  beginning  of  all  things  (apxv)  was  the 
unlimited  (aireipov),  —  that  is,  "  the  infinite  mass  of  matter,  out 
of  which  all  things  arise."  Still  others  said  the  ultimate  physi- 
cal principle  is  air,  or  "  eternally  living  fire."  Others  sought  a 
formal  or  quasi-spiritual  "  First ;  "  and  this  they  found  in  num- 
ber, through  which  the  totality  of  things  becomes  a  cosmos,  — 
an  orderly  and  beautiful  whole ;  or  in  One  Divine  Being,  "  all 
eye,  all  ear,  all  thought ; "  or  in  Mind,  "  itself  mixed  with  noth- 
ing," but  acting  on  matter  considered  as  an  inert  and  compound, 
but  as  yet  undifferentiated,  mass. 

It  is  to  physics  rather  than  to  metaphysics  that  inquirers 
appeal  in  these  days  for  a  speculative  solution  of  questions  like 
the  foregoing.  But  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  any  solution  of 
such  questions  must  always  be  mingled  largely  with  the  pre- 
vailing metaphysics.  The  fact  that  we  assign  their  discussion 
to  science  rather  than  to  philosophy,  illustrates  the  modern  ten- 
dency to  narrow  the  sphere  hitherto  occupied  by  philosophy. 

What  is  true  of  physics  is  even  yet  more  true  of  psychology, 
as  inclusive  of  both  logic  and  ethics.  For  this  science  the  com- 
plex states  of  consciousness  constitute  the  problems  to  be  solved. 
In  dealing  with  these  problems  psychology  presses  hard  upon 


4  INTRODUCTORY. 

philosophy  for  the  right  to  what  the  latter  formerly  consid- 
ered its  peculiar  domain.  The  descriptive  and  evolutionary 
science  of  mind  claims  the  power  to  explain  the  genesis  of  con- 
ceptions of  real  Being  and  eternal  Truth.  The  ultimate  and 
fundamental  forms  of  thought  and  belief  {semina  scicnticc, 
semina  ceternitatis)  are  thus  brought  into  the  burning  focus 
of  the  idea  of  development.  In  this  focus  the  hitherto  stable 
forms  of  all  Thought  and  Reality  lose  their  life.  Not  only 
Space  and  Time,  but  also  the  ethical  and  sesthetical  Ideals, 
and  even  the  categories  of  Thought,  are  thus  apparently  reduced 
to  a  condition  of  perpetual  change. 

With  Plato,  philosophy  moved  in  the  sphere  of  the  Idea.  The 
Platonic  Idea  (IBea  or  etSo?)  was  "  a  pure  archetypal  essence,  in 
which  those  things  that  are  together  subsumed  under  the  same 
concept  participate."  Both  aesthetically  and  ethically,  it  was 
the  perfect  in  its  kind ;  to  it  every  individual  reality  remained 
far  and  forever  inferior.  Of  all  the  ideas,  the  highest  (for  they 
were  a  kingdom)  was  the  Idea  of  the  Good.  This  Idea  is  the 
real  cause  of  all  Being  and  Knowledge,  as  the  sun  in  the  king- 
dom of  ideas.  In  this  sphere  of  lofty  intuitions  of  supersen- 
sible realities  did  divine  philosophy,  according  to  Plato,  have 
its  movement  and  life.  But  as  astronomy  with  the  telescope 
has  banished  from  the  heavens  the  fixed  and  musical  spheres 
of  the  planets,  so  have  psychology  and  anthropology  apparently 
banished  the  sphere  of  the  Platonic  ideas. 

The  very  conception  which  Aristotle  held  of  philosophy  was 
unfavorable  to  the  claim  for  it  of  a  domain  distinct  from  the 
particular  sciences.  Psychology  and  logic  recognize  in  this 
great  Greek  their  first  progenitor.  But  they  treat  the  Aristo- 
telian categories,  and  the  four  principles  of  his  "  First  Philos- 
ophy," —  questions  set  apart  by  him  for  metaphysics,  —  as 
subjects  falling  within  their  scientific  domain. 

Through  the  Middle  Ages,  and  even  into  modern  times,  it  was 
theology  which  was  most  closely  allied  with  philosophy.  Dur- 
ing this  period  the  latter  was  understood  to  be  ancillary  to  the 


DEFINITION   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  5 

former,  or  rather  to  the  reigning  dogmas  of  the  Church.  In 
theory  and  appearance,  theology  dominated  philosophy.  In  re- 
ality, philosophy  controlled  and  guided  theology ;  and,  finally, 
having  gained  her  own  freedom,  undertook  the  task  of  freeing 
her  former  mistress  from  the  principle  of  traditional  authority. 
In  the  general  movement  of  enlarging  and  diversifying  human 
knowledge,  a  so-called  "  science  of  religion  "  has  arisen.  Theo- 
logy, too,  has  at  length  tardily  and  feebly  felt  the  modern  im- 
pulse. It  has  even  claimed  to  be  the  "  science  of  sciences." 
How  much  more  of  the  sphere  once  recognized  as  belonging  to 
philosophy  is  not  in  this  way  forever  consigned  to  the  particular 
sciences  ? 

But  is  it  not  the  peculiar  and  indefeasible  right  of  philosophy 
to  transact  business  with  the  Absolute  ?  In  the  construction 
and  defence  of  this  Idea,  and  in  the  deduction  from  it  of  the 
forms  and  laws  of  all  reality,  may  not  philosophy  find  its  legiti- 
mate work  ?  But  certain  of  the  particular  sciences  refuse  to 
surrender  even  this  barren  right  to  philosophy.  Psychology 
attempts  to  bring  the  very  conception  of  the  Absolute  into  this 
same  focus  of  analysis.  The  conception  is  pronounced  negative, 
a  mere  abstraction,  with  no  correlate  in  reality.  The  deductive 
process,  by  which  philosophy  once  sought  to  pass  from  this 
Idea  to  the  world  of  concrete  realities  with  which  science  deals, 
is  shown  to  have  the  appearance  and  not  the  substance  of  an 
argument.  Ethics,  politics,  art,  and  religion  pursue  their  way, 
regardless  of  the  once  proud  philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  To 
it  is  left  only  those  pale  ghosts  of  conceptions  that  belong  to 
the  death-kingdom  of  abstract  thought. 

"  Philosophy,"  says  Lotze,  "  is  a  mother  wounded  by  the  in- 
gratitude of  her  own  children."  It  is  not  the  ingratitude,  how- 
ever, of  denying  their  maternal  origin  which  wounds  her  most 
deeply.  The  history  of  the  particular  sciences,  even  more  than 
the  history  of  philosophy,  shows  how  much  they  owe  to  the 
philosophic  impulse  and  the  philosophic  reflection  of  the  race. 
A  wound  not  only  deep  but  deadly  would  be  inflicted,  however, 


Q  INTRODUCTORY.  I 

if  these  sciences  should  quite  deprive  philosophy  of  her  rightful 
domain.  Yet,  after  granting  all  their  claims,  what  is  left  out  of 
which  to  constitute  this  domain  ? 

The  conception  of  philosophy,  like  the  conception  of  science, 
implies  a  living  historical  development.  We  cannot  wholly 
intrust  to  Plato  and  Aristotle  the  guidance  of  our  minds  into 
the  precise  and  comprehensive  idea  we  are  seeking.  But  in  the 
search  we  cannot  safely  overlook  the  thoughts  of  these  ancient 
masters  in  philosophy.  Kant,  too,  as  the  first  who  attempted 
to  mark  with  precision  the  boundaries  between  philosophy  and 
the  positive  sciences,  is  entitled  to  great  consideration  ;  and  yet 
we  cannot  uncritically  receive  the  definition  of  even  so  pro- 
found a  thinker. 

The  true  method  of  defining  the  nature  of  philosophy  is  there- 
fore perfectly  plain.  We  must  consult  the  history  of  philosophy 
and  learn  the  views  of  its  great  teachers ;  but  we  must  main- 
tain the  freedom  of  criticism  in  our  consultation  of  history. 
As  children  of  all  the  ages,  we  receive  with  docility  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  past.  As  children  especially  of  this  age,  we  must 
recognize  our  own  right  to  the  effort  for  an  independent  point 
of  view.  This  method  will  be  applied  in  two  ways.  A  brief 
sketch  of  the  history  of  the  term  "  philosophy "  will  serve  to 
indicate  what  are  the  important  and  permanent  factors  in  the 
conception  of  philosophy.  A  more  detailed  criticism  of  the 
principal  forms  of  definition  (particularly  in  the  modern  era) 
will  then  enable  us  so  to  combine  these  factors  as  to  reach 
the  true  and  comprehensive  definition. 

The  word  "  philosophy  " 1  and  its  kindred  terms  do  not  occur 
in  Homer  or  Hesiod.     Herodotus  (i.  30)  represents  Croesus  as 

1  Further  information  may  be  found  in  the  following,  among  other  works  : 
Ueberweg,  "  A  History  of  Philosophy,"  and  an  Article  in  the  "  Zeitschrift  fur 
Philosophie  u.  philosoph.  Kritik,"  New  Series,  vol.  xlii.,  1863,  pp.  185-199  ;  Striim- 
pell,  "Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie  vom  Standpunkte  d.  Geschichte  d.  Philoso- 
phie;" Article  by  R.  Hayrn,  in  Ersch  und  Gruber's  "  Encycl.  d.  Wissen.  u. 
Kunste,"  iii.  24;  Lichtenfels,  "  Lehrbuch  zur  Einleitung  in  d.  Philosophie;" 
Stuckenberg,  "  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Philosophy." 


DEFINITION   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  7 

saying  to  Solon  :  "  I  have  heard  that  thou  hast  travelled,  philoso- 
phizing, over  many  lands."  Thucydides  makes  Pericles  use  the 
term  "  to  philosophize "  in  the  Funeral  Oration  (ii.  40),  as  a 
striving  after  intellectual  and  scientific  culture.  A  statement, 
probably  mythical,  concerning  the  remote  and  shadowy  person- 
ality of  Pythagoras,  refers  to  him  as  the  first  to  designate 
philosophy  by  the  term  "  science."  The  thought  ascribed  to 
Socrates  is  well  known.  In  the  Platonic  Apology  (28  E)  he 
calls  by  the  term  "  philosophizing "  that  examination  of  him- 
self and  others  by  which  he  aimed  to  destroy  the  Sophistical 
conceit  of  wisdom ;  in  this  he  saw  the  mission  of  his  life.  It 
is  with  the  disciples  of  Socrates  that  the  term  "  philosophy " 
appears  with  a  technical  significance.  Xenophon  refers  (Memo- 
rabil.,  I.  ii.  31)  to  certain  men  who  made  a  business  (consti- 
tuting, perhaps,  a  school)  of  "  philosophizing." 

It  is  Plato,  however,  who  is  the  first  even  to  attempt  to  de- 
scribe, under  the  term  "  philosophy,"  a  definite  method  and 
domain  of  human  knowledge,  and  to  give  to  it  by  his  own 
labors  a  comprehensive  and  systematic  treatment.  Yet  Plato 
vacillates  in  his  definition,  nor  does  he  in  practice  remain  true 
to  any  one  conception  of  the  subject.  In  several  places 1  he 
expresses  the  belief  —  falsely  ascribed  to  Pythagoras,  but  prob- 
ably taught  by  Socrates  —  that  wisdom  belongs  to  God  alone ; 
while  it  belongs  to  man  to  be  rather  a  lover  of  wisdom.  This 
wisdom  (<ro<j>ia)  is  identical  with  true  knowledge  2  (eVtcrT^/x7?. 
or  —  as  we  should  say  —  with  science)  ;  philosophy  is  the 
acquisition  of  such  knowledge.3  It  has  to  do,  not  with  the 
sensuous,  but  with  the  ideal ;  and,  accordingly,  with  the  eternal 
and  immutably  real.  Philosophers  are  worthy,  then,  to  be 
spoken  of  as  those  who  "  set  their  affections,  in  each  case,  on 
the  really  existent ; " 4  or  as  those  who  "  are  able  to  appre- 
hend  that  which   is   always    self-identical    and    immutable."5 

1  Phsedr.,  278  d  ;  Symp.,  203  e  ;  Lysis,  218  a  (ed.  Steph.). 

2  Theaetet.,  145  e.  3  Euthyd.,  288  d. 
4  Rep.,  v.  480.  5  Rep.,  vi.  484  b. 


g  INTRODUCTORY. 

Elsewhere 1  he  speaks  of  philosophy  so  as  to  include  under 
it  certain  branches  of  knowledge  which  we  should  to-day 
assign  to  the  particular  sciences,  —  he  thus  speaks,  at  least, 
of  "geometry  and  certain  other  philosophy." 

Philosophy  has  its  spring,  according  to  Plato,  in  a  deep  and 
passionate  impulse  of  human  nature.  Its  root  is  Eros,  —  the 
effort  of  mortal  man  to  attain  the  immortal.  To  reach  its  proper 
aim  it  must  pass  from  what  is  sensuous  to  what  is  intellectual, 
from  the  individual  to  the  universal,  —  to  the  intuition  and 
understanding  of  the  Idea.2  Thus  philosophy  is  the  elevation  of 
the  entire  man  out  of  the  senses ;  it  includes  all  real  and  valu- 
able knowledge,  as  well  as  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  in  the 
correct  manner.  It  also  secures  the  fulfilment  of  moral  duties. 
All  other  education  or  culture  is  merely  a  preparation  for 
philosophy.3 

These  expressions  of  Plato  are  sufficiently  vague  and  shifting ; 
yet  they  clearly  suggest  all  four  of  the  most  important  factors 
in  the  true  conception  of  philosophy.  Two  of  them,  at  least,  are 
to  be  distinguished  even  previous  to  the  Platonic  writings.  One 
of  these  is  the  recognition  of  the  profound  and  noble  impulse 
from  which  springs  the  movement  of  philosophical  thought. 
The  truth  is  indeed  expressed  by  Plato  in  figures  of  speech,  but 
it  is  unmistakably  expressed.  What  is  only  sensuous  as  an 
object,  and  uncertain  opinion  as  a  method,  does  not  satisfy  the 
rational  nature  of  man.  He  longs,  sometimes  with  the  en- 
thusiasm of  the  lover  for  his  mistress,  for  communion  with 
the  Ideas,  —  with  the  eternal  verity  and  real  Being  which 
they  are. 

The  world  has  grown  old  since  Plato's  time,  and  some  would 
have  us  believe  that  the  passionate  but  rational  impulse  to 
which  he  appealed  has  become  obsolete.  But  the  philosophic 
impulse  still  exists,  as  vigorous  and  effective  as  ever,  for  its 
seat  is  the  rational  human  soul ;  and  until  it  fails,  philosophy 

l  Theietet.,  143  d.  2  Symp.,  211  d;  Phsedr.,  246-256. 

8  Rep.,  vii.  514-521  c  ;  540  a  and  b. 


DEFINITION   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  9 

will  not  fail  to  have  its  devotees  and  to  fulfil  its  mission  in  the 
evolution  of  mind.  Unlike  any  of  the  particular  sciences,  it  is 
of  the  very  nature  of  philosophy  to  exist  with  man.  If  there 
were  no  shells,  there  would  be  no  science  of  conchology ;  if 
there  were  no  insects,  no  entomology ;  if  there  were  no  precious 
metals,  the  science  of  political  economy  would  undergo  a  great 
change.  But  wherever  finite  reason  is,  there  philosophy  as 
a  pursuit  and  discipline  must  arise,  and  run  a  course  of 
development. 

Another  factor  made  prominent  by  Plato  in  his  inchoate 
conception  may  be  thus  stated :  Philosophy  is  a  special  and 
peculiarly  certain  knowledge  of  reality.  Whatever  in  each  case 
is  the  really  existent,  upon  that  is  the  affection  of  the  philoso- 
pher set.  Whatever  is  eternal  and  immutable,  this  constitutes 
the  object  which  he  strives  to  grasp  and  hold.  The  most  hardy 
Realist  of  the  present  age  does  not  venture  to  re-establish,  in 
their  ancient  Platonic  form,  the  kingdom  of  Ideas.  And  not  a 
few  students  of  the  particular  sciences  would  have  us  believe 
that  to-day,  at  least,  knowledge  can  flourish  and  justify  itself  at 
the  bar  of  Reason  without  reference  to  metaphysical  reality.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  these  sciences  may  be  successfully  pur- 
sued without  bringing  to  the  front  the  problems  with  which 
philosophy  deals.  Yet  each  of  the  greater  divisions  of  sci- 
ence will  always  have  its  own  peculiar  metaphysical  assump- 
tions ;  and  the  thought  that  somehow  philosophy  includes  the 
search  after,  and  the  certification  of,  a  higher  and  more  compre- 
hensive Reality,  still  furnishes  an  essential  factor  in  the  defini- 
tion of  philosophy.  This  factor  certainly  entered  into  the 
Platonic  conception. 

Another  noteworthy  element  in  Plato's  definition  of  philoso- 
phy is  emphasized  whenever  he  brings  this  discipline  into  rela- 
tion with  character  and  with  the  life  of  conduct.  The  wisdom 
in  which  it  consists  is  not,  indeed,  primarily  and  chiefly  a  matter 
of  character  and  conduct.  Plato  identifies  it  (crocpla)  with 
true  and  certain  knowledge  (iTricrTrj/j,r)),  rather  than  with  dis- 


10  INTRODUCTORY. 

position  or  sound  judgment  in  practical  affairs  (awtypocrvvr)).1 
Later  we  come  upon  the  definition  of  Cicero,  which  identifies  it 
with  that  wisdom  which  is  a  knowledge  of  human  and  divine 
affairs.2  And  yet  with  Plato  neither  the  method  nor  the  con- 
clusions of  philosophy  can  be  separated  from  practical  life.  For 
its  successful  pursuit  a  right  disposition  is  indispensable ;  when 
successfully  pursued,  it  is  a  chief  and  only  effectual  means  of 
cultivating  a  right  disposition.  To  philosophic  insight  Plato, 
especially  in  all  his  earlier  writings,  refers  the  whole  round  of 
human  virtues.  This  close  connection  between  philosophical 
inquiry  and  the  life  of  character  and  conduct  remains,  in  spite 
of  all  impressions  to  the  contrary,  until  the  present  time.  It 
will  always  endure ;  for  it  belongs  to  the  very  nature  of  phi- 
losophy, as  issuing  from  its  sources  in  the  soul  of  man. 

The  fourth  factor  in  the  conception  of  philosophy,  implicitly 
but  insufficiently  recognized  by  Plato,  is  its  dependence  upon 
the  particular  sciences.  Between  them  and  it  he  does  not 
clearly  distinguish ;  and,  indeed,  this  distinction  was  not  clearly 
made  by  any  writer  until  centuries  after  the  time  of  Plato. 
But  the  double  sense  in  which  the  Greek  master  and  his 
followers  employ  the  word,  recognizes  both  the  fact  of  a  dis- 
tinction and  the  fact  of  the  reciprocal  dependence  of  these 
two  forms  of  knowledge. 

With  Aristotle  philosophy  (cf)i\oao(f)ia,  and  sometimes  aocfiia) 
was  identified  with  science  in  general ;  in  its  most  comprehen- 
sive meaning  it  included  things  so  diverse  as  mathematics  and 
physics,  ethics  and  politics.3  The  "philosophies,"  or  philosophi- 
cal sciences,  of  mathematics,  physics,  and  theology,  were  called 
theoretical.4  But  these  sciences  were, .  after  all,  not  placed 
upon  precisely  the  same  footing  with  philosophy  proper,  in 
the  thought  and  definitions  of  this  writer.     There  is  a  "  First 

1  Comp.  Lichtenfels,  Lehrbuch  zur  Einleitung  ill  die  Philosophie,  p.  6  f. 

2  Philosophia  est  studium  sapientise  ;  sapientia  vero  est  scientia  rerum  huma- 
narum  atque  divinarum. 

3  Metaph.,  v.  1  1026  a. 

4  Metaph.,  ibid. ;  comp.  Ethic.  Nicomach. ,  i.  4  1096  b  31. 


DEFINITION   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  H 

Philosophy"  (ttpcott)  <f)i\oao(f)ta),  and  the  knowledge  of  this 
is  the  distinguishing  pursuit  of  the  philosopher.1  This  pre- 
eminently philosophical  science  is  the  systematic  and  critical 
knowledge  of  the  most  general  and  fundamental  principles  of 
Being,  —  the  science  of  Being,  as  such  (to  bv  y  6v),  and  not 
of  any  particular  kind  or  department  of  existences.2  In  brief, 
it  is  what  many  would  now  call  "metaphysics,"  or  "ontology." 
In  contrast  with  this,  the  special  sciences  are  to  be  considered 
only  partial. 

It  is  obvious  that  two  of  the  four  important  factors  of  the 
Platonic  conception  have  been  made  more  prominent  in  the 
definitions  of  Aristotle.  Philosophy  has  especially  to  do  with 
the  fundamental  principles  of  all  Eeality ;  its  object  of  search 
is  more  general  than  that  of  any  of  the  particular  sciences, 
not  even  excepting  theology.  As  compared  with  any  of  these 
sciences,  it  is  universal,  first,  pre-eminent.  It  therefore  involves 
some  special  knowledge  of  the  really  true  and  the  really  exis- 
tent. As  Paulsen  says:  "Aristotle  indeed  thinks  he  philoso- 
phizes when  he  investigates  the  natural  history  of  animals,  or 
household  economy ; "  but  Aristotle  does  not  consider  such 
investigation  as  constituting  philosophy  in  the  highest  and 
peculiar  meaning  of  the  term. 

And  yet  —  so  the  vacillation  of  the  great  Greek  in  his  two- 
fold use  of  the  term  seems  to  say  —  philosophy  and  the  par- 
ticular sciences  are  intimately  interdependent.  Moreover,  as 
to  subject-matter  they  must  cover  a  common  ground ;  for 
Aristotle  admits  no  real  kingdom  of  an  ideal  order  existing 
apart  from  the  individual  and  concrete  realities  with  which 
the  particular  sciences  deal.  Philosophy  must  also  follow 
scientific  method ;  it  must  be  systematic,  comprehensive,  and 
yet  kept  constantly  in  toucli  with  concrete  realities. 

After  Aristotle,  until  comparatively  recent  times,  little  or 
no  advance  was  made  in  the  definition  of  philosophy.      The 

i  Metaph.,  v.  1,  1026  a  24  and  30  ;  iii.  3,  1005  a  21. 
2  Ibid.,  v.  1,  1026  a  31;  comp.  x.  3  1060  b  31. 


12  INTRODUCTORY. 

movement  of  thought  was  in  this  regard  rather  retrograde. 
The  boundary  which  Plato  began  to  draw  when  he  distin- 
guished the  doctrine  of  the  Ideas  from  other  forms  of  knowl- 
edge,  and  which  Aristotle  made  clearer  when  he  distinguished 
"  first  philosophy "  from  the  other  philosophies  and  sciences, 
was  again  obscured  by  the  Stoics.  By  philosophy  they  under- 
stood all  forms  of  theoretical  knowledge,  together  with  its 
relations  to  conduct  and  to  practical  morality.  The  Epi- 
cureans also  emphasized  this  aspect  and  application  of  phi- 
losophy, to  the  exclusion  of  other  factors  in  its  conception. 
With  Seneca  philosophy  is  the  "  love  of  wisdom "  (sapientice 
amor),  or  the  "  zealous  pursuit  of  virtue "  (studium  virtutis) 
through  virtue  itself.1  Epicurus  himself  is  said  to  have  iden- 
tified philosophy  with  "  the  rational  pursuit  of  happiness." 2 
Still  later,  under  the  Neo-Platonists,  the  name  became  sy- 
nonymous with  the  esoteric  wisdom  of  sacred  myth  and  the- 
ological poetry.  Under  early  Christianity  the  monks  came 
to  be  called  philosophers,  and  the  doctrines  of  the  Church 
a  philosophy. 

The  indefiniteness  of  the  term  among  the  Greeks  and  their 
somewhat  degenerate  successors  shows  —  as  says  Zeller  —  that 
the  thing  itself  had  scarcely  yet  appeared  as  "  a  specific  form 
of  intellectual  life."  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that 
this  lack  of  definiteness  was  chiefly  due  to  a  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish philosophy  from  the  particular  sciences.  But  the 
conception  of  "  science  "  also  was  never  clearly  formed  in  the 
Greek  mind.  It  was  indeed  rather  foreign  to  their  stage  of 
intellectual  development.  So  true  is  this,  that  during  all  the 
Greek  period  the  conception  of  philosophy,  as  respects  com- 
prehensiveness and  accuracy,  was  rather  in  advance  of  the 
conception  of  science.  Aristotle  was,  indeed,  a  real  founder 
of  logic,  psychology,  ethics,  and  aesthetics ;  but  it  was  only 
in   the  Alexandrian  period  that  some  of  the  other  particular 

1  Epist.,  89,  3  and  7. 

2  Sext.  Empir.  Adv.  Math.,  xi.  169. 


DEFINITION   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  13 

sciences  attained  to  the  dignity  of  an  independent  cultiva- 
tion.1 Previously  they  had  all  been  included  in  the  vague  term 
philosophy.  It  was  centuries  after  this  period,  however,  before 
the  conception  of  science  was  developed. 

It  would  be  of  little  service  to  our  purpose  to  trace  in 
detail  the  history  of  the  term  "  philosophy  "  from  the  post- Aris- 
totelian period  down  to  the  time  of  Kant.  The  Schoolmen 
did  little  more  than  repeat  what  had  been  said  by  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  Descartes  and  his  followers,  so  far  as  they  make 
any  attempt  at  definition,  do  not  escape  the  confusion  in- 
volved in  cultivating,  not  only  psychology,  but  also  physics 
and  biology,  under  the  term  "  philosophy."  The  three  principal 
works  of  Descartes  himself  are  a  mixture  of  considerations 
which  would  now  be  ascribed  to  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
to  theology,  and  to  physics.  Spinoza's  works  made  an  influ- 
ential contribution  to  the  speculative  treatment  of  the  highest 
philosophical  themes ;  but  their  author  does  nothing  to  dis- 
tinguish philosophy  from  the  particular  sciences.  The  belief, 
which  was  fundamental  with  Leibnitz,  compelled  him  every- 
where to  unite  the  theological  with  the  mechanical  view  of 
the  universe.  Philosophy  is  therefore  the  result  of  a  specu- 
lative union  of  two  corresponding  sets  of  ideas ;  but  its  nature 
and  scope  are  nowhere  clearly  defined.  The  school  of  Leib- 
nitz as  a  distinct  development  culminated  with  the  writings 
of  Christian  Wolff.  This  philosopher  advocates  a  conception 
of  philosophy  wider,  but  less  definite  and  satisfactory,  than 
that  of  Aristotle.  It  is  "  such  knowledge  of  those  things  that 
are,  or  happen,  as  enables  us  to  understand  why  they  are  or. 
happen  ; "  or  it  is  "  the  knowledge  of  things  possible,  in  as 
far  as  they  are  possible." 2 

By  Locke,  and  most  of  the  writers  in  England  who  sprung 
from  the  movement  he  originated,  psychology  and  the  theory 
of  knowledge  were  identified  with  philosophy.      The   aim  of 

1  See  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Philosophy,  p.  6. 

2  Philos.  Ration.,  Disc.  Praelim.,  §§  4,  6,  and  29. 


14  INTRODUCTORY. 

his  philosophical  treatise,  "Essay  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing," he  defines  (i.  1,  2,  and  3)  as  the  inquiry  "  into  the 
original,  certainty,  and  extent  of  human  knowledge,  together 
with  the  grounds  and  degrees  of  belief,  opinion,  and  assent." 
But  in  the  same  treatise  Locke  also  calls  physics  —  that  is, 
"  the  knowledge  of  things  as  they  are  in  their  own  proper 
beings,  their  constitutions,  properties,  and  operations "  —  by 
the  term  "  natural  philosophy."  Elsewhere  he  pronounces 
philosophy  nothing  but  the  true  knowledge  of  things.  The 
followers  of  Newton  and  Bacon  emphasized,  not  only  specu- 
lative, but  experimental,  physics  as  philosophy  pre-eminently. 
The  former  indeed  uttered  the  warning,  "  Beware  of  meta- 
physics ; "  but  himself  made  large  use  of  metaphysics,  and 
did  much  to  fix  the  subsequent  vague  use  of  the  term  phi- 
losophy by  calling  his  great  work  "  Philosophise  Naturalis 
Principia  Mathematica."  Hobbes  defines  philosophy  as  the 
knowledge  of  effects  or  phenomena  by  their  causes,  and  of 
causes  from  their  observed  effects,  by  means  of  legitimate  in- 
ferences. Thus  is  philosophy  again  identified  with  the  whole 
round  of  the  sciences.  In  Hobbes's  opinion  philosophy  has 
to  do  only  with  bodies,  natural  and  political ;  it  therefore 
comprises  only  the  two  divisions  corresponding  to  these  terms. 
Yet  a  prima  philosophia  is  in  some  sort  recognized,  which  is 
nothing  more  than  a  mixture  of  definitions  of  the  more  fun- 
damental conceptions. 

Until  the  present  time  the  same  confusion  of  philosophy 
with  the  particular  sciences  —  even  with  physics,  but  espe- 
cially with  psychology  —  has  prevailed  among  English  writers. 
Only  recently  has  much  skilled  effort  been  expended  upon 
the  necessary  distinctions.  In  a  note  to  his  "  Encyclopaedia," 
Hegel  remarks  upon  the  use  of  the  word  in  England  in  his 
own  time.  "Among  the  advertisements  of  books  just  pub- 
lished," says  he,  "I  lately  found  the  following  notice  in  an 
English  newspaper :  '  The  Art  of  Preserving  the  Hair,  on 
Philosophical    Principles,   neatly   printed    in    post   8vo,   price 


DEFINITION   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  15 

seven  shillings.'  "  l  Hegel  adds  the  remark,  —  is  it  with  pure 
sarcasm,  or  refreshing  naivete?  —  "By  philosophical  principles 
for  preserving  the  hair  are  probably  meant  chemical  or  physio- 
logical principles."  Surely,  "  thought,  and  not  a  mere  combi- 
nation of  wood,  iron,  etc.,  ought  to  be  called  the  instrument 
of  philosophy,"  says  he,  in  commenting  upon  the  practice  of 
calling  physical  apparatus  by  the  title  "philosophical."  But 
to-day  England  abounds  in  books,  pamphlets,  journals,  on 
special  topics  in  experimental  physics,  that  bear  the  same 
inappropriate  title, —  not  to  speak  of  uncouth  and  newfangled 
toys. 

Nor  has  this  country  been  free  from  a  confusion  of  thought 
scarcely  less  great  than  that  which  has  maintained  itself  in 
England.  If  the  confusion  be  in  any  degree  less,  it  is  because 
the  pursuit  of  both  science  and  philosophy,  and  the  institutions 
connected  therewith,  are  more  recent  here.  They  have  there- 
fore derived  somewhat  more  benefit  from  the  recent  attempts, 
especially  since  the  time  of  Kant  in  Germany,  to  distinguish 
between  the  two. 

The  precise  limitation  of  the  province  of  philosophy  was 
undertaken  by  Kant.  In  his  remarks  upon  the  "Architec- 
tonic of  Pure  Eeason "  this  thinker  defines  the  discipline 
which  was  his  pursuit  in  life.2  All  knowledge,  considered 
from  the  subjective  point  of  view,  is  either  historical  or  ra- 
tional :  the  former  sets  out  from  empirical  data ;  the  latter 
from  principles  (cognitio  ex  principiis).  Now,  again,  of  this 
rational  knowledge,  one  kind  is  based  on  concepts ;  the  other 
is  based  on  the  construction  of  concepts.  The  former  alone 
is  philosophical ;  the  latter  is  mathematical.  Thus  does  Kant, 
with  two  strokes,  mark  out  the  domain  of  philosophy,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  empirical  sciences  on  the  one  hand,  and 
on   the   other   from   pure    mathematics.      The  "  system   of  all 

1  Encyclopedic  der  philosophischen  Wissenschaf'ten  im  Grundrisse,  Heidelberg, 
1827,  p.  11. 

2  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Miiller's  Translation,  ii.  714  f. 


16  INTRODUCTORY. 

philosophical  knowledge  "  (i.  c,  knowledge  starting  from  rational 
principles  and  based  on  concepts)  is  called  "  philosophy."  So 
far  the  concept  of  philosophy  is  Scholastic,  —  "  one  of  the 
many  crafts  intended  for  many  objects." 

As  related  to  the  ends  of  reason,  moral  philosophy,  which 
concerns  itself  with  the  whole  destination  of  man,  and  aims 
at  the  perfect  systematical  unity  of  reason,  stands  highest.  In 
its  "  cosmical "  concept,  as  something  that  must  be  of  interest 
to  everybody,  philosophy  is  "  the  science  of  the  relation  of  all 
knowledge  to  the  essential  aims  of  human  reason." 

As  regards  the  objects  of  philosophy,  it  may  be  divided  into 
two  branches,  —  the  philosophy  of  nature,  which  relates  to  all 
that  is;  the  philosophy  of  morals,  which  relates  to  all  that 
ought  to  be.  As  regards  its  method,  it  may  be  either  pure  or 
empirical.  Pure  philosophy  is  either  critical,  and  "  inquires 
into  the  faculties  of  reason  with  regard  to  all  pure  knowledge 
a  priori ;  "  or  it  is  metaphysic,  and  "  comprehends  in  systemat- 
ical connection  the  whole  of  philosophical  knowledge."  Meta- 
physic is  either  speculative  use  of  pure  reason  (the  "  metaphysic 
of  nature ") ;  or  it  is  practical  (the  "  metaphysic  of  morals  "), 
and  contains  the  principles  which  a  priori  determine  and  neces- 
sitate all  doing  and  not  doing. 

It  is  therefore  obvious  that  Kant  distinctly  separates  philoso- 
phy from  all  the  positive  sciences,  including  descriptive  psy- 
chology, logic,  and  psychological  ethics ;  and  that  he  identifies 
it  with  metaphysics,  in  the  more  extended  use  of  the  latter 
term.  With  Kant,  criticism  of  reason  is  metaphysical,  and 
metaphysics  is  but  the  enumeration  and  systematic  arrange- 
ment of  the  conceptions  which  have  already  been  sifted  out 
of  experience  by  the  process  of  metaphysical  critique.  Both 
his  definitions  and  his  practice  introduce  a  new  era  in  the  con- 
ception of  philosophy.  This  fact,  however,  is  not  due  simply 
to  his  consistent  attempt  to  establish  some  line  of  demarcation 
between  philosophy  and  the  particular  sciences.  It  is  also  due 
to  the  prominence  he  gave  to  a  new  factor  in  the  conception, 


DEFINITION   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  17 

and  accordingly  to  a  new  division  of  philosophical  discipline. 
With  Kant  philosophy  becomes  pre-eminently  man's  rational 
se//-knowledge. 

The  new  department  of  philosophy  brought  into  prominence 
by  Kant  we  may  call  "Theory  of  Knowledge"  (Noetics,  Episte- 
mology,  Erkenntnisslehre,  Wissenschaflslehre) ;  it  is  the  critical 
investigation  of  man's  power  to  reach  that  which  philosophy 
had,  previously  —  as  he  thought  —  uncritically  assumed  to 
impart ;  namely,  the  certified  cognition  of  reality.  With 
him  this  critical  investigation  of  reason,  both  as  a  process  and 
as  a  summary  of  results,  constitutes  the  very  essence  of  philo- 
sophy. It  is  because  of  their  involvement,  as  it  were,  in  pure 
reason  as  Ideals  that  the  great  themes  of  God,  Freedom,  and 
Immortality  are  objects  of  philosophical  investigation,  by  the 
critical  method,  in  the  Kantian  system. 

With  Kant  the  present  era  of  philosophy  began ;  and  with 
him  was  completed  the  entire  round  of  attempts  to  survey  the 
domain  of  philosophy.  No  other  important  factors  in  its  con- 
ception remain  to  be  introduced.  As  an  object  of  pursuit  it 
may  be  said  to  have  attained  to  a  clear  self-consciousness.  In- 
deed, the  essential  factors  in  the  true  conception  have  been,  for 
centuries,  at  least  obscurely  indicated.  But  in  the  Kantian 
system  they  are  distinctly  recognized  and  expressed. 

The  failure  of  the  authorities  of  the  last  century  to  agree  in 
their  conception  of  the  nature  of  philosophy  has  not,  then,  been 
chiefly  due  to  ignorance.  It  has  rather  been  due  to  bias  from 
the  existing  philosophical  systems.  The  philosophical  tenets  of 
each  writer  on  philosophy  have  been  too  much  made  a  part  of 
his  definition  of  philosophy.  The  very  nature  of  philosophy 
—  since  it  is  held  to  be  concerned,  in  some  special  manner, 
with  ultimate  Eeality  —  tends  toward  this  result.  But  the 
answer  to  our  inquiry,  What  is  philosophy  ?  must  not  be  made 
dependent  upon  our  tenets  concerning  what  the  true  philo- 
sophical system  ought  to  be. 

The  temptation  to  incorporate  into  one's  definition  of  philos- 

2 


18  INTRODUCTORY. 

ophy  one's  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  Reality, 
and  as  to  the  possibility  of  knowledge  of  such  Eeality,  will 
always  exist.  These  conclusions  are  the  tenets  on  which  the 
different  schools  of  thinkers  are  divided.  It  is  not  strange, 
therefore,  that  these  schools  hold  different  conceptions  as  to 
the  nature  of  philosophy.  And  yet  we  cannot  think  that  the 
previous  wide  differences  with  respect  to  the  domain  common 
to  all  schools  need  continue  to  exist.  What  is  required  for  a 
true  definition  is  that  it  shall  include  all  the  permanent  his- 
torical factors  corresponding  to  the  term  "  philosophy."  In 
this  way  alone  can  we  place  our  conception  on  objective  and 
abiding  grounds. 

The  definitions  of  philosophy  which  have  prevailed  since  the 
time  of  Kant  may  be  divided  into  four  classes.  Each  of  these 
classes  is  inclined  to  place  its  own  peculiar  and  exclusive  em- 
phasis upon  some  one  or  two,  only,  of  the  factors  necessary 
to  the  complete  and  true  conception. 

One  principal  form  of  the  modern  conceptions  of  philosophy 
has  continued  to  emphasize  the  factors  rendered  most  promi- 
nent by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  This  makes  the  essence  of  phi- 
losophy consist  in  the  special  and  profound  knowledge  which  it 
furnishes  of  the  really  Existent,  of  that  Being  which  has  reality 
indeed.  Such  knowledge  may  well  seem  to  have  a  somewhat 
esoteric  character;  at  any  rate,  it  is  pre-eminently  rational 
knowledge.  But  all  the  objects  of  the  particular  sciences  are 
also  regarded  —  however  uncritically  —  as  concrete  real  exis- 
tences. If,  then,  philosophy  is  to  be  distinguished  from  these 
sciences,  the  Eeality  with  which  it  concerns  itself  must  be  in 
some  way  distinguished  from  those  concrete  realities  with  which 
the  particular  sciences  are  concerned.  In  Plato's  thought,  this 
Eeality  —  alone  worthy  the  name  —  was  regarded  as  the  or- 
derly system  of  Ideas ;  in  the  thought  of  Aristotle,  philosophy 
was  the  science  of  the  most  fundamental  forms  of  all  being, 
—  of  Being  as  such.  The  corresponding  modern  conception  of 
philosophy  emphasizes  especially  its  metaphysical  content ;  it 


DEFINITION   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  19 

even  identifies  philosophy  with  an  ontological  metaphysics. 
Philosophy,  from  this  point  of  view,  may  be  defined  as  the  sys- 
tematic knowledge  of  supersensible  reality,  or  of  the  supreme 
Eeality. 

Under  this  same  general  conception  of  philosophy,  several 
of  the  great  systems  and  schools  alike  readily  fall.  Idealism, 
Eealism,  and  Dualism,  disagree  fundamentally  in  the  conclu- 
sions they  advocate  respecting  the  nature  of  the  Eeality  which 
philosophy  seeks ;  but  they  may  agree  in  defining  the  sphere  of 
search.  Matter,  Force,  "  the  Idea,"  Will,  "  the  Unconscious," 
the  "  Absolute  Ego,"  or  Personal  Absolute,  "  whom  faith  calls 
God,"  are  identified  by  different  systems  with  the  One  Eeality, 
supersensible  and  ultimate,  which  all  alike  seek. 

In  his  "  Encyclopaedia  "  1  Hegel,  while  denying  that  it  is  pos- 
sible "  to  give  in  a  preliminary  way  a  general  conception  of 
philosophy,"  defines  it,  with  reference  to  his  own  system,  as 
the  "  science  of  the  Idea."  Logic,  which  is  Hegel's  prima  plii- 
losophia,  is  the  "  science  of  the  Absolute  Idea."  Even  in  the 
philosophy  of  nature  (of  so-called  material  reality)  nothing 
else  is  to  be  discerned  except  the  "  Idea ; "  and  all  philosoph- 
ical discipline  is  to  be  conducted  on  the  assumption  that  this 
Idea  and  all  real  Being  is  identical.  For  Eeason  is  the  sub- 
stance of  the  universe,  and  the  Absolute  Idea  is  the  identity 
of  the  theoretical  and  the  practical.2 

Schleiermacher,  too,  found  the  true  sphere  of  philosophy  in 
the  idea  of  the  highest  unity  of  physical  and  ethical  knowl- 
edge, —  while  demanding  a  realism  that  shall  consider  each 
finite  thing  as  a  manifestation  of  the  eternal,  and  claiming  that 
speculative  thinking  is  reason's  highest  objective  function.  In 
the  mind  of  this  quickening  thinker,  philosophy  is  the  specu- 
lative activity  of  human  reason  directed  toward  the  transcendent 


1  Encyclopadie   der  philosophischen  Wissenschaften  im   Grundrisse,    p.   25  : 
Wallace's  Translation,  The  Logic  of  Hegel,  p.  23. 

2  See  Philosophy  of  History  (Translation,  London,  1884,  pp.  9  f. ),  and  Werke, 
(Berlin,  1841)  :  Logik,  zweiter  Theil,  p.  :'.17. 


20  INTRODUCTORY. 

"  Ground "  of  all  existences.1  So  does  a  modern  exponent  of 
his  views  define  philosophy  as  that  fundamental  science  whose 
form  is  pure  reflective  thinking,  but  whose  content  is  the  to- 
tality of  being  as  related  to  its  ultimate  "Ground,"  —  to  the 
Absolute. 

With  essentially  the  same  view  of  the  nature  of  philosophy 
Trendelenburg  defines  it  as  the  "  science  of  the  Idea ;  "  while 
another  writer  (Lichtenfels)  would  start  the  discussion  of  its 
nature  with  the  distinction  between  the  supersensible  and  the 
sensuously  real,  and  thus  make  philosophy  the  rational  knowl- 
edge of  supersensible  Reality.  "  Philosophy,"  says  Schmid, 
"is  the  rational  science  of  reality."  What  is  philosophy?  It 
is,  says  yet  another  writer,  "  the  science  of  the  supreme  and 
most  important  realities." 

Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann  also,  although  differing  funda- 
mentally from  the  authorities  just  quoted,  in  respect  to  their 
solution  of  the  great  problems  of  philosophy,  virtually  agree 
with  them  in  identifying  it  with  ontological  metaphysics.  The 
question  which  the  former  aims,  by  his  entire  system,  to  answer, 
may  be  stated  thus  :  What,  besides  idea,  is  the  World  ?  Scho- 
penhauer's answer  to  the  question  is  :  The  World  is  also  "  thing- 
in-itself,"  a  supersensible  and  superintelligible  reality ;  and, 
as  such,  it  is  Will.  In  its  positive  and  constructive  part,  the 
entire  philosophical  system  of  Hartmann  is  identical  with  the 
"metaphysics  of  the  Unconscious,"  —  namely,  of  the  ultimate 
and  supreme  Reality,  which  is  Will  and  Idea. 

This  conception  of  philosophy,  however,  is  apt  to  be  defec- 
tive in  certain  important  particulars  ;  and  these  are  the  partic- 
ulars most  emphasized  by  definitions  of  the  other  three  classes. 
Especially  does  it  fail  to  consider  sufficiently  the  important 
critical  work  of  reason  with  itself,  and  the  resulting  progress 
of  rational  self-knowledge.  Neither  does  it,  as  a  rule,  suffi- 
ciently regard  the  dependence  of  philosophy  upon  the  partic- 
ular sciences. 

1  See  his  Dialektik  ;  Reden  iiber  die  Religion  ;  and  Vertraute  Briefe. 


DEFINITION    OF  PHILOSOPHY.  21 

But  the  antiquity  of  this  conception,  which  identifies  philoso- 
phy with  some  special  knowledge  of  ultimate  Eeality,  and  its 
persistent  character  before  the  assaults  of  criticism  and  scep- 
ticism, furnish  a  preliminary  warrant  in  its  favor.  The  con- 
clusion derived  from  an  unbiassed  estimate  of  modern  views 
confirms  that  derived  from  an  historical  study  of  the  develop- 
ment of  philosophy,  beginning  with  the  conception  of  Plato. 
As  long  as  man  aspires  to  know,  with  a  rational  completeness, 
what  is  the  ultimate  content  of  human  experience,  there  will 
be  a  so-called  science  of  Being.  We  find  here,  then,  an  essen- 
tial truth  as  to  the  unchanging  nature  of  philosophy. 

The  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  "  turned  the  thought  of  men 
to  a  neglected  aspect  of  the  human  mind ;  it  resulted,  as  has 
been  shown,  in  bringing  into  prominence  a  new  department 
of  philosophy.  With  Kant  himself  this  self-criticism  of  reason 
was  the  greater  part  of  philosophical  discipline.  Metaphysics, 
he  holds,  can  only  exhibit  the  system  of  conceptions  which  the 
critical  process  discovers  ;  metaphysics,  as  a  pure  ontological 
science,  cannot  exist.  Tt  is  this  critical  conclusion  which  is 
emphasized  by  the  second  class  of  definitions  of  philosophy. 
This  definition  identifies  philosophy  with  the  science  of  rational 
knowledge  itself ;  it  is  "  science  of  science,"  science  of  notions, 
or  theory  of  knowledge.  It  may  also  be  called  rational  self- 
knowledge,  or  science  of  the  ultimate  contents  of  consciousness. 

Of  Fichte,  who  is  the  principal  representative  of  this  concep- 
tion, Professor  Adamson  has  truly  said :  "  Philosophy  is  to  him 
the  re-thinking  of  actual  cognition,  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
the  complete  systematic  exposition  of  the  principles  which  lie 
at  the  basis  of  all  reasoned  cognition."  "This  science,"  says 
Fichte  himself,  "can  be  nothing  but  the  universal  knowledge, 
which  has  come  to  know  of  itself,  and  has  entered  a  state 
of  light,  consciousness,  and  independence  in  regard  to  itself." * 
It   is  well  known  that  Herbart  also  made  the  distinct  func- 

1  New  Exposition  of  the  Science  of  Knowledge.  Translation  by  A.  E.  Kroger, 
St.  Louis,  1869,  p.  7. 


22  INTRODUCTORY. 

tion  of  philosophy  to  be  the  elaboration  of  concepts  {Bear- 
leitung  der  Begriffe).  Following  in  the  same  line  of  definition, 
we  find  one  author l  (Eiehl)  declaring  that  philosophy  began 
with  Locke,  and  that  it  is  the  science  and  criticism  of  cogni- 
tion ;  another  (Biedermann)  speaking  of  the  whole  system  of 
philosophical  discipline  as  the  "  science  of  the  notion ; "  and 
yet  a  third  describing  it  as  the  science  which  has  for  its  object 
of  examination  the  function  of  thinking  itself.  By  all  these 
writers  the  criticism  of  the  processes  and  presuppositions  of  all 
thinking  is  made  identical  with  philosophy. 

Essentially  the  same  conception  of  philosophy  controls  the 
consideration  of  philosophical  themes  in  the  case  of  two  other 
suggestive  modern  writers.  "  Philosophy  calls  itself,"  says  Kuno 
Fischer,  "  knowledge  of  the  Universe  ( Weltweisheit) ; "  but  "  we 
call  it  self-knowledge."  For  the  wTorld  is  our  object,  our  presen- 
tation; "We  ourselves  are  the  world."2  This  conception  must 
be  modified,  however,  by  introducing  the  principle  of  develop- 
ment. For  all  the  concepts  with  which  philosophy  deals,  and 
the  concept  of  philosophy  itself,  are  developments.  Nay,  more, 
"  This  process  of  progressing  development  is  the  human  mind." 
Philosophy,  therefore,  is  the  progressive  self-knowledge  of  the 
human  mind. 

It  might  be  expected  that  intelligent  advocates  of  a  similar 
view  would  arise  in  England,  where,  since  the  time  of  Locke, 
philosophy  has  been  so  constantly  identified  with  the  theory  of 
knowledge.  Mr.  Shadworth  IT.  Hodgson,  in  his  "  Philosophy  of 
Eeflection,"  takes  great  pains  clearly  to  distinguish  philosophy 
from  psychology ;  and  would  also  make  the  former  include  a 
theory  of  Being,  or  Existence.  Philosophy  he  defines,  in  "  con- 
tradistinction to  Psychological  Science,"  as  "  the  ultimate  analy- 
sis of  states  of  consciousness  in  connection  with  their  objective 
aspects,  abstracting  from   their   conditions   in  the  organism." 3 

1  Philosophischer  Kriticismus,  ii.  2,  p.  15;  comp.  ii.  1,  pp.  2f. 

2  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  Introduction,  chap.  i. 

3  See  especially  the  chapter  on  "  Philosophy  and  Science,"  vol.  i. 


DEFINITION   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  23 

In  its  analytic  branch,  therefore,  —  and  with  Mr.  Hodgson  this 
seems  its  main  branch,  —  it  is  an  analysis  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness. Even  in  its  constructive  branch  it  is  a  "phi- 
losophized psychology,  or  the  return  of  Metaphysic  upon 
psychology." 

The  factors  in  philosophy  chiefly  emphasized  by  such  defi- 
nitions as  the  foregoing  cannot  safely  be  overlooked.  With- 
out recognition  of  them  no  fruitful  discussion  of  philosophical 
problems  is  possible,  much  less  any  attempt  at  a  system  of 
philosophy.  But  we  may  not  assume  in  our  very  definition 
that  the  criticism  of  rational  processes,  and  the  synthetic  rep- 
resentation of  the  conceptions  discovered  thereby,  cover  the 
whole  domain  of  speculative  thinking. 

Yet  more  comprehensive  definitions  of  philosophy  are  derived 
by  combining  these  two  sets  of  factors,  and  by  laying  a  more 
nearly  equal  emphasis  upon  both.  In  this  way  does  Zeller,  by 
a  study  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  arrive  at  the  following 
statement :  "  The  problem  of  philosophy  is  to  investigate  scien- 
tifically the  ultimate  grounds  of  Being  and  Knowledge,  and  to 
comprehend  all  that  is  actual  in  its  connection  with  them." x 
Dr.  E.  Pfleiderer  also,  after  defining  philosophy  as  "  the  science 
of  principles,"  remarks :  "  And  so,  one  of  its  chief  problems  is 
to  investigate  and  establish  the  fundamental  conditions,  pre- 
suppositions, and  norms  of  cognition,  —  of  scientific  activity  in 
general."2  The  view  of  Dr.  William  T.  Harris  should  prob- 
ably be  mentioned  in  this  connection.  "  Philosophy,"  says  this 
writer,  "attempts  to  find  the  necessary  a  priori  elements  or 
factors  in  experience,  and  arrange  them  into  a  system  by  de- 
ducing them  from  a  first  principle."  Von  Hartmann,  too,  with 
a  naive  contradiction  of  his  own  practice  in  the  "  Metaphysics 
of  the  Unconscious,"  expressly  declares :  "  The  theory  of  knowl- 
edge is  the  true  prima  philosophia."  3 

1  Grundriss  der  Gcschichte  der  Griechischen  Philosophic,  p.  1. 

2  Die  Aufgabc  dor  Philosophie  in  unserer  Zeit,  p.  8. 

8  Preface  to  the  eighth  edition  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious. 


24  INTRODUCTORY. 

Fearing  —  and  not  without  reason  —  that  the  conception  and 
practice  of  philosophy  may  separate  their  favorite  pursuit  too 
far  from  the  life  of  conduct,  the  advocates  of  a  third  view 
would  put  emphasis  upon  a  thought  as  old  as  Plato.  This 
thought  has  been  presented  somewhat  as  follows  by  a  modern 
writer.1  Philosophy  must  indeed  be  science,  as  defined  by  its 
form  and  method.  Thus  defined,  it  constitutes  the  only  means 
of  raising  all  our  most  important  opinions,  and  choicest  faiths, 
to  the  state  of  invincible  conviction.  But  if  philosophy  is  to 
be  defined  as  science,  then  it  must  be  not  as  a  science  of  mere 
thinking,  but  as  a  total  and  comprehensive  consciousness,  a 
science  of  the  whole  personality  and  of  all  that  stands  in  con- 
nection with  it,  —  that  is,  of  willing  and  acting,  of  disposition 
and  conduct  of  life.  It  is,  then,  a  living  effort,  a  striving  con- 
scious of  itself  and  of  its  goal,  a  determinate  form  of  willing. 
Philosophy,  according  to  form,  is  science  ;  and  according  to  its 
content,  is  wisdom  (  Wissenschuftlicher  Weisheitswille).  "  It  is 
the  self-conscious  effort  of  the  human  spirit  after  wisdom,  in 
order  to  actualize  the  truth." 

It  would  be  unhistorical  to  doubt  that  this  third  concep- 
tion of  philosophy  makes  prominent  an  ancient  and  important 
truth.  Tt  is  as  old  as  Plato,  and  it  was  taught  by  Kant.  In 
his  "  Preface  to  Jachmann's  Examination  of  the  Kantian  Phi- 
losophy of  Religion,"  Kant  himself  wrote  :  "  Philosophy  as  sci- 
entific theory  may,  like  every  other  discipline,  serve  as  an 
instrument  for  attaining  a  variety  of  excellent  ends,  but  has 
in  this  regard  only  a  relative  value.  But  philosophy,  in  the 
literal  meaning  of  the  word  as  a  doctrine  of  wisdom  ( Weisheits- 
lehre)  has  an  absolute  value ;  for  it  is  the  doctrine  of  the  final 
purpose  of  human  reason." 

By  all  means  let  it  never  be  forgotten  that  the  choicest  issue 
of  philosophy  is  not  merely  a  system  of  speculative  thinking, 
T)ut  the  production  also  of  conduct  and  character.     We  will, 

i. 

1  Chalybaus,  Fundamentalphilosophie,  ein  Versuch  das  System  der  Philosophic 
auf  ein  Realprincip  zu  grunden,  p,  5  f. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  25 

moreover,  follow  Kant  in  the  passage  just  quoted,  and  address 
the  man  who  in  himself  completely  meets  this  theoretical  de- 
mand, as  "the  perfect  practical  philosopher  (an  ideal)."  But 
we  cannot  consent  to  define  the  doctrine  solely  by  emphasiz- 
ing its  practical  aspect;  for  such  a  definition  fails  to  distin- 
guish philosophy,  as  such,  from  certain  branches  of  psychology 
and  ethics,  and  even  from  that  fund  of  sound  maxims  and  cor- 
rect moral  habits  which  the  so-called  "  wise  man  "  has  gathered 
from  the  experience  of  life. 

The  fourth  form  of  defining  philosophy  has  arisen  from  that 
modern  development  of  the  particular  sciences  to  which,  in  its 
influence  on  speculative  thinking,  reference  has  already  been 
made.  Philosophy,  say  its  advocates,  is  a  comprehensive  and 
systematic  view  of  all  the  particular  sciences  ;  it  is  not  so  much 
science  of  science,  or  certified  knowledge  as  such,  but  —  as  it 
were  —  science  of  all  the  sciences. 

The  dependence  of  philosophy  upon  the  particular  sciences 
was  emphasized  by  Auguste  Comte  in  such  manner  as  to 
amount  to  a  denial  that  it  has  any  domain  of  its  own.  The 
so-called  "  Positive  Philosophy,"  with  a  dogmatic  scepticism 
which  Kant  came  forever  to  condemn,  uncritically  excludes 
all  metaphysical  problems  as  insoluble.  In  his  "  Problems  of 
Life  and  Mind,"  Mr.  Lewes,  after  pronouncing  this  exclusion 
"  somewhat  arbitrary  and  injudicious,"  pleads  the  cause  of  a 
philosophy  which  is  metaphysics  detached  from,  and  not  dis- 
tributed among,  the  sciences  from  which  its  data  are  drawn. 
This  metaphysics,  which  is  the  sum-total  of  philosophy,  he  un- 
derstands to  be  a  "  codification  of  the  laws  of  Cause."  "  Its 
object  is  the  disengagement  of  certain  most  general  principles, 
such  as  Cause,  Force,  Life,  Mind,  etc.,  from  the  sciences  which 
imply  these  principles,  and  the  exposition  of  their  constituent 
elements,  —  the  facts,  sensible  and  logical,  which  these  prin- 
ciples involve,  and  the  relation  of  these  principles."1  That 
philosophical    theory   of    cognition    is   a   necessary   correlated 

1  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  *  pp.  67  f,  73  f. 


26  INTRODUCTORY. 

branch  of  inquiry,  this  writer  recognizes  —  though  not  very 
clearly  —  by  giving  to  metaphysics  the  title  "  Objective  Logic." 
In  this  meaning  of  the  word  "  philosophy  "  it  may  be  recognized 
as  "  a  possible  branch  of  science." 

With  much  firmer  grasp  and  clearer  vision  does  a  recent 
German  thinker  expound  and  defend  this  conception  of  phi- 
losophy as  a  science  of  all  the  positive  sciences.  Its  purpose, 
says  Wundt.1  is  to  be  found  in  the  attainment  of  such  a  sum- 
mary of  the  particular  cognitions,  in  our  view  of  the  world  and 
of  life,  as  shall  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  intellect  and  the 
needs  of  the  heart  (des  Gemuthes).  Philosophy  is,  then,  "the 
universal  science  which  has  to  unite  the  cognitions,  obtained 
by  the  particular  sciences,  into  a  consistent  system."  This  is 
scientific  philosophy  ;  and  its  divisions  are  to  be  determined  by 
the  general  scheme  of  the  positive  sciences. 

A  correct  conception  of  philosophy  must  undoubtedly  recog- 
nize its  dependence  for  development,  as  a  distinct  discipline, 
upon  the  particular  sciences.  For  its  best  growth  this  noblest 
child  of  reason  requires  not  only  to  be  kept  in  contact  with  all 
the  forces  that  sway  the  popular  life  of  feeling  and  conduct,  but 
also  to  be  trained  in  all  the  schools  where  certified  knowledge 
of  fact  and  law  controls,  where  method  is  strictly  limited,  and 
where  theory  is  constantly  recalled  to  the  test  of  experience. 
History  amply  demonstrates  this  necessity.  The  future  of 
philosophy  depends  upon  the  intelligent  and  consistent  recog- 
nition of  the  same  necessity. 

And  yet  philosophy  should  not  be  defined  solely  by  stating 
its  relation  of  dependence  upon  the  particular  sciences.  This 
would  involve  too  wide  a  departure  from  the  historical  point  of 
view.  Philosophy  was  cultivated,  and  the  most  essential  factors 
of  its  right  conception  recognized,  for  centuries  before  its  rela- 
tion to  the  particular  sciences  was  clearly  discerned.  The 
progress  of  its  history  shows  that  important  elements  in  its 
definition    and   important   developments   in   its    pursuit   exist 

1  System  der  Philosophie,  Leipzig,  1889,  pp.  2,  21  f. 


DEFINITION   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  27: 

apart  from  the  considerations   which  are   emphasized   by  the 
definitions  of  Lewes  and  Wundt. 

We  make,  then,  a  provisional  attempt  to  gather  into  a  single 
sentence  all  the  essential  truths  emphasized  in  the  preceding 
four  classes  of  conceptions.  The  relations  of  philosophy  to  the 
practical  life,  however,  can  be  only  indirectly  expressed  in  the 
definition,  through  its  relations  to  the  sciences  of  conduct,  —  to 
psychology,  ethics,  and  the  science  of  religion.  Philosophy  — 
we  define  to  be  - —  the  progressive  rational  system  of  the  prin- 
ciples presupposed  and  ascertained  by  the  particular  sciences,  in 
their  relation  to  ultimate  Reality. 

1.  Philosophy  treats  all  its  material  of  principles  with  a 
view  to  determine  their  relation  in  a  Unity  of  Reality  ;  it  seeks 
to  know  the  nature  of  this  One  ultimate  Reality,  if  such  reality 
there  be.     It  is  then  the  science  of  Being  as  such. 

2.  Philosophy  is  a  progressive  and  rational  system  of  those 
principles  assumed  or  taken  for  granted  in  the  particular  sci- 
ences. It  is  critical  of  all  the  pre-suppositions  of  each  form  of 
positive  knowledge.  It  is  itself  without  pre-suppositions,  be- 
sides the  self-conscious  existence  of  reason  as  an  unfolding  life. 
It  is  science  of  Knowledge,  as  such,  —  a  theory  of  cognition. 

3.  Inasmuch  as  there  are  sciences  which  consider  the  phe- 
nomena of  ethical,  sesthetical,  and  religious  life,  of  conduct, 
character,  social  relations,  religious  aspiration,  worship,  etc.  ; 
and  inasmuch  as  there  are  principles  presupposed  or  ascertained 
by  these  sciences  which  apparently  stand  in  a  peculiar  relation 
to  ultimate  Reality,  —  philosophy  involves  the  effort  to  actualize 
the  truth  of  these  sciences  in  wisdom.  It  "deals  with  those 
riddles  by  which  our  mind  is  oppressed  in  life ; "  it  is  practical, 
and  cannot  be  divorced  from  disposition,  faith,  hope,  and  ethical 
conviction. 

4.  But  philosophy  is  in  certain  aspects  strictly  dependent, 
for  its  legitimate  domain  and  successful  cultivation,  upon  sci- 
entific spirit  and  scientific  method ;  it  draws  from  and  deals 
with  the  whole  round  of   the   positive  sciences.      It  may  be 


28  INTRODUCTORY. 

defined  with  Ueberweg  as  "the  science  of  the  Universe,  not 
according  to  its  details,  but  according  to  the  principles  which 
condition  all  particulars ; "  or  as  the  science  of  the  principles 
of  what  is  knowable  by  means  of  the  special  sciences. 

This  definition  of  philosophy,  thus  justified  by  an  appeal  to 
the  history  of  the  term  and  to  the  different  classes  of  current 
conceptions,  will  serve  to  guide  our  subsequent  inquiries. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE   SOURCES    OF    PHILOSOPHY,    AND   ITS    PROBLEM. 

THE  answer  to  the  question,  Whence  comes  philosophy? 
must  be  framed  in  accordance  with  our  conception  of 
the  nature  of  philosophy.  Now,  since  philosophy  is  a  progres- 
sive and  rational  system,  its  fundamental  impulses  must  belong 
to  the  life  and  growth  of  reason  itself ;  and  since  it  seeks  to 
know  both  the  highest  and  the  most  fundamental  verities,  it 
must  spring  from  the  noblest  and  most  strenuous  of  rational 
impulses.  It  is  not  sufficient,  however,  to  refer  the  origin  of 
philosophy  in  a  general  way  to  the  reason  of  man,  and  to 
affirm  that  it  is  inseparable  from  the  activity  and  development 
of  reason,  —  although  this  is  a  remark  which  frequently  occurs 
in  the  history  of  human  thought. 

Plato  found  the  main  root  of  philosophy  in  Eros,  a  deeply 
seated  and  passionate  longing  of  man  for  communion  with 
the  world  of  eternal  realities.  At  the  beginning  of  his  Meta- 
physics, Aristotle  declares  that  "  all  men  by  nature  reach  after 
knowledge."  1  In  the  opening  words  of  his  "  Convito,"  Dante 
translates  with  approval  the  declaration  of  the  Greek  thinker.2 
This  sentence  Mr.  Shadworth  Hodgson 3  echoes  by  declaring 
that  "  the  need  to  philosophize  is  rooted  in  our  nature  as  deeply 
as  any  other  of  our  needs."  Starting  from  the  scientific  point 
of  view  in  the  formation  of  his  conception,  we  have  seen  how 
Wundt  affirms  that  a  philosophical  view  of  the  world  is  ne- 
cessary "  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  intellect  and  the  needs 

1  U&PTes  dvOpuTroi  tov  elMvai  optyuvrat  (pvcrei. 

2  Tutti  gli  uomini  naturalmente  desiderano  di  sapere. 
8  Time  and  Space,  p.  14. 


30         SOURCES  OF   PHILOSOPHY,  AND  ITS  PROBLEM. 

of  the  heart."  The  purpose  of  philosophy,  says  another  mod- 
ern German  writer,  is  the  satisfaction  of  our  metaphysical 
needs, —  "the  effort,  namely,  which  dwells  in  all  men,  but 
in  most  unconsciously,  after  the  knowledge  of  the  Being  and 
the  Connection  of  things!"1  And  Lotze,  in  the  Introduction 
to  his  "  Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophy,"  warns  us  against  sup- 
posing that  philosophy  is  a  discipline  so  peculiar  in  its  na- 
ture and  methods  as  to  be  adapted  only  to  the  pursuit  of 
the  few.  The  rather  is  it  nothing  else  than  "the  strenuous 
effort  of  the  human  spirit "  to  find  a  solution  for  those  riddles 
about  which  we  are  all  compelled  to  hold  some  view  in  order 
to  live  at  all. 

But  why  plead  that  philosophy  is  essentially  and  thoroughly 
human,  and  that  without  its  pursuit  much  of  the  noblest  and 
most  rational  part  of  human  nature  must  be  left  unsatisfied  ? 
Only  unworthy  ignorance  or  invincible  prejudice  will  be  found 
ready  to  deny  so  obvious  a  truth.  It  is  not,  however,  a  suffi- 
cient answer  to  the  inquiry,  Whence  does  philosophy  spring  ? 
to  refer  it  in  general  to  the  nature  of  man  as  a  rational  being ; 
some  more  detailed  and  analytic  account  of  its  origin  is  re- 
quired. The  influence  of  the  more  important  particular  activ- 
ities in  that  complex  of  forms  of  thinking,  feeling,  and  willing 
which  we  are  accustomed  to  call  the  "  human  reason "  must 
be  traced  with  some  detail.  Moreover,  it  would  be  a  serious 
mistake  to  suppose  that  philosophy  lives  and  grows  simply 
as  the  result  of  definite  intellectual  aims.  It  has  indeed,  dur- 
ing modern  times,  defined  more  clearly  than  ever  before  the 
problems  which  it  feels  the  need  of  pursuing;  it  has  also 
acknowledged,  with  more  than  traditional  modesty,  its  depend- 
ence upon  the  general  advance  of  human  knowledge  in  the 
form  of  the  particular  sciences.  And  yet  if,  by  speaking  of 
"  rational "  impulses  as  furnishing  the  fundamental  and  im- 
perishable sources  of  philosophy,  we  mean  solely  to  emphasize 

1  Kiiber,  Das  philosophische  System  E.  von  Hartmann's,  p.  1  (in  express 
agreement  with  Schopenhauer). 


SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM.         31 

the  fondness  of  man,  natural  or  acquired,  for  speculative  think- 
in<r,  we  cherish  far  too  narrow  a  view  of  the  right  answer  to 
this  inquiry.  By  thought  man  lives,  and  yet  not  by  thought 
alone.  It  is  only  by  recognizing  the  truth,  that  the  rational 
being  penetrates  and  transforms  the  entire  life,  —  sensation, 
motion,  perception,  instinct,  feeling,  sesthetical  and  ethical  idea- 
tion and  emotion,  as  well  as  choice,  —  that  we  can  fully  account 
for  the  origin  of  philosophy  by  referring  it  to  "  human  reason." 

One  of  the  more  primary  sources  of  philosophy  is  that  naive 
or  more  intelligent  wonder  with  which  man  stands  —  as  ante- 
cedent to  philosophical  reflection,  and  yet  a  principal  stimulus 
of  such  reflection  —  before  the  phenomena  of  nature.  For 
the  average  man  the  phrase  "  phenomena  of  nature "  signifies 
an  exceedingly  narrow  domain.  The  special  student  of  the 
physical  sciences  thinks  of  nature  as  a  realm  of  entities  and 
forces,  to  the  uniformities  of  whose  relations  he  is  learning 
to  give  an  ever-increasing  accuracy  of  mathematical  expression. 
To  such  an  one  the  most  pressing  need  of  philosophical  treat- 
ment for  the  deeper  problems  of  nature  customarily  comes  only 
as  an  indirect  result ;  it  arises  after  the  insufficiency  of  the 
particular  sciences  to  deal  with  these  problems  has  become 
matter  of  recognized  experience. 

The  case  of  the  untutored  man,  if  he  have  a  mind  at  all 
reflective,  is  favorable  for  realizing  in  its  most  primitive  form 
the  energy  of  this  particular  impulse  toward  philosophy.  He 
stands  face  to  face  with  a  little  world  of  natural  objects,  and  of 
happenings  among  those  objects.  For  most  of  these  things  and 
events  he  knows  of  no  so-called  "scientific"  explanation.  The 
inducement  to  discover  the  invariable  sequences  among  the 
phenomena  is  not  large.  He  may  exist  in  mingled  depend- 
ence upon  nature  and  mastery  over  it,  by  attributing  the  di- 
rection and  flight  of  his  arrow  to  the  structure  of  his  bow 
and  the  pull  of  his  arm,  his  sensations  of  warmth  to  the  sun 
or  to  the  fire,  the  coming  of  children  to  the  act  of  procrea- 
tion, the  drift  of  his  canoe  to  the  currents  of  water  and  wind. 


32        SOURCES  OP  PHILOSOPHY,  AND   ITS  PROBLEM. 

Beyond  these  and  similar  few  and  simple  inductions  he  feels 
little  need,  and  makes  little  use  of  science,  however  crude  and 
inchoate.  But  he  wonders  why  things  exist  and  happen  as 
they  do ;  for  the  very  structure  of  his  mind  impels  him  to 
interest  in  the  beings  and  events  about  him,  and  to  inquiry 
after  their  causes.  Why  does  his  child  sicken  and  die  ?  Why 
does  the  lightning  strike  here  rather  than  there  ?  How  does 
the  corn  grow  in  the  ground,  and  the  bones  of  his  offspring 
in  the  womb  of  its  mother  ?  It  is  to  a  metaphysical  rather 
than  a  scientific  answer  to  these  inquiries  that  his  need  im- 
pels and  compels  him.  He  knows  nothing  of  microbes  and 
atoms,  of  storm-centres  and  electrical  fluids.  He  does  not  wait 
to  approach  the  solution  of  these  problems  after  having  gone 
through  the  temple  of  an  inductive  physics,  physiology,  or 
meteorology.  His  naive  wonder,  joined  to  that  necessary  and 
rational  impulse  to  explain  which  is  recognized  by  philosophy 
in  the  so-called  universal  "  principle  of  sufficient  reason,"  drives 
him  forward  upon  the  road  of  speculative  thinking.  He  adopts 
the  metaphysical  explanation  ;  and  all  that  is  left  unexplained 
by  his  meagre  list  of  uniform  physical  sequences  he  perhaps 
ascribes  to  some  one  entity,  —  spirit  like  himself,  or  blind, 
unreasoning  force.  And  since  with  him  the  causae  occulta' 
so  vastly  outnumber  the  causes  which  are  known  as  estab- 
lished uniformities,  the  sphere  of  his  metaphysics  covers  far 
more  of  his  mental  life  than  the  sphere  of  his  scientific 
knowledge.     He  does  not  systematize,  however. 

It  was  partly  in  the  way  just  described  that,  as  a  matter  of 
history,  philosophy  had  its  source  in  human  nature  as  a  crude 
and  primitive  cosmological  speculation.  In  modern  times  — 
itself  a  science,  in  acknowledged  dependence  upon  the  culture 
and  attainments  of  all  the  particular  sciences  —  it  makes  use 
of  essentially  the  same  human  interest  and  human  activities, 
though  in  a  different  way.  The  realm  of  occult  causes  is  not 
banished,  but  rather  more  firmly  established,  by  the  physics  of 
to-day.     We  now  know  the  "  why  "  of  many  things  before  un- 


SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM.         33 

known ;  and  doubtless  physical  science  will  continue  its  con- 
quests in  this  domain.  And  yet  by  these  conquests  the  realm 
of  occult  causes  is  not  even  narrowed,  but  constantly  enlarged. 
Nor  can  we  say  that  this  realm  is  removed  farther  from  us, 
whether  in  time  or  in  space,  by  the  progress  of  the  particular 
sciences.  For  occult  causes  are  here  and  now  present  in  every 
phenomenon,  no  matter  how  fully  explained  it  may  be  said 
to  be  by  all  the  results  of  modern  physical  discoveries. 

The  relation  of  the  physical  sciences  to  philosophy  is  not 
such,  however,  as  to  exclude  the  latter  from  the  possibility, 
and  even  from  the  right,  of  considering  every  natural  phe- 
nomenon from  its  own  point  of  view.  When  the  appearance 
of  naivete  has  departed  from  the  wonder  with  which  man 
contemplates  nature,  the  strength  of  the  wonder  and  the 
philosophical  impulse  which  it  imparts  are  not  also  neces- 
sarily gone. 

Explanation,  indeed !  and  yet  how  much  in  every  case  left 
unexplained !  May  not  the  more  cultivated  man  feel  all  the 
more  strongly  the  temptation,  at  every  point,  to  strike  into 
the  realm  of  natural  phenomena  with  a  metaphysical  faith,  or 
postulate,  or  reasoned  theory,  which  shall  hold  out  the  attrac- 
tive promise  of  showing  to  him  the  more  interior  mechanism, 
or  the  real  meaning,  of  this  realm  ? 

But  it  is  with  the  individual  in .  his  development  as  it  has 
been  with  the  history  of  the  race.  The  reflections  in  which 
philosophy  chiefly  consists  do  not  concern  the  origin,  nature, 
and  destiny  of  things.  It  is  in  the  consciousness  of  self,  rather 
than  in  objective  consciousness,  —  or  rather,  it  is  in  the  reflec- 
tive consciousness  which  converts  the  inner  stream  of  life  into 
an  object,  —  that  the  more  vigorous  sources  of  philosophy  are 
to  be  found.  Whence  do  I  come,  and  whence  come  the  living 
men  who  surround  me  ?  For  I  cannot  avoid  believing  them 
to  be  the  possessors,  with  myself,  of  those  intellectual  and 
emotional  interests  and  aptitudes  which  make  man  the  so- 
called   rational   one   among   the   animals.      Whither,  too,  are 

3 


34         SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM. 

we  in  common  going  ?  And  what  in  reality  is  this  being  I 
call  myself, --its  connection  with  reality  in  general,  its  sig- 
nificance, and  its  value  ? 

When  such  inquiries  as  the  foregoing  are  once  raised  by 
man's  mind,  he  stands  face  to  face  —  at  first  with  a  simplicity 
of  wonder  akin  to  that  which  possesses  the  untutored  mind 
when  it  looks  upon  the  realm  of  external  nature  —  with  a 
world  of  another  kind.  To  the  impulse  from  wonder,  joined 
with  reason's  unceasing  demand  for  more  complete  explana- 
tion, is  now  added  the  unsurpassed  interest  which  man  takes 
in  his  own  conscious  life.  Even  uninstructed  observation 
serves  to  unite  under  the  principle  of  uniformity  the  rise  of 
the  body  of  the  individual  —  its  racial,  family,  and  individual 
characteristics  —  with  his  progenitors.  This  body  comes  from 
the  parents  by  a  process  which  is  natural,  and  which  affords 
a  visible  explanation  of  its  own  appearance  in  the  world  of 
things.  But  whence  comes  the  conscious  life,  the  subject  to 
which  the  changing  states  are  referred,  the  one  I  call  myself  ? 
When,  at  a  certain  stage  in  the  mental  evolution  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  of  the  race,  this  question  is  first  intelligently  pro- 
pounded, an  added  impulse  is  given  to  philosophical  inquiry. 
This  question,  at  a  certain  stage  in  all  unchecked  development, 
is  sure  to  be  propounded.  It  at  once  gathers  to  itself  all  the 
interest  which  the  Ego  feels  in  whatever  concerns  its  own  life. 

Ordinary  observation  also  furnishes  every  man  with  material 
for  the  induction  that  he,  like  the  others  of  his  kind  around  him, 
is  going  to  die.  This  is  a  mystery  which,  on  first  reflection, 
seems  to  the  mind  to  involve  in  itself  the  contradiction  of 
being  and  not-being  at  the  same  time.  Others  who  have  al- 
ready died  are  not  sensibly  existent  —  to  me,  to  their  friends 
or  to  their  enemies,  until  the  end  of  time.  And  yet  I  cannot 
picture  to  myself  the  dying  of  myself,  if  by  this  be  meant  the 
cessation  at  once  and  forever  of  all  my  conscious  life.  Doubt- 
less my  body  will  continue,  visibly  and  tangibly,  to  be,  for  a 
time  (as  have  the  bodies  of  other  dead  persons),  after  the  mys- 


SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM.         35 

tery  of  death  has  come  to  me.  Some  sort  of  separation  is  then 
possible,  at  least  in  imagination,  between  this  body  and  what  I 
am  entitled  to  call  "  myself."  The  question,  of  destiny  thus 
becomes  for  the  primitive  man,  in  its  natural  and  most  inter- 
esting form,  the  inquiry  :  Whither  do  we  go  at  death  ? 

To  the  questioning  of  the  human  spirit  concerning  its  own 
origin  and  destiny,  certain  of  the  particular  sciences  attempt 
to  furnish  an  answer.     Histology,  embryology,  and  physiology 
approach  the  question  of  origin,  and  deal  with  it  more  or  less 
successfully,  on  the  physical  side  of  the  twofold  being  of  man. 
Biology  strives   to  reduce    to  terms   of   a  general   mechanical 
theory  the  phenomena  of  life,  —  such  as  those  of  metabolism, 
propagation  by  fissure,  and  the  "  amoeboid  "  movements  of  bio- 
plasm.    This  general  theory  it  attempts  to  apply  to  the  body  of 
man.     Embryology  traces  the  evolution  of  the  human  offspring 
from  the  impregnated  egg  until  its  outfit  of  organs  is  complete ; 
it  tells  the  marvellous  story  how  by  segmentation  and  prolifera- 
tion of  cells,  by  deposit  and  differentiation  of  layers  of  cells,  — 
epiblast,  mesoblast,  and  hypoblast,  —  and  by  progressive  changes 
of  these  layers,  under  mechanical  and  vital  conditions,  the  new- 
born infant  has  come  to  be.     That  is,  it  aims  to  give  the  com- 
plete description  of    the  history  of    the  "  becoming "    of    the 
individual  body.     Physiology  then  essays  to  finish  the  work 
of  explanation.     To  accomplish  this,  it  employs  the  aid  of  his- 
tology and  general  molecular  physics  and  chemistry. 

Thus  does  modern  physical  science  attempt  to  push  its 
researches  toward  the  ultimate  secrets  that  concern  the  genesis 
of  human  life. 

The  childlike  theological  views  of  the  ancient  Hebrews,  in 
common  with  those  of  all  the  great  Oriental  nations,  connected 
the  divine  interest  and  agency  in  some  special  way  with  the 
origin  of  human  life.  In  their  thought,  God  was  pre-eminently 
the  author  and  disposer  of  all  life ;  he  was  the  giver  of  the  new 
life  of  every  new-born  child.  To  this  feeling,  that  the  genesis 
and  growth  of  man  are  not  wholly  explained  by  appeal  to  vis- 


3G         SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM. 

ible  acts  and  processes,  the  heart  of  the  untutored  man  every- 
where responds.  Nor  do  the  utmost  efforts  of  the  modern 
sciences  succeed  in  removing  this  impression  ;  with  its  thought- 
ful student,  life,  over  and  above  and  underneath  all  scientific 
explanations,  calls  attention  to  the  presence  of  the  Unexplained. 
This  presence  is  brought  so  near  to  all  our  interests,  and  it 
seems,  by  the  complexity  and  apparent  freedom  of  the  phe- 
nomena, so  to  baffle  the  utmost  conceivable  extension  of  sci- 
entific methods,  that  the  bare  recognition  of  it  becomes  a 
strong  stimulus  toward  philosophical  research.  Indeed,  mod- 
ern biology  is  one  of  the  most  important  handmaids  of  modern 
philosophy. 

"What  is  true  of  the  genesis  of  man's  bodily  life  is  more  obvi- 
ously true  of  his  mental  being  and  development.  Whoever 
has  attained  a  certain  stage  of  psychological  development,  in- 
fallibly distinguishes  —  whether  scientifically  or  unjustifiably, 
whether  for  his  intellectual  weal  or  woe  —  between  himself  and 
his  body.  No  scientific  explanation  which  applies  merely  to 
the  genesis  of  the  body  will  then  satisfy  the  inquiry :  Whence 
do  I  come  ?  Doubtless  with  most  men  in  the  earlier  stages 
of  the  mental  evolution  of  the  race,  and  with  every  man  in 
the  earlier  stages  of  his  individual  evolution,  the  two  ques- 
tions are  not  clearly  distinguished.  But  they  certainly  come 
to  be  distinguished  whenever  a  certain  stage  is  reached  in  the 
development  of  both  race  and  individual.  Biology,  psycho- 
physics,  and  psychology  therefore  essay  to  treat  scientifically 
the  genesis  of  consciousness  and  of  self-conscious  rational  life. 

It  is  not  easy  for  the  ordinary  man,  even  after  he  has  some- 
what clearly  conceived  the  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  conscious- 
ness and  of  the  higher  rational  activities,  to  understand  what  is 
meant  by  ascribing  it  to  physical  processes.  And  indeed  the 
expert  student  of  biology  and  physiological  psychology  is  little 
better  off.  How  does  consciousness  come  to  be,  as  the  result  of 
physical  processes  ?  How  does  human  reason  arise  —  with  its 
discourse  about  "  metempirical "  entities  and  "  transcendental  " 


SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM.        37 

causes,  about  freedom,  ideal  beauty,  immortal  life,  the  "  ought " 
with  its  categorical  imperative,  aud  the  grand  ideal  Eeality 
called  God  —  as  the  result  of  similar  processes  ? 

From  the  strong  impulse  to  inquire  into  the  origin  of  self- 
conscious  and  rational  life,  and  from  the  powerlessness  of  the 
particular  sciences  to  answer  the  inquiry,  philosophy  receives 
much  assistance.  It  becomes  the  refuge  of  disappointed  and 
eager  questioners.  It  may  fail,  in  its  turn,  to  satisfy  the  diffi- 
cult conditions  required  of  the  answer  to  any  of  this  question- 
ing, but  in  the  questioning  itself  resides  one  of  the  principal 
sources  of  its  own  life. 

At  a  certain  stage  in  the  development  of  the  individual  and 
of  the  race,  inquiry  arises  —  and  with  how  great  interest  to 
the  reflective  soul  •  —  as  to  the  destiny  of  the  life  of  self-con- 
sciousness. Obviously,  with  death  the  more  tangible  and  visi- 
ble evidence  of  the  body  is  at  an  end.  So  intimately  associated 
is  this  bodily  life  with  the  entire  conception  of  existence,  and 
even  with  the  possibility  of  existence,  that  the  more  primitive 
reflections  of  man  indissolubly  connect  the  two.  But  the  ap- 
propriate physical  sciences  show  beyond  question  that  death 
terminates  that  organic  and  vital  union  of  the  physical  ele- 
ments on  which  the  bodily  life  depends.  Death,  says  science, 
ends  the  body,  by  returning  its  constituent  material,  from  the 
highly  complex  forms  of  elaboration  it  had  attained  to  lower 
and  more  stable  combinations.  But  does  death  end  all  ?  Is 
it  the  destiny  of  that  self-conscious  and  rational  subject,  a  con- 
ception of  which  the  man  has  succeeded  in  detaching  from  the 
flowing  stream  of  sensations  and  perceptions,  —  is  it  the  destiny 
of  the  Ego  also  to  cease  to  be  ?  To  form  a  positive  conception 
of  the  total  cessation  of  the  life  of  conscious  feeling  and  thought 
is  plainly  impossible.  This  impotency  —  if  one  please  so  to  call 
it  —  acts,  not  as  a  rational  argument,  but  as  a  blind  impulse,  so 
as  to  favor  the  belief  in  a  continued  existence  for  the  soul.  But 
the  same  positive  sciences  which  aim  to  explain  the  genesis  of 
mind  and  the  cessation  as  well  as  the  genesis  of  the  body,  also 


38  SOURCES  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  AND  ITS  PROBLEM. 

aim  to  treat  the  question  of  its  mortality.  They  thus  speedily 
come,  not  only  upon  many  unsolved  psycho-physical  problems, 
but  also  upon  certain  considerations  derived  from  departments  of 
human  knowledge  and  human  feeling  with  which  they  are  not 
fitted  to  deal.  Their  lack  of  success  reinforces  the  impulse 
to  philosophical  reflection  which  is  derived  from  man's  natural 
interest  in  the  destiny  of  the  life  of  self-conscious  feeling  and 
thought. 

For  the  question  of  the  so-called  "natural"  immortality  of 
the  mind  is  not  primarily  a  question  for  theology,  nor  is  it 
chiefly  a  question  for  physical  science.  It  is  primarily  and 
chiefly  a  psychological  and  philosophical  inquiry.  For  it  is 
psychology,  descriptive  and  theoretical,  which  inquires  into  the 
nature  of  mind ;  and  it  is  philosophy  which  attempts  to  dis- 
cern the  more  ultimate  relations  in  which  Mind  stands  to  Mat- 
ter, Time,  Space,  and  that  ultimate  Eeality  which  philosophy 
knows  as  the  Absolute,  but  which  religious  faith  receives  as  the 
Heavenly  Father,  God.  The  interest  which  every  self-conscious 
reason  takes  in  its  own  continued  existence  gives  reflective  ear- 
nestness to  the  question  :  Whither  am  I  going  ?  It  thus  lends 
impulse  to  philosophical  inquiry  ;  it  is  a  source  of  that  product 
of  reflection  which  is  called  philosophy. 

More  maturity  of  reflective  analysis  is  implied  in  the  inquiry, 
What  am  I  ?  than  in  the  inquiries,  Whence  do  I  come  ?  and 
Whither  am  I  going?  The  problem  of  the  metaphysical  na- 
ture of  mind  arises  late  in  the  history  of  mental  evolution. 
Yet  when  once  raised,  this  later  inquiry  proves  itself  even  more 
provokingly  difficult  and  baffling,  though  scarcely  less  interest- 
ing as  viewed  from  both  the  theoretical  and  the  practical  points 
of  view. 

Simply  to  be  conscious  and  sentient,  this  seems  to  most  men 
a  sufficiently  accurate  statement  in  answer  to  all  inquiry  after 
the  real  nature  of  the  mind.  And,  indeed,  the  most  thoroughly 
reflective  and  consistent  thinking  has  difficulty  in  saying  much 
more.      The  intelligent  child,  or  the  adult  of  untutored  but 


SOURCES  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  AND  ITS  PROBLEM.  39 

thoughtful  mind,  first  makes  answer  to  the  question,  What  am 
I  ?  by  a  psychical  or  physical  gesture  directed  toward  certain 
of  the  more  obvious  bodily  parts.  The  precise  meaning  of 
this  demonstration  is  not,  I  am  my  heart,  my  head,  or  the 
viscera  I  call  mine ;  much  less  is  it  that  any  of  these  organs 
or  all  of  them  combined  constitutes  the  whole  of  what  I  call 
"myself"  The  gesture  means  rather,  by  indicating  some  of 
the  more  prominent  forms  of  localized  sensibility,  to  insist 
upon  the  primary  but  indescribable  actuality  of  the  life  of 
conscious  feeling  and  thought.  To  the  question,  What  are 
you?  the  strong  inclination  of  the  earlier  stages  of  the  de- 
velopment of  reflective  consciousness  is  to  respond,  Here  am- 
I.  But  the  presence  of  the  Ego  with  itself  is  never  undif- 
ferentiated or  abstract ;  it  is  always  a  definite  and  concrete 
presence  in  some  particular  form  of  sentient  life.  The  sentio 
or  cogito,  ergo  sum,  is  not  simply  equivalent  to  sentiens  or 
cogitans  sum ;  it  is  rather  equivalent  to  the  declaration  of 
an  existing  complex  of  feeling  and  ideation,  in  which  the 
more  persistent  and  prominent  factors  are  localized  bodily 
sensibility. 

It  is  true  that,  by  the  process  of  the  mind's  unfolding,  there 
comes  to  exist,  in  the  case  of  the  more  reflective  members  of 
the  race,  a  conception  of  the  "  self  "  that  is  highly  abstract  and 
separated  from  all  the  more  obvious  references  to  bodily  activ- 
ities. The  formation  of  this  conception  is  helped  forward  by 
reflection  upon  the  problems  of  the  origin  and  destiny  of  man. 
If  a  scientific  description  of  the  physical  processes  in  which 
the  body  begins  and  ceases  to  be,  is  not  a  satisfactory  answer 
to  the  question,  Whence  do  I  come  ?  and  Whither  do  I  go  ? 
it  would  also  seem  that  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  inquiry, 
What,  in  real  essence,  am  I  ?  cannot  consist  of  a  simple  appeal 
to  localized  bodily  sensibility. 

There  are  other  more  obvious  reasons,  however,  why  the 
reflecting  mind  of  the  adult  is  not  satisfied  with  the  child's 
answer  to  the  inquiry,  What  am  I  ?     The  progress  of  experi- 


40         SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND  ITS   PROBLEM. 

ence,  through  abstracting  and  relating  thought,  eliminates  one 
by  one  from  the  conception  of  the  "self"  the  factors  of  the 
general  conception  of  the  body.  Two  conceptions  come,  there- 
fore, to  be  formed,  —  distinct,  and  yet  in  their  genesis  and 
growth  curiously  interrelated.  My  body  is  mine,  and  not  my- 
self. I  am ;  and  I  have  a  body.  But  then,  what  am  I  that 
have,  but  am  not,  my  body  ?  To  this  question  the  more  cul- 
tivated stage  of  reflection,  when  unaided  by  philosophy,  makes 
direct  and  uncritical  answer  in  the  form  of  a  conception  of 
the  soul  or  spiritual  principle.  The  conception  itself  is  of 
course  only  a  complex  mental  product,  having  its  ground  in 
memory-images  of  past  concrete  experiences.  The  answer 
amounts,  then,  simply  to  saying,  I  am  —  what  I  remember 
myself  and  others  of  my  kind  to  have  thought,  felt,  and  done. 
But  this  answer  seems  plainly  inadequate  to  the  now  aroused 
and  inquiring  mind. 

The  sciences  of  biology,  psycho-physics,  and  psychology  prof- 
fer their  assistance  in  completing  the  answer  to  the  inquiry 
after  the  essential  nature  of  man.  The  first  of  these  sciences 
describes  the  particular  form  of  life  which  man  possesses  in  its 
relation  to  its  environment  and  to  other  living  forms.  But 
this  description  fails  to  satisfy  wholly  the  self-conscious  rational 
soul  when  it  inquires  after  the  essence  of  its  own  life.  Psycho- 
physics  further  explains  man  as  the  fortunate  owner  of  an 
incomparably  superior  central  nervous  organism,  and  as  stimu- 
lated, conditioned,  and  compelled  to  the  forth-putting  of  sen- 
tient life  by  the  action  of  physical  forces  within  and  upon  this 
organism.  And  then  psychology  —  descriptive,  non-metaphy- 
sical, and  "  without  a  soul "  —  essays  a  similar  task.  It  gives, 
with  all  the  details  made  possible  by  introspection  and  modern 
experimental  methods,  the  history  of  the  formation  of  the  con- 
ception of  "  self."  It  regards  this  very  conception  as  the  result 
of  a  process  of  evolution.  The  conception  is,  therefore,  in  its 
very  nature  subject  to  change,  different  for  different  individuals 
and   for  different  epochs  in  the  development  of  the  race, — ■ 


SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS  PROBLEM.         41 

different  also  for  the  same  individual  under  different  circum- 
stances and  at  different  times. 

The  effort  of  descriptive  psychology  to  discover  some  fixed 
kernel  of  reality,  as  it  were,  in  the  midst  of  this  shifting  com- 
plex of  images  so  loosely  united  under  the  common  term  "  my- 
self," seems  to  meet  with  an  insufficient  reward.  And  this 
excites  small  surprise  in  one  who  admits  the  truth  of  considera- 
tions which  Herbart 1  has  especially  emphasized.  /  a  m  myself, 
is  the  sole  answer  which,  it  would  seem,  can  be  given  by  psy- 
chology, thus  pursued,  to  the  inquiry,  Who,  or  what,  am  I  ? 
For  all  perception  in  time  is  a  process ;  hence,  by  "  perception 
in  time  I  can  never  find  myself  at  all,  as  the  one  who  I  really 
am."  And  all  my  effort  is  but  a  waltzing  about  in  a  circle, 
where  the  Ego  representing  itself  and  the  Ego  represented  by 
itself  form  a  mysterious  couple,  —  a  one  that  dissolves  itself 
into  two,  that  unite  themselves  again  into  one.  I  am,  then,  a 
process ;  and  all  my  conceptions  of  selfhood,  personal  identity, 
reality  of  being,  are  shifting  moments  and  elements  of  the 
process. 

But  this  answer  of  scientific  psychology  is  least  of  all  satis- 
factory to  the  inquiry  of  self-conscious  rational  man.  For  man 
is  a  metaphysical  being.  He  postulates  and  confides  in  reality, 
although  he  may  not  find  himself  able  to  comprehend  reality, 
or  even  to  explain  the  genesis  and  significance 'of  his  own  pos- 
tulate and  belief.  And  if  there  be  reality  anywhere,  how  could 
it  fail  to  be  embraced  in  mans  own  self-conscious  rational  life  ? 
How,  otherwise,  should  he  even  postulate  and  believe  in  reality  ? 
Thus  is  the  mind  of  man  driven  by  the  impulse  of  its  primitive 
or  more  mature  inquiry  after  the  nature  of  what  he  calls  his 
"  soul,"  his  ego,  his  "  self,"  to  the  pursuit  of  philosophy.  In 
the  form  of  rational  psychology,  or  the  metaphysics  of  mind, 
philosophy  at  least  promises  a  further  and  more  searching  crit- 
icism of  these  important  conceptions. 

The  considerations  just  mentioned  have  brought  us  near  to 

1  Psychologic,  Kbnigstoerg,  1824,  i.  85  f. 


42        SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,  AND   ITS   PROBLEM. 

the  border-line  of  more  distinctively  ethical,  sestheticai,  and 
religious  feelings  and  thoughts.  "  What  called  forth  Greek 
philosophy,"  says  Zeller,  '■'  was  originally  not  so  much  the  de- 
sire for  knowledge  as  the  feeling  of  dependence  upon  higher 
powers  and  the  wish  to  secure  their  favor."  x  Not  among  the 
Greeks  alone,  but  also  among  all  primitive  peoples,  the  impulses 
to  religious  faith,  doctrine,  and  worship  have  been  also  sources 
from  which  philosophy  has  sprung.  And  not  only  so  ;  for 
many  of  those  more  obscure  forms  of  feeling  and  ideation  that 
lie  at  the  base  of  the  beliefs  and  practical  life  of  morals, 
art,  and  religion  are  important  impulses  toward  philosophical 
reflection  as  well. 

There  naturally  arise,  even  in  the  experience  of  the  most  un- 
reflecting, certain  vague  and  indefinite  feelings  which  impel 
toward  the  search  for  the  Invisible  and  toward  an  effort  for  the 
establishment  of  right  relations  toward  the  Invisible.  Fears  of 
injury  to  the  person,  to  the  dwelling,  or  to  the  relatives  of  the 
primitive  man  stir  an  obscure  consciousness  of  the  presence 
of  some  power  that  can  make  for  his  weal  or  woe,  but  cannot 
be  guarded  against  by  sensible  barriers  or  weapons,  or  by  the 
precautions  which  suffice  for  dealing  with  the  objects  of  ordi- 
nary sensible  experience.  Out  of  this  feeling  of  fearful  depen- 
dence or  of  awe  springs  one  of  the  roots  of  religious  faith  and 
life.  The  same  feeling  is  also  a  root  for  the  growth  of  philos- 
ophy as  well.  As  knowledge  of  the  sources  of  danger  and  of 
the  means  for  guarding  against  them  increases,  the  reasons  for 
fear  and  awe  are  not  removed  from  the  heart  of  man.  The 
realm  of  the  dreadful  that  is  also  the  mysterious  is  scarcely 
diminished  at  all  by  the  development  of  our  experience  of  those 
things  that  are  visible,  tangible,  and  calculable.  Here,  then,  is 
an  unceasing  intimation  of  the  presence  of  a  mysterious  un- 
known Cause  of  disaster  or  of  success  with  which  man  is  inter- 
ested to  come  to  a  reckoning.     He  worships  in  propitiation  of 

1  Grundriss  dor  Geschichte  der  Griechischen  Philosophie,  §  2.  (Translation  : 
Outlines  of  the  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  New  York,  1886.) 


SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM.         43 

it,  and  speculates  as  to  what  it  is,  and  as  to  what  are  the 
relations  to  it  in  which  it  will  be  possible  and  best  for  him  to 
stand.  Not  alone  among  the  sensitive  ancient  Greeks  and 
among  other  primitive  peoples  in  less  degree,  but  also  in  the 
case  of  the  most  cultivated  modern  nations,  philosophy  springs, 
with  religion,  from  this  common  root. 

There  are  other  higher  and  more  distinctively  ethical  forms 
of  feeling  and  ideation  which  give  rise  both  to  philosophy  and 
to  religion.  These  fruits  of  the  ethical  being  of  man  were  pro- 
duced long  before  even  the  blossoms  were  put  forth  which  may 
some  day  develop  into  a  science  of  ethics.  Such  a  science  on 
the  sociological  side  and  as  studied  under  the  guidance  of  the 
idea  of  evolution,  has  now  only  just  begun  to  collect  its  "data;" 
it  will  doubtless  be  some  time  before  it  will  be  a  science  in  any- 
thing more  than  name.  As  studied  from  the  individual  and 
introspective  points  of  view,  ethics  is  not  an  independent  sci- 
ence at  all ;  it  is  only  a  branch,  or  rather  an  aspect,  of  psychol- 
ogy. But  the  existence  of  attempts  at  a  moral  philosophy  is  as 
old  as  the  beginnings  of  reflective  thought ;  and  at  its  begin- 
nings this  existence  has  its  sources  in  common  with  those  of 
religion. 

Among  the  more  important  of  those  forms  of  ethical  life  in 
which  philosophy  finds  an  originating  impulse,  are  the  idea  of 
'■'  the  ought "  and  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation.  Something  of 
that  unconditional  and  absolute  character  which  Kant  claimed 
for  this  idea  doubtless  belongs  to  it  in  the  mind  of  men  in  all 
times  and  stages  of  their  evolution.  What  I  ought,  I  may 
learn  by  consultation  of  my  parents,  my  companions,  my  eccle- 
siastical, social,  or  political  connections ;  or  from  my  own  im- 
pressions and  judgments  relative  to  my  position,  opportunities, 
etc.  But  that  /  ought  "I  all,  —  this  is  a  unique  fact  of  the 
mind's  life  which  seems  to  demand  another  kind  of  explanation. 

The  idea  of  the  Ought,  and  its  correlated  feeling  of  obliga- 
tion, doubtless  impel  men,  both  uncritically  to  believe  in  and 
intelligently  to  search  for,. a  "ground"  in  reality  on  which  the 


44         SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM. 

idea  and  the  feeling  may  rest.  The  belief  is  in  itself  a  source 
of  religion.  The  belief  and  the  rational  search  for  its  more 
clear  and  objective  determination  give  rise  to  moral  philosophy. 

Now,  it  is  conceivable  —  at  least,  we  will  for  the  present 
assume  it  to  be  conceivable — that  evolutionary  ethics  will 
some  time  dispel  the  almost  universal  confidence  of  mankind 
that  a  "ground"  exists  in  the  ultimate  Reality  for  distinctively 
ethical  feelings  and  ideas.  But  such  a  result,  if  it  could 
be  placed  on  scientific  grounds,  would  be  difficult  to  reconcile 
with  the  rational  interpretation  of  certain  historical  facts.  Men 
have  turned,  in  faith  or  fear,  toward  gods  many  and  toward 
one  God  under  influence  from  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation. 
Under  the  same  influence  have  they  been  impelled  to  inquire 
into  the  nature  of  that  absolute  Being  to  which  the  feeling  in 
themselves  corresponds ;  and  also  into  the  relations  in  reality, 
sustained  by  themselves  and  others,  toward  this  Being.  Is  the 
ultimate  Reality  ethical  or  non-ethical  in  its  essence  ?  Is  the 
obligation,  which  appears  in  human  consciousness  as  a  restless 
feeling  or  vague  perception  of  a  bond  between  man  and  the 
Absolute,  sure  to  be  exacted  in  the  realm  of  reality  ?  If  so, 
what  is  its  guarantee;  and  what,  in  case  of  payment  or  failure, 
is  its  outcome  in  invisible  spaces  and  far  distant  times  ?  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  men  have  been  driven  to  reflective  think- 
ing and  to  its  issue  in  philosophy  by  a  strong  and  imperishable 
interest  in  questions  such  as  these. 

The  statement  just  made  is  in  some  sort  true,  not  only  of 
the  worshipper  of  the  fetich  who  aims  by  physical  propitiation 
to  forestall  his  dues  with  the  unseen  Reality,  but  also  of  the 
modern  writer  of  polished  essay  who  courteously  acknowl- 
edges the  existence  of  a  "  Power  not  ourselves  which  makes 
for  righteousness."  No  theist  could  undertake  to  show  with 
more  ardor  and  elaboration  than  does  Schopenhauer  that  the 
"  Ground  "  of  all  reality  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  philosophical 
account  of  the  life  of  human  character  and  human  conduct. 
With  him    it  is   Will   as  "  thing-in-itself,"  —  timeless,  uncon- 


SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS    PROBLEM.         45 

scious,  unknown,  except  that  it  is  will,  —  which  is  the  alone 
free,  eternal  in  justice  and  benevolence.  And  has  not  Mr. 
Spencer  himself  spoken  of  ethical  and  religious  beliefs  and  in- 
stitutions as  "  modes  of  manifestation  of  the  Unknowable ; " 
and  has  he  not  appealed,  in  justification  of  his  own  belief,  to 
the  Unknown  Cause  who  produced  the  belief  in  him,  and  there- 
by "  authorized  him  to  profess  and  act  out  that  belief  "  ? 

It  is  for  reasons  such  as  these  that  "  moral  philosophy,"  or 
the  metaphysical  treatment  of  the  grounds  and  nature  of  duty 
and  obligation,  is  far  older  in  history  and  more  deeply  rooted 
in  rational  impulses  than  is  any  empirical  science  of  ethics  so 
called.  This  statement  may  not  be  to  the  taste  of  the  modern 
student  of  ethical  phenomena  from  the  evolutionists  point  of 
view.  But  the  facts  on  which  one  may  rely  for  making  the 
statement  are  no  unimportant  part  of  the  phenomena.  They 
show  at  least  the  truth  of  our  reference  to  the  ethical  being 
of  man  as  a  principal  source  of  philosophy. 

There  exist  also  certain  distinctively  assthetical  feelings  and 
obscure  forms  of  ideation  in  which  philosophy  lias  its  source. 
To  whatever  seems  beautiful  in  perception  or  imagination,  — 
to  the  graceful,  the  harmonious,  the  sublime,  —  the  heart  of 
man  responds  with  emotions  and  thoughts  which,  when  devel- 
oped in  their  finer  and  more  cultured  forms,  are  not  improperly 
held  to  be  activities  of  "reason"  itself.  The  object  of  this 
feeling  for  the  beautiful  is  considered  to  have  an  unconditioned 
value.  The  thoughts  prompted  by  intuition  of  the  beautiful 
object  lead  to  a  postulated  ground  for  themselves  and  for  the 
emotions  in  some  ultimate  and  supreme  Eeality.  With  such 
activities  of  human  nature  both  art  and  religion  are  concerned ; 
both  look  to  such  activities  for  an  explanation  of  their  own 
origin  and  significance.  Art  and  religion,  though  far  from 
being  the  same,  have  many  common  roots  struck  down  deep 
into  the  feeling  and  ideating  of  man.  They  both  customarily 
assume  the  existence,  e^ra-mentally,  of  that  which  is  surpass- 
ingly beautiful  and  sublime.    In  the  unreflecting  forms  of  union 


46         SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM. 

which  they  have  oftentimes  agreed  to  assume  in  history,  they 
have  not  always  by  any  means  served  the  interests  of  a  purer 
morality,  but  they  have  borne  witness  to  a  certain  real  affinity 
of  origin.  This  is  true  alike  of  the  debased  worship  of  beauty 
in  connection  with  heathen  temples  and  of  the  "  beauty  of  holi- 
ness "  that,  as  a  controlling  idea,  moulded  the  temple  of  Jeho- 
vah. And  when  our  modern  art,  under  the  name  of  "  realism," 
in  painting,  sculpture,  prose  or  poetic  romantic  literature,  dis- 
regards or  offends  the  power  of  ethical  ideals  with  the  claim  to 
a  peculiar  relationship  with  divinity,  its  action  is  the  more  mis- 
chievous because  its  claim  has  at  its  basis  so  much  of  undoubted 
truth.  Indeed,  the  invincible  persuasion  of  man  that  whatever 
is  most  grand  and  beautiful  in  his  own  ideal  world  must  be 
existent  in  the  world  of  Eeality,  is  one  of  the  strongest  supports 
of  religion.  It  is  the  very  essence  and  life  of  several  of  the 
strongest  "  arguments,"  so  called,  for  the  being  of  God. 

But  the  attempt  of  reflection  to  justify  by  thought  the  feel- 
ings and  obscure  forms  of  mental  representation  to  which 
reference  has  just  been  made,  constitutes  also  a  source  of  phi- 
losophy. That  the  Being,  out  of  whose  nature  and  action  all 
physical  phenomena  and  all  experience  of  mind  are  to  be  de- 
rived," is  grand  and  sublime,  seems  to  follow  upon  the  most 
primitive  consideration  almost  as  a  matter  of  course.  The 
theory  of  "  the  beautiful,"  as  a  definite  and  carefully  cultivated 
form  of  philosophical  discipline,  has  no  doubt  had  a  far  less 
notable  place  in  history  than  the  theory  of  "  the  ought."  "  The 
Good  "  of  the  Platonic  philosophy  was,  however,  aesthetically  as 
well  as  ethically  good.  And  all  along  the  course  of  the  devel- 
opment of  speculative  thought  certain  considerations,  appertain- 
ing more  fitly  either  to  aesthetics  alone  or  to  ethics  alone,  have 
been  treated  without  distinction  of  the  field  in  which  they  be- 
longed. This  treatment  has  resulted  in  confusion.  But  the 
fact  of  its  existence  enforces  the  claim  that  the  aesthetical  being 
of  man  must  be  recognized  as  a  principal  source  of  philosophy. 

We  should  gain  little  for  our  present  purpose  by  tracing  the 


SOURCES   OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM.         47 

sources  and  development  of  particular  eras,  schools,  or  national 
types  of  philosophy.  This  work  belongs  rather  to  the  writer  on 
the  history  of  philosophy,  or  on  the  philosophy  of  history.  The 
philosophical  position  and  growth  of  any  age  or  people  is  an 
exceedingly  complex  result.  The  account  of  it  includes  a  mul- 
titude of  particular  influences.  The  physical  and  commercial 
conditions  of  any  people,  its  educational  and  especially  its  polit- 
ical and  religious  status,  act  strongly  upon  the  rise  and  cultiva- 
tion of  philosophy.  In  every  age  and  among  all  peoples,  the 
prevalent  views  on  philosophical  subjects  are  also  to  be  regarded 
in  their  connection  with  the  preceding  and  surrounding  stream 
of  reflective  rational  life.  Especially  is  it  true  of  modern  times 
and  nations  that  the  sources  of  any  particular  development  of 
philosophy  cannot  be  successfully  considered  as  existing  apart 
from  the  general  current  of  the  world's  thought.  In  regard  of 
them,  Kuno  Fischer's  conception  of  philosophy  is  emphatically 
true,  —  it  is  the  progressive  self-knowledge  of  the  human  mind ; 
an  evolution  of  the  self-conscious  reason  of  the  race.  In 
each  case,  too,  —  no  matter  how  close  the  connection  with  other 
eras  and  peoples  may  appear  to  be,  —  if  there  is  a  fresh  upris- 
ing of  mind  and  a  marked  development  of  speculative  thought, 
an  unexplained  residuum  of  causes,  as  it  were,  will  be  left  to  be 
assigned  to  the  genius  of  great  individuals,  or  of  the  time,  or  of 
the  people  at  large  (the  Zeitgeist). 

Doubtless,  too,  the  action  of  those  permanent  and  universal 
sources  of  all  philosophy  in  reason  itself,  the  more  precise 
nature  of  which  we  have  been  trying  to  determine,  is  different 
in  different  cases  and  at  different  epochs  in  the  evolution  of  the 
race.  Some  individual  thinkers  and  some  communities  of  re- 
flective minds  —  schools  or  epochs  or  national  types  —  resort  to 
philosophy  chiefly  from  the  ethical  or  religious  interest ;  others 
from  the  more  purely  intellectual,  in  the  determination  to  at- 
tain a  scientific  system  for  their  views  of  nature,  mind,  conduct, 
life,  and  all  Reality.  To  say  this,  is  essentially  the  same  thing 
as  to  say  that  the  various  main  sources  of  philosophical  disci- 


48        SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM. 

pline  are  not  always  operative  with  the  same  absolute  or  rela- 
tive strength  of  impulse.  That  these  sources  always  exist  and 
operate  as  the  main  sources,  and  that  the  foregoing  analysis  of 
them  is  correct,  the  progress  of  the  discussion  will  show.  In- 
deed, the  true  and  complete  division  of  the  departments  of 
philosophical  discipline  follows  directly  from  the  analysis  of  its 
sources. 

A  writer  of  some  fifteen  years  ago1  declared  that,  for  us  and 
for  the  epochs  preceding  ours,  "  philosophy  is  no  longer  a  pre- 
eminently Quietistic  mode  of  contemplating  the  universe,  but  is 
rather  an  essentially  restless  and  active  principle  for  the  many- 
sided  shaping  of  life."  Philosophy  is  then  the  development  of 
the  highest  form  of  the  consciousness  of  the  world  and  of  life. 
Doing  and  thinking,  willing  and  knowing,  active  transforma- 
tion and  passive  mirroring  of  the  world,  are  the  two  sides  of  this 
consciousness.  This  view  of  philosophy  contains  important 
truth  ;  it  is  truth,  however,  which  is  recognizable,  not  only  in 
the  modern  epoch,  but  also  in  all  epochs  of  the  development  of 
rational  life.  For  the  essential  nature  of  philosophy  as  a  pre- 
cise form  of  rational  activity  is  unalterably  determined  by  the 
nature  of  its  sources  in  the  rational  being  of  man. 

As  long,  however,  as  the  pursuit  of  philosophy  is  ascribed 
simply  to  the  undisciplined  action  of  certain  constitutional  im- 
pulses, its  highest  and  most  truly  scientific  development  is  not 
secured  or  explained.  The  modern  conception  of  philosophy 
aims  to  make  it  more  amenable  than  it  has  hitherto  been  to 
scientific  tests  and  to  the  scientific  method.  This  form  of 
rational  life  may  difference  itself  from  the  particular  sciences  if 
it  can ;  but  it  may  not  advance  its  speculations  or  alleged  intu- 
itional truths  and  postulates  in  disregard  of  these  sciences.  It 
may  go  forth  undismayed  into  the  realm  of  the  unknown,  even 
beyond  those  unseen  and  intangible  entities  called  atoms  and 
energies,  with  which  physical  science  underlays  the  world  of 

1  Diihring,  Cuvsus  der  Philosophie  als  streng  wissenschaftlicker  Weltanschau- 
ung und  Lebensgestaltung,  {>.  1  f. 


SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,   AND  ITS   PROBLEM.         49 

phenomena ;  it  may  go  into  the  most  profound  depths  and  most 
transcendent  heights  of  speculation ;  but  it  must  not  lose  its 
vital  touch  with  the  concrete  and  verifiable  facts  and  realities 
that  secure  soberness  and  certainty  to  physical  science.  Its 
walk  may  be  with  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  but  the  solid 
ground  of  admitted  experience  must  be  beneath  its  feet.  It 
must  show  its  humility  not  only  before  God,  but  also  before  the 
students  of  the  positive  forms  of  human  knowledge. 

The  justice  of  such  demands  is,  with  us,  not  simply  a  confes- 
sion, it  is  rather  an  indubitable  inference  from  the  very  nature 
of  philosophy ;  for  however  we  may  be  inclined  to  make  dis- 
tinctions between  science  and  philosophy,  we  cannot  forget  that 
both  are  the  outcome  of  the  same  human  nature  placed  in  the 
same  environment.  The  need  of  explanation  -  -  the  need  to 
know,  not  only  for  the  sake  of  knowing  itself,  but  also  for  the 
sake  of  satisfying  the  demands  of  the  heart  and  of  basing  the 
conduct  of  the  individual  and  of  society  in  verifiable  principles 
—  gives  rise  to  both.  And  if  philosophy  is  to  make  good  its 
claim  to  a  domain  of  its  own,  and  to  freedom  of  control  within 
that  domain,  it  must  acknowledge  in  a  more  than  merely  theo- 
retical way  its  dependence  upon  the  positive  sciences.  But  it 
must  also  prove  its  power  to  furnish  reasonable  grounds  for  the 
hope  of  a  fuller  satisfaction  of  this  need  than  can  be  afforded  by 
these  sciences. 

The  inquiry,  What  is  the  Problem  of  Philosophy  ?  admits  of 
various  answers,  dependent  upon  somewhat  different  views  taken 
of  the  nature,  sources,  and  method  of  philosophy.  Looked  at  in 
the  light  of  the  two  most  prominent  factors  in  the  customary 
conception  of  philosophy,  it  may  be  said  that  its  problem  is  to 
discover  and  establish  a  true  metaphysics,  in  its  two  branches 
of  ontology  and  theory  of  knowledge.  To  avoid  the  odium  at- 
tached to  the  word  "  metaphysics,"  we  may  state  essentially  the 
same  problem  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  Thus  we  have 
seen  that  Zeller  declares  that  the  function  of  the  philosopher  is 
not  simply  to  investigate  the  ultimate  grounds  of  Knowledge  and 

4 


50         SOURCES  OP  PHILOSOPHY,   AND  ITS  PROBLEM. 

Being,  but  also  to  comprehend  all  that  is  actual  in  its  connec- 
tion with  them.  And  after  Brodbeck,  following  Schleiermacher, 
has  shown  that  philosophy,  as  pure  thinking,  seeks  the  perfect 
agreement  of  thought  with  the  whole  domain  of  being,  in  so  far 
as  being  is  knowable,  he  hastens  to  explain :  its  problem  is  to 
make  the  organism  of  tlmiking  a  true  representative  of  the 
organism  of  the  world. 

Both  the  foregoing  definitions  of  the  problem  of  philosophy 
contain  the  postulate  of  some  unity  of  real  being  and  life  ex- 
tending through  the  world  of  nature  and  of  mind.  And,  indeed, 
without  such  a  postulate  no  worthy  and  comprehensive  concep- 
tion of  this  problem  can  be  framed,  no  significant  attempt  at  its 
solution  can  be  made.  It  is,  of  course,  the  business  of  philo- 
sophy to  clarify  and  defend  this  postulate ;  but  without  the 
postulate,  I  repeat,  even  the  conception  of  the  problem  of  phi- 
losophy cannot  be  formed.  This  position  must  be  maintained 
in  opposition  to  those  who  would  restrict  philosophy  to  a  theory 
of  knowledge,  and  so  make  its  sole  problem  the  establishment 
of  such  a  theory  in  satisfactory  philosophical  form. 

Those  who  desire  to  emphasize  the  practical  benefits  of  phi- 
losophy would  define  its  problem  as  pre-eminently  the  attain- 
ment of  true  wisdom,  the  actualizing  of  truth  in  life.  This 
very  definition  (if  we  may  call  so  loose  and  indefinite  a  state- 
ment a  "  definition  ")  leads  us,  however,  though  by  a  more  in- 
direct path,  to  the  same  postulate.  For  by  this  definition  the 
ideal  side  of  philosophy,  as  it  were,  and  the  departments  of 
Ethics,  ^Esthetics,  and  Philosophy  of  Beligion  are  brought  into 
especial  prominence.  But  it  is  the  philosophy  of  the  ideal,  in 
these  three  departments  belonging  to  it,  which  most  peremp- 
torily demands  the  postulate  of  a  unity  of  life  and  reality  as 
the  "  Ground  "  of  the  whole  world.  If  philosophy  do  not  fur- 
nish a  critical  examination  and  defence  of  this  postulate,  if  it 
do  not  even  consider  how  the  basis  of  human  ideals  of  duty, 
of  beauty,  and  of  supreme  rational  and  self-conscious  life  is 
possibly  or  certainly  to  be  laid  in  a  unity  of   real  being,  it 


SOURCES  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  AND  ITS  PROBLEM.         51 

misses  entirely  its  own  peculiar  problem.  The  practical  life 
of  conduct,  of  art,  and  of  religious  faith  may  exist  without 
such  critical  examination,  but  not  the  cultivation  of  ethical 
and  sesthetical  philosophy,  or  of  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

Nor  is  it  necessary  for  philosophy  to  define  its  problem  as 
purely  or  chiefly  practical,  in  order  that  it  may  have  the  most 
salutary  and  effective  influence  upon  the  life  of  conduct.  Like 
all  science,  it  seeks  primarily  the  truth  for  the  truth's  sake. 
Its  spirit  is  far  enough  removed,  however,  from  that  idolatrous 
worship  of  concrete  facts  and  exact  formulas  which  does  not 
shrink  from  ruthlessly  sacrificing  to  them,  as  to  gods,  all  the 
finer  and  choicer  ethical,  sesthetical,  and  religious  feelings  of 
the  sensitive  soul.  This  is  not  simply  because  philosophy  is 
always  bound  to  remember  that  these  feelings  are  themselves 
facts,  and  that  they  are  no  less  certainly  facts,  and  no  less 
potent  in  influence  and  worthy  of  rational  regard,  although 
they  do  not  admit  of  easy  reduction  to  the  terms  of  the  math- 
ematical and  physical  sciences.  It  is  rather  because  the  very 
essence  of  philosophical  reflection  on  ethical,  sesthetical,  and 
religious  phenomena  consists  in  regard  for  the  ideals  of  duty 
and  of  beauty,  and  for  that  Ideal-Eeal  which  religion  calls 
God.  Through  this  process  of  reflection  philosophy  becomes 
more  fully  and  profoundly  conscious  of  the  effort  to  apply  and 
verify  its  postulate  of  a  unity  in  reality  for  the  world  of 
nature  and  of  mind, — a  unity  higher  than  any  of  the  positive 
sciences  are  competent  to  describe. 

That  conception  of  the  nature  of  philosophy  which  regards 
it  as  a  "  possible  branch  of  positive  science,"  or  even  as  a  uni- 
versal science,  readily  defines  the  problem  of  philosophy  from 
the  point  of  view  of  its  relation  to  the  particular  sciences. 
The  task  which  Mr.  Lewes  sets  for  himself  he  defines  as  "  the 
transformation  of  metaphysics  by  reduction  to  the  method  of 
science."  x  The  problem  of  philosophy —  that  is,  of  metaphysics 
thus  reduced  to  a  science  —  is,  then,  to  discard  all  metaphysical 

1  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  vol.  *  part  i. 


52         SOURCES  OF  PHILOSOPHY,   AND  ITS  PROBLEM. 

elements,  and  thereupon  to  handle  certain  scientific  conceptions 
with  which  it  is  inconvenient  for  any  of  the  positive  sciences 
to  deal.  But  according  to  Wundt's  much  profounder  view,  its 
problem  is  "  to  unite  the  general  cognitions  obtained  by  the 
particular  sciences  into  a  consistent  system."  But  in  this  view 
also  we  find  necessarily  involved  the  postulate  of  a  possible 
system,  "  consistent "  and  able  to  serve  as  a  basis  of  union,  a 
ground  of  unity,  for  the  particular  sciences. 

Moreover,  unless  we  enter  upon  the  study  of  philosophy 
with  the  dogmatic  rejection  of  that  assumption  which,  in  un- 
critical form  at  least,  is  made  by  all  the  sciences,  we  must  re- 
gard this  consistent  system  of  the  general  cognitions  obtained 
by  them  as  having  its  possible  "  Ground  "  in  some  really  ex- 
istent Unity.  It  belongs,  to  be  sure,  to  philosophy,  as  criti- 
cal of  all  assumptions  and  as  interested  in  a  wholly  rational 
theory  of  knowledge,  to  examine  thoroughly  this  assumption. 
Philosophical  criticism  may  greatly  change  the  crude  form  in 
which  the  presupposition  is  held  by  the  particular  sciences. 
But  in  the  very  examination  it  is  accompanied  by  the  presence 
and  constantly  feels  the  power  of  this  same  postulated  Unity 
of  all  Eeality.  Reason  at  the  bar  of  reason  is  the  same  rea- 
son which  sits  as  judge.  Whatever  theory  of  cognition  the 
philosopher  may  accept,  —  and  in  this  regard  it  is  of  the  very 
nature  of  scientific  and  critical  philosophy  to  claim  the  free- 
dom of  reason,  —  he  cannot  understand  his  main  problem,  or 
even  state  it,  without  use  of  the  postulate.  To  say  this  is 
the  same  thing  as  to  say  that,  while  the  particular  sciences 
may  possibly  disregard  all  inquiry  "as  to  the  ultimate  basis  on 
which  they  individually  rest,  and  on  which  reposes  the  con- 
nection existing  between  them,  philosophy  cannot  so  do.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  along  this  fundamental  level  that  its  pecu- 
liar inquiries  lie.  Its  one  great  problem  concerns  the  exis- 
tence and  nature  of  this  fundamental  principle. 

We  may  then  affirm  in  a  general  way  that  the  problem  of 
philosophy  is  to  discover  and  comprehend  a  certain  kind  of 


SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,   AND   ITS   PROBLEM.         53 

unity.  This  unity  involves  some  connection  in  reality  of  the 
principles  of  all  being  and  the  principles  of  all  knowledge  ; 
for  philosophy  deals  with  both.  It  is  not  merely  a  critical 
or  positive  ontology,  nor  is  it  merely  a  critical  or  dogmatic 
theory  of  knowledge.  This  unity  must  also  serve  as  a  rational 
basis  for  the  principles  of  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  religion.  Phi- 
losophy seeks  a  unity,  not  only  for  the  realities  of  thought, 
but  also  for  the  ideals  of  moral  conduct,  art,  and  the  religious 
life.  It  further  aims  to  bring  the  general  principles  of  being 
and  of  rational  knowledge  into  connection  and  harmony  with 
these  ethical  and  sesthetical  ideals.  That  is,  philosophy  strives 
to  find  for  all  these  principles  a  unity  of  being  and  life,  an 
ideal  Keal,  a  realized  Idea.  In  other  words,  philosophy  im- 
plies the  search,  in  rational  confidence  and  hope,  after  some 
sort  of  a  unity,  in  which  all  real  processes  may  have,  as  it 
were,  an  ideal  side,  a  side  of  sentient,  sesthetical,  and  ethical 
life,  and  in  which  the  fundamental  forms,  not  only  of  rational 
cognition,  but  also  of  resthetical  and  ethical  ideals,  may  have 
existence  in  reality. 

There  is,  however,  no  such  thing  possible  as  an  immediate 
knowledge  of  either  the  real  or  the  ideal  independently  of  those 
concrete  acts  and  objects  of  particular  knowledge  with  which 
the  positive  sciences  deal.  Each  of  these  sciences  implies  the 
existence  and  activity  of  human  reason,  upon  the  basis  of  its 
fundamental  postulates  and  according  to  its  most  general  laws. 
But  each  of  them  also  involves  the  gathering  and  sifting  of 
definite  material  of  experience  ;  each  of  them,  therefore,  takes 
for  granted  the  general  postulate  that  they  are  all  dealing  with 
reality,  and  proceeds  to  tell  how  particular  forms  of  reality 
actually  behave.  The  sciences  of  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  religion 
describe  further  how  certain  great  ideals  —  as  of  duty,  beauty, 
and  God  —  are  formed  within  the  mind  of  the  individual  and 
of  the  race.  When  further  reflection  is  given  to  the  results  of 
these  various  branches  of  positive  science,  both  physical  and 
psychological,  it  is   found   that  their  most  mature   and  well- 


54         SOURCES   OF   PHILOSOPHY,    AND   ITS   PROBLEM. 

verified  conclusions  serve  to  suggest  still  other  problems,  which 
are  unsolved  and  which  lie  beyond  the  power  of  any  form  of 
science  to  offer  for  them  a  solution.  These  problems  become 
the  problem  of  philosophy.  They  must  be  pursued  in  depen- 
dence upon  the  positive  sciences  for  the  forms,  as  ascertained 
principles  or  general  presuppositions  of  these  sciences,  in  which 
they  are,  as  it  were,  handed  over  to  philosophy.  As  parts  of 
the  philosophical  problem,  however,  they  can  neither  be  solved 
by  the  sciences,  nor  can  they  be  solved  by  philosophical  reflec- 
tion in  disregard  of  or  opposition  to  the  sciences.  They  must 
be  considered  and  solved,  if  at  all,  in  such  manner  as  to  tend 
toward  the  formation  of  the  sum-total  of  knowledge  by  reflec- 
tion into  a  harmonious  system.  The  problems  thus  become 
parts  of  one  problem,  —  the  problem  of  philosophy. 

At  this  point  we  discover  again  the  presence  of  the  great 
postulate  to  which  reference  has  already  repeatedly  been  made. 
There  is  ultimate  and  fundamental  unity  of  being  to  be  as- 
sumed as  the  only  conceivable  or  possible  ground  for  a  harmo- 
nious and  consistent  rational  system  of  the  positive  sciences. 
From  this  point  of  view,  then,  we  may  say  that  to  convert  as- 
sumption into  a  rational  conviction,  to  explore  the  nature  of 
such  ultimate  being  and  its  relations  to  the  thoughts  and  ideals 
of  reason,  and  so  to  discern  and  apprehend  the  true  unity  of 
all  the  sciences,  is  the  problem  of  philosophy. 


CHAPTER  III. 

RELATION    OF    PHILOSOPHY   TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES. 

NOTHING  is  in  these  days  more  important  for  the  true 
conception  and  successful  pursuit  of  philosophy  than  to 
determine  precisely  its  relation  to  the  particular  sciences.  The 
entire  history  of  speculative  thinking  enforces  this  truth.  His- 
tory reveals  the  suffering  of  philosophy  from  its  failures,  in  the 
ancient  and  mediaeval  eras,  to  distinguish  itself  from  the  more 
positive  forms  of  human  knowledge.  It  reveals  also  the  great 
influence  which  modern  scientific  methods  have  already  exer- 
cised, and  it  prophesies  the  yet  greater  influence  which  they 
are  destined  to  exercise  in  the  future,  for  the  correction  and 
improvement  of  philosophy.  Even  a  measure  of  the  strong 
contempt  prevalent  among  devotees  of  physical  science  for  so- 
called  metaphysics  has  been  a  real  service  to  the  same  cause. 

It  is  no  longer  possible  to  cultivate  philosophy  in  virtual  dis- 
regard of  the  conclusions  reached  by  observers  in  the  differ- 
ent classes  of  physical  and  psychological  phenomena.  The  new 
physics  and  the  new  psychology  both  demand  a  hearing  at  the 
court  which  claims  to  have  supreme  and  final  appellate  juris- 
diction. But  who  is  sufficient  to  sit  as  judge  in  that  court? 
Certainly  not  the  man  who  has  been  educated  amidst  invincible 
ignorance  of  both  the  new  physics  and  the  new  psychology. 

Yet  further :  the  expert  students  of  the  particular  sciences 
cannot  avoid  the  enterprise  of  passing  judgment  upon  the  prob- 
lems which  belong,  in  a  peculiar  way,  to  speculative  thought. 
The  man  of  the  Scholastic  or  the  strictly  Hegelian  development, 
in  his  day,  felt  himself  competent  to  deduce  the  principles  of 


56  RELATION    OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  positive  sciences  from  the  laws  of  absolute  existence.  And 
was  it  not  his  peculiar  business  to  be  familiar  with  those  laws  ? 
But  the  tables  are  now  turned  upon  philosophy.  Who  now 
feels  himself  competent  to  pronounce  with  reference  to  phi- 
losophical secrets,  —  to  solve  problems  of  Freedom,  God,  and 
Immortal  Life,  and  to  discern  the  inmost  being  of  the  really 
existent,  whether  it  be  blind  Force,  "  the  Unconscious,"  the 
"  mysterious  something "  which  we  rightly  call  "  Matter,"  or 
the  self-conscious  Universal  Eeason,  —  unless  it  be  the  students 
of  empirical  physics  and  psychology  ? 

There  is  danger,  then,  that  the  favor  of  this  potent  mistress 
of  thought,  called  modern  science,  may  become  more  embar- 
rassing to  philosophy  than  her  disfavor  has  been.  Hence,  in 
part,  the  necessity  of  determining  more  carefully  the  natural 
and  necessary  relations  of  the  two. 

Our  previous  investigations  enable  us  at  once  to  reject  cer- 
tain views  as  to  the  distinction  between  philosophy  and  the 
positive  sciences.  Four  ways  of  drawing  this  distinction  are 
enumerated  by  Mr.  Hodgson,1  preliminary  to  the  statement  of 
the  one  which  he  himself  adopts.  We  agree  with  him  in  re- 
jecting them  all.  The  line  between  philosophy  and  science 
cannot  be  drawn  so  as  to  assign  to  the  former  only  those 
unverifiable  guesses  at  truth  which  precede  the  correct  meth- 
ods and  verifiable  truths  of  positive  science  (view  of  "  English 
Positivism").  Nor  can  the  chief  or  distinctive  work  of  phi- 
losophy be  held  to  consist  in  simply  co-ordinating  and  sys- 
tematizing the  many  different  branches  into  which  advancing 
science  differentiates  itself  ("Comtian  Positivism").  Nor  can 
we  make  the  latter  view  adequate  by  adding,  as  does  Mr.  Lewes, 
the  task  of  "disproving  and  keeping  out  of  science  all  ontologi- 
cal  entities."  All  those  three  ways  of  regarding  the  relation  of 
philosophy  and  science  destroy  the  independent  existence  and 
value  of  philosophy ;  they  arise  from  a  total  misconception  of 
either  its  true  problem  or  its  correct  method,  or  of  both.     But 

1  Philosophy  of  Reflection,  i.  28  f. 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR  SCIENCES.  57 

the  view  which  maintains  that  philosophy,  heing  the  discovery 
of  Absolute  Existence,  is  so  related  to  the  sciences  that  it  im- 
parts to  them  their  scientific  character,  by  making  their  prin- 
ciples deductions  from  the  laws  of  this  Existence  ("  the  Hegelian 
view  "),  is  also  summarily  to  be  dismissed.  The  disproof  of  this 
view  is  not  more  firmly  embodied  in  the  claims  and  achieve- 
ments of  modern  science  than  in  the  woful  failures  which  it 
has  occasioned  to  the  pursuit  of  philosophy. 

Philosophy  owes  its  origin  and  justification,  in  its  modern 
form  as  a  distinct  discipline  and  pursuit,  to  the  failure  of  each 
and  all  of  the  positive  sciences  to  satisfy  the  most  profound 
and  imperative  demands  of  human  reason.1  This  failure  has  re- 
spect to  three  things,  —  to  comprehensiveness,  to  certainty,  and 
to  ethical  and  sesthetical  significance.  The  positive  sciences  do 
not  attain,  and  from  their  very  nature  cannot  aim  at  reaching, 
the  ideally  most  comprehensive  view  of  the  world.  From  their 
very  nature  they  are  particular  sciences.  But  philosophy,  from 
its  very  nature,  deals  with  the  most  general  conceptions  ;  it 
postulates  the  possibility  of  regarding  all  the  conclusions  of  the 
sciences  in  the  light  of  a  unity  of  reality ;  and  from  this  point 
of  view  it  strives  to  transcend  what  is  most  particular  in  each 
of  them,  and  to  reach  what  is  universal  and  common  to  them 
all.  It  thus  offers  to  rational  inquiry  the  hope  of  attaining  a 
comprehensiveness  of  knowledge,  for  lack  of  which  the  forms 
of  more  concrete  knowledge  fail  wholly  to  satisfy  the  heart 
and  mind. 

The  different  positive  sciences,  as  forms  of  science,  possess  a 
particular  degree  and  kind  of  certainty.  But  they  all  involve  a 
host  of  presuppositions,  —  of  unverified  conceptions,  postulated 
entities  and  relations  of  entities,  assumed  modes  of  the  being 
and  behavior  of  things.  Upon  the  basis  of  these  presuppo- 
sitions they  move  onward  toward  the  discovery  of  further  em- 
pirical truths.     It  is  not  their  business  to  consider  the  reality 

1  Compare  Spir,  Forschung  nacb  der  Gewissheit  in  tier  Erkeuntniss  der  Wirk- 
lichkeit,  Leipzig,  1869,  p.  If. 


58  RELATION   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  basis,  or  the  grounds  of  certainty  with  which  affirma- 
tions or  denials  can  be  made  touching  its  reality  and  its  nature. 
The  "  truths "  of  science  are  the  uniform  sequences  of  phe- 
nomena which. have  been  discovered  by  fortunate  guessing,  and 
verified  by  application  of  the  methods  of  scientific  induction- 
The  certainty  of  science  is  never  more  than  a  higher  or  lower 
degree  of  probability,  —  of  probability  that,  if  something  of 
definite  sort  has  been  or  has  happened,  then  something  else  of 
a  definite  sort  has  been  or  happened,  or  is  being  or  happening, 
or  will  be  or  will  happen.  But  philosophy,  with  its  claim  to 
investigate  the  grounds  of  all  reason,  and  the  universal  forms 
and  laws  of  being,  holds  out  the  hope  of  a  more  nearly  abso- 
lute certainty  of  knowledge. 

The  different  positive  sciences  do  not,  as  forms  of  science, 
necessarily  concern  themselves  with  the  analysis,  criticism, 
and  justification  of  the  ideals  of  reason.  This  is  true  of 
ethics,  aesthetics,  and  the  science  of  religion,  as  well  as  of 
physics  and  psychology.  These  pursuits  also,  as  long  as  they 
concern  themselves  only  with  particular  classes  of  phenomena, 
leave  much  to  be  desired.  It  is  only  when  they  cease  to  be 
strictly  empirical  sciences,  and  enter  upon  inquiry  as  to  the 
value  and  existence  in  reality  of  such  ideals  as  the  Good,  the 
Beautiful,  and  God,  that  they  seem  to  attain  their  highest 
significance.  But  when  they  do  this,  they  cease  to  remain 
within  the  legitimate  sphere  of  science;  they  pass  over,  though 
it  may  be  while  retaining  the  same  names,  into  the  domain  of 
the  philosophy  of  the  Ideal.  They  then  seem,  and  truly,  to  the 
reflecting  mind  to  surpass,  in  meaning  and  value,  all  the  par- 
ticular sciences,  and  to  gain  an  existence  that  is  distinctly 
superior  to  the  basis  of  scientific  induction  upon  which  they 
dependency  rest. 

Help  toward  the  fuller  comprehension  of  the  relation  of 
philosophical  discipline  to  the  positive  sciences  may  be  gained 
by  considering  under  what  conditions  science  and  philosophy 
appear  as  distinct  stages  of   development   in  the  life  of   the 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  59 

individual  and  of  the  race.  Both  are  related  to  ordinary  non- 
scientific  cognition  as  being  alike  the  result  of  the  secondary 
and  more  elaborate  forms  of  observation  and  reflection.  It  may 
be  said,  then,  that  progress  toward  the  highest  possible  organiza- 
tion of  experience  into  a  unity  of  thought  has  three  principal 
stages.  The  first  of  these  is  that  stage  which  is  marked  by 
such  a  knowledge  of  things  and  events  as  constitutes  ordinary 
experience.  The  second  and  third  stages  are  those  of  science 
and  philosophy.  In  the  development,  both  of  the  individual 
reason  and  of  that  of  the  race,  these  three  stages  are,  of  course, 
not  preserved  apart;  nor  do  they  ever  exist  without  direct  and 
reactionary  influences  upon  each  other.  Neither  does  all  note- 
worthy construction  of  philosophical  system  wait,  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  evolution  of  mankind,  until  both  the  popular  and 
the  scientific  modes  of  cognition  have  reached  their  highest 
development ;  nor  is  it  possible  to  say  at  just  what  point  ordi- 
nary and  non-scientific  knowledge  passes  over  into  the  more 
strictly  scientific ;  or  where  is  the  precise  dividing-line,  in 
some  of  the  sciences,  between  their  scientific  content,  strictly 
so  called,  and  the  philosophical  elements  and  tenets  which 
they  contain. 

It  is  nevertheless  possible  to  distinguish,  though  in  a  some- 
what rough  and  uncertain  way,  three  main  stages  of  knowledge, 
whatever  the  subject-matter  of  the  knowledge  may  be.  To  know 
that  yeast  raises  bread,  or  that  mother-of-vinegar  converts  cider 
into  vinegar,  and  how  to  bring  about  these  desirable  changes, 
may  be  called  ordinary,  or  non -scientific,  knowledge.  To  know 
how  the  yeast  and  vinegar  plants  appear  under  the  microscope, 
to  what  classes  of  other  minute  plant-life  they  are  most  closely 
allied,  what  are  the  precise  thermic,  chemical,  and  mechanical 
conditions  favorable  to  their  propagation,  etc.,  is  to  have  a  more 
scientific  knowledge  of  the  same  subject.  To  know  that  by 
exciting  the  nerves  of  sense,  sensations  are  produced  in  the 
mind ;  that  if  the  sun  is  shining,  the  stars  are,  by  a  law 
governing    the    action    of    stimulus    on    the    nervous    system, 


(,0  RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

obscured ;  and  that  injury  to  the  mass  of  the  brain  by  wounds 
and  tumors  paralyzes  the  power  of  feeling  or  motion  in  the 
extremities,  - —  this  is,  indeed,  to  be  better  informed  than  Aris- 
totle ;  but  for  our  generation  it  may  be  called  quite  ordinary 
knowledge.  To  know  that  the  mechanical  or  chemical  action 
of  stimuli  on  the  end-organs  of  sense  starts  a  mysterious  molecu- 
lar commotion  in  the  axis-cylinders  of  the  centripetal  nerves, 
and  that  this  commotion  propagates  itself,  as  a  process  of  an  un- 
certain character,  to  the  central  nervous  mass,  and  there,  as  a 
process  yet  more  mysterious,  lays  the  physical  basis  for  a  special 
forth-putting  of  the  life  of  conscious  sensation ;  to  know  that 
Weber  and  Fechner  consider  an  increase  in  geometrical  propor- 
tion of  the  strength  of  the  stimuli  necessary  to  an  increase  in 
arithmetical  proportion  of  the  strength  of  the  resulting  sensa- 
tion, but  that  other  explorers  have  probably  disproved  the 
exactness  of  this  alleged  law ;  to  know  that  Ferrier  locates 
the  so-called  "centre  of  sight"  chiefly  in  the  gyrus  angularis, 
while  Munk  considers  this  gyrus  the  cortical  region  for  the 
tactile  sensations  of  the  eye,  and  locates  the  chief  centre 
of  sight  in  a  limited  area  of  the  occipital  lobe,  while  Goltz 
flouts  at  the  conclusions  of  both,  —  to  know  these  things, 
and  the  grounds  on  which  they  rest,  is  to  be  scientific  as  re- 
spects physiological  and  psycho-physical  questions  of  the  most 
important  kind. 

None  of  the  foregoing  species  of  knowledge  would  be  called 
"philosophical"  in  any  admissible  sense  of  the  word.  There 
is,  however,  a  science  which  aims  to  compass  the*  most  general 
laws  of  all  life.  It  is  called  biology.  It  is  comparatively  new 
in  its  equipment  of  method,  instruments  of  research,  and  masses 
of  material  calling  for  scientific  treatment.  It  is  intensely  in- 
teresting, for  its  subject  of  investigation  is  life,  —  as  such,  and 
in  all  its  forms.  And  it  is  as  ambitious  as  it  is  interesting.  It 
is  no  longer  satisfied  merely  to  classify  and  so  to  build  up  more 
and  more  minute  and  elaborate  accounts  of  the  related  forms 
of  life ;  its  principal  questions  are  no  longer  morphological. 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  61 

What  is  it  to  live  ;  or  rather,  to  be  alive  ?  It  is  this  question 
which  biology  essays  to  answer.  But  the  inquiry  after  the 
origin  of  life,  —  the  question,  "  Whence  does  life  come  ? "  is  re- 
garded with  no  less  interest  by  this  same  science  of  biology. 
It  is  true  that  for  the  present  there  is  an  almost  complete 
cessation  from  scientific  attempts  to  answer  this  question.  The 
hot  strife  over  theories  of  biogenesis  and  abioyenesis  has  largely 
subsided;  the  attempt  to  decide  by  scientific  experimentation 
between  the  two  theories  has  been  temporarily  abandoned. 
So  far  as  we  know,  Omne  vivum  e  vivo,  is  the  true  statement 
of  fact.  Biology  therefore  becomes  the  science  of  the  origin 
of  life  only  in  so  far  as  it  can,  by  study  of  embryology  and  of 
different  living  forms  under  the  light  of  evolution,  describe  in 
what  manner  and  by  what  stages  one  living  being  follows  from 
another  being  also  alive. 

But  biology  cannot  forever  abandon  the  hope  of  tracing  the 
existing  forms  of  life  beyond  the  first  living  germs  to  their 
genesis  from  non-living  matter.  Meantime,  it  is  at  liberty  to 
comfort  itself  by  pushing  the  origin  of  those  much-needed  first 
particles  of  living  protoplasm  out  into  infinite  space  as  well  as 
back  into  infinite  time.  Sir  W.  Thomson's  hypothesis,  or  some 
equally  unverifiable  form  of  guessing,  may  in  the  mean  time  fill 
the  place  vacant  of  truly  scientific  information :  germs  of  living 
things  —  we  will  conjecture  —  have  been  transported  to  our 
globe  from  some  globe  unknown.  In  the  future,  however,  bio- 
logy will  certainly  return  to  the  inquiry  after  the  real  genesis 
of  life.  It  will  then  give  attention  to  this  question  with  vastly 
increased  resources  for  its  successful  treatment,  and  from  a  far- 
advanced  point  of  view.  Suppose  it  were  at  that  time  to  attain 
a  truly  scientific  knowledge  of  the  origin  of  life,  and  were  even 
able,  from  non-living  material  particles,  to  manufacture  to  order 
bits  of  living  protoplasm  :  what  then  would  be  left  in  the  realm 
of  living  beings  for  philosophy  to  do  ; 

In  answer  to  this  question  there  is  no  escape  from  the  admis- 
sion that,  so  far  as  what  we  call  "  life  "  is  a  series  of  physical 


C2  EELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

processes  and  of  related  material  forms,  the  whole  subject  in  all 
its  aspects  must  be  left  to  science,  in  distinction  from  philosophy. 
Morphology  and  physiology,  but  both  as  studied  under  the  con- 
ception of  evolution,  are  the  twin  branches  of  biology  which 
cover  the  whole  domain  of  life,  —  of  life,  however,  only  so  far  as 
it  consists  of  related  physical  processes  and  material  forms.  But 
life,  we  might  go  on  to  argue,  is  not  all  mere  physical  processes 
and  material  forms.  Sentience  is  perhaps  connected,  in  some 
degree,  with  the  least  highly  differentiated  of  these  vital  pro- 
cesses and  living  forms.  Upon  the  more  highly  developed 
bodily  organisms  a  complex  psychical  development  is  depen- 
dent, —  a  life  of  soul  goes  with  the  life  of  organism.  In  the 
case  of  that  supreme  animal  called  man,  life  has  become  self- 
conscious,  rational,  free,  and  spiritual,  —  whatever  meaning  we 
may  attach  to  these  and  similar  terms.  Now,  if  philosophy  is 
forbidden  to  concern  itself  with  the  question  of  life  in  its  physi- 
cal aspects  and  manifestations,  may  it  not  appropriate  the 
consideration  of  those  aspects  and  manifestations  which  are 
called  spiritual  ?  This  separation  of  spheres  between  science 
and  philosophy  is  the  one  proposed  by  certain  strenuous  advo- 
cates of  the  claims  of  philosophy.  "  Philosophy  of  nature," 
says  Lichtenfels,  "  is  a  contradiction  ;  philosophy  of  spirit  a 
pleonasm."  : 

But  the  modern  science  of  life  is  not  satisfied  to  leave  an  un- 
contested field  to  philosophy,  even  after  the  latter  has  modestly 
retreated  from  the  consideration  of  all  questions  of  morphology, 
physiology,  and  the  physical  evolution  of  living  forms.  Biology 
follows  philosophy  in  its  attempted  retreat.  It  claims  the  right 
to  consider,  as  falling  under  general  biological  laws,  the  phe- 
nomena of  sentient,  and  even  of  rational  or  spiritual,  life.  For 
are  not  sentience  and  reason  forms  and  processes  of  life ;  and  is 
not  biology  (as  the  very  title  signifies)  the  science  of  the  most 
general  principles  of  all  life  ?  We  are  invited  then  to  listen  to 
discourse  of  a  "  physiology  of  the  soul,"  of  a  "  morphology  of 

1  Lehrbuch  zur  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  p.  10. 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  6 


•  > 


concepts,"  of  an  "  evolution  of  reason  "  from  the  irrational  life 
of  the  brute,  of  a  "  development  of  perceptions  "  out  of  sensa- 
tion-complexes which  are  themselves  highly  elaborate  "  aggre- 
gations "  and  "  agglutinations "  of  simple  sensation-elements, 
which  are  in  turn  the  subjective  correlates  of  undifferentiated 
nervous  shocks.  In  fact,  a  scientific  biology  is  ambitious  (and 
shall  we  say  impudent?)  enough  to  claim  that  psychology  is 
only  a  dependent  branch  of  its  own  native  stock. 

It  is  plain  from  the  foregoing  considerations  that  no  valid 
distinction  between  science  and  philosophy  can  be  based  upon 
the  present  limitations  of  success  in  the  attempt  to  reduce  to 
scientific  form  any  special  group  of  phenomena.  We  cannot 
assign  the  inquiry  into  the  forms  and  laws -of  actual  life  to 
science,  and  the  speculative  determination  of  the  genesis  of  life 
to  philosophy.  Nor  can  we  say  that  the  nature,  laws,  and 
genesis  of  sentient,  rational,  and  self-conscious  life  —  it  being 
withdrawn  from  the  domain  of  science  —  are  the  peculiar  prop- 
erty of  philosophy. 

There  are  sciences  which  lawfully  treat,  with  more  or  less 
strictly  scientific  methods,  the  various  classes  of  the  phenomena 
of  sentient  and  rational  life.  Among  them  are  psychology  (in 
the  narrower  sense  of  the  word),  psycho-physics,  ethics,  and 
sociology.  They  may  be  somewhat  imperfectly  grouped  to- 
gether and  called  the  psychological  sciences,  or  "  psychology," 
in  the  more  general  sense  of  the  word.  The  relations  which 
the  science  of  general  psychology  sustains  to  philosophy  are 
so  peculiar  and  so  important  that  to  distinguish  clearly  and 
sharply  between  the  two  is  not  easy.  One  important  depart- 
ment of  philosophy  is  called  rational  psychology,  or  the  phi- 
losophy of  mind.  Other  departments  are  called  ethics,  {Esthetics, 
and  the  philosophy  of  religion.  l>ut  there  is  a  science  of  ethics 
as  well  as  a  science  of  theology  and  of  comparative  religions  ; 
there  is  also  perhaps  a  science  of  aesthetics.  If  then  it  is  a 
"  pleonasm  "  to  speak  of  the  philosophy  of  spirit,  how  shall  we 
distinguish  between  philosophy  and  the  psychological  sciences, 


64  RELATION   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

even  after  it  has  been  admitted  that  it  is  a  "  contradiction  " 
to  speak  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  ? 

We  will  not  for  a  moment  admit  that  philosophy  has  no 
place  or  rights  in  the  domain  of  physical  phenomena.  It  is 
no  more  a  contradiction  to  speak  of  the  "  philosophy  of  nature  " 
than  it  is  a  pleonasm  to  speak  of  the  "  philosophy  of  spirit." 
We  must  rather  speak  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the 
philosophy  of  spirit  as  the  two  branches  of  the  great  depart- 
ment of  metaphysics  in  philosophy,  ■ —  and  this  without  either 
contradiction  or  pleonasm.  To  illustrate  and  enforce  the  possi- 
bility of  such  a  distinction  between  science  and  philosophy  as 
shall  secure  the  rights  of  both  in  the  domain  of  both  matter 
and  mind,  it  will  be  helpful  subsequently  to  recur  to  the  case 
of  biology.  This  case  affords  in  some  respects  the  best  possi- 
ble illustration,  because  biology  is  the  crowning  general  science 
of  physical  phenomena ;  because,  also,  it  has  such  peculiar  and 
important  relations  to  the  other  great  groups  of  phenomena 
with  which  the  psychological  sciences  deal. 

The  distinction  between  "  science  "  and  such  ordinary  knowl- 
edge as  we  should  hesitate  to  dignify  by  this  term  cannot  — 
as  we  have  seen  —  be  drawn  by  a  hard  and  fixed  line.  This 
fact  has  important  bearings  upon  the  attempt  to  distinguish 
between  science  and  philosophy.  The  observations  and  induc- 
tions of  the  average  man  have  different  degrees  of  approach  to 
the  more  strictly  scientific  method  and  to  scientific  accuracy. 
The  physical  and  natural  sciences  are  justly  proud  of  the  won- 
derful apparatus,  due  to  the  advances  in  telescopy,  microscopy, 
photography,  chemical  analysis,  etc.,  which  they  are  able  to  use 
in  the  observation  and  discrimination  of  related  phenomena. 
But  not  a  few  of  their  most  important  discoveries  have  been 
made  by  observers  who  had  at  command  little  more  than  the 
ordinary  means  of  observation.  The  inductions  of  science,  too, 
are  supposed  to  be  clearly  superior  to  those  of  common  life, 
not  only  because  of  their  use  of  the  superior  means  of  obser- 
vation which  science  possesses,  but  also  because  the  successive 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  65 

steps  of  induction  are  much  more  skilfully  prepared  and  care- 
fully guarded.  It  would  be  difficult,  however,  to  say  just  what 
amount  of  the  rules  of  induction  —  agreement,  difference,  and 
concomitant  variation  —  is  needed  in  each  case  in  order  to  im- 
part to  the  conclusions  reached,  the  right  to  be  called  "  scien- 
tific." And  there  are  subjects  where  we  may  (whether  rightly 
or  wrongly,  we  will  not  say)  still  prefer  the  declarations  and 
predictions  of  men  of  so-called  non-scientific  experience  to 
those  of  professed  scientific  experts.  Not  a  few  pleasure- 
seekers,  for  example,  take  counsel  of  the  weather-wise  farmer 
or  sailor  with  more  confidence  than  of  their  morning  newspaper. 
Furthermore,  when  we  ask  the  students  of  science  themselves 
to  name  the  distinguishing  marks  of  that  kind  of  knowledge 
to  which  they  lay  special  claim,  we  do  not  receive  a  wholly 
unequivocal  and  satisfactory  answer.  The  feeling  of  this  ina- 
bility it  doubtless  was  which  led  Professor  Huxley  to  define 
science  as  "  organized  common-sense."  If  we  were  to  gather 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  conception  of  the  nature  of  science  from 
his  essay  on  "  The  Classification  of  the  Sciences,"  we  should  say 
that  he  regards  it  as  the  " interpretation"  either  "  analytical " 
or  "  synthetical,"  of  the  different  principal  groups  of  similar  phe- 
nomena. But  Mr.  Spencer  apparently  does  not  give  us  any  rule 
for  telling  precisely  how  much  of  "  interpretation  "  is  necessary 
to  the  existence  of  "  science,"  as  distinguished  from  ordinary 
non-scientific  cognition.  At  the  same  time,  no  one  holds  more 
firmly  than  he  to  a  distinct  place  for  philosophy  as  a  sphere 
or  kind  of  interpretation  beyond  that  of  science.  Science,  Mr. 
Spencer  regards  as  "  partially  unified  knowledge  ; "  but  "  phi- 
losophy is  completely  unified  knowledge."1  That  "interpre- 
tation "  of  phenomena  which  seeks  the  complete  unification  of 
knowledge  is  doubtless  philosophy.  But  since  all  attempts 
at  philosophy  are  only  "  partially "  successful,  the  distinction 
between  science  and  philosophy  becomes  in  its  turn  a  matter 
of  degree. 

1  First  Principles,  p.  539. 
5 


66  RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Considered  with  reference  to  its  object  of  pursuit,  Helmholtz 1 
defines  science  to  be  "the  knowledge  how,  at  different  times, 
under  the  same  conditions,  the  same  results  are  brought  about " 
Defining  more  loosely,  and  yet  from  the  same  point  of  view, 
Professor  Tait  declares :  "  The  object  of  all  pure  physical  sci- 
ence is  to  endeavor  to  grasp  more  and  more  perfectly  the 
nature  and  laws  of  the  external  world."  And  Helmholtz 
expands  his  conception  of'  science  when  he  proceeds  to  say : 
"  Our  desire  to  comprehend  natural  phenomena  .  .  .  thus  takes 
another  form  of  expression,  —  that  is,  we  have  to  seek  out 
the  forces  which  are  the  causes  of  the  phenomena." 

In  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  foregoing  definitions  and 
of  the  entire  body  of  scientific  investigation,  we  describe  the 
work  of  modern  science  as  follows  :  It  is  the  systematizing  of 
experience,  by  classifying  the  different  like  groups  of  pheno- 
mena through  exact  and  comprehensive  observation,  and  by 
explaining  them  through  the  discovery  and  verification  of  the 
existing  uniform  relations.  Its  formula  is :  If  this  happens, 
that  will  happen  ;  or  if  this  has  happened,  that  has  also  hap- 
pened, —  everywhere  and  every  time. 

All  knowledge  implies  the  progressive  systematizing  of  ex- 
perience ;  this  is  as  true  of  that  which  is  esteemed  ordinary 
knowledge  as  of  that  which  is  praised  for  its  highly  scientific 
character.  Indeed,  it  might  be  said  that  the  growth  of  expe- 
rience itself  is  but  a  progressive  formation  of  system  amongst 
the  different  elements  and  individual  items  of  experience.  Sci- 
ence is  superior  to  the  unscientific  growth  of  knowledge,  in 
respect  both  of  the  accuracy  and  extent  of  its  observations, 
and  of  the  discovery  and  verification  of  so-called  forces  and  laws. 
Its  observations  are  rendered  more  accurate  by  the  use  of  spe- 
cial means  of  observation,  —  telescope,  microscope,  and  all  the 
improved  means  of  making  physical  measurements  and  calcula- 
tions, —  in  the  hands  of  trained  and  expert  observers.  Its  expla- 
nations far  surpass  those  of  the  men  of  ordinary  knowledge, 
1  Popular  Lectures  on  Scientific  Subjects,  pp.  370  f.  and  393  f. 


TO   THE   PAKTICULAR   SCIENCES.  67 

because  they  consist  in  the  application  of  a  well-compacted 
body  of  acknowledged  facts  and  laws  to  the  discovery  of  new 
facts  ;  and  either  to  the  further  verification  of  forces  and  laws 
already  known,  or  to  the  establishment  of  new  knowledge  of 
forces  and  laws.  Thus  understood,  however,  science  differs  from 
ordinary  non-scientific  knowledge  in  degree  rather  than  in  kind 
of  knowledge. 

But  thus  understood,  science  is  invested  on  either  hand  by 
knowledge,  or  rather  by  a  potentiality  —  we  will  say  —  of 
knowledge,  from  which  it  differs  in  kind  as  well  as  in  degree. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  assumes  (oftentimes  with  a  naivete  as  great 
as  that  which  characterizes  the  men  of  only  ordinary  experi- 
ence) certain  conceptions,  forms  of  general  judgment,  or  other 
principles,  which  it  does  not  feel  itself  bound  or  competent 
critically  to  examine.  Or  if  it  does  subject  these  postulates 
of  all  its  procedure  to  critical  examination,  it  concerns  itself 
only  with  the  shape  which  they  must  take  as  tenable  scientific 
hypotheses.  It  regards  the  postulates  as  instruments  for  the 
successful  treatment  of  phenomena  by  the  methods  of  classi- 
fication and  discovery  of  so-called  laws  or  uniform  relations. 
But  if  science  ventures  upon  a  discussion  of  the  applicability 
in  reality  of  these  postulates,  or  of  the  relation  they  sustain 
in  reality  to  the  unity  of  the  world  and  of  all  experience,  it 
abandons  its  own  peculiar  sphere;  for  such  discussion  is  not 
scientific,  and  does  not  admit  of  scientific  proof  or  disproof,  in 
the  stricter  meaning  of  these  words.  Such  discussion  is  meta- 
physics, —  that  is,  a  branch  of  philosophy.  And  this  is  equally 
true  whether  it  be  metaphysics  of  mathematics,  or  of  physics, 
or  —  again  —  of  psychology. 

On  the  other  hand  of  the  legitimate  sphere  of  scientific  re- 
search stands  another  class  of  inquiries  which  are  its  limits,  and 
at  the  same  time  the  boundaries  of  philosophy.  These  are  the 
inquiries  into  the  relations  of  the  different  groups  of  phenom- 
ena, with  which  the  particular  sciences  deal,  to  the  Ideals  of 
reason,  and  to  the  Unity  of  Reality  in  which  these  Ideals  are 


68  KELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

held  by  philosophy  to  have  their  ground.  The  truth  of  science 
is  fact  and  law,  —  the  latter  being  understood  as  the  verified 
uniform  concomitances  and  sequences  of  facts.  How  these  can 
have,  or  whether  they  do  have,  the  value  which  reason  attaches 
to  what  is  true  (in  the  philosophical  sense  of  the  word),  beauti- 
ful, and  morally  good,  science  does  not  inquire.  Or  if  it  does 
enter  upon  this  inquiry,  it  passes  beyond  the  limits  of  the  par- 
ticular sciences,  and  enters  the  proper  domain  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  Ideal.  It  becomes,  no  longer  science,  but  philosophical 
ethics  or  aesthetics,  or  the  .philosophy  of  religion. 

The  general  distinction  which  has  just  been  made  we  will 
now  apply  to  biology ;  and  since  the  foregoing  considerations 
have  had  particular  reference  to  the  relation  of  philosophy  and 
the  physical  and  natural  sciences,  we  will  now  consider  biol- 
ogy as  only  one  of  these  sciences.  What  then,  we  may  ask, 
remains  in  the  sphere  of  physical  life  for  philosophy  to  con- 
sider, if  biology  as  a  science  is  entitled  to  claim  as  its  own  the 
discovery  and  verification  of  the  most  general  laws,  not  only  of 
the  evolution,  but  also  of  the  genesis,  of  all  life  ?  There  re- 
mains for  philosophy,  we  reply,  no  less  than  the  consideration 
of  the  most  interesting,  difficult,  and  in  some  regards  most  im- 
portant, of  all  the  inquiries  touching  the  general  subject-matter 
of  biology. 

What  is  the  significance,  in  reality,  of  life  ?  Is  it  to  be  found 
in  the  supreme  form  of  life,  in  the  self-conscious  striving,  the 
thinking  and  planning,  the  joy  and  suffering,  of  rational  mind ; 
or  in  an  unconscious  principle  called  Matter,  Absolute  Ego, 
Will,  or  Will  conjoined  with  Idea  and  yet  not  conscious  of  itself  ? 

What  significance  in  reality,  moreover,  shall  we  attach  to  the 
development  of  living  forms  ?  Biological  science  deals  with  the 
evolution  of  life  in*  the  individual,  the  species,  the  family,  —  in 
all  interconnected  forms  of  life.  But  with  its  aid  alone  the  law 
of  evolution  can  never  attain  to  anything  more  than  the  place 
of  a  working  hypothesis,  adapted  to  the  systematizing  of  the 
groups  of  observed  or  inferred  phenomena.     Is  this  great  law 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  69 

itself  valid  in  Eeality ;  or  is  it  good  for  use  only  as  a  seeming 
(Schein)  ?  May  we  speak  of  the  Absolute  (of  God)  as  in  a 
process  of  becoming  ?  Or  if  not,  in  what  relation  do  the  law 
of  evolution  and  the  living  forms  evolved  stand  to  the  supreme 
Reality  we  try  to  express  by  that  word  ?  What,  further,  do  we 
mean  when  we  proclaim,  in  the  name  of  biological  science,  the 
goodness  of  the  result  attained  through  the  struggle  of  species, 
as  higher  and  yet  higher  forms,  leading  up  to  self-conscious  ra- 
tional life,  appear  to  view  ?  What  is  this  standard  by  which 
we  attempt  to  difference  ideally  the  living  forms  and  arrange 
them  in  series,  with  man  at  their  head  ?  Is  it  a  matter  simply 
of  complexity  of  mechanical  contrivances  and  processes,  leaving 
all  conscious  life  out  of  the  account  ?  Or  is  it  a  matter  of  more 
or  less  in  the  gross  amount  of  sensuous  or  other  forms  of 
happiness  and  misery  ?  Or,  finally,  is  it  not  also  a  matter  of 
approximation  to  certain  ideals  of  reason,  to  the  beautiful  and 
the  morally  good  ?  And  what  reality  does  our  standard  of 
good  possess ;  or  is  the  standard  itself  mere  seeming  good 
(Scheingut)  ? 

Now,  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  the  consideration  of  questions 
such  as  the  foregoing  is  not  in  a  large  measure  distinct  from 
strictly  scientific  inquiry  after  the  physical  relations  under 
which  the  genesis  and  evolution  of  particular  living  forms 
take  place.  This  distinction  would,  moreover,  continue  to 
hold  if  biology  were  a  much  more  highly  developed  physical 
science  than  it  can  at  present  pretend  to  be.  Nay,  more :  the 
distinction  would  not  cease  to  be  important  if  biology  had  fin- 
ished all  the  work  that,  as  an  exact  science  (?),  it  can  ever  hope 
to  finish.  If  the  description  of  all  the  observed  forms  of  life 
were,  in  all  their  stages,  made  complete,  and  if  the  genesis  and 
interrelated  growth  of  these  forms  were  so  mastered  that  all  the 
facts  could  be  brought  under  general  laws,  the  services  of  bio- 
logical science  to  philosophy  would  be  greatly  enlarged.  But 
the  peculiar  task  of  philosophy  with  reference  to  the  problems 
of  life  would  not  be  accomplished.     Indeed,  it  would  not  neces- 


7()  RELATION   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

sarily  be  even  rightly  begun.  For  the  consideration  of  the  re- 
lation in  which  all  these  living  forms,  with  the  generalized 
statements  of  fact  respecting  their  physical  genesis  and  devel- 
opment, stand  to  the  world's  Unity  in  Eeality,  and  to  the  ideals 
of  reason,  —  the  beautiful,  the  morally  good,  and  that  supreme 
object  of  religious  adoration  whom  faith  calls  God,  —  would 
still  remain  untouched.  Such  consideration  is  for  philosophy 
to  attempt. 

It  may  be  maintained  that  philosophy  can  answer  none  of 
the  foregoing  questions,  or  that  it  can  cope  with  only  a  few 
of  them,  and  with  these  only  with  a  partial  success.  So  it 
may  be  maintained  (and  truthfully)  that  biology  can  at  present 
give  a  strictly  scientific  solution  to  almost  none  of  its  own  more 
important  problems,  and  that  its  most  strenuous  efforts  to  bring 
the  phenomena  of  life  under  the  law  of  the  conservation  and 
correlation  of  energy,  and  under  the  form  of  a  general  mechan- 
ical theory,  have  resulted  only  in  unverifiable  guessing.  But 
such  a  claim  does  not  work  the  destruction  of  the  science  of 
biology  so-called ;  nor  does  it  prevent  our  setting  apart  for  its 
researches,  (albeit  so  difficult,  and  restricted  in  exact  results)  a 
distinctive  sphere.  In  like  manner,  the  claim  that  philosophy 
has  achieved  small  success  in  solving  the  problems  assigned 
to  it,  does  not  destroy  its  claim  to  a  distinctive  work  within  a 
somewhat  definitively  recognized  sphere.  Perhaps  if  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  principles  of  all  life  becomes  more  scientific,  the  phi- 
losophical consideration  of  these  principles  will  become  more 
satisfactory  to  biologists  themselves.  Certainly,  at  present, 
neither  the  student  of  biological  science,  nor  the  thinker  who 
would  give  to  the  phenomena  of  life  a  philosophical  treatment, 
is  entitled  to  despise  the  work  of  the  other. 

Nor  can  it  be  maintained  that  the  special  form  of  biological 
inquiries,  with  which  philosophy  attempts  to  deal,  is  not 
worthy  of  consideration.  So  narrow  an  interest  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  life  would  be  as  unbecoming  to  science  as  to 
philosophy. 


TO  THE   PARTICULAR  SCIENCES.  71 

Besides  the  special  philosophical  problems  which  attach 
themselves  to  biology  as  a  positive  science,  there  are  others 
which  are  common  to  it  and  to  the  other  physical  sciences. 
The  relation  of  biology  to  all  these  sciences  is  such  that  it 
founds  itself  upon  them  all.  It  is  the  crowning  science  among 
the  system  of  sciences,  —  pre-eminently  complex,  sensitive, 
and  dependent,  and  yet  supremely  interesting  on  account  of 
its  connections  with  practical  and  philosophical,  as  well  as 
strictly  scientific  problems.  Its  springs  and  currents  of  dis- 
covery and  speculation  swarm  with  postulated  physical  en- 
tities, forces,  and  laws,  of  a  kind  to  promote  a  large  extension 
of  metaphysical  theory. 

The  modern  science  of  biology  is  not  chiefly  a  system  of 
classifications.  Besides  morphology,  it  depends  upon  histo- 
logy, embryology,  and  physiology ;  and  it  receives  and  appro- 
priates the  results  of  all  three  of  these  sciences  as  studied 
in  the  light  of  the  theory  of  evolution.  But  each  of  these 
sciences  makes  use  of  microscopy  and  of  the  general  mechan- 
ical theory ;  especially  does  each  rely  upon  the  conclusions 
and  methods  of  chemistry  and  molecular  physics.  In  accept- 
ing these  methods  and  conclusions,  biology  accepts  the  pos- 
tulated entities,  forces,  and  laws  which  enter  into  them  all. 
It  explains  the  phenomena  of  life  by  reference  to  their  causes 
in  invisible  and  intangible  beings  of  a  material  sort,  called 
"atoms"  and  "molecules;"  and  between  these  beings  it  as- 
sumes or  demonstrates  relations  of  attraction  and  repulsion, 
of  changing  position  or  motion,  of  affinity  and  synthesis  or 
its  contrary,  and  the  like.  And  since  a  general  theory  of 
molecular  physics  best  explains  the  likenesses  and  unlike- 
nesses  in  the  groups  of  phenomena,  which  refers  them  to  the 
reciprocal  influence  of  the  elementary  beings  (i.  e.,  of  the 
atoms  and  molecules),  such  theory  ascribes  to  these  beings 
"  natures  "  according  to  which  they  are  arranged  into  hypotheti- 
cal kinds,  either  like  or  unlike.  It  distinguishes  at  present 
more  than  sixty  of  such  kinds.     The  natures  of  these  beings 


72  RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

are,  moreover,  said  to  be  determined  by  the  forces  inherent  in 
them ;  these  forces,  science  declares,  may  nevertheless  be  modi- 
fications of  one  and  the  same  force.  Possibly  the  number  of 
entities  needed  for  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  may  be 
found  to  be  more  than  is  now  thought  requisite ;  or  —  what 
seems  rather  to  be  desired,  and  likelier  to  turn  out  true  — 
the  present  number  may  ultimately  be  greatly  reduced. 

All  observed  changes  in  biological  phenomena  are  therefore 
referred,  for  their  ultimate  explanation,  to  occult  changes  in 
the  invisible  realm  of  molecular  entities,  forces,  and  laws. 
The  science  of  the  genesis  and  growth  of  living  forms  regards 
them  thus.  Life  and  death  are  alike  in  this  respect,  that 
they  both  consist  of  observed  changes,  which  are  to  be  referred 
for  their  explanation  to  the  occult  influence  of  the  same  mo- 
lecular beings,  with  their  wonderful  equipment  of  related 
forces,  acting  under  law.  Thermic,  electric,  chemical,  and 
other  mechanical  energies  have  their  bearing  on  the  phe- 
nomena of  life  through  the  same  invisible  world  of  atoms 
with  their  ceaseless  changes  of  relation  in  space. 

How  does  the  science  of  biology  come  into  possession  of 
this  equipment  of  mysterious  entities  and  forces  ?  What  is 
the  nature  of  the  knowledge  it  has  lawfully  gained  of  atoms 
and  molecules,  original  natures  of  atoms,  forces  of  molecular 
attraction  and  repulsion ;  also  of  occult  causes,  and  of  the 
hypothesis  of  universally  regnant  law  ?  It  borrows  this  knowl- 
edge from  the  other  physical  sciences  on  which  it  depends. 
What,  furthermore,  have  the  sciences  on  which  biology  de- 
pends to  do  with  the  same  metaphysical  pre-suppositions  ? 
Much,  if  the  pre-suppositions  are  used  simply  as  working  hy- 
potheses; nothing,  if  they  require  to  be  validated  as  belonging 
to  the  world  of  reality. 

To  the  sciences,  in  so  far  as  they  are  merely  scientific,  all 
consideration  of  the  world  of  entities,  forces,  and  causes  has 
only  the  value  of  good  or  bad  working  hypotheses.  To  them 
the  existence  and  nature  of  the  atom  is  an  hypothesis,  valu- 


TO  THE   PARTICULAR  SCIENCES.  73 

able  according  as  it  does,  or  does  not,  serve  to  explain  the 
phenomena  by  aiding  the  discovery  and  verification  of  their 
uniform  concomitances  and  sequences.  To  them  the  extra- 
mental  reality  of  the  causes  and  forces  —  thought  of  as  exist- 
ing "in"  the  atoms,  or  "between"  them,  or  presiding  "over" 
them  —  is  of  no  immediate  concern.  For  to  them  causes  and 
forces  also  are  only  hypotheses,  useful  in  the  classification,  and 
reduction  to  uniform  relations,  of  the  phenomena. 

The  sciences  on  which  biology  more  immediately  depends 
themselves  rest  on  a  lower  and  broader  basis  of  physical 
science.  Along  the  general  level  of  this  basis,  although  at 
somewhat  different  relative  heights,  are  such  sciences  as  as- 
tronomy, geology,  meteorology,  and  especially  physics,  in  the 
more  limited  meaning  of  the  word.  Lower  still  lies  mechanics, 
as  the  most  general  science  of  the  action  of  forces  in  the  pro- 
duction of  motion  or  of  strain.  This  science,  as  Professor  Tait 
tells  us  in  the  last  edition  of  the  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica," 
"  treats  of  the  action  of  Force  upon  Matter ; "  but  is  more  cor- 
rectly (is  this  because  of  the  hope  thus  to  escape  from  the 
metaphysical  implications  of  words  like  "force"  and  "action," 
etc.?)  "the  Science  of  Matter  and  Motion,  or  of  Matter  and 
Energy."  Matter,  Motion,  and  Energy,  —  these  are  words 
burdened  with  the  survivals  of  centuries  of  metaphysical 
doctrine,  and  utterly  and  forever  incapable  of  being  wholly 
cleared  of  a  metaphysical  investment  and  reference. 

What,  we  might  ask,  is  this  "  Matter "  with  which  it  is  the 
business  of  the  science  of  mechanics  especially  to  deal  ?  Is  it 
the  only  matter  which  is  concretely  and  definitively  known; 
namely,  matter  subjective,  the  synthesis  in  experience  of  local- 
ized sensation-complexes,  of  remembered  images  of  sensation- 
complexes,  of  inferences  from  such  images,  and  of  the  naive 
metaphysical  postulate  of  an  unknown  objective  ground  for 
the  phenomena  ?  This  can  scarcely  be  so,  for  we  are  told  in 
this  connection  that  a  better  name  for  mechanics  would  be 
abstract    dynamics,    and    that    the    science    is    what    is    called 


74  KELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

"pure."  Is  then  the  "matter"  of  which  mechanics  treats  a 
concept  merely,  albeit  a  concept  of  the  very  highest  form  of 
generalization,  and  equivalent  perhaps  to  the  "  mysterious  some- 
thing" by  which  all  this  (the  processes  and  evolution  called 
"  physical  ")  is  accomplished  ?  Now,  the  type  of  this  matter 
with  which  mechanics  deals  is  a  single  particle,  without  nature, 
character,  instinct,  will,  or  idea.  But,  in  reality,  where  exists 
any  such  particle  ?  In  reality,  of  course,  each  particle  is  an 
atom,  or  a  congeries  of  atoms,  full  of  manifold  potentialities  and 
forms  of  energy,  found  at  the  beginning,  and  always  known, 
only  in  the  most  complicated  processes  of  changing  relations 
toward  other  like  or  unlike  particles. 

Let  not  mechanics,  that  science  so  "  pure "  and  "  abstract," 
think  to  escape  the  need  of  help  from  philosophy  by  substi- 
tuting for  the  metaphysical  term  "  force  "  such  words  as  "  mo- 
tion "  and  "  energy."  For  what  are  we  to  understand  by  the 
motion  of  which  it  is  the  science,  if  it  be  aught  more  than  a  par- 
ticular time-series  of  differently  localized  sensation-complexes, 
—  as  when  a  shooting-star  passes  over  the  field  of  my  vision, 
or  a  fly  crawls  over  the  skin  of  my  cheek  or  hand  ?  Is  there 
motion,  in  reality  ?  Can  there  be  motion  without  some  reality 
to  Space,  in  which,  as  we  say,  motion  takes  place ;  or  without 
some  reality  to  Time,  within  which  (in  another  meaning  of  the 
word  "  within  ")  motion  occurs  ?  Can  there  be  motion  without 
some  real  being  to  move  ?  What  is  the  relation  in  which  all 
motion  stands  to  the  ultimate  Eeality,  after  whose  nature  phi- 
losophy seeks  ?  Does  this  Eeality  itself  change ;  and  how  can 
it  be  the  ground  of  change  of  relations  in  space  among  those 
elements  of  material  kind  whose  existence  physical  science 
assumes  as  its  working  hypothesis?  These  are  among  the 
problems  handed  over,  as  it  were,  to  philosophy  from  the  naive 
and  uninstructed  presuppositions  with  which  this  so-called 
science  of  motion  deals. 

It  has  been  fashionable  for  some  time  past  to  reject  the  word 
"force"  from  the  discussions  of  the  exact  sciences,  and  to  sub- 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  7.-, 

stitute  for  it  the  word  "  energy."  '  To  this  no  objection  can  be 
raised  if  the  end  desired  be  to  obtain  and  employ  a  term,  in  a 
hypothetical  way,  which  shall  be  better  capable  of  fulfilling  the 
requirements  of  exact  science.  It  would  be  vain,  however,  to 
hope  by  a  change  of  words  to  free  physical  science  from  its 
natural  dependence  on  reason,  or  from  its  obligations  to  that 
higher  use  of  reason  at  which  philosophy  aims.  If  we  adopt 
the  new  word,  all  the  old  philosophical  problems  at  once  recur, 
and  attach  themselves  with  equal  persistence  to  it.  What  is 
this  "  energy,"  whose  conservation  and  correlation  is  a  postulate 
of  all  modern  physical  science,  and  with  the  most  general  laws 
of  which,  as  productive  of  motion,  it  is  the  business  of  "  ab- 
stract dynamics  "  to  deal  ?  Let  a  colleague  of  Professor  Tait 
in  the  same  literary  work  make  answer.  "Energy,"  says  Mr. 
William  Garnett,  "  may  be  defined  as  the  power  of  doing  work." 
But  in  this  definition  the  metaphysical  conception  is  returned 
to  philosophy  for  its  consideration  anew.  For  what  is  "power," 
potential  or  kinetic,  apart  from  all  implication  of  force  ?  What 
also  is  it  "  to  do,"  and  "  to  do  work,"  unless  the  influence  of  one 
part  of  real  being  on  another,  and  the  occurrence  of  reciprocally 
dependent  changes  in  reality,  and  the  reality  of  some  unity  in 
causal  relations,  be  somehow  implied. 

Undoubtedly  it  would  not  do  to  affirm  that  mechanics 
cannot  exist  and  grow,  as  an  exact  and  pure  science,  without 
consciously  resting  on  some  basis  of  philosophical  doctrine, 
more  or  less  intelligently  adopted.  The  contrary  is  true.  As 
pure  science,  and  unmixed  with  definite  metaphysical  doctrine, 
it  need  not  consider  the  foregoing  fundamental  problems  at  all. 
It  is  meant  rather  to  affirm  that  mechanics,  like  every  form 
of  physical  or  natural  science  into  which  mechanics  enters, 
actually  involves  certain  assumptions,  the  criticism  and  sys- 
tematizing of  which  it  is  the  business  of  philosophy  to  un- 
dertake. When,  then,  mechanics  and  the  other  mechanical 
sciences  employ  words  like  "Matter,"  "Motion,"  and  "Energy" 
or  "  Force,"  they  are  to  be  understood  as  legitimately  extending 


76  RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  field  of  science  by  use  of  certain  universal  hypotheses. 
But  the  student  of  mechanics,  as  a  student  of  science  merely, 
can  go  no  farther  than  to  say,  if  by  matter,  motion,  and  force 
we  mean  thus  and  so,  then,  under  certain  circumstances  (also  — 
it  is  likely  —  wholly  hypothetical),  the  uniform  concomitances 
and  sequences  of  phenomena  will  be  of  the  following  order 
and  kind.  Whenever  the  student  of  science  enters  upon  the 
discussion  of  the  nature  and  validity,  in  reality,  of  the  hypo- 
theses he  feels  compelled  to  make,  he  departs  from  the  sphere 
of  science  strictly  so  called.  He  becomes  a  metaphysician,  a 
philosopher  in  one  of  the  most  abstruse  and  difficult  depart- 
ments of  philosophy.  He  is  not  by  any  means  necessarily 
saved  by  his  scientific  training  and  resources  from  being  a  bad 
metaphysician,  although  within  the  sphere  of  scientific  hypo- 
theses. He  is  not  rendered  able  to  extricate  himself,  or  his 
science,  from  need  of  the  helping  right-hand  of  philosophy. 

All  the  abstract  and  pure  sciences,  like  mechanics,  as  sciences, 
have  only  the  value  of  a  consistent  arrangement  of  conceptions 
under  a  number  of  most  general  hypotheses.  The  validity  which 
they  seem  in  themselves  to  have  is  due  to  their  consistency. 
Nor  is  even  the  consistency,  which  these  sciences  are  obliged 
to  maintain,  as  necessary  to  their  successful  prosecution,  of  the 
highest  kind.  It  is  not  necessary,  for  example,  that  the  con- 
ception of  Space  which  is  held  by  the  student  of  mechanics 
should  be  consistent  with  the  truths  of  psychological  develop- 
ment, or  with  the  highest  doctrine  of  that  unity  which  belongs 
to  the  world  of  reality.  The  student  of  mechanics  may  adopt 
the  crudest  realism ;  he  may  even  regard  space  as  itself  an  ex- 
istent entity,  an  indefinitely  spread- out  actuality;  he  may  feel 
unable  to  imagine  the  Infinite  as  independent 'of  the  relations 
and  limitations  of  space.  He  may  speak  of  energy  as  though 
it  were  something  which  could  actually  be  stored  up,  and  passed 
over  from  one  atom  or  mass  to  another.  He  may  make  bis 
atoms  into  gods,  and  bow  down  and  worship  them,  while  deny- 
ing all  power  in  philosophy  or  theology  to  bring  to  man  the 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR  SCIENCES.  77 

knowledge  of  God,  the  Father  Almighty.  Such  crudities  and 
vagaries  of  philosophical  thought  would  not,  however,  of  neces- ' 
sity  injure  the  cogency  or  completeness  of  his  reasoning  in  the 
sphere  of  his  science.  The  highest  success  here  is  possible,  if 
only  the  few  conceptions  to  be  systematized  be  kept  consistent 
with  one  another,  under  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  funda- 
mental hypotheses. 

Much  of  what  has  already  been  said  concerning  the  relation 
of  mechanics  to  philosophy  is  also  true  of  pure  mathematics. 
The  latter  science  has  sometimes  been  called  distinctively 
metaphysical.  The  designation  is  to  a  certain  extent  correct, 
because  the  entities  and  ratiocinative  processes  of  mathematics, 
like  those  of  metaphysics,  appear  before  the  mind  as  indepen- 
dent of  verification  from  concrete  and  individual  experiences. 
But  in  the  course  of  thought  we  are  now  following,  mathemat- 
ics, of  all  the  sciences,  stands  most  remote  from  metaphysics. 
It  involves  comparatively  few  of  those  assumptions  touching 
the  existence  and  nature  of  known  reality  with  which  meta- 
physics is  concerned.  We  are  reminded,  however,  that  an  an- 
cient system  of  philosophy  made  number  of  the  very  essence  of 
reality.  Great  is  the  power  of  this  same  conception  of  number 
in  the  modern  mechanical  theory  of  the  world ;  great  also  in 
respect  to  the  questions  it  opens  before  us  as  to  the  possibility 
—  for  example  —  of  space  of  n  dimensions,  and  as  regards  the 
application  of  all  arithmetical  and  geometrical  formulae  to  the 
ultimate  being  of  things.  And  here  the  problems  of  mathe- 
matics and  metaphysics  begin  to  coincide  at  so  many  points 
that  the  lines  of  the  movement  of  the  two  seem  to  become 
identical. 

Is  the  Absolute  a  unity,  or  in  fact  can  we  apply  at  all  the 
conceptions  and  relations  of  number  to  the  ultimate  Being  we 
designate  by  that  word  ?  And  if  the  Absolute  is  One,  how 
shall  we  conceive  of  the  nature  of  that  unity  which  the  Abso- 
lute has  or  is  ?  What  kind  of  unity  do  the  elements  of  material 
reality,  the  so-called  atoms,  have  ?     How  shall  we,  by  indefinite 


78  RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

subdivisions  into  minuter  parts,  reach  a  real  physical  unity  ? 
How,  indeed,  can  there  be  Unity  in  consistency  with  the  vari- 
ety of  the  really  Existent  ?  What  bond  in  idea  or  actuality 
ties  the  infinite  multiplicity  of  things  and  atoms  into  the  one- 
ness of  being  which  the  real  world  has  ? 

The  answer  to  such  questions  as  the  foregoing  may  be  far 
and  difficult  to  seek,  or  even  impossible  to  find.  But  the  ques- 
tions themselves  spring  forth  with  ever-new  freshness  and 
power  from  the  human  reason.  They  are  not  proposed  as  the 
useless  puzzles  of  a  few  disturbed  brains.  They  perpetually 
recur  along  the  path  of  scientific  and  rational  evolution.  They 
ask  themselves,  as  it  were,  and  keep  insisting  upon  considera- 
tion, although  the  complete  answer  to  them  has  never  yet  been 
found.  Mathematics,  as  a  science  pure  or  applied,  cannot  en- 
tertain, not  to  say  answer  them.  They  do  not  fall  within  the 
legitimate  sphere  of  any  of  the  physical  and  natural  sciences. 
Yet  these  sciences  all  contain  the  fundamental  conceptions,  the 
reflective  analysis  and  the  attempted  synthesis  of  which  give 
to  philosophy  some  of  its  hardest  problems. 

It  is  not  simply  for  the  detection  and  criticism  of  their 
presuppositions,  both  general  and  special,  that  the  physical 
sciences  are  dependent  upon  philosophical  analysis  ;  they  are 
also  dependent  upon  synthetic  philosophy  for  certain  su- 
preme generalizations  which  may  be  given  to  the  highest 
principles  that  have  been  discovered  empirically.  And,  in 
turn,  philosophy  is  dependent  upon  the  particular  sciences 
for  its  own  subject-matter  in  the  form  of  their  highest  scien- 
tific generalizations.  All  the  more  comprehensive  results  of 
induction,  as  they  are  afforded  by  these  sciences,  are  contribu- 
tions to  the  material  of  philosophy.  The  very  life  and  growth 
of  philosophy  as  a  scientific  system  depends  upon  its  appropria- 
tion of  this  material.  Only  in  this  way  can  the  results  of 
speculative  reflection  keep  constantly  in  touch  with  concrete 
and  living  realities.  Only  in  this  way  can  philosophy  be  saved 
from  the  fate  of  deceiving  itself  with  the  synthesis  of  barren 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  79 

abstractions,  —  mere  fragments  of  incomplete  analysis,  mingled 
with  conjectural  entities  and  forces,  and  bound  together  into 
a  totality  that  has  only  the  consistency  and  unity  of  pleasant 
dreams. 

The  attitude  of  direct  dependence  in  which  philosophy  stands 
toward  the  positive  sciences  might  be  illustrated  by  many  ex- 
amples. Indeed,  the  entire  history  of  modern  philosophy  does 
but  afford  a  series  of  illustrations.  The  Hegelian  system,  as 
left  by  its  founder,  fell  into  disfavor,  not  more  because  of  the 
general  defectiveness  of  the  dialectical  method  and  the  inability 
of  its  conclusions  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  heart,  than  through 
the  contempt  which  the  positive  sciences  threw  upon  its  man- 
ner of  treating  the  choicest  results  of  their  inductions.  Every 
new  attempt  at  philosophical  system  has  first  of  all  to  reckon 
with  the  positive  sciences.  If  it  passes  by  their  discoveries  in 
silence,  the  present  age  is  sure  to  consider  it  inadequate  and 
insufficiently  founded.  If  it  contradicts  these  discoveries,  it  is 
itself  immediately  subjected  to  so  great  contempt  as  not  even 
to  be  thought  worthy  of  argument.  If  it  seems  to  show  higher 
speculative  reasons  for  the  validity  of  scientific  discoveries,  or 
illustrates  them  by  pointing  out  new  and  valuable  relations  in 
which  they  stand  to  the  Ideals  of  Eeason  and  to  the  Ultimate 
Being  of  the  world,  it  wins,  so  far  forth,  some  claims  to  recog- 
nition and  to  respect  at  the  hands  of  science.  Nor  do  we  for 
a  moment  think  of  complaining  of  all  this.  On  the  contrary, 
this  is  precisely  as  it  should  be.  There  can  be  no  philosophy 
of  nature  which  is  not  securely  founded  upon  the  principles 
established  by  the  inductive  science  of  nature.  There  is  no 
philosophy  of  mind  which  is  not  dependent  for  its  material 
upon  the  empirical  pursuit  of  the  psychological  sciences.  The 
favor  shown  to  those  speculative  thinkers  who  give  plain  signs 
of  the  endeavor  to  bring  their  philosophical  conclusions  at 
every  possible  point  of  contact  to  the  test  of  the  widest  and 
most  certain  generalizations  of  the  positive  sciences,  is  thus 
explained.     It  is  largely  for  this  reason  that  Herbert  Spencer, 


80  RELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Von  Hartmann,  and  other  writers  on  philosophy,  who  avowedly 
build  their  synthesis  on  an  inductive  basis,  attract  so  large  a 
following  among  the  students  of  these  sciences. 

The  law  of  the  conservation  and  correlation  of  energy,  and 
the  various  laws  which  enter  into-  the  general  theory  of  evolu- 
tion, form  conspicuous  instances  at  present  of  the  truth  which 
has  just  been  stated.  The  philosophy  of  nature  and  every 
other  department  of  philosophy  feels  the  influence  of  these 
vast  but  vague  scientific  generalizations.  Who  would  venture 
to  put  forth  a  system  of  philosophy  or  to  deal  freely  with  phi- 
losophical problems,  and  leave  these  generalizations  out  of  the 
account  ?  No  philosophy  can  become  current  that  neglects 
them.  Indeed,  the  greater  danger  to  speculative  thinking 
arises  just  now  from  a  too  hasty  and  complete  acceptance  of 
these  supreme  working  hypotheses  of  all  natural  science,  rather 
than  from  a  tendency  to  treat  them  with  disrespect  or  neglect. 
And  what  is  true  of  such  supreme  principles,  in  so  many  and 
important  regards,  is  true  in  fewer  and  less  important  regards 
of  all  the  minor  generalizations  of  the  natural  sciences. 

Science  is  knowledge,  as  the  very  word  of  course  signifies. 
It  is  knowledge  of  perception  and  inference,  —  knowledge  ren- 
dered comprehensive  and  exact  by  special  methods,  and  ren- 
dered systematic  and  rational  by  extension  to  a  vast  multitude 
of  cases  under  general  laws.  But  as  knowledge,  science  is 
ever  dependent  upon  the  activity  and  the  constitution  of  the 
knowing  mind.  Perception  and  inference  are  processes  of 
knowledge,  the  nature,  genesis,  and  evolution  of  which  may  be 
made  the  subjects  of  scientific  research.  The  comprehensive 
term  for  the  science  resulting  from  this  kind  of  research  is 
"  psychology."  As  thus  employed,  the  term  includes  also  the 
empirical  pursuit  of  logic,  ethics,  and  aesthetics.  Concepts, 
judgments,  and  inductive  and  deductive  argument  are  all 
processes  of  the  psychological  kind ;  the  description  and  ex- 
planation of  the  genesis,  nature,  and  development  of  logical 
processes  and  logical  products  belong  to  the  science  of   psy- 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR   SCIENCES.  81 

chology.  Nor  is  the  case  at  all  essentially  different  if  the  con- 
cepts, judgments,  and  arguments  are  of  duty  or  of  beauty ; 
that  is,  if  they  belong  to  the  so-called  science  of  ethics  or  of 
aesthetics.  As  positive  sciences,  ethics  and  aesthetics,  as  well  as 
logic,  are  only  branches  of  psychology. 

But  processes  of  knowledge  or  phenomena  of  cognition  do 
not  exhaust  the  variety  of  the  modes  of  behavior  which  we  at- 
tribute to  the  principle  called  "  soul  "  or  "  mind."  Psychical 
life  shows  a  richness  of  phenomena  too  great  to  be  grouped 
under  the  one  rubric  of  ideation.  Phenomena  of  feeling,  desire, 
volition,  also  require  scientific  treatment ;  the  exact  classifica- 
tion and  explanation,  by  tracing  their  genesis  and  development, 
of  these  phenomena  also  belong  to  psychology. 

Within  the  very  penetralia  of  psychological  science,  as  it 
were,  arise  the  forms  with  whose  more  intimate  and  profound 
acquaintance  philosophy  is  specifically  concerned.  The  effort 
to  explain  the  phenomena  of  psychical  life,  leads  at  once  to  the 
detection  of  certain  constitutional  mental  modes  (the  so-called 
"  categories  ")  that,  in  their  native  aspect,  lay  claim  to  a  uni- 
versal significance  and  validity.  Among  these  phenomena  are 
certain  of  a  peculiarly  shadowy  and  evanescent  sort ;  but  they 
seem  to  testify  to  the  presence  and  exciting  influence  upon  the 
emotions  and  volitions  of  supreme  ideals.  These  are  the  ideals 
of  duty,  of  beauty,  and  of  the  One  whom  men  call  God. 

In  natural  as  well  as  in  developed  and  scientifically  reflective 
self-consciousness,  there  emerges  a  persistent  diremption  of  the 
complexes  of  psychical  life.  There  is  a  distinction  established 
which  seems,  as  regards  its  logical  value  and  significance,  to  lie 
at  the  basis  of  all  distinguishing  activity.  There  comes  to  be 
recognized  the  "  Ego  "  (T),  as  the  subject  of  all  the  states,  and 
the  states  which  are  all  alike  to  be  called  mine.  Still  later  in 
the  development  of  mind,  whether  naively  or  with  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  trained  psychologist,  I  come  to  speak  of  my  body, 
and  of  the  world  that  is  not  me,  in  contrast  to  which  I  am  as 
thinking,  feeling,  willing  mind. 

6 


82  RELATION   OF  PHILOSOPHY 

"Who  does  not  recognize  in  such  considerations  as  these  the 
call  of  introspective  and  experimental  psychology  upon  phi- 
losophy for  its  help  ?  Further  reflection  upon  these  consid- 
erations —  reflection  of  the  more  distinctively  philosophical 
order  —  leads  to  the  development  of  several  departments  of 
philosophical  discipline.  Such  departments  are  the  theory 
of  knowledge  and  theoretical  psychology,  or  the  philosophy  of 
mind.  By  combination  of  similar  material  with  material  drawn 
from  positive  sciences  other  than  the  strictly  psychological,  the 
philosophy  of  ethics,  of  aesthetics,  and  of  religion  arise.  All 
these  branches  of  philosophy  are  so  closely  intertwined  with 
different  branches  of  psychology,  or  rather  they  seem  so  to 
spring  forth  from  one  root  in  psychological  inquiry,  that 
their  treatment  apart  becomes  a  matter  of  peculiar  difficulty. 
Not  a  few  have,  therefore,  either  explicitly  admitted  or  in 
practice  implied  that  psychology  and  philosophy  cannot  be 
distinguished. 

The  relations  of  psychological  science  to  philosophical  dis- 
cipline are  so  important  as  to  demand  a  separate  detailed 
treatment.  It  is  enough  at  present  to  insist  that  the  same 
characteristic  traits  of  philosophy  distinguish  it  from  the  psy- 
chological and  the  physical  sciences.  Psychology,  as  a  science 
in  the  widest  legitimate  use  of  the  term,  is  concerned  only  with 
the  classification  of  psychical  phenomena  and  with  their  ex- 
planation through  the  discovery  and  verifying  of  the  uniform 
relations  existing  among  the  psychical  phenomena,  and  be-, 
tween  the  psychical  and  certain  physical  phenomena.  But  the 
psychological  sciences,  as  well  as  the  physical,  have  a  body  of 
principles,  presupposed  or  ascertained,  with  the  systematizing 
of  which  in  their  relation  to  ultimate  Eeality  philosophy  must 
deal.  The  presuppositions  are  to  be  discerned  and  handled 
with  that  free,  reflective  analysis  which  characterizes  philo- 
sophical method.  The  discovered  principles  of  psychological 
science  afford  philosophy  the  material  of  synthesis  for  which 
it  is  dependent  upon  the  positive  sciences. 


TO   THE   PARTICULAR  SCIENCES.  83 

1 

It  is  now  obvious  that  the  relation  which,  so  far  as  material 
for  systematic  treatment  is  concerned,  exists  between  philos- 
ophy and  the  particular  sciences,  is  precisely  that  which  was 
provided  for  in  the  definition  of  philosophy.  Philosophy  is  the 
rational  system  of  the  principles  presupposed  or  ascertained  by 
the  particular  sciences.  But  philosophy  regards  all  these  prin- 
ciples from  its  own  point  of  view,  and  with  its  peculiar  final 
purpose  bearing  upon  them  all.  It  endeavors  to  reduce  them 
to  system, — by  considering  them  all  in  their  relation  to  a 
Unity  of  ultimate  Eeality. 


\  r 


84  PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER    IV. 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND    PHILOSOPHY. 


THAT  a  peculiar  relation  exists  between  the  science  of  mind 
and  the  conclusions  of  philosophical  study,  may  be  argued 
from  the  nature  of  both  and  from  the  history  of  their  develop- 
ment. Some  difficulty  has,  indeed,  always  been  experienced 
in  clearly  distinguishing  certain  branches  of  philosophy  from 
the  more  closely  correlated  forms  of  the  positive  sciences  of 
nature.  In  the  practice  of  experts  themselves  metaphysics  has 
hitherto  mingled  freely  with  mechanics,  physics,  chemistry,  and 
biology.  But  we  have  seen  that  these  and  similar  empirical  or 
more  nearly  "  pure  "  departments  of  human  knowledge  retain 
their  strictly  scientific  character  only  so  long  as  they  confine 
their  aims  to  the  classification  of  phenomena,  and  to  explana- 
tion by  the  discovery  and  verification  of  uniform  relations  be- 
tween phenomena.  All  the  particular  sciences,  however,  involve 
certain  principles,  which  are  either  presupposed  by  them  or  else 
are  the  highest  generalizations  reached  in  the  course  of  their 
development.  The  ultimate  source  and  validity  in  reality  of  the 
presuppositions  is  not  a  matter  for  scientific  inquiry.  The  gen- 
eralizations do  not  require  to  be  validated  in  reality,  or  con- 
nected with  generalizations  of  other  sciences  in  the  unity  of  a 
rational  system,  by  the  particular  sciences  that  make  them. 
These  limitations  by  which  their  pursuits  are  lawfully  bound, 
and  the  need  of  subjecting  their  principles  to  a  more  pene- 
trating analysis  and  a  higher  rational  synthesis,  are  now  gen- 
erally recognized  by  the  most  thoughtful  and  candid  students 
of  physical  science. 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  85 

But  the  case  between  psychology  and  philosophy  is  not  pre- 
cisely the  same  ;  nor  is  it  so  clear,  whether  it  be  viewed  in  the 
light  of  history,  or  of  a  satisfactory  division  of  the  fields  of  sci- 
entific and  philosophical  inquiry.  From  time  immemorial,  but 
especially  since  Descartes,  the  analysis  of  consciousness  and 
the  statement  of  conclusions  based  upon  this  analysis  have 
been  largely  dominated  by  metaphysical  points  of  view.  With 
English  authors,  since  Locke  and  until  the  present  generation, 
psychology  has  controlled  and  absorbed  philosophy.  In  Eng- 
land, indeed,  philosophy  has  scarcely  existed  otherwise  than  in 
the  form  of  a  mixture  of  empirical  and  metaphysical  observa- 
tions —  interesting,  stimulating,  yet  perplexing  —  that  have 
rambled  over  the  fields  of  a  descriptive  science  of  related  states 
of  consciousness,  philosophical  theory  of  knowledge,  ontology  of 
mind,  philosophy  of  ethics,  and  theology.  Eecently,  however, 
the  empirical  science  of  psychology  has  striven,  with  commend- 
able success,  to  establish  for  itself  an  independent  existence. 
The  philosophy  of  religion  has  been  more  clearly  distinguished 
from  dogmatic  and  biblical  theology;  and  moral  philosophy, 
properly  so-called,  has  recognized  many  of  its  points  of  contact 
and  of  contrast  with  the  science  of  ethical  phenomena.  A  still 
more  vigorous  and  intelligent  development  of  the  different  con- 
nected branches  of  philosophical  system,  as  dependent  upon 
psychology  and  upon  all  the  particular  sciences,  is  doubtless 
near  at  hand. 

The  philosophy  of  Locke  is  chiefly  an  "Essay  concerning 
Human  Understanding."  This  essay  has  been  pronounced  "  the 
most  important  offspring  of  modern  philosophy."  It  is,  how- 
ever, described  by  its  author  as  an  inquiry  "into  the  original, 
certainty,  and  extent  of  human  knowledge,  together  with  the 
grounds  and  degrees  of  belief,  opinion,  and  assent." J  From  the 
more  modern  point  of  view  these  words  would  be  understood 
as  proposing  a  mixed  psychological  and  philosophical  inquiry. 
This  the  "  Essay "  of  Locke  really  is.     The  philosophy  of  his 

1  Book  I.  chap.  i.  2. 


86  PSYCHOLOGY  AND    PHILOSOPHY. 

great  successor,  Berkeley,  is  confined  for  the  most  part  to  a 
psychological  and  metaphysical  treatment  of  a  single  problem 
of  cognition,  —  the  problem,  namely,  of  perception  by  the  senses. 
Hume  justifies  his  discussion  of  the  more  profound  and  difficult 
philosophical  problems,  in  a  "  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,"  by 
observing  that  "  all  the  sciences  have  a  relation,  greater  or  less, 
to  human  nature ; "  and  that  "  in  pretending,  therefore,  to  ex- 
plain the  principles  of  human  nature,  we  in  effect  propose  a 
compleat  system  of  the  sciences."  In  this  way  psychology,  if 
it  be  understood  as  the  science  which  explains  the  principles 
of  human  nature,  appears  to  include  not  only  all  philosophy, 
but  also  all  the  other  particular  sciences. 

More  recently,  John  Stuart  Mill  and  the  associational  school 
generally  have  dominated  philosophical  discussion  almost  com- 
pletely with  a  special  psychological  theory  of  the  origin  and 
laws,  in  combination,  of  the  ideas.  The  "  Scottish "  school, 
including  Sir  William  Hamilton,1  have  constantly  confused 
the  psychological  investigation  of  the  problem  of  perception 
with  the  effort  to  establish  a  peculiar  form  of  realism  against 
all  rival  claimants  in  the  general  field  of  philosophy.  With  the 
same  object  in  view,  the  most  distinguished  living  representative 
of  this  school,  Dr.  McCosh,  identifies  metaphysical  philosophy 
throughout  with  the  systematic  arrangement  of  the  so-called 
"intuitions/'  as  determined  —  it  seems  to  us — by  an  insuffi- 
cient psychological  analysis. 

On  the  Continent,  and  especially  in  Germany,  somewhat  dif- 
ferent relations  have  been  maintained  between  psychology  and 
philosophy.  But  everywhere  the  established  relations  between 
the  two  have  been  intimate  and  influential  for  the  fate  of  both. 
By  reflective  analysis  Descartes  laid  the  foundations  of  modern 
philosophy  in  an  ultimate  psychological  fact.  But  every  student 
of  Cartesianism  knows  how  unsatisfactory  was  the  metaphysical 
structure,  regarding  Mind  and  Matter,  and  the  connection  of 

1  See  the  Article  of  Professor  Seth  on  Philosophy,  Encyclopaedia  Britannica 
ninth  edition. 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  87 

the  two,  and  regarding  God  and  his  relation  to  the  world,  which 
Descartes  and  his  disciples  proceeded  at  once  to  build  upon 
these  foundations.  The  monadology  of  Leibnitz  is  a  beautiful 
and  inspiring  dream  in  metaphysics  as  controlled  by  naive  psy- 
chological intuition.  It  is  the  type  of  all  subsequent  attempts 
(like  that  made,  for  example,  by  Fechner  in  his  "  Nanna,  or  the 
Soul-life  of  Plants  ")  to  transfer,  with  little  enough  of  criticism, 
the  diminishing  degrees  of  man's  self-conscious  life  to  the  diverse 
forms  of  reality. 

Wolff  is  said  to  have  been  the  first  to  make  that  distinction 
of  psychology  into  empirical  and  rational  which  holds,  substan- 
tially unchanged,  until  the  present  time.  To  empirical  psycho- 
logy he  assigned  the  description  and  systematic  arrangement  of 
psychical  processes ;  to  rational  psychology  the  explanation  of 
these  processes  by  reference  to  the  real  nature  of  the  mind 
itself.  But  the  Wolffian  empirical  psychology  was  defective 
in  that  it  substituted  classification  for  scientific  explanation. 
The  Wolffian  rational  psychology  had  no  sufficient  basis  in  em- 
pirical science,  and  was  also  devoid  of  critical  quality.  More- 
over, the  distinction  introduced  by  Wolff  must  be  employed 
(after  being  corrected  and  expanded)  to  separate  the  empirical 
science  of  psychology  from  the  philosophy  of  mind,  rather  than 
simply  to  emphasize  a  division  in  psychology. 

With  Kant  a  new  department  of  philosophy  sprang  out  of 
the  more  penetrating  and  comprehensive  application  of  reflective  . 
analysis  to  psychological  phenomena.  The  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason "  proposes  a  problem  in  the  theory  of  cognition  ;  this 
problem  is  to  be  pursued  without  a  critical  reconstruction  of 
the  conclusions  of  empirical  psychology  and  in  contempt  and 
despair  of  rational  psychology.  Plainly,  the  Kantian  theory 
of  knowledge  is  itself  dependent  upon  certain  views  of  the 
psychical  processes  that  only  partially  command  the  support  of 
inductive  science,  while  it  involves  conclusions  that  constitute 
a  special  metaphysics  of  mind,  and  have  the  widest  and  most 
profound  influence  on  all  subsequent  philosophical  system. 


88  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

Since  Kant,  in  Germany,  three  not  very  distinctly  separable 
ways  of  regarding  the  relations  of  psychology  and  philosophy 
have  been  prominent.  One  of  these  is  the  precise  opposite  of 
that  prevalent  among  English  writers.  In  Germany,  the  great 
philosophical  systems  have  too  often  dominated  the  scientific 
study  of  the  phenomena  of  man's  sentient  life.  The  tendency 
has  been  to  deduce  the  nature  and  modes  of  the  behavior  of  the 
mind  from  some  supreme  principle,  reached  by  philosophical 
speculation  rather  than  by  inductive  science.  Hegel's  "  Phe- 
nomenology of  Spirit,"  for  example,  is  not  a  psychology  es- 
tablished upon  a  scientific  basis  of  observed  psychical  facts, 
and  inferences  from  such  facts ;  it  is  rather  a  comprehensive 
but  somewhat  incoherent  survey  of  different  phases  in  the 
intellectual  growth  of  the  race,  from  a  peculiar  speculative 
point  of  view.  It  is,  says  Dr.  "William  Wallace,1  "  the  pic- 
ture of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  in  the  making,  —  at  the 
stage  before  the  scaffolding  has  been  removed  from  the  build- 
ing." From  Fichte  and  Schelling,  as  well  as  Hegel,  and  from 
Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann,  we  get  no  scientific  handling 
of  psychical  phenomena.  Whatever  light  these  writers  throw 
upon  such  phenomena  comes  under  the  shadow  of  their  theo- 
ries respecting  the  nature  of  reality  in  general.  The  science  of 
mind  is  made  dependent  upon  a  special  way  of  the  speculative 
solving  of  philosophical  problems. 

One  of  the  most  fruitful  of  the  attempts  made  in  modern  times 
to  subject  the  phenomena  of  mind  to  a  strictly  scientific  treat- 
ment arose  with  Herbart.  This  great  psychologist  and  his  fol- 
lowers have  persistently  introduced  metaphysics  into  the  study 
of  the  psychical  processes.  But  their  point  of  view  has  been 
distinctly  different  from  that  maintained  by  the  advocates  of  sys- 
tematic philosophical  Idealism.  The  Herbartians  have  rather 
made  use  of  metaphysics  in  psychology,  tentatively  and  as  a 
working  hypothesis,  to  assist  in  the  detailed  explanation  of  the 
genesis  and  development  of  observed  states  of   consciousness. 

1  Article  on  Hegel  in  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  ninth  edition. 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  89 

Herbart  himself  announces  on  the  titlepage  of  his  work  J  the 
intention  to  treat  psychology  as  a  "  science ; "  although  he  will 
found  it  anew,  not  only  on  experience,  but  also  upon  "meta- 
physics and  mathematics."  The  consummate  product  of  the 
Herbartian  development,  Volkmann  von  Volkmar,  in  his  ad- 
mirable work  on  Psychology,2  defines  its  problem  as  follows : 
"  To  explain  the  general  classes  of  psychical  phenomena  by 
means  of  processes  of  ideation  (Vorstellungen)  as  empirically 
given,  and  from  the  speculative  concept  of  ideation  in  accord- 
ance with  the  general  laws  of  the  life  of  ideation."  The  phi- 
losophy of  this  school  of  psychologists  is  avowedly  realistic. 
Its  influence  is  designedly  made  prominent  in  the  discussion 
of  psychological  problems.  Each  of  these  problems  is  to  be 
considered  as  having,  so  to  speak,  a  twofold  aspect.  It  is  a 
question  of  the  relation  of  states  of  consciousness  as  empi- 
rically given  (a  problem  in  psychological  science) ;  but  it  is 
also  a  question  for  the  correct  deductive  application  of  the 
laws  of  the  soul's  life,  as  growing  out  of  the  very  nature  of 
that  entity  we  call  soul.3 

Now,  in  view  of  the  almost  uniform  practice  of  the  physical 
sciences  in  dealing  with  phenomena  under  terms  of  hypotheti- 
cal entities,  —  such  as  atoms,  ether,  electricity  (as  an  essence), 
etc.,  —  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  psychology  should  be  forbidden 
to  speak,  at  least  hypothetically,  of  the  entities  and  forces  which 
it  seems  to  find  necessary  for  the  explanation  of  its  own  pecu- 
liar phenomena.  But  may  it  not  thus  speak  with  a  clear  under- 
standing of  the  fact  that  it  is  using  appropriate  hypotheses  ? 
And  may  it  not  defer  to  that  broader  and  more  penetrating 

1  Psychologie  als  Wissenschaft,  neu  gegriindet  auf  Erfahrung,  MetaphySik  und 
Mathematik,  Kijiiigsberg,  1824. 

2  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie  vom  Standpunkte  des  Roalismus  und  nack  gene- 
tischer  Methode,  last  edition,  Cothen,  1884. 

3  Thus  Herbart  himself  declares  :  "  The  whole  series  of  the  forms  of  experience 
must  be  investigated  twice  over,  metaphysically  and  psychologically.  Both  in- 
vestigations must  lie  side  by  side,  and  be  compared  together  long  enough  for 
every  one  to  see  their  complete  difference  so  plainly  as  never  to  be  in  danger  of 
confusing  them  again. " 


I 


90  PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

analysis  which  philosophy  provides  for  the  more  complete 
interpretation  of  its  hypotheses  ? 

The  third  form  of  regarding  the  relations  of  psychology  and 
philosophy  which  has  prevailed  in  Germany  is  that  of  which 
Beneke 1  may  be  regarded  as  the  chief  forerunner  and  represen- 
tative. It  contends  for  the  possibility  of  separating  psycho- 
logy from  metaphysics,  and  of  studying  it  as  a  natural  science 
by  the  methods  appropriate  to  such  a  science.  Experience  is 
rationally  elaborated  through  science.  The  peculiar  experience 
to  which  psychology,  by  methods  common  to  it  with  all  natural 
science,  attempts  to  give  rational  elaboration  is,  "What  thou 
findest  in  thee,  or  what  thy  self-consciousness  shows  to  thee." 
But  although  Beneke  would  have  us  avoid  founding  psychology 
upon  metaphysics,  he  himself  developed  several  branches  of 
philosophy  upon  the  basis  of  his  own  psychological  doctrines. 
Moreover,  as  Ueberweg  declares,  the  guiding  thought  in  all  the 
investigations  of  Beneke  is  this,  "  that  through  self-conscious- 
ness we  know  ourselves  psychically  just  as  we  really  are."  The 
external  world,  however,  we  can  know  only  indirectly,  by  sup- 
posing "  analoga  of  our  own  psychical  life  "  to  underlie  its  phe- 
nomena. The  masterly  effort  of  this  thinker  to  establish  a 
distinction  between  psychology  and  philosophy,  by  freeing  psy- 
chology from  metaphysics,  serves  further  to  illustrate  how  inti- 
mate and  pervasive  are  the  relations  of  the  two. 

The  development  of  psychology  in  attempted  independence 
of  metaphysics,  and  by  the  methods  of  the  natural  sciences,  has 
now  gone  far  beyond  the  point  at  which  it  was  left  by  Beneke. 
Even  the  modest,  tentative  hypothesis  of  a  soul,  and  of  its  de- 
velopment as  the  life  of  a  real  being,  has  been  rejected  by  many 
as  a  prejudice  harmful  to  the  freedom  of  scientific  inquiry.  But 
no  examination  of  so-called  psychical  processes  can  be  prose- 

1  For  Beneke's  own  view,  see  his  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie  als  Naturwissen- 
schaft,  lste  Aufl.,  1833  ;  4rte  Aufl.,  1877.  Also  Pragmatische  Psychologie,  1850  ; 
Die  neue  Psychologie,  etc.  ;  System  der  Metaphysik,  p.  68  ff.  ;  and  the  supple- 
ment ;  Der  streng  naturwissenschaftliche  Character  der  neuen  Psychologie,  in 
the  Archiv  fur  die  pragmatische  Psychologie,  iii.  495  if. 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  91 

cuted  long  without  bringing  the  inquirer  face  to  face  with  a 
certain  conception  of  peculiar  value  and  peculiar  claims  to 
validate  itself,  in  some  sort,  on  reality  (with  the  conception,  that 
is,  of  the  Ego,  which  is  the  permanent  subject  of  states,  and  yet 
not  itself  a  state) ;  accordingly,  the  science  of  psychology  seems 
to  itself  confined  within  limits  too  narrow  for  its  own  comfort 
and  success  as  a  science,  if  denied  the  thorough  analysis  of  this 
conception. 

The  extreme  followers  of  this  empirical  tendency,  in  Ger- 
many and  in  France,  have  proclaimed  the  possibility  and  ne- 
cessity of  a  science  of  "  psychology  without  a  soul."     But  how 
shall  we  understand  this  phrase  ?     Does  it  mean  that  even 
such   reality    of   being  as    consciousness   itself    commonly   at- 
taches to  the  word  "  soul "  is  to  be  understood  by  the  science 
of  psychical  phenomena  as  merely  hypothetical  ?     Then  it  be- 
longs either  to  psychology,  or  to  some  more  nearly  ultimate 
form  of  reflective  analysis,  to  clear  up  this  hypothesis.     Does 
it  mean  to  deny  that  any  conception  such  as  that  called  the 
"  soul,"  with  even  its  alleged  hypothetical  reference  to  reality, 
is  actually  to  be  found  among  the  psychical  phenomena  ?    Then 
the  examination  and  analysis  of  these  phenomena  has  hither- 
to been  most  amazingly  lacking  in  scientific  thoroughness  and 
exactness.     Does  it  mean   that,  for  the  hypothesis  of  a  soul, 
scientific  psychology  requires  that  we   should   substitute   the 
hypothesis   of   no-soul,  —  the  negative  or   sceptical  conclusion 
that  the  subject  to  which  the  states  of  consciousness  are  re- 
ferred has  no  existence  in  reality?     Then  psychology,  in  the 
name  of  exact  science,  has  gone  beyond  the  avowed  rights  of 
such  science.     It  has  substituted  one  metaphysical  hypothesis 
for  another ;  it  has  assumed  the  so-called  positivistic,  or  mate- 
rialistic, instead  of  the  so-called  spiritualistic  position. 

So  difficult  is  it  wholly  to  bar  metaphysics  out  of  psychology 
that  those  who  claim  to  approach  the  psychical  phenomena 
from  the  purely  empirical  and  physiological  point  of  view  are 
not    infrequently   chief    sinners    in    respect    of    metaphysical 


92  PSYCHOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

hypotheses.  Their  whole  language  convicts  them  of  this.  For 
explanation  of  the  processes  observed  in  self-consciousness, 
they  freely  refer  to  hypothetical  and  inferred  entities  that  lie 
wholly  and  forever  beyond  consciousness.  The  existence  of 
occult  metempirical  (to  borrow  Mr.  Lewes's  word)  beings,  far 
removed  from  any  possible  or  conceivable  experience,  is  as- 
sumed to  account  for  psychical  phenomena.  Only  the  meta- 
physics of  physics,  in  its  most  uncouth  and  untried  forms,  can 
be  admitted,  it  would  seem,  into  the  exact  science  of  psychol- 
ogy. Psychical  phenomena  are  not  allowed  to  appear  in  their 
naked  reality,  undisguised  with  the  war-paint  and  war-feathers 
of  some  momentarily  dominant  physiological  or  physical  hy- 
pothesis. To  such  a  result  have  certain  devotees  of  science 
been  led  by  the  attempt  to  set  psychology  free  from  its  inti- 
mate relation  to  philosophy. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  reasons  for  the  difficulties 
which  have  so  constantly  accompanied  the  attempt  to  distin- 
guish psychology  and  philosophy,  lie  deep  in  the  nature  of  the 
case.  Psychology,  in  the  widest  meaning  of  the  word  (as  in- 
cluding the  sciences  of  logic,  ethics,  and  aesthetics),  cannot  be 
mechanically  separated  from  philosophy.  For  psychology  is 
the  only  normal,  and  the  chief  necessary,  propaedeutic  of  phi- 
losophy. All  the  problems  of  philosophy  first  emerge  to  clear 
view  in  the  study  of  psychical  processes.  Psychology  starts 
and  shapes  these  problems ;  from  its  hands  philosophy  receives 
them  for  further  analytic  treatment,  and  for  constructive  use  in 
the  elaboration  of  philosophical  system.  Psychology  represents 
the  first  and  scientific  stage  of  reflective  analysis,  and  of  the 
theoretic  synthesis  of  experience.  But  philosophy  is  the  stage 
beyond  and  ultimate.  Philosophy  involves  the  further  and 
most  complete  possible  reflective  analysis  of  the  problems  pre- 
pared for  it  by  psychology.  It  aims  at  a  theoretical  synthesis 
which  shall  include  the  supreme  generalizations  based  not  only 
upon  the  psychological  sciences  in  their  widest  range,  but  also 
upon  all  the  sciences. 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  93 

But  the  principles  with  which  philosophical  analysis  and 
synthesis  deal  must,  in  their  turn,  penetrate  and  modify  the 
results  of  psychological  science.  Every  one  of  these  principles 
has  a  two-fold  aspect,  as  it  were.  It  may  be  considered  as  a 
conception  or  judgment  built  up  in  the  actual  evolution  of  the 
mind's .  life,  or  as  a  self-consciously  recognized  norm  or  presup- 
position of  the  concrete  activities  of  that  life.  But  it  may  also 
be  considered  as  having  a  reference  to  forces  and  beings  in  the 
world  of  the  really  Existent.  On  the  one  hand,  its  genesis  and 
development  admit  of  study  as  a  process  capable  of  scientific 
verification.  On  the  other  hand,  the  questions  respecting  its 
extra-mental  reference,  and  place  in  the  universe  of  intercon- 
nected reality,  remain  for  philosophy  to  undertake.  They 
remain,  even  after  we  have  endeavored  to  exclude  them.  They 
recur,  even  after  —  in  the  name  of  exact  science  —  we  have 
dogmatically  given  to  them  the  agnostic,  the  sceptical,  or  the 
materialistic  explanation. 

In  view  of  facts  like  these,  Wundt  feels  justified  in  holding 
that  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  all  the  sciences  is  such  as  to 
give  to  every  important  subject-matter  two  aspects,  or  rather, 
a  place  in  two  systems,  —  the  system  of  science,  and  the  system 
of  philosophical  unity.  But  so  close  and  peculiar  is  the  rela- 
tion of  psychology,  in  particular,  to  philosophy  that  the  parti- 
tion of  sovereignty  between  the  two  is  an  abstract  scheme  which, 
in  the  presence  of  actuality,  always  appears  unsatisfactory.1 

The  general  truth  just  stated  might  be  illustrated  by  the 
example  of  every  important  psychological  problem. 

The  problem  of  sense-perception,  the  cognition  of  things  by 
the  senses,  is  primarily  a  psychological  problem ;  but  it  involves 
various  philosophical  questions  over  which  the  different  schools 
of  philosophy  have  divided.  As  pursued  by  the  so-called 
"  old  psychology,"  its  solution  was  understood  to  be  chiefly  a 
matter  of  the  classification  of  psychical  activities  under  the 
heads  of  "  faculty,"  "  intuition,"  etc.     As  pursued  by  the  new 

1  System  tier  Philosophie,  pp.  5  and  21  f. 


94  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

psychology,  it  is  rather  an  inquiry  into  the  genesis  and  evolu- 
tion of  related  psychical  processes  in  dependence  upon  excited 
states  of  the  nervous  mechanism.  The  scientific  solution  of 
the  problem  of  perception  by  the  senses  requires,  therefore,  an 
analysis  of  a  complex  process  into  its  simplest  discernible 
factors,  and  a  precise  statement  of  the  conditions  under  which 
perceptions  arise  and  develop  in  consciousness.  We  are  thus 
led  to  examine  not  only  the  different  sorts  of  sensations  in 
themselves  considered,  but  also,  and  chiefly,  the  laws  of  their 
dependence,  as  respects  quality,  quantity,  time-rate,  etc.,  upon 
the  kind,  amount,  order,  etc.,  of  the  stimuli,  and  upon  the 
structure  and  locality  of  the  nervous  mass  to  which  the  stim- 
uli are  applied.  We  are  also  led  to  consider  the  laws  according 
to  which  the  sensations  are  combined,  the  sensation-complexes 
grow  in  intricacy  and  are  localized  and  objectively  projected, 
so  as  to  become  possessed  of  those  relations  which  belong  to 
every  so-called  "Thing,"  with  other  things,  in  the  world  of 
space  and  time. 

But  is  our  analysis  of  "  things "  ultimate  when  we  have 
reduced  them  to  localized  and  objectively  projected  sensation- 
complexes  ?  Is  there  not  somewhat  over  and  above,  or  under- 
neath, all  that  is  reached  by  the  analysis,  necessary  to  the 
cognition  of  things,  —  somewhat  corresponding  to  what  we 
mean,  or  think  we  mean,  when  we  affirm  of  every  "  Thing  "  a 
Reality  that  is  not  exhausted  by  the  description  of  concrete 
psychical  processes  ?  Whence,  too,  comes  this  form  of  Space, 
in  which  all  things  are  given  as  existent  ?  What,  if  anything, 
that  is  itself  really  existent,  do  we  mean  by  the  word  "  space  "  ? 
How,  moreover,  shall  we  explain  Time,  in  which  things  appear 
to  have  their  sequence,  as  itself  arising  in  our  minds,  or  in 
reality,  from  the  sequence  of  experienced  things  ? 

With  questions  such  as  these  the  empirical  science  of  modern 
psychology  struggles  manfully.  In  the  effort  to  answer  them 
it  employs  a  keener  analysis  and  a  more  elaborate  experimenta- 
tion for  the  discovery  and  description  of  the  genesis  and  evo- 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  95 

lution  of  the  requisite  psychical  processes.  It  investigates  the 
rise  and  growth  of  those  refinements  of  conceptions  involved  in 
all  the  matured  sensation-complexes,  such  as  have  already  been 
referred  to  under  the  names  Eeality,  Space,  and  Time.  But 
the  mind,  roused  by  the  discipline  of  empirical  psychology  to 
scepticism  even  concerning  its  own  instinctive  metaphysics,  is 
not  fully  satisfied  with  the  answer  which  the  most  elaborate 
forms  of  this  science  provide.  It  demands  something  more,  if 
it  be  possible,  than  a  description  of  the  order  in  which,  and  the 
circumstances  under  which,  arose  its  own  mental  images  of 
Eeality,  Space,  and  Time.  It  inquires  into  the  eu^ra-mental 
validity  and  significance  of  these  conceptions  ;  it  demands  a 
further  reflective  analysis  in  order  to  absolve  them  from  some 
of  the  difficulties  and  contradictions  that  seem  attached  to 
them,  and  perhaps  reduce  them  to  the  unity  of  some  higher 
Idea.     This  inquiry  and  demand  give  rise  to  philosophy. 

Nor  does  it  seem  easy  theoretically  to  draw  the  line,  exact 
and  rigid,  about  the  domain  within  which  the  purely  scientific 
consideration  of  the  problem  of  sense-perception  must  confine 
itself.  To  be  scientific,  in  any  worthy  sense  of  the  word,  it 
would  seem  that  we  must  make  our  analysis  of  the  phenomena, 
and  our  description  and  explanation  of  their  uniform  relations, 
as  complete  as  possible.  In  the  very  effort,  then,  to  be  com- 
pletely scientific,  we  cannot  avoid  starting  various  latent  meta- 
physical questionings.  On  reflection  a  "  Thing  "  always  appears 
to  us  as  involving  somewhat  more  than  is  fully  described  in  the 
narrative  of  our  experience  with  the  related  psychical  processes. 
There  is  always  in  the  "  Thing  "  an  additional  unknown  quan- 
tity, a  plus  x,  as  it  were,  which  seems  to  refuse  to  be  classified 
or  explained  in  company  with  all  concrete  processes.  And 
unless  we  are  willing,  with  an  unsophisticated  cheerfulness  of 
superficiality  which  is  no  less  unscientific  than  unphilosophi- 
cal,  either  to  overlook  this  +  x  altogether,  or  to  deceive  our- 
selves with  the  thought  that  we  have  explained  it  when  we 
have  called  it  by  another  name  (c.  g.,  substance,  substratum, 


96  PSYCHOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

permanent  subject  —  Trager  —  of  states),  we  seem  forced  by 
our  problem  to  enter  the  deep  shadows  of  metaphysics.  When 
we  look  back  from  the  land  of  these  shadows,  we  find  it  dif- 
ficult to  say  at  just  what  point  we  abandoned  the  certainties 
of  empirical  science. 

Schools  of  philosophy  have  divided  over  the  problem  of 
perception  by  the  senses.  The  "  empiricists  "  and  "nativists" 
cannot  even  keep  their  strife  out  of  experimental  psychology. 
But  this  strife  within  the  so-called  "  scientific  "  domain  is  only 
anticipatory  of  the  larger  and  profounder  contention  which 
issues  in  the  domain  of  philosophy.  Here  the  manner  of 
regarding  and  solving  the  problem  of  our  cognition  of  things 
is  found  to  involve  considerations  determinative  of  our  entire 
system  of  speculative  thinking.  Out  of  this  problem  there 
seem  necessarily  to  arise  questions  concerning  the  relation 
of  the  brain  and  the  sentient  life  in  man,  of  "matter"  and 
"  mind"  in  the  universe  at  large,  and  of  the  ultimate  nature  and 
reality  of  those  existent  beings  which  we  mean  to  designate 
by  the  latter  two  abstract  terms.  Hence  arise,  in  no  small 
degree,  the  differences  discussed  between  philosophical  agnos- 
ticism and  scepticism  on  the  one  hand,  and  realism,  idealism, 
dualism,  or  monism,  on  the  other. 

As  this  general  problem  of  sense-perception  is  specialized 
by  the  particular  natural  and  physical  sciences,  it  is  seen  to 
furnish  yet  more  definite  material  for  philosophy.  The  cog- 
nition of  "  Things,"  as  they  are  known  by  these  sciences,  is  said 
to  be  based  on  exact  and  comprehensive  observation.  But,  in 
truth,  the  psychological  theory  of  this  so-called  "  observation  " 
will  go  but  a  little  way  toward  the  justification  of  the  scien- 
tific character  of  the  cognition.  Every  plain  man  is,  in  his 
practice,  a  wonderful  metaphysician.  He  uncritically  and  in- 
stinctively makes  the  world  of  his  immediate  experience  to 
be  all  underlain  and  interpenetrated  with  a  world  of  postulated 
real  existences.  Psychology  shows  us  not  only  in  what  con- 
crete forms  ordinary  experience  proceeds  to  organize  itself  into 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  97 

the  living  development  of  mind,  but  also  in  accordance  with 
what  primitive  norms,  and  upon  the  basis  of  what  necessary 
postulates,  this  organization  takes  place.  But  the  "  unseen 
world "  of  the  physical  and  natural  sciences  is  much  more 
wonderful  than  that  of  ordinary  experience.  The  student  of 
these  sciences  —  scorner  of  metaphysics  though  he  may  be  — 
is  a  most  masterful  metaphysician.  The  world  in  the  midst 
of  which  he  lives  —  the  world,  primarily,  of  his  own  psychical 
processes  of  imagination  and  inference,  founded  upon  unusual 
means  for  perception  by  the  senses,  and  stimulated  by  the 
rivalry  of  critics  and  colleagues  —  is  far  removed  from,  and 
vastly  unlike,  the  world  of  immediate  experience  and  first 
intention.  And  here  we  do  not  need  to  repeat  what  has 
been  said  in  discussing  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  the  posi- 
tive sciences  of  the  external  world.  We  only  insist  that  the 
treatment  of  the  principles,  presupposed  and  ascertained  by 
these  sciences,  is  difficult  satisfactorily  to  apportion  between 
the  science  of  psychology  and  the  philosophy  of  nature  and 
mind.  Where,  for  example,  does  the  psychological  discussion 
of  such  conceptions  as  Force,  Matter,  Law,  Causation,  etc., 
end,  and  their  philosophical  discussion  begin  ? 

No  less  difficulty  is  experienced  when  the  attempt  is  made  to 
secure  a  strict  and  mechanical  separation  between  the  psycholo- 
gical and  the  philosophical  treatment  of  the  problem  of  self- 
consciousness.  The  interest  which  the  human  mind  necessarily 
takes  in  the  knowledge  of  itself  is  undoubtedly  a  most  potent 
and  indestructible  source  of  philosophy.  So  true  is  this  that 
metaphysical  answers  to  the  questions,  What  am  I  ?  and  How 
and  whence  do  I,  self-conscious  and  rational  being,  come  to  be  ? 
long  preceded  the  beginnings  of  empirical  and  scientific  psychol- 
ogy. To  this  science,  as  now  understood,  it  belongs  to  trace  the 
genesis  and  evolution  of  those  states  which  we  call  "self-con- 
scious," of  the  concept  of  that  self  to  which  all  states  of  con- 
sciousness are  referred,  and  of  that  peculiar  form  of  activity 
in    which    the   reference   consists,  —  the   so-called   activity   of 

7 


98  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY. 

"  self-consciousness."  This  general  problem  modern  psychology 
therefore  attacks  in  several  ways.  It  describes  the  physical  and 
psychical  conditions  under  which,  so  far  as  can  be  ascertained, 
we  become  self-conscious.  It  traces  the  stages  of  the  develop- 
ment of  self -consciousness,  in  dependence  upon  these  conditions. 
It  strives  by  analysis  to  discover  the  factors  and  laws  which 
enter  into  this  development. 

But  again,  in  the  consideration  of  the  problem  of  self-con- 
sciousness, empirical  psychology  starts  a  variety  of  questionings 
which  it  cannot  answer,  or  even  consider,  without  an  appeal  to 
philosophy.  Of  the  other  particular  sciences  we  may  say  that 
their  attitude  is  uncritical  toward  the  different  ways  of  answer- 
ing such  questions.  But  the  very  business  of  psychology  re- 
quires the  determination  of  the  most  exact  and  comprehensive 
answer  possible  to  these  inquiries.  And  as  this  science  presses 
forward  with  its  attempts  at  explanation,  it  becomes  increas- 
ingly difficult  to  tell  precisely  when  it  crosses  the  line  that 
bounds  it,  as  science,  from  the  larger  domain  of  philosophy. 

The  problem  of  the  cognition  of  things  and  the  problem  of 
the  cognition  of  self  are  both  connected  inseparably  with  the  gen- 
eral problem  of  all  cognition.  In  these  two  forms  of  the  prob- 
lem both  the  objects  and  the  method  of  cognition  appear  to  be 
very  different.  The  object  in  one  case  is  "  things  ; "  in  the  other 
case  it  is  that  "  self  "  which  makes  no  other  distinction  so  clearly 
and  persistently  as  the  distinction  between  itself  and  things. 
The  method,  in  one  case,  is  called  by  psychology  "  percep- 
tion "  through  the  senses ;  in  the  other  case  it  is  called  "  self- 
consciousness."  But  both  processes  must  be,  in  some  sort, 
fundamentally  alike ;  otherwise  they  could  not  both  be  called 
by  the  common  term  "  cognition."  And  both  objects,  —  things 
and  self,  —  it  would  seem,  must  be  held  to  have  some  real  like- 
ness underlying  or  conjoined  with  that  difference  which  is  re- 
cognized in  the  seemingly  fundamental  distinction  made  by 
consciousness,  since  they  are  both  alike  objects  for  the  cogni- 
tion of   the   same  subject.      Here,  then,  is    another   problem, 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  99 

requiring  discussion  from .  both  the  psychological  and  the 
philosophical  points  of  view.  Here,  also,  is  another  problem 
in  the  consideration  of  which  psychology  and  philosophy  find 
it  necessary  to  enter  into  their  own  peculiar  form  of  partner- 
ship. In  this  case,  too,  the  partnership  is  unlimited  as  respects 
time,  and  difficult  of  exact  limitation  as  respects  each  partner's 
share  of  responsibility. 

"  Logic  "  is  the  name  given  for  many  centuries  after  Aristotle 
to  a  science  which  aimed  (either  as  pure  or  applied)  to  tell  men 
how  they  do  and  must  think,  as  well  as  how  they  ought  to 
think.  Far  be  it  from  our  purpose  to  depreciate  the  achieve- 
ments of  this  science,  whether  as  it  was  left  by  its  great  founder 
in  what  was  long  esteemed  a  finished  form,  or  as  it  is  now  modi- 
fied under  the  influences  of  modern  psychology  and  philosophy. 
But  if  the  truth  must  be  spoken,  there  can  be  no  science  of  logic 
as  independent  of  psychology  and  the  philosophical  theory  of 
cognition.  To  psychology  rightfully  belongs  the  description 
and  explanation  of  the  genesis  and  organization  of  experience 
through  thought ;  the  forms  and  laws  of  thought  are  therefore 
peculiarly  its  own  material.  If  logical  forms  and  laws  are 
regarded  as  primarily  other  than  forms  and  laws  of  living  psy- 
chical processes,  they  are  wrongly  regarded.  Moreover,  psy- 
chology, in  the  broad  modern  way  of  its  study,  has  reference 
to  thought-processes  and  thought-products,  not  simply  as  made 
known  to  introspection  in  the  consciousness  of  the  individual, 
but  also  as  made  known  to  historico-genetic  researches  in  the 
evolution  of  the  thought  of  the  race.  Therefore,  that  form  of 
logic  which  deals  with  the  correct  method  of  discovery  and 
verification,  in  the  particular  sciences,  is  but  an  apartment  of 
applied  psychology.  But  if  logic  raises  the  ultimate  inquiries 
respecting  the  power  of  man  to  know  reality,  to  represent  in 
forms  of  his  thought  the  forms  of  the  being  and  action  of  the 
really  Existent,  then  it  becomes  philosophical.  Such  "  logical " 
inquiries  belong  to  that  branch  of  philosophy  which  is  called 
the  theory  of  knowledge. 


100  PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  problem  of  knowledge,  therefore,  it  is 
peculiarly  difficult  to  tell  where  a  line  shall  be  drawn  between 
those  sciences,  on  the  one  hand,  which  we  call  logic  or  psychol- 
ogy, and  the  domain,  on  the  other  hand,  of  philosophy  as  the 
general  doctrine  of  cognition. 

Ethics,  considered  as  an  empirical  science,  like  logic,  cannot 
be  given  a  place  among  the  sciences  as  distinct  from  psychology. 
Indeed,  the  practical  outcome  of  the  attempt  to  separate  ethics 
and  psychology  has  been  highly  injurious  to  both.  This  at- 
tempt has  resulted  not  only  in  confining  the  discussion  of 
psychological  problems,  among  English  writers,  too  closely  to 
the  phenomena  of  cognition,  but  also  in  vitiating  the  interpreta- 
tion of  these  phenomena  by  excluding  from  it  the  light  thrown 
by  the  scientific  study  of  the  phenomena  of  desire,  feeling,  and 
willing.  It  has,  moreover,  resulted  in  much  ^^psychological 
discussion  of  ethical  problems.  Few  of  the  English  treatises 
on  "  ethics "  so  called  have  been  based  upon  that  thorough 
knowledge  of  modern  psychological  conclusions,  or  that  consis- 
tent use  of  psychological  analysis,  which  are  indispensable  to 
the  highest  success.  Indeed,  under  this  title  we  ordinarily 
expect  to  find  either  a  work  on  moral  philosophy  or  one  on 
ethical  praxis  {%.  e.,  the  art  of  behaving  one's  self  properly  in 
society  as  at  present  constituted,  especially  in  English-speaking 
countries). 

In  Germany,  on  the  contrary,  treatises  corresponding  to  the 
English  books  on  ethics  are  comparatively  rare.  And,  indeed, 
the  occasion  for  the  composition  of  such  works  has  scarcely 
been  felt.  Eor  in  Germany  every  writer  on  psychology,  how- 
ever unimportant,  thinks  it  necessary  to  touch  upon  those  forms 
of  psychical  life  that  are  called  "  ethical,"  —  and  this  from  the 
point  of  view  of  a  scientific  psychology.  Psychological  treatises 
on  the  different  ethical  problems,  such  as  those  of  feeling,  habit, 
volition,  etc.,  therefore  abound.  But  this  does  not  prevent  a 
rich  development  of  writings  concerned  with  the  metaphysics  of 
ethics,  the  philosophy  of  rights,  and  of  the  State ;  and  with  the 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  101 

special  classes  and  forms  of  ethical  principles  such  as  are  treated 
under  the  head  of  "  theological  ethics  "  (Eothe),  Christian  ethics, 
biblical  ethics,  etc. 

Ethics,  then,  cannot  be  considered  an  independent  science. 
What  is  properly  called  by  this  term  is  either  a  phase  or  de- 
partment rather  than  a  distinct  branch  of  psychology ;  or  else 
it  is  moral  philosophy.  The  relation  in  which  the  science  of 
ethics  stands  to  philosophical  discipline  is  to  be  determined  as 
part  of  the  more  general  question,  What  is  the  relation  of  psy- 
chological science  to  philosophy  ?  When,  then,  Dr.  Stucken- 
berg  considers  psychology  as  propedeutic  to  philosophy,  rather 
than  a  branch  of  philosophy,  but  at  the  same  time  separates 
ethics  from  its  complete  dependence,  as  a  science,  upon  psycho- 
logical analysis  and  upon  general  psychological  principles,  he 
seems  to  us  precisely  to  reverse  the  right  relations.1  In  the 
treatment  of  those  problems  which  are  called  "ethical"  it  is  no 
easy  matter,  however,  to  distinguish,  either  theoretically  or  in 
practice,  between  the  point  of  view  held  by  the  science  of  psy- 
chology and  that  taken  by  ethical  philosophy. 

Psychological  ethics  investigates  those  psychical  processes  — 
whether  called  processes  of  cognition,  feeling,  desire,  or  voli- 
tion —  which  enter  into  what  we  call  conduct  and  character, 
as  distinguished  from  mere  action  and  habit.  Among  such 
cognitive  processes  it  discovers  the  genesis  and  maturing  of  cer- 
tain ideas  of  a  peculiar  kind.  By  analysis  and  generalization 
of  these  processes  it  arrives  at  the  existence  of  a  norm  of  all 
ethical  ideation,  called  "  the  idea  of  the  right,"  or  "  the  morally 
good."  By  the  same  method  of  scientific  psychological  analysis, 
it  arrives  at  the  existence  of  an  altogether  peculiar  norm  of 
feeling;  for  this  it  appropriates  the  term  "feeling  of  the 
ought,"  or  feeling  of  moral  obligation.  It  also  traces  the  gen- 
esis and  development  of  those  peculiar  emotions  which  are  ex- 
perienced in  the  contemplation  of  character  or  conduct  that 
appears  in  relations  of  conformity  or  opposition  to  the  idea  of 

1  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Philosophy,  chapters  iv.,  v.,  and  ix. 


102  PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  right,  of  the  morally  good.  These  are  the  emotions  of  moral 
approbation  and  disapprobation,  of  ethical  good-  and  ill-desert. 
Furthermore,  it  investigates  the  evolution  of  so-called  "  free- 
will." It  traces,  that  is,  the  rise  and  growth  of  the  mind's 
power  to  conform  character  and  conduct  to  certain  ideals  of 
reason.  In  all  this,  psychology  is  in  the  exercise  of  its  legiti- 
mate scientific  function,  —  not  the  less  truly  because  the  psy- 
chical processes  which  it  classifies  and  endeavors  to  explain 
appear  of  a  somewhat  peculiar  nature. 

The  further  demand  of  reason  for  light  upon  the  problems 
of  psychological  ethics  has  been  seen  to  be  one  of  the  main 
sources  of  philosophy.  The  relation  of  the  science  of  psycho- 
logy to  philosophy  is,  accordingly,  not  different  with  respect  to 
these  problems  from  that  which  maintains  itself  with  respect 
to  all  problems  that  are  common  to  both  branches  of  knowl- 
edge. But  the  department  of  philosophy  with  which  psycho- 
logical ethics  stands  in  such  peculiar  relations  is  of  a  special 
kind.  This  department  is  not  metaphysics,  in  the  more  limited 
sense  in  which  we  shall  employ  that  word.  It  is  rather  the 
philosophy  of  one  of  the  Ideals  of  Eeason,  —  the  Ideal  of  Con- 
duct. When  we  inquire  into  the  origin,  the  ground,  and  vali- 
dity of  those  ideation  processes  in  which  the  Eight,  the  Ought, 
the  Morally  Well-deserving  or  Ill-deserving  are  given  to  self- 
consciousness,  we  find  the  resulting  problems  related  to  the 
general  postulate  of  a  unity  of  Ultimate  Eeality  in  another  than 
the  strictly  metaphysical  way.  The  conceptions  answering  to 
these  terms  ("  the  Eight,"  etc.)  do  not  represent  particular  real 
entities  or  modes  of  the  being  of  such  entities  as  do  the  concep- 
tions of  Matter,  Force,  Atom,  Mind,  Thought,  etc.  They  rather 
stimulate  and  guide  the  feeling  and  volition  in  that  compre- 
hensive and  indefinite  way  which  belongs  to  a  rational  Ideal. 

Philosophy  receives  from  psychological  ethics  the  problems 
already  prepared  for  it  by  the  first  steps  of  reflective  analysis. 
Its  one  greatest  and  final  inquiry  concerns  the  relation  in 
which  the  ethical  ideals  stand  to  that  Unity  of  all  ultimate 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  1Q3 

Reality  which  it  is  compelled  to  postulate.  Ethical  philosophy 
thus  leads  the  mind  forward  to  the  question  whether  these  and 
all  other  ideals,  as  well  as  all  forms  of  concrete  reality,  must 
not  be  considered  as  having  their  ground  in  one  Being  (an 
Ideal-Real,  or  really  existent,  supreme  Idea).  But  this  ques- 
tion belongs  rather  to  the  philosophy  of  religion,  which  is  the 
supreme  department  of  philosophy,  —  the  highest  rational 
synthesis  of  metaphysics,  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  the 
philosophy  of  the  Ideal. 

The  remarks  just  made  concerning  ethics  apply  as  well  to 
{esthetics,  which  also  may  be  treated  either  as  a  branch  of 
psychological  science,  or  as  a  department  of  the  philosophy 
of  the  Ideal. 

Abundant  reasons,  then,  exist  not  only  in  the  past  history  of 
philosophy,  but  also  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  for  affirming  that 
the  relation  of  philosophy  to  empirical  psychology  is  peculiarly 
intimate.  Neither  in  theory  nor  in  practice  is  it  possible  to 
make  a  mechanical  division,  as  it  were,  between  the  two.  And 
if  objection  be  made  to  the  word  "mechanical,"  as  not  correctly 
expressing  the  nature  of  the  division  to  be  made  between  even 
the  physical  sciences  and  philosophy,  we  are  ready  to  discard 
the  term.  It  is  not  so  much  as  possible  to  propound  and  un- 
derstand the  problems  of  philosophy  without  the  propaedeutic 
of  scientific  psychology.  Every  important  philosophical  in- 
quiry is  primarily  psychological ;  not  one  such  inquiry  would 
ever  be  raised,  much  less  intelligently  shaped,  by  the  physical 
and  natural  sciences  alone.  Moreover,  the  psychological  dis- 
cussion of  the  problems  of  mind  cannot  escape  the  influence  of 
philosophy.  It  should  never  strive  to  make  this  escape.  And 
yet  a  plain  distinction  between  psychology  and  philosophy, 
even  in  the  consideration  of  the  same  problems,  may  be  made 
theoretically ;  and  in  practice  the  distinction  may  be  carried 
out  with  a  measure  of  success. 

Several  recent  writers  have  drawn  the  distinction  between 
psychology  and  philosophy  with   more   than   customary   clear- 


104  PSYCHOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

ness  and  intelligence.  Mr.  Shad  worth  Hodgson,  for  example, 
holds,  in  apparent  opposition  to  most  of  his  own  countrymen, 
that  this  distinction  can  be  scientifically  defined  and  consis- 
tently carried  out.1  He  keenly  and  correctly  shows  the  failure 
of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  John  Stuart  Mill,  and  Herbert 
Spencer  to  make  and  observe  this  distinction.  "  Psychology," 
says  Mr.  Hodgson,  "  has  all  states  of  consciousness  for  its 
object-matter ;  and  so  far  it  has  precisely  the  same  object- 
matter  as  that  here  attributed  to  philosophy.''  And  yet  by 
simply  "  adding  psychology  to  the  list  of  the  other  sciences," 
we  do  not  perform  the  same  service  as  we  should  do  "by  super- 
posing philosophy  on  the  other  sciences,  as  something  gener- 
ically  different  from  them."  Psychology,  indeed,  is  led,  in  its 
search  for  the  conditions  existendi  of  the  states  of  consciousness, 
to  the  laws  and  nature  of  the  objects,  of  substances  so  called. 
Tt  "  envisages  the  particular  relations  of  dependence  which  par- 
ticular portions  of  the  subjective  aspect  have  to  particular  por- 
tions of  the  objective.  And  it  is  therefore  not  permitted,  like 
philosophy,  to  abstract  from  the  substrate,  or  agent  which  has 
the  states  of  consciousness."  Moreover,  "  the  analysis  of  states 
of  consciousness  as  given  in  philosophy  takes  those  states  in  con- 
nection with  their  objective  aspects,  —  these  objective  aspects 
it  is  which  give  us  the  states  to  be  analyzed ;  but  in  psycho- 
logy it  is  in  reference  to  their  conditions  in  the  organism  or 
other  substratum  that  they  come  under  analytic  dissection." 
The  method  and  assumption  of  the  two  are,  accordingly,  dia- 
metrically opposed.  In  philosophy,  we  take  the  ultimate 
truths  of  the  sciences  and  inquire  what  are  their  subjective 
aspects ;  in  psychology  we  take  supposed  ultimate  subjective 
aspects  and  ask  what  their  objective  aspects,  what  their  corre- 
sponding existences,  must  be.  Philosophy  is  therefore  distin- 
guished from  psychology  by  its  elevation  of  Eeflection  into 
a  method. 

Philosophy  is  not,  however.  —  we  are  at  once  told,  —  limited 

1  Philosophy  of  Reflection,  i.  50  if. 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND     PHILOSOPHY.  105 

to  the  analytic  branch  of  ultimate  subjective  science ;  the  con- 
structive branch  of  philosophy  is  also  necessary  and  legitimate. 
The  constructive  branch  must  be  pursued  in  connection  with 
the  analytic.  But  the  elements  given  by  the  different  analyses 
may  be  hypothetical^  constructed  and  reconstructed  in  various 
ways.  There  cannot  be  anything  beyond  existence  that  is  not 
existence.  But  there  may  be  existences  or  existent  worlds  very 
different  from  that  given  in  our  consciousness.  "  This  whole 
hypothetical  group  of  phenomenal  worlds  would  constitute  the 
field  of  the  constructive  branch  of  philosophy.  It  is  this  right 
of  making  hypotheses  in  explanation  of  our  own  world  which 
connects  philosophy  with  science.  Here  again,  however,  phi- 
losophy differs  from  the  particular  sciences,  including  psycho- 
logy, in  the  application  of  method  common  to  them  both.  All 
these  sciences  use  reflection,  and  by  this  use  are  connected  with 
each  other  and  with  philosophy.  "  But  philosophy  elevates  this 
common  thread  of  reflection  into  a  method  ;  and  it  is  its  method, 
founded  on  reflection,  that  at  once  distinguishes  philosophy  from 
the  sciences  and  gives  it  a  larger  field."  The  constructive 
branch  of  philosophy,  when  constituted  by  the  method  of  the 
most  ultimate  reflection,  is,  however,  says  Mr.  Hodgson,  "  to  be 
regarded  as  a  philosophized  psychology,  or  the  return  of  Meta- 
physic  upon  psychology."  It  is  "  hypothetical  psychology,  psy- 
chology carried  up  into  more  general  regions."  "  Its  aim  is  to 
put  the  objective  aspect,  a  new  hypothetical  world,  to  the  hypo- 
thetical subjective  aspect  with  which  it  begins." 

More  particularly  still,1  we  have  psychology  described  by 
Mr.  Hodgson  as  dealing  with  the  conditions  or  causes  of  states 
of  consciousness  in  a  scientific  way.  But  philosophy  considers 
"  aspects."  ''Aspect,  as  a  philosophical  term,  means  a  character 
co-extensive  with  and  peculiar  to  the  thing  of  which  it  is  an 
aspect."  The  two  ultimate  and  necessary  aspects  in  philosophy 
are  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  "  The  high  and  abstract 
region  in  which    this    distinction    arises   is    the  watershed   of 

1  Philosophy  of  Reflection,  ii.  20  If. 


106  PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophical  systems."  The  limits  and  relations  between  a 
genuine  philosophy  and  a  scientific  psychology  can  be  defined 
only  by  the  removal  of  causation  from  consciousness,  as  such. 
Now,  since  the  only  known  causation  is  material,  if  you  retain 
causation  in  philosophy,  as  respects  the  ultimate  aspects  with 
which  it  deals,  you  materialize  philosophy.  If  you  do  not  hold 
fast  by  it  in  psychology,  you  render  psychology  unscientific  and 
illusory,  since  "causation  by  consciousness  is  incalculable."1 
In  this  connection,  and  it  would  seem  as  a  result  of  the  effort 
to  distinguish  psychology  and  philosophy,  Mr.  Hodgson  avows 
his  conversion  to  completely  materialistic  psychology. 

The  distinction  drawn  by  Professor  Seth  2  between  psycho- 
logy and  philosophy  differs  from  the  foregoing  in  several 
important  particulars.  "Whereas  Mr.  Hodgson  emphasizes 
especially  the  ultimate  nature  of  the  analysis  which  philos- 
ophy employs,  "  it  is  with  the  ultimate  synthesis,"  says  Pro- 
fessor Seth,  "  that  philosophy  concerns  itself ;  it  has  to  show 
that  the  subject-matter  with  which  we  are  dealing  in  detail 
really  is  a  whole,  consisting  of  articulated  members."  Psycho- 
logy, on  the  other  hand,  belongs  with  the  group  of  the  sciences  ; 
although  a  special  relation  has  always  existed  between  it  and 
systematic  philosophy,  and  the  closeness  of  the  connection  is 
characteristic  of  modern,  and  especially  of  English,  thought. 
The  explanation  of  this  connection  is  that  in  the  scientific 
study  of  mind  "  we  have,  so  far,  in  our  hands  the  fact  (the  fact 
of  intelligence)  to  which  all  other  facts  are  relative."  But 
mind,  and  its  facts  of  knowing,  willing,  etc.,  may  be  looked 
at  in  two  different  ways.  "  It  may  be  regarded  simply  as  fact, 
in  which  case  the  evolutions  of  mind  may  be  traced  and  re- 
duced to  laws  in  the  same  way  as  the  phenomena  treated  by 
the  other  sciences  (psychology,  sans  phrase)."  It  is  mind  in  its 
ulterior  aspect,  as  grounding  inferences  beyond  itself.  Now 
"  the  last  abstraction  which  it  becomes  the  duty  of  philosophy 

1  Philosophy  of  Reflection,  ii.  65. 

2  Article  on  Philosophy  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  (9th  edition). 


PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY.  107 

to  remove  is  the  abstraction  from  the  knowing  subject  which  is 
made  by  all  the  sciences,  including  the  science  of  psychology." 

Subject-object,  knowledge  with  its  implicates  —  this  unity 
in  duality  is  the  ultimate  aspect  which  reality  presents.  Phi- 
losophy may  then  be  said  to  be  the  explication  of  what  is  in- 
volved in  this  relation,  or  a  theory  of  its  possibility.  Two 
problems  may  be  discriminated  as  entering  necessarily  into 
this  general  problem  of  the  explication  of  what  is  involved  in 
the  relation  of  subject-object ;  these  are  a  problem  of  knowl- 
edge and  a  problem  of  being.  "  It  is  evident,  then,  that  phi- 
losophy as  theory  of  knowledge  must  have  for  its  complement 
philosophy  as  metaphysics  or  ontology."  Logic,  aesthetics,  and 
ethics  are  rightly  considered  by  Professor  Seth  to  be  sciences 
affording  subject-matter  which  requires  both  psychological  and 
philosophical  treatment.1 

A  nearer  approximation  to  the  correct  statement  of  the  rela- 
tion of  psychology  to  general  philosophical  discipline  is,  in  at 
least  some  respects,  that  made  by  Dr.  Stuckenberg.2  This 
writer  objects,  indeed,  to  placing  psychology  in  the  same  cate- 
gory with  the  natural  sciences.     It  appears,  however,  that  his 

1  It  will  be  helpful  in  this  connection  to  quote,  from  two  other  writers  on  this 
subject,  passages  which  are  brought  forward  with  approval  in  the  article  of  Pro- 
fessor Seth. 

"  We  may  view  knowledge, "  says  Professor  Croom  Robertson,  "as  mere  sub- 
jective function  ;  but  it  has  its  full  meaning  only  as  it  is  taken  to  represent  what 
we  may  call  objective  fact,  or  is  such  as  is  named  (in  different  circumstances)  real, 
valid,  true.  As  mere  subjective  function,  which  it  is  to  the  psychologist,  it  is 
best  spoken  of  by  an  unambiguous  na'me,  and  for  this  there  seems  none  better 
than  Intellection.  We  may  then  say  that  psychology  is  occupied  with  the  nat- 
ural function  of  Intellection,  seeking  to  discover  its  laws  ami  distinguishing  its 
various  modes.  .  .  .  Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  theory  of  Knowledge  (as 
that  which  is  known)."  — ■  Psi/chologi/  and  Philosophy  (Mind,  1883,  p.  15  f.). 

"Comparing  psychology  and  epistemology,"  says  Dr.  Ward,  "we  may  say 
that  the  former  is  essentially  genetic  in  its  method,  and  might,  if  we  had  the 
power  to  revise  our  existing  terminology,  be  called  biology  :  the  latter,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  essentially  devoid  of  everything  historical,  ami  treats,  sitb  specie 
aeternitaMs,  as  Spinoza  might  have  said,  of  human  knowledge,  conceived  as  the 
possession  of  mind  in  general."  -  Psychological  Priiiciplrs  (Mind,  1883,  pp.  16f>  ff.). 

2  Chapter  on  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  in  his  Introduction  to  the  Study 
of  Philosophy,  New  York,  1888. 


108  PSYCHOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

objection  obtains  against  reducing  the  science  of  mind  to  the 
rank  of  a  department  of  physics  and  chemistry,  rather  than 
against  giving  to  the  psychical  processes  a  treatment  by  strictly 
scientific  method.  "  To  make  a  theory  of  the  essence  of  the 
soul,  the  principle  for  the  explanation  of  its  processes  is,"  says 
this  writer,  "  both  unphilosophical  and  unscientific."  And  yet 
"if  the  natural  sciences  may  postulate  matter,  there  is  no  rea- 
son why  psychology  may  not  postulate  mind,  as  a  peculiar 
entity.  It  must,  however,  be  treated  as  a  mere  postulate,  and 
the  supposed  essence  must  not  dominate  the  entire  investiga- 
tion, as  if  its  nature  were  established."  Psychology,  then,  can- 
not take  the  place  of  philosophy,  which  is  "  the  rational  system 
of  fundamental  principles."  But  while  every  serious  study 
may  be  a  preparation  for  philosophy,  psychology  is  peculiarly 
its  propaedeutic.  In  carrying  out  this  distinction,  however, 
Dr.  Stuckenberg  makes  no  provision  for  the  philosophical  treat- 
ment of  the  principles  of  the  natural  sciences  ;  nor  does  he 
sufficiently  discriminate  the  scientific  from  the  philosophical 
treatment  of  the  subjects  usually  included  under  the  heads  of 
logic,  ethics,  and  aesthetics,  as  well  as  psychology.  The  results 
of  this  failure  render  his  divisions  of  philosophy  peculiarly 
unsatisfactory. 

We  believe  that  the  previous  definition  of  philosophy,  and  the 
fixing  of  its  relations  to  science  in  general,  furnish  the  means 
for  indicating  more  clearly  and  comprehensively  than  do  any 
of  the  foregoing  views,  its  peculiar  relations  of  agreement  and 
difference  toward  psychology. 

The  peculiar  domain  of  empirical  psychology  is  the  descrip- 
tion and  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  individual  human 
consciousness,  as  such.  Every  so-called  "state  of  conscious- 
ness "  may  be  said  to  furnish  a  number  of  problems  which  pro- 
voke reflective  analysis  and  scientific  research.  This  research 
is  made  more  difficult,  because  self-consciousness,  in  the  form 
in  which  psychological  science  begins  to  make  use  of  it,  im- 
plies an  organization   of  experience  that  has  already  reached 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND   PHILOSOPHY.  109 

an  advanced  stage.  The  science  of  psychology  is  by  no  means 
satisfied  with  the  mere  description  and  classification  of  the 
"states"  given  in  developed  self-consciousness.  Especially  as 
studied  in  the  modern  spirit  and  by  the  modern  methods,  it 
recognizes  the  demand  made  upon  it  to  "  explain  "  these  states. 
This  explanation  it  undertakes  to  make  scientific,  especially  in 
two  directions.  It  analyzes  the  exceedingly  complex  states,  as 
they  are  given  to  developed  self-consciousness,  into  their  most 
primitive  and  nearly  simple  factors  ;  and  it  discovers  the  laws 
and  conditions  of  their  synthesis.  It  also  traces  the  evolution 
of  the  same  states  as  they  succeed  each  other,  with  dependence 
upon  preceding  states  and  with  a  growing  complexity,  in  the 
life  of  the  soul.  In  other  words,  psychology  strives  to  be  sci- 
entific by  being  thoroughly  analytic  and  historico-genetic  in  its 
study  of  mental  phenomena.  It  is  not,  however,  as  Mr.  Hodg- 
son claims,  limited  in  its  attempts  at  exact  explanation  to  the 
"  causal "  action  of  the  body  (objective  aspect,  or  organism)  on 
the  mind  (subjective  aspect,  or  conscious  state). 

But  psychology  cannot  be  long  and  thoroughly  pursued  as 
a  science  without  becoming  aware  of  the  presence  of  problems 
which  it  seems  beyond  the  power  of  experimental  or  intro- 
spective analysis  and  synthesis  fully  to  solve.  When  scientific 
study  is  begun,  it  finds  the  distinction  between  subjective  and 
objective  already  established.  It  makes  unquestioning  use,  at 
first,  of  this  distinction  to  explain  the  genesis  of  states  of 
consciousness  from  the  effect  of  external  influences  upon  the 
peripheral  or  central  nervous  system.  It  finds  the  subject  of 
all  the  psychical  states  already  self-constituted,  as  it  were,  and 
insisting  on  its  right  of  referring  to  itself  the  states  as  all  its 
own.  It  makes  use  of  this  reference  to  explain  the  present 
states  as  arising  from  previous  states,  under  a  theory  of  the 
association  of  ideas  or  of  the  influence  of  desire  upon  volition, 
etc.  It  finds  certain  collective  images,  and  so-called  abstract 
concepts  and  intuitions,  already  set  into  an  habitual  mode  of 
procedure,  in  the  uniform  development  of  the  mental  life.     It 


HO  PSYCHOLOGY   AND   PHILOSOPHY. 

helps  out  its  science  by  employing  these  images  and  concepts. 
It  tells  how  states  of  consciousness  are  "caused"  by  pre- 
existing or  co-existing  states  of  the  brain  ;  or  how  the  body 
and  mind  "  influence "  each  other  ;  or  how  "  quantity "  and 
"  quality  "  of  psychical  states  "  depend  "  upon  amount  and  kind 
of  physical  stimuli ;  or  how  the  states,  although  they  seem  to 
"belong"  to  the  mind,  do  "really"  belong  to  the  brain,  etc. 

As  a  matter  of  course,  then,  the  scientific  student  of  men- 
tal phenomena  raises  the  question  as  to  the  genesis  of  these 
very  distinctions  and  presuppositions  in  which  he  finds  his 
own  attempts  at  explanation  invariably  and  inextricably  in- 
volved. He  is  forced  to  come  to  some  conclusion,  at  least 
a  provisional  and  hypothetical  one,  regarding  the  nature  and 
form  of  development  of  that  (the  life  of  the  so-called  Mind  or 
Soul)  which  he  is  engaged  in  studying.  But  he  cannot  accept 
any  conclusion  on  such  a  matter  —  in  however  cautious  and 
merely  tentative  a  manner  —  without  appearing  to  adopt  a 
philosophical  tenet.  Moreover,  he  finds  that  some  theory  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  subject  called  "  myself,"  and  of  the  objects 
known  as  "  things  "  of  my  experience,  and  as  to  the  relations 
existing  between  this  subject  and  these  objects,  and  as  to 
the  validity  of  the  self-reference  of  all  states  to  the  one  sub- 
ject of  them  all,  etc.,  is  helpful  in  explanation.  His  case  is  here 
somewhat  analogous  to  that  of  the  working  physicist,  who  holds 
provisionally  the  molecular  theory  of  the  constitution  of  matter. 

The  psychologist  who  aims  to  keep  his  pursuit  within  strictly 
scientific  lines  can  proceed  little  or  no  farther  than  the  point 
described  above.  His  attitude  toward  philosophical  discipline 
is  that  of  a  giver  and  a  borrower  as  well.  He  contributes  to 
philosophy,  as  transformed  by  the  first  stages  of  reflective  analy- 
sis and  synthesis,  the  problems  which  constitute  its  subject- 
matter,  and  over  the  treatment  of  which  its  schools  are  divided. 
He  gives  to  these  problems  the  correct  shaping  which  they  may 
receive  as  presuppositions  and  discovered  principles  of  that  sci- 
ence which  is  the  peculiar  propaedeutic  of  philosophy.     He  bor- 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  PHILOSOPHY.         m 

rows  from  philosophy,  as  working  hypotheses  to  be  tested  in 
an  experimental  way,  its  conclusions  concerning  the  nature  and 
validity,  in  the  world  of  reality,  of  the  principles  which  his  sci- 
ence implicates. 

But  philosophy  is  somewhat  more  than  a  higher  stage  of  psy- 
chology. Its  aim  is  the  rational  system  of  the  principles  pre- 
supposed and  ascertained  by  all  the  particular  sciences,  —  in 
the  relation  which  these  principles  sustain  to  ultimate  Eeality. 
Its  analysis  is  then  more  ultimate  and  objective  than  that  of 
psychology.  Its  problems  all  have,  indeed,  a  subjective  origin 
and  aspect ;  for  they  are  all  most  intelligently  and  consistently 
started  in  the  effort  of  reason  to  understand  itself.  Psycho- 
logical analysis,  as  a  special  propaedeutic  of  philosophy,  dis- 
engages and  prepares  these,  problems.  But  the  same  human 
reason  which,  with  introspective  or  experimental  analysis,  seeks 
to  know  itself  by  a  scientific  psychology,  constructs  all  the 
other  particular  sciences.  "Without  it,  and  except  as  under  its 
forth-puttings  and  laws,  none  of  the  sciences  exist.  Its  ulti- 
mate analysis  will,  therefore,  take  them  all  into  the  account. 
It  will  extricate  the  presuppositions,  and  seize  upon  and  appro- 
priate the  discovered  principles,  of  them  all.  This  implies  more 
than  what  Mr.  Hodgson  calls  "the  removal  of  causation  from 
consciousness,  as  such." 

And  in  its  synthesis  philosophy  will  transcend  the  psycho- 
logical theory  which,  after  accepting  the  primary  analysis, 
simply  puts  together  again  the  two  great  groups  of  psychical 
phenomena,  and  grounds  them  in  hypothetical  realities  called 
"souls"  and  "things,"  that  it  may  the  better  explain  the  un- 
folding of  psychical  development.  For,  in  its  synthesis,  philos- 
ophy will  consider  all  the  phenomena,  and  all  the  particular 
things  which  are  regarded  by  the  positive  sciences  as  their 
subjects,  —  all  happenings  and  all  realities,  —  in  relation  to 
one  supreme  Eeality.  This  Eeality  comprehends  in  itself  the 
ground  of  all  psychical  life,  even  of  the  ideals  of  reason  itself. 
It  is  a  unity  of  ideal  Eeality,  a  supreme  realized  Idea. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   SPIRIT   AND   THE   METHOD    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

HOW  to  arrive  at  philosophical  truth,  is  a  question  the 
consideration  of  which,  whether  from  the  theoretical  or 
the  practical  point  of  view,  is  encompassed  by  no  small  diffi- 
culties. Even  in  the  pursuit  of  science  the  question  of  method 
has  always  been  a  vexed  one ;  indeed,  from  its  very  nature,  it 
does  not  seem  to  admit  of  a  definite  and  final  answer.  We 
may,  of  course,  set  forth,  as  laws  of  so-called  "  pure  logic,"  or 
rules  of  "  logical  praxis,"  the  compound  results  of  psychological 
analysis  and  observation  of  the  means  actually  employed  to 
secure  the  growth  of  the  particular  sciences.  Thus  the  prin- 
ciples which  have  come  to  be  established  for  the  discovery 
and  verification  of  truth  in  respect  to  physical  phenomena  have 
been  the  subject  of  lengthy  and  learned  treatises.  These  trea- 
tises have  an  undoubted  value,  whether  they  are  more  or  less 
dominated  by  metaphysical  considerations  ;  whether  they  are 
styled  "  Novum  Organum,"  "  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive  Sci- 
ences," or  "  Empirical  Logic "  and  "  Symbolic  Logic."  Yet  the 
actual  ascertainment  and  verifying  of  scientific  truth  proceeds 
with  far  less  immediate  dependence  upon  the  theory  of  scien- 
tific method  than  we  are  accustomed  to  suppose.  This  remark 
is  justified,  even  if  we  exclude  the  enormous  influence  from 
flashes  of  wit  and  flights  of  speculative  genius,  and  from  for- 
tunate accident,  —  things,  the  occurrence  and  effect  of  which 
it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  bring  under  verifiable  law. 

The  method  of  each  one  of  the  particular  sciences  is  itself 
n  matter  of  development.     The  actual  growth  of  each  of  these 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  113 

sciences  is  dependent  indeed  upon  the  right  use  of  the  method 
peculiar  to  it ;  but  the  question  as  to  what  method  is  right, 
is  a  question  which  can  only  be  progressively  settled  by  the 
development  of  the  whole  body  of  the  science.  The  last  half- 
century  has  scarcely  made  a  greater  change  in  the  system  of 
conclusions  which  constitute  the  substance  of  the  physical  and 
natural  sciences  —  of  physics  and  chemistry,  of  physiology  and 
biology,  and  even  of  geology  and  astronomy  —  than  it  has 
accomplished  in  the  means  employed  by  them  for  ascertaining 
and  testing  their  conclusions.  In  that  particular  science,  for 
example,  called  "general  nerve-physiology,"  the  improved  use 
of  microscopy  and  micrometrical  measurement,  the  new  meth- 
ods of  electrical  stimulation,  of  the  staining  and  tracing  of 
nerve-tracts  by  Wallerian  or  other  degeneration,  or  by  photo- 
graphing successive  cross-sections  cut  by  the  microtome,  and 
of  the  study  of  reaction-time  by  the  pendulum-myograph  or 
other  similar  contrivance,  etc.,  are  both  products  and  indispen- 
sable conditions  of  scientific  advance.  What  is  true  of  this 
subdivision  of  one  of  the  natural  sciences  is  true  of  them  all. 
But  suppose  that  we  submit,  as  indeed  we  are  compelled  to 
do,  our  attempts  to  form  a  science  of  method  to  those  general 
principles  of  procedure  which  hold  true  of  all  the  inductive 
sciences.  Suppose,  that  is  to  say,  we  by  the  general  induc- 
tive method  strive  to  arrive  at  a  true  science  of  the  inductive 
method  itself.  We  are  then  at  once  brought  face  to  face  with 
the  same  fact  from  another  and  somewhat  different  point  of 
view.  The  history  of  these  particular  sciences  shows,  as  has 
already  been  remarked,  that  the  particular  methods  which  they 
severally  employ  are  subject  to  great  and  sometimes  rapid 
changes.  Moreover,  the  more  highly  developed  as  a  specialty 
any  of  these  sciences  is  found  to  be,  the  more  complicated,  and 
the  less  adapted  to  general  use  in  scientific  discovery,  is  its 
peculiar  method.  We  can,  to  be  sure,  make  a  somewhat  brave 
show  of  generalizing  laws,  or  rather  rules,  of  procedure  for  all 
the  physical  and  natural  sciences,  by  an  inductive  survey  of 

8 


114  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  entire  field.  But  the  wider  our  generalizations,  and  the 
more  valuable  as  a  psychological  or  logical  study  of  the  be- 
havior of  mind  as  it  faces  the  universe  of  material  reality,  the 
less  appropriate  and  valuable  are  the  same  generalizations  as 
indicative  of  an  effective  method  for  any  one  of  the  particular 
sciences.  And  if  our  generalizations  for  a  universal  science  of 
method  seem  complete,  they  perhaps  form  a  basis  for  only  such 
practical  exhortations  as  follow :  "  Observe,  inquire,  test,  read, 
and  think ;  be  patient,  humble,  but  bold ;  be  docile,  diligent, 
and  yet  free." 

Psychology  —  and  with  it,  as  a  matter  of  course,  all  the 
psychological  sciences  —  has  been  held  to  have  a  method  es- 
sentially and  peculiarly  its  own.  This  is  the  method  of  intro- 
spection, or  internal  observation,  or  reflective  consciousness. 
Its  motto  is,  "  Know  thyself,"  —  that  written  over  the  portal 
at  Delphi.  The  possibility  of  this  method  is  involved  in  that 
fundamental  fact  which  psychological  analysis  discovers,  —  the 
fact  of  self-consciousness  ;  it  is  also  the  fact  which,  having 
been  discerned  to  be  fundamental  by  psychological  analysis,  is 
given  to  philosophy  as  its  fundamental  problem,  —  the  problem, 
namely,  of  the  subject- object  in  the  unity  of  self-consciousness. 

The  method  of  introspection,  although  it  was  satisfactory  to 
the  "  old  psychology,"  has  been  recently  subjected  to  a  most 
searching  criticism,  largely  on  account  of  the  growing  influence 
of  the  physical  sciences.  It  has  not  simply  been  complained 
of  for  its  unscientific  and  indefinite  character ;  it  has  even  been 
summarily  dismissed  as  absurd  and  impossible.  Nor  has  the 
complaint  or  sentence  of  dismissal  come  from  the  devotees  of 
rival  pursuits  alone.  In  all  this  decrying  of  introspection  as 
an  effective  or  possible  method  of  psychological  science  the  pro- 
fessional psychologists  have  themselves  been  most  prominent. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  method  of  introspection  alone 
cannot  construct  an  adequate  science  of  the  psychical  phenom- 
ena. For  the  work  of  psychological  investigation,  like  every 
work  of  genuine  and  thorough  science,  is  not  satisfied  with 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  115 

mere  description  and  classification  ;  it  requires  explanation. 
But  explanation  necessitates  above  all  the  genetic  method. 
Lipps  1  may  be  correct  when  he  maintains,  in  accordance  with 
the  practice  and  claims  of  the  "  old  psychology,"  that  the 
means  of  knowledge  in  this  science  is  that  observation  which 
is  known  as  internal,  —  this  because  its  objects  are  to  be  ob- 
served in  that  way  only.  In  self-consciousness  the  Ego  envis- 
ages those  objects,  the  so-called  states  of  consciousness,  which 
contain  in  complex  and  involved  forms  the  problems  of  psy- 
chological science.  This  truth  will  forever  distinctly  separate 
psychology  from  all  forms  of  physical  and  natural  science,  not 
only  as  respects  the  nature  of  its  objects  and  problems,  but 
also  as  respects  the  method  of  the  solution  of  the  problems. 

But  the  view  of  Lipps  is  only  half  the  truth.  Volkmann  von 
Volkmar  2  is  also  right,  —  not,  indeed,  when  he  speaks  rather  too 
disparagingly  of  both  the  inductive  and  the  deductive  method 
in  psychology,  but  when  he  unites  the  essential  features  of 
both  in  what  he  calls  the  "genetic"  method.  In  order  that 
the  student  of  psychology  may  establish  a  valid  claim  for  his 
pursuit  to  a  position  among  the  sciences,  he  must  be  able  to 
explain  how  the  phenomena  called  "  states  of  consciousness " 
arise,  out  of  their  elements,  in  accordance  with  the  most  gen- 
eral laws  of  that  development  which  we  are  entitled  to  call  the 
"  life  of  the  mind."  The  genesis  of  these  states  is  not  wholly, 
it  is  only  very  partially,  if  at  all,  in  consciousness ;  it  cannot 
therefore  be  made  the  subject  of  introspection. 

To  envisage  the  object  already  existent,  aud  to  envisage  it  as 
at  once  my  object  and  my  state,  is  not  sufficient  to  explain  the 
genesis  of  the  object.  The  explanation  (so  far  as  it  can  be 
given  by  psychological  science)  of  the  genesis  of  any  particu- 
lar state  must  be  found,  in  part,  in  the  bodily  conditions,  under 
the  laws  investigated  by  pyscho-physics  and  physiological  psy- 
chology.    It  must  also  be  found  in  the  character  of  pre-exis- 

1  Grimdtatsachen  des  Seelenlebens,  Bonn,  1883,  p.  7f. 

2  Lehrbuck  der  Psychologie,  1884,  i.  6  f. 


116  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

ting  mental  states  —  conscious  or  unconscious  —  under  the  laws 
of  so-called  "  association  of  ideas."  The  explanation  of  all 
states,  regarding  their  purposive  and  organic  development,  is 
to  be  found  in  the  existence  and  evolution  of  a  living  being 
(the  mind,  or  soul),  with  a  nature  and  acquired  habits  peculiarly 
its  own. 

The  method  of  psychological  science  is,  therefore,  peculiarly 
introspective  and  analytic  of  the  envisaged  phenomena  called 
states  of  consciousness.  But  it  is  far  broader  and  more  effective 
than  it  could  be  if  it  were  merely  introspective.  It  pushes  its 
analysis  of  the  genesis  of  the  phenomena  as  far  back  as  possible, 
by  the  use  of  experimental  methods  and  methods  of  external 
observation  applied  to  the  whole  process  of  mental  evolution 
(study  of  infants,  of  primitive  man,  and  of  the  lower  animals,  — 
evolutionary  and  comparative  psychology).  It  interprets  the 
psychical  life  of  the  individual  mind  in  the  light  of  knowledge 
gathered  concerning  the  psychical  development  of  the  race  (the 
psychological  study  of  literature,  society,  art,  religion,  etc.).  It 
lays  peculiar  emphasis  upon  abnormal  and  pathological  phe- 
nomena of  the  nervous  and  mental  life  (psychiatry,  hypnotism, 
phenomena  of  insanity  and  of  the  criminal  classes,  etc.).  It  takes 
account  of  the  rise  and  fall  of  particular  forms  of  psychologi- 
cal theory  (the  history  of  psychology).  It  strives  to  transcend 
experience  by  the  positing  of  hypothetical  principles  of  expla- 
nation. But  in  the  employment  of  all  these  methods  this  sci- 
ence differs  in  no  important  respect  from  the  sciences  which 
deal  wholly  with  physical  phenomena.  It  is  only  the  use  of 
introspection  for  the  possession  and,  to  some  extent  at  least, 
for  the  analysis  of  its  objects,  which  makes  psychology,  as 
respects  its  method,  different  from  the  other  sciences. 

Far  too  much  of  mystery,  and  of  the  awe  which  is  bred  of 
the  sense  of  mystery,  has  often  surrounded  the  acquirement, 
use,  and  imparting  of  the  secrets  of  scientific  method.  But 
especially  esoteric  does  the  subject  of  method  at  times  appear 
in  the  pursuit  and  communication  of  philosophical  discipline. 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  H7 

The  sarcasm  of  Lotze,  although  directed  against  a  particular 
attempt  at  scientific  method  in  philosophy  (the  founding  of 
metaphysics  on  a  psychological  analysis  of  our  cognition),  seems 
at  times  to  apply  equally  well  to  all  attempts  at  method  in  this 
domain.  "  The  numerous  dissertations  directed  to  this  end  may 
be  compared  to  the  tuning  of  instruments  before  a  concert,  only 
that  they  are  not  so  necessary  or  useful."  "  The  constant  whet- 
ting of  the  knife  is  tedious,  if  it  is  not  proposed  to  cut  anything 
with  it."  Method,  indeed  '  we  may  be  inclined  to  exclaim  when 
weary  of  reading  criticisms  and  defences  of  the  Hegelian  Dialec- 
tic ;  let  but  Hegel,  or  any  one  of  his  critics  or  supporters,  intro- 
duce us  to  some  new  and  vital  truth  in  philosophy,  and  we  will 
excuse  him  from  any  detailed  explanation  of  the  method  by 
which  he  attains  it. 

A  remark  like  the  foregoing,  however  petulantly  or  thought- 
lessly uttered,  may  call  our  attention  more  closely  to  the  some- 
what peculiar  relation  in  which  the  spirit  and  method  of 
philosophy  stand  to  the  discovery  and  verification  of  its  truths. 
The  relation  of  philosophy  to  the  particular  sciences  is  such 
that  it  necessarily  shares  in  the  triumphs  of  their  special  me- 
thods; while  its  own  method  is,  in  some  respects,  an  advance 
beyond  them  in  the  same  direction  with  that  which  they  have 
marked  out.  Since  philosophy  is  not  a  physical  science,  it  does 
not  employ  any  one  of  the  special  methods  of  such  science.  It 
has  no  microscope,  telescope,  scales,  crucible,  or  other  physical 
apparatus  of  its  own.  Xeither  does  it  deal,  in  a  primary  and 
independent  way,  with  meteorological,  financial,  sociological,  or 
other  statistics.  And  yet  it  considers  none  of  these  things, 
nothing  that  is  human,  foreign  to  itself.  It  allows  to  each 
particular  science  the  way  of  discovering  and  verifying  its 
facts  and  laws  which  is  peculiar  to  it.  In  the  triumphs  of 
each  science,  through  whatever  means,  philosophy  rejoices 
sympathetically;  for  it  feels  itself  thereby  enriched. 

For  the  reception  of  the  principles  of  the  positive  sciences,  as 
distinguished  from  their  discovery  and  proof,  philosophy  does 


118  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

not  need  to  be  expert  in  the  use  of  special  scientific  methods. 
But  in  the  most  general  scientific  method,  and  in  that  spirit  — 
called  the  "  scientific  spirit  "  —  which  characterizes  the  modern 
pursuit  of  knowledge,  philosophy  needs  to  have  a  large  share. 
In  this  broad  and  somewhat  indefinite  meaning  of  the  "words, 
its  spirit  and  its  method  are  distinctly  scientific.  Indeed,  since 
its  subject-matter  is  not  confined  to  any  one  of  these  sciences, 
but  embraces  them  all,  and  since  its  generalizations  reach  beyond 
those  of  any  particular  science  and  cover  the  field  of  experience 
possessed  by  all,  philosophy  must  be,  in  some  sort,  more  scien- 
tific than  any  positive  science  can  be.  It  must  carry  the  spirit 
and  general  method  of  scientific  research  into  the  regions  of  the 
most  subtile  and  yet  complex  analysis,  and  of  the  loftiest  and 
most  comprehensive  synthesis.  For  it  is  of  the  very  essence  of 
philosophy  to  be  the  highest  and  purest  activity  of  reason  itself. 
The  special  relations  of  philosophy  to  psychology  are  such 
as  require  in  the  pursuit  of  the  former  the  extension  of  that 
method  of  reflective  analysis  which  is  peculiar  to  the  latter. 
Each  of  the  sciences  of  nature  furnishes,  as  material  for  further 
treatment  by  philosophy,  certain  presuppositions  upon  which, 
as  upon  fundamental  postulates,  all  its  positive  results  are 
obtained.  The  collection  of  these  presuppositions  and  the  at- 
tempt, in  an  external  way,  to  arrange  them  into  a  well-articu- 
lated system,  is  only  the  beginning  of  the  work  of  philosophy. 
All  these  very  presuppositions  are,  not  simply  working  hypo- 
theses of  the  particular  sciences,  but  modes  of  the  behavior,  and 
so  principles  of  the  constitution  and  development,  of  human 
reason.  As  soon  as  this  truth  is  once  apprehended  with  regard 
to  them,  the  method  of  their  consideration  ceases  to  be  purely 
historical  and  founded  on  external  observation.  The  world  of 
"  Things  "  is  properly  treated  by  the  physical  and  natural  sci- 
ences by  the  method  of  external  observation.  And  —  to  use, 
with  a  somewhat  different  meaning,  the  language  of  Kant !  — 

1  Critique*   of  Pure  Reason,  Transcendental  Dialectic,   Consideration  on  the 
whole  of  Pure  Psychology,  etc.     Max  Midler's  Translation,  p.  334. 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  119 

"so  long  as  we  connect  (internal  and  external)  phenomena  with 
each  other,  as  mere  representations  in  our  experience,  there  is 
nothing  irrational."  We  may  even  "  hypostasize  the  external 
phenomena,  looking  upon  them  as  no  longer  representations, 
but  as  things  existing  by  themselves  and  outside  us,  with  the 
same  quality  in  which  they  exist  inside  us;"  and  this  with- 
out vitiating  the  results  of  scientific  observation  and  analy- 
sis. But  as  soon  as  we  raise  the  inquiry  as  to  the  ultimate 
grounds  and  validity  of  such  connection  and  hypostasis,  we 
require  the  use  of  the  critical  method.  But  the  critical  method 
(in  the  philosophical  meaning  of  the  word  "  critical ")  is  not 
the  method  of  the  physical  sciences.  It  is  an  extension  of  the 
psychological  method  ;  it  is  the  method  of  ultimate  reflective 
analysis.  This  method  philosophy  is  compelled  to  employ,  be- 
cause it  regards  all  the  principles  postulated  by  the  positive 
sciences  as  "  moments  "  and  modes  of  the  being  and  behavior 
of   reason  itself. 

The  analytic  part  of  philosophical  discipline  concerns  chiefly 
the  collection  and  critical  sifting  of  its  material.  This  material 
comes  from  the  particular  sciences  ;  it  consists  of  the  principles 
presupposed  or  ascertained  by  them  all.  The  material,  as  con- 
sidered by  philosophy,  is  all  of  the  rational  order;  for  it  is 
reason's  world,  both  internal  and  external,  which  the  material 
constitutes.  But  without  the  use  of  synthesis  the  material 
cannot  be  considered  as  forming  part  of  a  rational  system  ;  it 
cannot  without  speculative  construction  be  shown  to  constitute 
a  cosmos,  —  an  orderly  and  beautiful  whole.  Now,  in  the  case 
of  the  particular  sciences  it  is  the  rational  presuppositions, 
which  are  accepted  but  not  critically  explored  by  these  sci- 
ences, that  serve  as  the  ground  of  their  unity.  The  principles 
of  material  Eeality,  called  "atoms,"  being  Existent  in  Space  and 
Time,  having  Quantity,  Quality,  and  Eolation  by  way  of  "  at- 
traction "  and  "  repulsion,"  and,  though  themselves  permanent 
Subject  of  states,  undergoing  Change  under  Law,  give  Unity  to 
the   otherwise  diverse  phenomena  of  the  science  of  molecular 


120  SPIRIT   AND  METHOD   OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

physics.  These  principles  make  the  disconnected  sequences  of 
our  experiences  with  "  Things  "  into  a  science. 

Attention  has  of  late  been  frequently  called  to  the  fact  that 
all  the  sciences  of  nature  —  biology  included  —  are  becoming 
more  and  more  branches  or  departments  of  the  one  inclusive 
science  of  molecular  physics.  In  our  judgment,  there  is  a  long 
and  weary  road  yet  to  travel  before  the  goal  to  which  this  tend- 
ency points  the  way  can  be  definitely  attained.  But  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  tendency,  and  of  its  marked  beneficial  effect  upon 
the  methods  of  the  particular  sciences,  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
We  now  refer  to  this  tendency  in  order  to  show  that  the  syn- 
theses of  experience  for  which  these  sciences  stand  are  made 
possible  only  through  those  postulated  principles  which  it  is  the 
business  of  analytical  philosophy  to  discover  and  criticise. 

Empirical  psychology  has  been  shown  to  have  its  collection 
of  postulates  and  empirical  laws,  with  the  further  treatment  of 
which  philosophy  is  concerned.  The  postulates  of  psychologi- 
cal science  are,  in  part,  those  of  the  general  science  of  physics ; 
but  more  particularly  they  are  those  of  the  science  of  human 
physiology.  They  are  also,  in  part,  certain  postulates  of  the 
existence  of  so-called  mind,  with  a  nature  (unity,  identity,  at- 
tributes, and  accidents)  and  a  development  of  a  peculiar  kind. 
They  include  also  potential  and  actual  relations  of  the  differ- 
ent beings,  thus  existent,  to  one  another,  to  the  beings  called 
atoms,  and  to  certain  other  potentially  or  actually  existent 
beings.  These  presuppositions  are  indispensable  to  give  unity 
to  that  science  which  deals  with  psychical  processes.  Without 
them  the  postulated  beings  called  minds  would  be  supposed  out 
of  all  relation  —  were  that  indeed  even  conceivable  —  with 
that  work  with  which  the  physical  sciences  deal. 

Now,  these  most  general  principles  of  all  the  particular  sci- 
ences, both  physical  and  psychological,  are  the  points  from 
which  the  synthesis  of  philosophy  takes,  as  it  were,  its  flight. 
Supposing  them  all  to  have  been  subjected  to  the  most  search- 
ing critical  analysis,  the  attempt  must  then  be  made  to  unite 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  121 

them  into  a  rational  system.  This  attempt  must  of  course 
proceed  by  use  of  the  synthetic  method.  It  is  an  attempt  at 
the  highest  and  most  complete  synthesis  of  principles,  based 
upon  the  most  thorough  and  exhaustive  reflective  analysis. 

But  can  this  attempt  at  supreme  synthesis,  which  it  is  of  the 
very  nature  of  philosophy  to  make,  itself  be  made  without  use 
of  any  presuppositions  whatsoever  ?  The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion has  already  been  indicated  in  the  discussion  of  the  defi- 
nition of  philosophy  and  of  its  relation  to  the  particular 
sciences.  More  light  will  be  thrown  upon  it  as  we  consider 
the  spirit  of  philosophy,  and  the  principal  attitudes  of  mind 
(dogmatism,  scepticism,  criticism)  which  are  possible  toward 
the  ultimate  problems  of  philosophy.  It  is  enough  at  present 
to  say  that  philosophical  thinking,  in  its  analysis  and  attempted 
synthesis  into  rational  system  of  all  the  principles  of  the  par- 
ticular sciences,  is  itself  compelled  to  carry  with  it  two  postu- 
lates. One  of  these  is  the  ground  of  that  confidence  which 
reason  persistently  has  in  itself.  Philosophy  —  in  the  language 
of  Lotze  1  —  postulates  "  the  existence  in  the  world  at  large  of 
a  '  truth,'  which  affords  a  sure  object  for  cognition."  Agnosti- 
cism, in  so  far  as  it  is  agnosticism,  can  therefore  never  be  a 
philosophy.  Nor  can  philosophy  ever  remain  satisfied  with 
an  agnostic  system,  —  if,  indeed,  the  very  words  "  system  of 
agnostic  philosophy  "  be  not  in  themselves  self-contradictory. 
And,  furthermore,  the  scepticism  "  without  motif "  which  aims 
to  thrust  forth  and  hold  in  position  permanently  the  inquiry, 
whether,  after  all,  reason  may  not  be  compelled,  after  its  best 
and  supreme  efforts,  to  be  self-deceived  through  and  through, 
is  inconsistent  with  that  postulated  self-confidence  of  reason, 
out  of  which  philosophy  springs. 

The  other  presupposition  which  necessarily  enters  into  every 
effort  of  philosophy,  of  a  synthetic  and  constructive  kind, 
concerns  a  unity,  of  some  sort,  of  ultimate  Reality.  A  uni- 
fying   principle,    or   group    of   interconnected  principles,  is  of 

1  Outlines  of  Logic  and  of  the  Encyc.  of  Philosophy,  Translation,  p.  147. 


122  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

necessity  the  postulate  upon  which  the  synthesis  of  philos- 
ophy proceeds.  Its  further  task,  as  constituting  a  rational 
system,  is  the  discovery  and  verifying  of  the  nature  of  such 
principle.  Wliat  the  principle  is,  philosophy  may  find  itself 
unable  fully  to  comprehend,  or  —  it  is  at  least  conceivable  — 
unable  even  to  conjecture  in  any  definitive  and  defensible  way. 
But  that  the  principle  is,  it  persistently  presupposes,  and  must 
presuppose  until  it  is  ready  to  relinquish  all  claim  to  rightful 
existence  for  itself  as  even  a  rational  striving  for  truth.  That 
the  unifying  principle  is  some  really  Existent,  is  also  an  insep- ' 
arable  part  of  this  fundamental  postulate  of  all  philosophical 
discipline.  Wliat  this  really  Existent  is,  and  whether  we  may 
define  it  or  not,  are  questions  to  which  the  different  schools  of 
philosophy  give  different  responses.  But  that  one  really  Ex- 
istent is  the  philosophical  ground  and  explanation  of  that 
unity  in  manifestation  of  the  world,  which  the  particular 
sciences  both  discover  and  presuppose,  is  a  postulate  wrought 
into  the  very  nature  of  philosophy.  It  is  a  postulate  springing 
from  the  very  being  of  reason  itself. 

The  technical  method  of  philosophy  cannot,  however,  be 
separated  from  the  spirit  of  philosophy,  which  imparts  to  it 
life,  guidance,  and  vigor.  On  this  account  it  is,  in  part,  that 
philosophy  is  less  technical  in  method  than  are  any  of  the 
particular  sciences ;  indeed,  so  far  as  it  can  be  said  to  have 
a  technical  method  at  all,  the  spirit  controls  the  method  much 
more  than  can  be  the  case  with  pure  science,  as  such,  or  with 
the  entire  body  of  the  inductive  sciences. 

The  spirit  of  philosophy  is  essentially  freedom,  —  the  exer- 
cise of  reason  absolutely  untrammelled  by  extraneous  bonds  or 
obligations.  As  Chalybaus  has  said,1  that  free  critical  move- 
ment which  prevails  in  all  the  sciences  is  essentially  philo- 
sophical. Tn  this  regard  modern  philosophy,  of  its  very  nature, 
surpasses  modern  science  in  what  is  common  and  essential  to 

1  Fundamentalphilosophie,  ein  Versuch  das  System  der  Philosophie  auf  ein 
Realprincip  zu  griinden,  p.  1  f. 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  123 

both.  How  this  freedom  may  be  not  only  compatible  with, 
but  conducive  to,  the  acceptance  of  the  truths  of  revelation, 
and  the  docile  reception  and  performance  of  many  merely  con- 
ventional duties  and  practices,  need  not  concern  us  at  the 
present  time.  But  if  the  mind  of  man  is  even  to  make  the 
attempt  to  subject  to  an  ultimate  analysis,  and  to  construct 
into  a  systematic  whole  by  a  supreme  synthesis,  the  principles 
presupposed  or  ascertained  by  the  particular  sciences,  it  must 
possess  this  absolute  philosophical  freedom. 

The  freedom  of  philosophy  includes  the  power  and  the  obli- 
gation to  examine  critically  all  the  presuppositions  of  every 
particular  form  of  human  knowledge.  It  includes  also  the 
right  of  reason  to  question  searchingly,  and  with  the  utmost 
possible  candor,  its  own  structure  and  processes,  —  their  nature 
and  their  validity.  This  right  extends  even  to  those  postulates 
of  all  reason  on  which  philosophy  is  itself  founded;  namely,  the 
confidence  of  reason  in  itself  as  able  to  attain  to  truth,  and  its 
metaphysical  faith  in  that  unity  of  objective  Eeality  whose 
nature  and  relations  to  experience  philosophy  investigates.  To 
be  sure,  in  the  exercise  of  its  freedom  to  the  fullest  extent  for 
the  investigation,  not  only  of  the  principles  of  all  the  particular 
sciences,  but  also  of  its  own  being  and  life,  reason  finds  itself 
necessarily  limited  by  the  laws  of  its  own  being  and  life.  As 
thinking  subject,  reason  is  one  with  itself  as  object  of  its  own 
thought.  The  freedom  of  philosophy  does  not  then  imply  the 
possession  by  reason  of  the  power  to  be  more  or  less  than  rea- 
son. We  do  not  wait  to  call  the  grayhound  free  (to  borrow  a 
figure  of  speech)  until  he  has  attained  the  power  to  outstrip 
his  own  shadow. 

The  history  of  philosophy  shows  that  none  of  the  particular 
systems  of  philosophy  have  realized  to  the  fullest  possible 
extent  this  inherent  freedom  of  the  philosophical  movement 
of  reason.  The  free  spirit  is,  however,  especially  characteristic 
of  modern  philosophy.  During  the  Middle  Ages  —  it  is  cus- 
tomary   to    say  —  the    principle    of   authority  (a   distinctively 


124  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

unphilosophical  spirit)  was  regnant  in  both  theology  and  phi- 
losophy. But  the  method  of  Descartes  emphasizes  the  freedom 
of  philosophy,  although  the  philosophy  of  Descartes  secured  but 
few  of  the  choicest  results  of  this  freedom.  In  the  first  of  his 
"  Meditations  "  this  thinker  exercises,  to  the  fullest  extent,  the 
freedom  of  philosophic  doubt.  All  things  may  be  doubted  ex- 
cept the  fact  that  I  doubt  (dubito) ;  or,  since  doubting  is  a  species 
of  thinking,  except  the  fact  that  I  think  {cogito).  Like  Archi- 
medes, says  Descartes  in  his  second  Meditation,  if  I  may  find 
one  fixed  point,  one  absolutely  indubitable  proposition,  I  may 
indulge  in  great  hopes  of  moving  the  whole  world  of  thought. 
Such  a  proposition  the  celebrated  Cartesian  maxim  is  supposed 
by  its  author  to  be  {Cogito,  ergo  sum).  From  this  point  of  stand- 
ing, in  the  subsequent  books  of  his  work  on  Philosophy,  the 
so-called  founder  of  the  modern  era  of  philosophical  thinking 
seeks  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God  and  the  existence 
of  the  soul  as  an  entity  separable  from  the  body.  From  this 
root,  that  itself  sprung  out  of  the  spirit  of  philosophic  freedom, 
there  developed  a  hardened  stalk  of  philosophical  dogma, — 
rational  cosmology,  rational  psychology,  rational  theology,  — 
which  the  critical  philosophy  was  destined  to  dissolve. 

The  appearance  of  Kant's  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  "  marks 
another  era  in  the  development  of  the  spirit  of  philosophical 
freedom.  As  critique  it  summons  pure  reason,  in  its  dogmatic 
use,  to  appear  before  the  critical  eye  of  a  higher  and  judicial 
reason ;  it  proposes  anew  to  exercise  the  rights  of  the  philo- 
sophical freedom  of  doubt ;  it  begins  and  proceeds  with  a  uni- 
versal mistrust  of  all  the  synthetic  propositions  of  the  existing 
metaphysics,  —  the  very  systems  which  had  developed  from  the 
Cartesian  philosophy.  But  the  still  more  modern  exercise  of 
the  same  freedom  in  analysis  which  Kant  himself  employed 
and  provoked  in  all  his  successors,  to  the  end  of  time,  discovers 
many  unanalyzed  and  doubtful  presuppositions  in  his  critical 
philosophy.  For  Kant  himself,  as  Herbart  and  others  have 
pointed  out,  assumed  in  a  quite  uncritical  way  almost  the  entire 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  125 

Aristotelian  and  Wolffian  theory  of  the  mind.  The  existence 
of  a  body  of  synthetic  truths  a  'priori,  in  physics  as  well  as  in 
mathematics,  is  another  Kantian  presupposition,  which  appar- 
ently was  taken  in  a  wholly  uncritical  way.  This  presupposi- 
tion has  not  improperly  been  called  "the  irpwrov  -^revSos  from 
which,  with  great  consistency,  the  whole  system  of  '  Criticism ' 
grew  up."  x  The  critical  freedom  of  philosophy  must  still  insist, 
in  the  name  of  Kant,  upon  its  right  to  doubt  and  to  analyze,  in 
a  more  ultimate  manner,  all  the  presuppositions  of  the  pure  and 
applied  physical  sciences.  Before  this  critical  spirit  the  axioms 
of  the  Euclidean  geometry  and  of  the  higher  mathematics  of 
modern  times,  as  well  as  all  the  recent  attempts  to  erect  the 
late  and  often  hasty  generalizations  of  physics  (e.  y.,  the  so- 
called  law  of  the  conservation  and  correlation  of  energy)  into 
the  place  of  rational  and  unchanging  principles  of  all  reality, 
must  appear  and  be  judged.  Such  principles  may  in  time 
become  so  established  for  the  particular  sciences  as  that  these 
sciences  do  not  feel  free  to  question  them.  But  it  is  of  the 
very  essence  and  life  of  philosophy  to  make  them  perpetually, 
so  often  as  occasion  requires,  the  subjects  of  the  freest  sceptical 
and  critical  examination.  For  the  freedom  of  philosophy  is  a 
freedom  from  all  unquestioned  presuppositions  whatsoever. 

The  spirit  of  philosophy  is  also  absolute  devotion  to  the  truth. 
"  It  is  truth  alone  I  seek,"  says  Locke.  This  is  the  attitude  of 
mind  toward  its  problems,  and  toward  all  attempts  at  the  treat- 
ment of  those  problems,  which  is  essential  to  philosophy.  The 
character  of  the  truth  which  philosophy  seeks,  with  an  absolute 
devotion  to  truth,  is  such  as  to  render  its  method  different  from 
that  of  the  particular  sciences.  Since  it  is  not  technically  cor- 
rect statement  of  matters  of  fact  which  constitutes  philosophic 
truth,  it  is  not  technical  correctness  of  method  in  ascertaining 
the  truth,  upon  which  philosophy  chiefly  insists.  The  student 
of  the  sciences  of  nature  or  of  mind  must  indeed  have  a  su- 
preme devotion  to  truth,  otherwise  his  method  of  seeking  truth 

1  Comp.  Ueberweg,  A  History  of  Philosophy,  ii.  161,  note. 


126  SPIRIT  AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

will  not  be  most  thoroughly  scientific.  This  is  so.  even  if  the 
subject  of  investigation  be,  for  example,  the  effect  of  repeated 
acts  of  stimulation  upon  the  nuclei  of  the  ganglionic  cells  of  a 
frog,  or  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  those  cells  and 
the  ultimate  elements  of  the  nerve-fibres  running  thereto.  The 
observer  in  astronomy  strives,  in  the  interests  of  truth,  to  recog- 
nize and  eliminate  the  errors  arising  from  his  "  personal  equa- 
tion." But  in  all  the  particular  sciences  the  problems  are  likely 
to  be  so  technical,  and  the  methods  of  examination  and  solution 
so  technically  fixed,  that  the  conscious  love  and  devotion  to 
truth  alone  is  comparatively  inconspicuous.  With  philosophy 
this  is  not  so,  or  at  least  it  is  not  so  to  the  same  degree.  Its 
problems  concern  the  highest  verities ;  such  are  the  nature  in 
reality  and  the  significance  of  the  system  of  physical  things,  the 
nature  and  significance  of  finite  mind,  the  ground  and  uncon- 
ditioned value  of  the  good  and  the  beautiful,  the  being  and 
predicates  of  the  Absolute,  and  the  fundamental  rational  rela- 
tions existent  among  all  these  forms  of  reality.  For  the  solu- 
tion of  these  problems  its  one  instrument  is  Thought,  —  or 
rather  (may  we  not  say  ?),  the  most  comprehensive  and  harmo- 
nious activity  and  development  of  self-conscious  rational  life. 
The  use  of  this  instrument,  the  method  of  philosophy,  is  reflec- 
tive analysis,  followed  by  the  highest  synthesis  of  the  elements 
discovered  by  analysis.  Devotion  to  the  truth  is,  then,  pre- 
eminently a  self-conscious  impulse  and  guide,  an  intelligent 
spirit  controlling  a  somewhat  indefinite  and  untechnical  method, 
in  all  philosophical  discipline. 

That  this  spirit  of  freedom  and  self-conscious  devotion  to 
truth  alone  has  been  exclusively,  or  even  pre-eminently,  char- 
acteristic of  philosophy,  it  is  not  our  intention  to  claim. 
Doubtless  there  is  ground  for  the  complaint,  emphasized  with 
such  vehemence  and  bitterness  by  Schopenhauer,  that  the  profes- 
sional teachers  of  philosophy  (the  Fachprofessoren,  the  teachers 
of  a  Katlicderphilosophie)  have  not  infrequently  had  an  eye 
on  their  own  fame  and  advancement,  or  on  the  security  of  their 


SPIRIT  AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  127 

tenure  of  office,  and  their  standing  with  the  appointing  power, 
rather  than  both  eyes,  with  a  single  heart,  solely  on  the  truth. 
It  is  a  fact  that  many  of  its  most  renowned  and  loyal  stu- 
dents, from  Descartes  to  Hartmann,  have  not  been  in  the 
"profession"  of  philosophy.  But  both  the  complaint  and  the 
fact  only  serve  to  make  clearer  the  truth  touching  that  spirit 
which  philosophy  pre-eminently  requires.  And  if  we  consider 
that  philosophy,  like  theology,  and  unlike  most  of  the  work 
concerned  in  the  advancement  of  the  empirical  sciences,  affects 
with  its  conclusions  the  profoundest  and  most  cherished  con- 
victions of  the  individual  and  of  society,  and  seems  to  support 
or  to  jeopard  what  men  generally  hold  most  important  and 
most  dear ;  and  that  it  therefore  places  both  the  thinker  and 
his  audience  under  the  most  severe  conditions  for  the  testing: 
of  character, —  an  historical  claim  may  be  established,  we 
think,  for  the  actual  superiority,  and  the  vast  superiority,  of 
philosophy  to  either  science  or  theology  in  its  simple,  un- 
swerving loyalty  to  truth,  and  to  truth  alone. 

The  spirit  of  philosophy  is  humility  and  teachableness  min- 
gled with  independence.  In  this  spirit  also  the  student  of  the 
physical  sciences  and  the  student  of  philosophy  are  called  to 
friendly  rivalry  by  the  very  nature  of  their  pursuits.  The  atti- 
tude of  the  great  discoverers  in  physics  and  biology  has  fitly 
been  that  of  the  docile  mind.  This  attitude  has  placed  them  in 
awe  and  expectancy  before  the  problems  whose  solution  would 
increase  our  knowledge  of  that  mysterious  totality  which  science 
calls  "  Nature,"  but  philosophy  calls  the  "  Absolute,"  and  faith 
calls  God.  For,  indeed,  the  truly  great  discoverers  in  physical 
science  have  been  possessed  by  the  philosophical  spirit,  and 
skilled  in  the  use  of  the  philosophical  method.  The  investiga- 
tion, by  technical  means,  of  minute  subdivisions  of  physical 
science,  makes  relatively  little  demand  upon  the  investigator  for 
the  docile  and  humble  mind.  The  botanist  may  count  the  sta- 
mens and  pistils  of  some  newly  found  plant,  may  mark  its 
leaves  as  oblate  or  spatulate,  may  classify  it  by  these  and  other 


128  SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tokens,  and  trace  its  genesis  as  related  to  other  most  closely 
allied  forms,  —  all  this,  with  small  regard  for  the  spirit  which 
controls  his  procedure.  But  when  he  uses  this  particular  plant 
as  an  example  by  which  to  rise  to  the  higher  generalizations  of 
his  science,  and  even  to  link  that  science  with  the  science  of  all 
life,  or  perhaps  to  throw  a  ray  of  light  toward  the  problem  of 
the  "  nature  "  of  that  Reality  in  which  all  living  things  exist,  he 
needs  the  inspiration  of  the  philosophic  spirit. 

The  humility  and  teachableness  of  philosophy  are  of  use  in 
two  principal  directions.  The  very  business  of  him  who  pur- 
sues its  studies  is  with  the  highest  ultimate  mysteries.  The 
seemingly  simplest  thing,  the  most  ordinary  occurrence,  is  in 
his  sight  a  factor  or  moment  in  these  mysteries.  The  "  meanest 
flower  that  blows  "  may  excite  the  scientific  botanist  only  to 
new  efforts  at  classification ;  but  philosophically  considered,  it 
may  open  up  all  the  "  seven  riddles  of  the  world,"  and  suggest 
the  reconstruction  of  aesthetics  and  theology.  The  student  of 
philosophy  lives  constantly  in  the  presence  of  the  sublime  and 
awful  mystery  of  Eeality.  The  humble  and  docile  spirit  toward 
this  presence  alone  befits  the  character  of  his  pursuit. 

But  in  these  days  philosophy  especially  requires  for  its  culti- 
vation the  spirit  of  humility  and  teachableness  before  the  dis- 
coveries of  the  particular  sciences.  Its  pride  has  been  to 
construct  the  world,  too  often  in  more  or  less  nearly  complete 
disregard  of  the  most  comprehensive  and  verifiable  knowledge 
touching  the  actual  mode  and  laws  of  its  constitution.  But 
its  true  and  final  aim,  as  Lotze  said,  is  not  to  "  construct "  the 
world,  but  to  "  explain  "  it.  This  business  it  shares  with  the 
particular  sciences.  Only  philosophy,  however,  seeks  the  most 
ultimate  possible  explanation  of  the  whole  world,  while  the 
sciences  strive  to  explain,  as  interrelated  under  uniform  se- 
quences, particular  groups  of  its  phenomena.  As  science  then 
is  humble  and  docile  toward  the  facts  of  nature  upon  which  it 
depends  for  the  generalizations  which  constitute  its  empirical 
truths,  so  does  it  become  philosophy  to  be  humble  and  docile 


SPIRIT  AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  129 

toward  those  scientific  truths  upon  which  it  is  dependent  for  its 
higher  truth.  The  truth  of  philosophy  lies  involved  in  the 
truths  of  science.  Without  the  teachable  mind  toward  these 
latter  truths  it  has  no  means  of  acquiring  material  upon 
which  to  build,  as  upon  a  verifiable  basis,  its  structure  of 
supreme  and  rational  truth.  And,  conversely,  Haeckel's  com- 
plaint of  "  the  lack  of  philosophical  culture  which  characterizes 
most  of  the  physicists  of  the  day,"  who  "  cherish  the  strange  illu- 
sion that  they  can  construct  the  edifice  of  natural  science  from 
facts  without  a  philosophical  connection  of  the  same,"  is  but  a 
fulfilment  of  the  prophecy  of  Herbart :  "  It  cannot  be  otherwise 
than  that  the  neglect  of  philosophy  should  result  in  a  frivolous 
or  perverted  treatment  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  all 
the  sciences."  This  relation  of  reciprocal  dependence  between 
philosophy  and  the  particular  sciences  it  is  especially  necessary 
for  the  former  to  incorporate  into  the  spirit  and  method  of 
its  pursuit. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  spirit  of  philosophy  partakes  of  a 
critical  independence  toward  the  particular  sciences.  It  does 
not  even  receive  the  material  upon  which  its  existence  depends 
in  an  uncritical  and  credulous  way.  When  physics  claims  for  its 
laws  an  a  priori  origin  and  an  unconditioned  validity,  philo- 
sophy is  competent  to  examine  these  claims.  When  biology 
attempts  to  lift  the  principle  of  evolution  from  the  rank  of  a 
working  hypothesis  and  give  it  the  place  of  an  ultimate  general- 
ization envisaging  the  nature  of  all  Reality,  philosophy  claims 
the  rights  of  a  judge  and  arbiter  in  this  domain.  It  knows,  as 
empirical  physics  and  biology  cannot,  what  is  necessary  to  so- 
called  a  priori  origin,  to  unconditioned  validity,  and  to  the  right 
to  act  as  interpreter  of  the  nature  of  ultimate  Eeality. 

The  spirit,  which  is  humility  and  boldness  combined,  is  at 
present  especially  necessary  in  the  philosophical  treatment  of 
recent  empirical  generalizations  in  biology  and  psychology. 
The  next  great  synthesis  in  philosophy  will  undoubtedly  rest 
largely  upon  the  basis  of  these  generalizations.     Already  the 

9 


130  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

speculation  of  Hartmann  has  made  itself  captivating  to  many  by 
its  obviously  extensive  use  of  the  inductive  method,  in  a  spirit 
of  deference  to  these  sciences.  "We  believe  both  the  method  and 
the  conclusions  of  this  writer  to  be  defective,  as  judged  by  the 
most  approved  scientific  standards.  But  who  that  is  intelli- 
gently interested  does  not  hear  with  desire  and  hope  the  Mace- 
donian cry  made  to  "  synthetic  philosophy  "  by  modern  biology 
and  modern  psychology?  What  wonderful  new  systems  of 
speculative  thinking  may  not  arise  in  answer  to  this  cry  ?  The 
doings  of  bioplasm,  the  laws  of  the  genesis  and  growth  of  plant 
and  animal  organisms,  the  relations  of  specific  and  generic  forms 
and  functions,  the  origin  and  evolution  of  the  psychical  pro- 
cesses of  the  lower  animals,  "  unconscious  cerebration "  and 
"  double  consciousness,"  the  phenomena  of  hypnotism,  trance, 
and  insanity,  the  principles  of  heredity,  suggestion,  and  spon- 
taneity, in  art,  in  therapeutics,  and  in  religious  and  social 
construction,  —  all  these  and  many  other  strange,  new  mani- 
festations of  the  presence  and  power  of  that  universal  anima 
mundi,  that  One  in  whose  life  and  being  all  living  beings  are, 
await  the  more  mature  and  strenuous  efforts  of  constructive 
philosophy. 

The  spirit  of  philosophy  is  also  infinite  patience,  both*  in  the 
collection  of  material  and  in  that  analytic  and  synthetic  think- 
ing which  constructs  the  material  into  a  rational  system.  And 
surely  the  student  of  philosophy  has  need  of  patience  in  the 
collection  of  material.  As  a  writer1  on  this  subject  has  said: 
"  It  is  the  activity  of  the  polymathist,  one  might  almost  say  of 
the  panmathist,  which  is  required  as  preliminary."  But  the 
patience  of  philosophy,  in  the  collection  and  preparation  of  its 
material,  does  not  lead  to  the  use  of  the  same  method  as  that 
employed  by  particular  sciences  to  this  end.  For  the  material  of 
philosophy  does  not  primarily  consist  in  facts  ;  nor  is  its  method 
directed  to  the  discovery  and  verification  of  bare  relations,  in 

1  Schaarschmidt,  in  Philos.  Monatsh.,  1877,  p.  5. 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  131 

fact,  among  the  different  groups  of  phenomena.  Its  material 
consists  rather  of  those  principles  that  are  presupposed  in  or 
ascertained  by  the  use  of  the  methods  belonging  to  all  the 
sciences.  The  student  of  philosophy  needs,  therefore,  such 
knowledge  of  these  sciences  as  will  give  him  the  power  to 
state  and  comprehend  the  meaning  of  these  principles.  It  is 
only  as  related  to  this  need  that  he  must  also  have  an  acquain- 
tance with  the  details  of  scientific  fact  and  scientific  method. 

Patience  in  analytic  and  synthetic  thinking  is  also  indispen- 
sable to  the  method  of  philosophy.  As  the  writer  just  quoted 
goes  on  to  declare :  "  And  yet  the  positive,  so-called  exact 
knowledge  is  the  least  of  the  things  required ;  for  it  is  not 
knowledge  which  constitutes  the  philosopher,  but  thinking, 
concentrated,  thorough,  and  methodically  trained.  To  this  the 
sum-total  of  scientific  attainment  is  but  a  premise  with  which 
it  starts  in  its  search  for  the  last  abstractions  and  highest 
ideas." 

For  reasons  like  the  foregoing  the  dependence  of  philosophy 
upon  the  moral  and  spiritual  characteristics  of  the  philosophical 
thinker  is  especially  close.  Theory  and  history  alike  emphasize 
this  truth.  Here,  far  more  than  in  any  other  form  of  rational 
endeavor,  the  method  is  the  spirit  of  the  man.  To  pursue  any 
of  the  particular  sciences  (even  empirical  psychology)  in  their 
modern  form  without  knowledge  of  technical  method  and  use 
of  instruments  technically  developed,  would  be  difficult  indeed. 
But  it  is  the  man  himself,  as  a  rational,  self-conscious  life, 
which,  in  philosophy,  chiefly  determines  the  right  and  success- 
ful use  of  method.  Acquaintance  with  the  science  of  the  sen- 
sible may  awaken  an  interest,  but  rational  self-consciousness 
must  also  be  aroused,  and  confidence  in  the  Supersensible  must 
be  systematically  unfolded  and  defended,  in  order  that  philo- 
sophical truth  may  result.1  The  completed  system  of  philosophy 
is  an  ideal  which  will  never  be  realized ;  but  the  contribution 

1  Comp.  Lichtenfels,  Lehrbuch  zur  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  p.  5. 


132  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

toward  it  which  every  workman  can  make  depends  in  no  small 
degree  upon  his  wealth  of  experience,  maturing  into  character. 

One  other  factor  in  the  very  nature  of  philosophy  is  influen- 
tial in  fixing  the  method  of  its  pursuit.  It  is  defined  as  a  'pro- 
gressive rational  system.  To  repeat  words  already  cited  from 
Kuno  Fischer,  —  it  is  the  progressive  self-knowledge  of  the 
human  mind.  The  bearing  of  this  truth  upon  the  question  of 
philosophic  method  is  at  once  obvious.  The  method  of  philos- 
ophy implies  for  its  successful  employment  a  knowledge  of  the 
past  and  present  developments  of  philosophy.  It  has  even 
been  said  of  late  that  "  philosophy  is  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy." Seriously  and  literally  taken,  this  statement  is  inexact 
and  inadequate.  But  it  emphasizes  with  scarcely  exaggerated 
strength  an  important  truth  touching  the  true  method  of  its 
pursuit.  It  sounds  a  much-needed  call  to  a  community  of  in- 
telligent efforts  in  the  consideration  of  philosophical  problems. 
Tor  here,  as  in  so  many  other  matters,  it  is  true,  when  rightly 
understood,  that  the  history  of  the  race  and  the  history  of  the 
individual  follow  the  same  type.  A  process  involving  the  con- 
struction, criticism,  and  disintegration  and  subsequent  improved 
reconstruction  of  the  results  of  reflective  thinking  has  gone  on 
in  the  evolution  of  the  human  mind.  This  process  is  the 
world-wide  historical  method  of  man's  progressive  rational 
knowledge.  No  individual  inquirer  now  undertakes  for  the 
first  time  the  ultimate  analysis  of  the  fundamental  elements 
of  philosophy,  or  the  supreme  synthesis  of  them  into  a  rational 
system.  Every  individual  thinker  lives  in  and  of  the  thought 
of  his  race. 

The  study  of  the  history  of  philosophy  is,  however,  a  neces- 
sary propaedeutic  of  philosophy  rather  than  a  necessary  charac- 
teristic of  the  philosophical  method  as  such.  Eclecticism  is 
not  a  method  in  philosophy ;  neither  is  the  historical  method 
peculiar  to  or  distinctive  of  philosophy.  The  choice  of  the 
materials  which  are  to  enter  into  any  philosophical  system,  as 
well  as  the  choice  of  the  principle  of  their  combination,  requires 


SPIRIT  AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  I33 

guidance  from  conceptions  which  rule  over  all  historical  sys- 
tems. The  right  shaping  of  these  conceptions  cannot  be  gained 
in  a  merely  historical  way  ;  it  requires  special  skill  in  reflective 
analysis  and  in  that  higher  speculative  synthesis  which  is  of 
the  very  nature  of  philosophical  system. 

The  history  of  philosophy  is  an  indispensable  help  to  the 
modern  student  of  philosophical  discipline  in  the  definition  of 
his  problems.  It  shows  him  what  great  and  permanent  forms 
of  questioning  have  occupied  the  self-conscious  reason  of  man. 
These  are  the  same  problems  as  those  which  are  immediately 
presented  to  him  by  scientific  psychology,  as  pursued  in  the 
most  comprehensive  and  critical  way.  Moreover,  the  answers 
which  have  been  given  to  these  problems  by  the  successive 
great  masters  and  more  prominent  schools  of  philosophy  serve  us 
as  stimulus,  warning,  and  guide.  The  survey  of  them  excites  the 
laudable  ambition  to  become  one  of  that  band  of  workmen  who 
have  assumed  the  burden  of  the  effort  to  solve  —  or  at  least  to 
lighten  —  "those  riddles  by  which  the  mind  of  man  is  oppressed 
in  life,  and  about  which  we  are  all  compelled  to  hold  some 
view  or  other,  in  order  to  be  able  to  live  at  all."  History  also 
warns  each  new  explorer  against  making  the  old  mistakes  in 
their  old  form  ;  and  it  points  out  new  by-paths  or  modes  of 
following  in  the  better  beaten  tracks  that  may  possibly  lead 
into  a  region  of  clearer  light.  The  study  of  the  formation, 
criticism,  disintegration,  and  reconstruction  of  philosophical 
systems,  and  the  comprehensive  and  sympathetic  acquaintance 
with  the  whole  course  of  speculative  thought,  is  therefore  a 
constant  and  necessary  accompaniment,  a  perpetual  and  indis- 
pensable propaedeutic,  of  philosophical  discipline. 

But  the  history  of  philosophy  is  not  philosophy,  —  if  by  this 
it  be  meant  that  to  know  this  history,  however  comprehensively 
and  minutely,  is  sufficient  for  the  student  of  philosophy;  or 
that  the  history  will  organize  itself  into  a  system  of  consistent 
and  verifiable  philosophical  truths.  Nor  is  the  study  of  history 
the  sole  method  of  philosophical   study.      It  is  probably  not 


134  SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

even  the  chief  preparatory  discipline.  Were  we  called  upon 
to  choose  between  it  and  that  other  propaedeutic  which  consists 
in  the  comprehensive  scientific  investigation  of  the  phenomena 
of  mind,  we  should  probably  (though  regretfully)  prefer  the 
latter. 

Still  further,  and  strictly  speaking,  historical  study  is 
not  an  integral  part  of  the  technical  method  of  philosophy ; 
although  by  it  the  material  which  consists  in  past  results  of 
philosophizing  is  gathered  and  displayed.  But  it  still  remains 
material  needing  treatment  by  renewed  rational  effort  of  each 
advancing  age.  The  method  of  such  treatment  is  the  method 
of  philosophy ;  it  is  not  itself  historical,  but  the  combination  of 
analysis  and  synthesis  in  a  peculiar  way. 

By  help  of  the  foregoing  considerations  we  may  define  more 
precisely  the  technical  method  of  philosophy.  It  is,  first  of 
all,  the  method  of  reflective  analysis  directed  upon  the  prin- 
ciples presupposed  or  ascertained  by  the  particular  sciences. 
This  is,  so  far  as  the  presuppositions  of  these  sciences  are  con- 
cerned, an  extension  of  the  modified  psychological  method.  Xn 
the  pursuit  of  psychological  science  we  reach  a  point  where  the 
historical  description  of  the  genesis  and  development  of  psychi- 
cal processes  is  seen  to  imply  and  depend  upon  certain  presup- 
positions that  have  not  as  yet  themselves  been  subjected  to 
critical  examination.  The  psychological  method  aims,  there- 
fore, at  a  more  complete  and  fundamental  analysis ;  it  passes 
over,  that  is,  into  the  philosophy  of  mind.  When  this  analysis 
has  been  made,  so  far  as  the  material  of  psychology  is  con- 
cerned, it  is  discovered  that  all  the  other  particular  sciences 
also  imply  and  depend  upon  presuppositions.  These  presup- 
positions also  are  to  be  subjected  to  the  method  of  reflective 
.analysis.  They  are  thus  seen  to  be  essentially  the  same  as 
those  to  which  we  have  already  been  introduced  in  the  philo- 
sophical study  of  mind.  They  appear,  therefore,  as  those  uni- 
versal modes  of  the  behavior  of  reason  (whether  it  be  engaged 
with  the  subject-object  called  "  Self,"  or  with  the  object-object 


SPIRIT  AND   METHOD  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  135 

called  a  world  of  "  Things,")  which  analytical  philosophy  aims 
to  discover,  criticise,  display,  and  defend. 

Philosophy,  however,  does  not  undertake  to  build  its  supreme 
synthesis  upon  presuppositions  alone.  It  finds,  in  surveying 
the  fields  of  the  particular  sciences  wherein  its  material  lies,  a 
great  number  of  principles  which  are  the  results  of  the  widest 
inductions  during  centuries  of  the  race's  experience.  It  can  in 
no  wise  vindicate  its  claim  to  the  title  "  science  of  the  sciences," 
or  "  universal  science,"  without  taking  these  principles  also  into 
the  account.  Only  in  this  way  can  it  be  sufficiently  compre- 
hensive ;  only  in  this  way  can  it  remain  in  touch  with  a  living 
and  developing  knowledge  of  all  Keality.  Only  in  this  way, 
too,  can  it  avoid  the  complaint  and  answer  the  demands  of  the 
studeuts  of  the  particular  sciences.1  But  it  surely  cannot 
receive  these  principles,  inductively  ascertained  by  the  appro- 
priate scientific  instrumentalities,  without  subjecting  them  to 
its  own  peculiar  method  of  reflective  analysis.  They,  too,  are 
regarded  by  it  as  preliminary  results  of  the  activity  of  that  rea- 
son whose  highest  self-knowledge  it  claims  to  represent.  The 
inductive  principles  of  astronomy,  physics,  biology,  and  psycho- 
logy must  be  interpreted  by  its  thinking,  to  see  what  higher 
significance  and  value  in  reality  they  may  implicate  and  repre- 
sent. These,  too,  it  is  the  business  of  analytical  philosophy  to 
receive  from  the  particular  sciences ;  but  also  to  criticise,  un- 
fold, interpret,  and  defend,  —  before  the  tribunal  of  reason  in 
its  highest  jurisdiction. 

It  is  the  feeling  that  this  humble,  patient,  candid  work  of  an- 
alytical philosophy  should  precede  and  justify  all  constructive 
and  speculative  attempts,  which  has  called  forth  the  demand 
that  philosophy  in  general  be  "  scientific "  and  "  inductive." 
It  can  never  be  scientific  in  the  sense  of  using  the  technical 
instruments  and  forms  of  experimentation  belonging  to  the 
methods   of   the   particular   sciences.      It   must,   however,   be 

1  Compare,  for  example,  Riehl,  Philosophischer  Kiiticismus,  iii.  84  f  and  101  f. 


136  SPIRIT  AND  METHOD   OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

scientific  in  the  sense  of  obtaining  by  research  from  the  sci- 
ences, as  its  own  material,  the  general  truths  they  have 
established.  It  must  also  vindicate  its  claim  to  the  same  title 
by  what  Schleiermacher  called  "scientific  thinking."  It  must 
submit  all  its  conclusions  to  that  testing  which  follows  a  per- 
petually enlarging  acquaintance  with  the  generalizations  of 
the  particular  sciences.  Its  peculiar  method  of  thus  being 
scientific  is  the  method  of  reflective  analysis. 

Nor  can  philosophy  be  inductive,  if  by  this  be  understood 
the  generalization  of  laws  from  observed  facts  and  their  veri- 
fication  by  prediction   and    experimentation.      This   inductive 
growth  of  the  knowledge  of  Reality  it  intrusts  with  confidence 
to  the  particular  sciences.     But  it  does  not  venture  to  proceed 
with  its  system-making  in  a  voluntary  or  indolent  disregard, 
either  total  or  partial,  of  any  principles  inductively  established. 
It  is  inductive  in  the  sense  of  being  eager  to  learn  these  gene- 
ralizations of  the  particular  sciences,  that  it  may  —  having  re- 
ceived them  with  candor  —  subject  them  to  its  own  method 
of  a  more  ultimate  analysis.     This  is  the  truth  in  the  capti- 
vating plea  of  Hartmann  and  others  to  establish,  in  a  superior 
manner,  a  so-called  inductive  philosophy.1     But  much  of  the 
benefit  claimed  for  this  method  is  lost  by  its  advocates  (notably 
so  by  Hartmann)  because  the  boasted  induction  is  concluded 
without  sufficient  thoroughness  in  the  use  of  both  the  scientific 
and  the  philosophical  methods.     The  philosophical  treatment 
of  the  phenomena  of  reflex-action,  of  so-called  instinct  in  man 
and  the  lower  animals,  of  conscious  or  unconscious  psychical 
processes,    normal    and    abnormal,    does    indeed    demand    the 
"inductive"   method.      But   the   philosopher   who   makes   his 
own  hasty  generalizations  of  laws  directly  from  the  phenom- 
ena may  be  injuring  rather  than  helping  the  cause  of  philos- 
ophy, by  the  use  of  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  the  inductive 
method. 

1  See  Philosophie  des  Unbewussten,  7th  ed.,  Berlin,  1876,  i.  5  f.,  and  English 
Translation,  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  i.  6  f. 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  137 

Let  it  be  repeated,  then :  The  application  of  thorough  reflec- 
tive analysis  to  the  principles  of  the  particular  sciences  is  the 
so-called  inductive  and  scientific  method  in  philosophy.  Only 
by  understanding  this  can  we  give  to  both  science  and  philos- 
ophy their  respective  rights,  and  so  maintain  their  intercourse 
in  relations  of  mutual  dependen3e  and  helpfulness.  This  view 
includes  all  that  is  true,  and  excludes  all  that  is  erroneous,  in 
the  attempt  to  set  up  the  method  called  "  scientific,"  "  induc- 
tive," or  "  cosmological,"  in  philosophical  study. 

But  analytical  philosophy  is  not  the  sum-total  of  philosophy ; 
indeed,  it  cannot,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  be  a  sum- 
total  at  all.  The  impulses  of  reason,  out  of  which  philosophy 
springs,  are  toward  a  unifying  of  knowledge,  or  rather,  of  all 
experience.  Philosophy  requires,  therefore,  the  freest  and  high- 
est use  of  the  method  of  synthesis.  It  is  theoretically  and 
speculatively  constructive,  of  natural  right  and  as  in  duty 
bound.  And  in  truth  there  is  no  department  of  scientific 
knowledge  also  where  analysis  alone  can  supply  the  demands 
for  satisfactory  interpretation  of  the  facts.  Reason  works  syn- 
thetically in  the  organization  of  ordinary  experience  and  in  the 
construction  of  scientific  system.  It  postulates  for  the  savage 
and  the  boor  some  sort  of  unity  in  reality  —  a  me  and  other 
"  things,"  and  the  two  related  —  as  the  basis  of  the  otherwise 
disconnected  phenomena.  Science  broadens  and  defines  this 
postulate,  in  the  many  different  modifications  of  it  with  which 
its  particular  departments  are  concerned.  But  philosophy 
listens  to  the  profoundest  intimations  of  reason,  and  endeavors 
to  conceive  and  explicate  all  that  which,  concerning  the  being 
and  life  of  this  Unity  of  Reality,  both  ordinary  experience  and 
the  particular  sciences  imply.  Its  method  is,  therefore,  syn- 
thetical, in  the  supreme  and  most  comprehensive  way. 

Now,  it  is  to  the  legitimate  and  inalienable  rights  of  this 
method  that  the  existence  and  value  of  all  the  great  philosophi- 
cal systems  called  "absolute"  must  be  ascribed.  The  deductive 
method  in    philosophy,  so   far  as  it    is   legitimate   and  valu- 


138  SPIRIT  AND  METHOD  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

able,  must  be  vindicated  in  the  light  of  the  same  truth.  For 
every  system  of  philosophical  truths,  every  "  synthetic  philos- 
ophy," is  at  once  called  upon  to  approve  itself  in  two  directions. 
These  directions  are  indicated  in  two  questions.  Can  you  show 
that  your  synthesis  contradicts  none  of  the  principles  of  science 
as  subjected  to  reflective  analysis  ;  but  that,  on  the  contrary, 
it  comprehends  and  takes  due  account  of  them  all  ?  Can  you 
use  the  synthesis  itself  deductively  for  the  interpretation,  in 
the  light  of  the  Unity  of  Eeality,  of  those  principles  of  the 
particular  sciences  upon  which  it  claims  to  be  based  ? 

Fichte  desired  to  make  his  supreme  synthesis  in  the  interests 
of  the  interpretation  and  completion  of  the  Kantian  analysis. 
Schelling  found  this  synthesis  of  Fichte  one-sided,  and  en- 
deavored to  supplement  it  by  the  addition  of  the  neglected 
aspects  of  Eeality,  —  thus  the  better  to  understand  the  riddles 
of  the  world  of  matter  and  mind.  Hegel  complained  that  the 
principle  of  Schelling's  synthesis  was,  as  it  were,  "  shot  out  of 
a  gun  ; "  by  the  dialectical  method  he  would  himself  expose  in 
its  completeness  the  nature  of  that  Eeality  in  which  Being  and 
Thought  are  one.  We  find  fault  with  none  of  these  great 
thinkers  because  they  have  used  the  method  of  all  constructive 
philosophy.  But  by  the  accuracy  and  comprehensiveness  of 
the  analysis  upon  which  their  synthesis  was  based,  and  by  the 
power  which  the  supreme  principles,  reached  by  the  synthesis, 
have  deductively  to  interpret  the  particular  principles  discovered 
by  the  analysis,  their  speculative  systems  must  stand  or  fall. 

Since  the  great  synthetic  movement  of  the  Hegelian  school 
reached  its  highest  development  and  declined,  the  analytical 
study  of  particular  problems  and  the  researches  of  history  have 
mainly  occupied  the  attention  of  students  of  philosophy.  Signs 
of  new  great  attempts  at  system-making  are  in  the  air.  Indeed, 
Schopenhauer,  Hartmann,  and  Herbert  Spencer,  if  not  also 
Lotze  and  Wuridt,  have  undertaken  to  base  a  synthetic  phi- 
losophy upon  the  consideration  of  principles  derived  from  the 
particular  sciences. 


SPIRIT   AND   METHOD   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  139 

Fault  is  not  to  be  found  with  Schopenhauer  because  he  "  pos- 
ited "  a  supreme  principle,  —  namely,  Will,  —  and  attempted  to 
treat  by  deductive  procedure  from  it  all  the  different  depart- 
ments of  philosophical  discipline.  But  we  consider  the  synthe- 
sis founded  on  a  lame  and  incomplete  analysis,  and  lamentably 
defective  as  respects  its  power  of  interpreting  the  world  of 
reality  made  known  by  science.  Its  crude  postulating  of  a 
principium  individuationis,  and  of  Platonic  ideas  that  are  out 
of  all  comprehensible  relation  in  reality  with  the  One  Will,  and 
its  consequent  patent  failure  to  explain  what  it  sets  out  to 
explain,  rather  than  the  fact  that  it  employs  the  method  of 
synthesis,  furnish  grounds  for  its  rejection.  For  it  is  not  the 
deductive,  or  speculative,  or  synthetic  method,  as  such,  which 
we  deprecate  in  philosophy;  it  is  its  unsuccessful  result  in  any 
case  which  we  decline  to  approve. 

It  must  not  be  understood,  however,  that  the  progress  of 
philosophy  is  conditioned  upon  the  consistent  and  complete 
employment  of  this  double  method  of  procedure  by  any  one 
individual  or  any  one  age.  Every  individual  thinker,  as  indeed 
every  particular  age,  may  be  more  successful  in  either  analysis 
or  synthesis,  at  the  relative  and  temporary  expense  of  the 
other.  Every  individual  or  age  may  apply  either  branch  of 
the  one  method  more  strictly  and  successfully  than  otherwise 
to  some  one  or  more  of  the  great  problems  of  reflective  think- 
ing; for  no  individual  and  no  age  furnishes  the  complete  and 
final  philosophy. 

Every  individual  and  every  age  contributes  something  to 
the  great  whole,  which  is  the  self-development  of  reason  in  its 
understanding  of  the  problem  of  the  universe,  and  the  adjust- 
ment and  interpretation  of  its  own  life  as  part  of  that  problem. 
But  the  method  of  philosophy  remains  essentially  the  same 
with  every  individual  and  every  age.  That  method  it  is 
which  we  have  endeavored  to  describe. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

DOGMATISM,    SCEPTICISM,    AND    CRITICISM. 

THEEE  attitudes  of  mind  toward  philosophical  truth  have 
always  characterized  the  development  in  reflection  of  the 
individual  thinker  and  of  the  race.  These  three  are  dogmatism, 
scepticism,  and  criticism ;  and  the  order  of  their  actual  predomi- 
nance may  be  said  to  correspond  to  that  in  which  their  names 
are  here  placed.  The  dogmatic,  sceptical,  or  critical  mental 
attitude  is  not  peculiar  to  any  particular  school  or  method  of 
philosophy.  Either  one  of  these  attitudes  is  perhaps  equally 
compatible  with  each  of  the  great  philosophical  schools  or 
systems ;  no  one  of  them  can  be  held  to  be  incompatible  with 
the  use  of  the  correct  method  of  philosophizing.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  most  fruitful  and  effective  development  of  the  tenets 
of  every  school  can  be  gained  only  through  the  employment  of 
reason  upon  these  tenets  with  each  one  of  these  mental  atti- 
tudes. And  if  the  method  of  analytical  philosophy  seems  to 
be  most  closely  allied  to  scepticism  and  to  criticism,  and  the 
method  of  synthetical  philosophy  to  dogmatism,  this  only  shows 
that  the  true  method,  which  holds  both  analysis  and  synthesis 
in  a  living  and  progressive  union,  requires  for  its  working  all 
three. 

Agnosticism  and  eclecticism,  although  not  infrequently  classed 
with  dogmatism,  scepticism,  and  criticism,  have  absolutely  no 
claim  to  recognition  as  distinct  mental  temperaments  or  atti- 
tudes toward  philosophical  truth.  Indeed,  the  term  "agnosti- 
cism "  does  not  properly  serve  to  define  a  philosophical  system, 
a  philosophical  method,  or  even  —  as  has  just  been  said  —  a  dis- 


DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM.  141 

tinct  attitude  of  mind  toward  truth.  This  apparently  paradox- 
ical proposition  might  be  amply  justified  in  its  application  to 
the  tenets  of  the  most  prominent  leader,  in  England  and  this 
country  at  least,  of  philosophical  agnosticism.  We  refer,  of 
course,  to  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  As  respects  his  conclusions, 
this  thinker  is  to  be  classed  among  the  realists  in  philosophy ; 
his  system  is  to  be  defined,  not  as  agnosticism,  but  —  to  use  his 
own  term  —  as  "  Transfigured  Kealism."  It  is  true  that,  in 
his  earlier  and  cruder  writings,  under  the  influence  of  a  lauda- 
ble ambition  once  for  all  time  to  reconcile  the  ancient  strife 
between  science  and  religion,  he  stated  his  discovery  of  the 
supreme  Principle  in  terms  of  agnostic  dogmatism.  The  "  deep- 
est, widest,  and  most  certain  of  all  facts,"  said  he,  is  this,  — 
"  that  the  Power  which  the  Universe  manifests  to  us  is  utterly 
inscrutable."  1  But  a  careful  examination  of  the  context  of 
this  statement  shows  us  that  this  Power  cannot,  in  the  deeper 
judgment  of  Mr.  Spencer,  be  called  "  utterly  inscrutable ; "  for 
he  himself  speaks  of  it  as  a  Unit-Being,  having  Permanency, 
and  manifesting  itself  in  the  world  of  phenomena ;  it  is  Ul- 
timate Existence,  Ultimate  Cause ;  it  has  an  "  established 
order,"  is  responsible  for  "  actions  "  and  even  for  ethical  "  in- 
fluence "  upon  personal  agencies ;  and  it  "  forms  the  basis  of 
intelligence."  No  wonder,  then,  that  in  his  more  mature  pro- 
nouncements, as  "  Synthetic  Philosophy,"  he  changes  the  more 
agnostic  to  the  more  positive  form.  Thus  what  was  originally 
a  provisional  assumption  becomes  a  verified  truth.2  Accord- 
ingly, we  are  now  told :  "  Behind  all  manifestations,  inner  and 
outer,  there  is  a  Power  manifested."  "  The  one  thing  perma- 
nent is  the  Unknowable  Pteality  hidden  under  all  these  changing 
forms." 

What  is  true  of  Spencerian  agnosticism  so-called  is  neces- 
sarily true  of  all  philosophical  agnosticism.  So  far  as  it  tran- 
scends that  pause  before  the  positing  of  affirmative  or  negative 

i  First  Principles,,  New  York,  1872,  p.  46. 

2  Principles  of  Psychology,  New  York,  1876,  ii.  503. 


142  DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM. 

statements  touching  the  knowledge  and  being  of  the  truly  Ex- 
istent, which  the  sceptical  and  critical  attitudes  demand,  it  can 
assume,  of  necessity,  only  some  form  of  dogmatism.  Philosophi- 
cal scepticism  is  the  genuine  and  necessary  doubt  with  which 
the  freedom  of  inquiring  reason  envisages  all  the  positive  con- 
tent of  scientific  and  philosophical  truth.  Philosophical  crit- 
icism is  the  activity  of  reason,  disciplined  and  informed,  in  the 
use  of  the  most  searching  analysis  of  its  own  processes  and  of 
their  products.  But  both  scepticism  and  criticism  necessarily 
issue  in  the  discrimination  of  those  ultimate  and  verifiable 
principles  —  whatever  and  now  many  so  ever  they  may  be  — 
which  demand  and  support  the  positive  and  synthetic  construc- 
tion of  philosophy.  There  is  therefore  no  such  thing  possible 
as  an  "  agnostic  "  philosophy  as  distinguished  from  the  exercise 
of  those  rights  of  scepticism  and  criticism  which  belong  to  all 
philosophy. 

What  is  true  of  the  conclusions  of  Spencerian  agnosticism  is 
true  of  its  method  also.  Agnosticism  has  no  special  method 
superior  or  unknown  to  all  the  systems  of  more  positive  kind. 
Indeed,  an  examination  of  the  customary  method  of  its  devo- 
tees —  largely  if  not  especially,  of  Mr.  Spencer  himself  —  dis- 
closes a  certain  defectiveness  in  respect  of  that  very  scientific 
and  critical  quality  of  which  it  is  accustomed  to  boast.  All 
attempts  hitherto  made  at  a  completely  sceptical  or  agnostic 
philosophy  sadly  lack  consistency  and  method.  From  the  very 
nature  of  the  case  this  must  be  so.  For  uncritical  scepticism 
issuing  in  agnosticism,  as  Kant  long  ago  pointed  out,  is  essen- 
tially dogmatic.  A  completely  agnostic  issue  to  a  sceptical  and 
critical  survey  of  the  problem  of  knowledge  is  self-destructive. 
But  arbitrarily  to  limit  reason  in  its  power  to  discern  not  only 
the  existence  (that  there  is  a  "  Power  manifested,"  a  "  Eeality 
hidden  under  all  the  changing  forms  "),  but  also  the  nature 
(what  is  the  Power,  and  therefore  that  it  is  not  "  utterly  in- 
scrutable") of  the  ultimate  principle,  is  to  throw  one's  self 
again  into  the  arms  of  dogmatism.      However,  if  the  limita- 


DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,  AND  CRITICISM.  143 

tion  be  made  as  the  result  of  the  most  penetrating  criticism, 
it  involves  in  the  making  a  large  positive  content  of  philosophy. 
It  is  therefore  reflective  analysis,  and  constructive  synthesis  of 
the  principles  selected  through  analysis,  which  constitute  the 
method  of  even  so-called  agnostic  philosophy.  In  the  use  of 
this  method  every  form  of  dogmatism  must  pass  by  the  paths 
of  scepticism  and  criticism  to  the  possession  of  its  right  to  its 
conclusions,  whether  they  be  affirmations  or  denials.  There  is 
no  royal  road  to  professional  and  systematic  philosophical 
nescience. 

It  is  then  perfectly  legitimate  for  the  disciples  of  Spencerian 
or  other  forms  of  agnosticism  to  adopt  a  consistent  system  of 
affirmative  and  negative  propositions  touching  man's  power  to 
know  the  Ultimate  Eeality  and  touching  the  Being  and  Nature 
of  that  Eeality.  But  this  system  they  must  arrive  at  as  the 
result  of  a  well-disciplined  and  thorough  critical  thinking.  Nor 
do  their  negations  of  knowledge,  its  possibility  and  its  actual- 
ity, stand  on  peculiarly  sacred  ground.  When  it  is  shown  that 
they  themselves  affirm  or  deny  more  than  they  can  maintain 
successfully  in  view  of  ultimate  principles  of  all  knowing  and 
being,  —  albeit  their  excess  of  knowledge  concerns  chiefly  the 
exact  limits  beyond  which  reason  cannot  pass,  —  they  must  be 
ready  cheerfully  to  enter  anew  upon  the  pursuit  of  philosophy 
by  its  only  true  method.  If  they  praise  Mr.  Spencer  because 
he  pronounces  "  utterly  inscrutable  "  that  Eeality  whose  exis- 
tence, nevertheless,  he  maintains  to  be  the  most  indubitable  of 
all  truths,  about  whose  attributes  he  has  himself  pronounced  so 
freely,  and  the  law  of  whose  life  and  manifestation  he  describes 
in  terms  of  evolution,  —  they  cannot  well  blame  some  other 
thinker  (for  example,  Hegel)  simply  because  he  attempts  to 
show  that  this  Eeality  is  Eeason  itself,  and  the  law  of  its  being 
the  dialectical  movement  (an  evolution)  from  An-sich-sein 
through  Anders-sein  to  Filr-sich-sein. 

The  remarks  just  made  apply,  in  part,  to  the  plan  of  Mr. 
Lewes  for  getting  rid  of  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  the  "  me- 


144  DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,  AND  CRITICISM. 

tompirical  "  elements  and  problems  of  philosophy.1  His  modi- 
fied agnosticism  or  positivism  is  another  of  the  many  attempts, 
without  a  thorough  and  consistent  critical  analysis,  to  maintain 
a  system  of  speculative  statements  in  which  somewhat  dogmatic 
negations  have  too  prominent  a  place.  "  Whenever,"  says  this 
writer,2  "  a  question  is  couched  in  terms  that  ignore  experience, 
reject  known  truths,  and  invoke  inaccessible  data,  —  i.  e.,  data 
inaccessible  through  our  present  means,  or  through  any  con- 
ceivable extension  of  those  means,  —  it  is  metempirical,  and 
philosophy  can  have  nothing  to  do  with  it."  Now  it  is  safe  to 
say,  with  only  a  fairly  strict  interpretation  of  Mr.  Lewes's  lan- 
guage, that  no  such  question  could  ever  be  raised,  or  couched  in 
any  terms  whatever,  by  the  human  mind.  Do  ghosts  exist  ?  Is 
there  a  well-founded  art  of  palmistry  ?  Are  the  claims  of  tele- 
pathy true  ?  Is  electricity,  like  light,  a  mode  of  motion,  or  is 
it  a  peculiar  entity,  the  bearer  of  energy  but  devoid  of  mass  ? 
These  are  questions  in  which  the  particular  sciences  of  physics, 
physiology,  and  psychology  are  interested.  We  may  be  ignorant 
of  their  answer,  but  we  cannot  exclude  them  from  consideration 
by  the  human  mind  simply  by  calling  them  "  metempirical." 
And  of  course  Mr.  Lewes's  philosophical  agnosticism  does  not 
extend  to  questions  couched  in  such  terms  as  these. 

Questions  relating  to  "  things  per  se"  their  nature  and  their 
properties,  are,  however,  metempirical;  and  by  things  per  se, 
their  nature  and  their  properties,  Mr.  Lewes  seems  to  wish  to 
cover  all  that  we  regard  as  having  reality,  in  distinction  from 
the  merely  phenomenal.  But  the  problem  of  how,  and  why, 
and  with  what  warrant,  men  come  to  imagine  (to  use  Mr. 
Lewes's  term)  "  Things  as  they  are,  and  underlying  the  Things 
which  appear,  —  a  world  behind  phenomena,  incapable  of  being 
sensibly  grasped,  but  supposed  to  have  a  more  perfect  reality 
than  the  phenomenal  world,"  —  belongs  within  the  distinctive 

1  For  a  detailed  criticism  of  Mr.  Lewes,  see  Shadworth  Hodgson's  Philosophy 
of  Reflection,  two  vols.,  London,  1878. 

2  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  vol.  *  p.  30. 


DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM.  145 

domain  of  philosophy.  Just  so  far  as  he  refuses  to  consider 
this  problem  he  declines  the  pursuit  of  philosophy,  as  a  theory 
of  knowledge  by  the  legitimate  method  of  reflective  analysis 
and  speculative  synthesis,  and  remains  in  the  negative  aud  inert 
condition  of  dogmatic  agnosticism. 

But,  like  every  other  professional  positivist,  Mr.  Lewes  is  not 
lacking  in  confidence  in  the  ability  of  his  own  reason  to  accom- 
plish —  off-hand,  as  it  were  —  certain  very  difficult  feats  in 
metaphysical  philosophy.  The  method  of  his  procedure  he 
describes  as  follows  :  "  To  disengage  the  metempirical  elements, 
and  proceed  to  treat  the  empirical  elements  with  the  view  of 
deducing  from  them  the  unknown  elements,  if  that  be  practi- 
cable ;  or  if  the  deduction  be  impracticable,  of  registering  the 
unknown  elements  as  transcendental."  But  what  is  implied  in 
the  very  attempt  which  is  here  proposed  ?  Is  it  not  implied 
that  metempirical  elements  exist  in  human  thinking,  and  that 
the  very  nature  of  these  elements  is  such  as  further  to  impli- 
cate the  existence  of  a  world  of  reality  such  as  Mr.  Lewes  calls 
transcendental  ?  And  is  it  not  also  implied  that  this  individual 
thinker  is  competent,  not  only  to  disengage  these  metempirical 
elements  and  make  deductions  from  the  known  to  the  unknown, 
but  also  to  register  in  the  behalf  of  the  race,  the  material  which 
is  "  transcendental  "  ?  Now  what,  we  might  further  inquire  in 
the  interest  of  reason's  progressive  self-knowledge,  is  to  be  done 
with  this  collection  of  "transcendental"  refuse  material?  Is  it 
to  be  at  once  and  forever  consumed  in  the  fire  of  agnostic  meta- 
physics ?  Or  is  it  to  be  doomed  to  perpetual  imprisonment  in 
a  cell  over  which  the  inscription  is  written  —  not  to  "  the  great 
Unknown,"  but  to  "  the  eternally  Unknowable  "  ?  Or  is  it  to 
be  kept  for  future  analysis,  in  the  hope  of  further  reducing  its 
quantity  ? 

Scepticism  and  criticism  are  indispensable  to  the  progress  of 
philosophical  thinking.  They  are  attitudes  of  reason  before  its 
eternal  problems,  as  it  advances,  by  the  method  of  reflective 
analysis,  from  an  incomplete  synthesis  to  one  relatively  more 

10 


146  DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,   AND  CRITICISM. 

perfect  and  comprehensive.  But  as  distinguished  from  these 
mental  attitudes  and  the  method  of  advance  in  the  knowledge 
of  its  problems  which  philosophy  employs,  agnosticism  and  posi- 
tivism have  no  philosophical  standing.  They  serve  only  to  recall 
the  saying  of  Lessing  :  "  For  the  vast  majority  the  goal  of  their 
reflection  is  the  spot  where  they  grow  tired  of  reflection." 

That  so-called  eclecticism  is  neither  a  philosophy  nor  a  method 
of  philosophy  follows  —  as  we  have  already  seen  —  from  the 
nature  of  philosophy  and  its  method.  Nor  is  eclecticism  to  be 
classed  with  the  three  forms  of  mental  attitude  toward  philoso- 
phical truth  which  we  have  called  the  dogmatic,  the  sceptical, 
and  the  critical.  So  far  as  it  differs  from  that  spirit  of  critical 
freedom  with  which  the  student  of  philosophy  conducts  his 
survey  of  history,  it  is  an  inept  way  of  expressing  one  of  the 
two  fundamental  postulates  which  all  philosophical  discipline 
implies.  This  postulate  is  that  of  "  the  existence  in  the  world 
at  large  of  a  '  truth '  which  affords  a  sure  object  for  cognition." 
The  world  in  which  eclecticism  expects  to  find  this  truth  is  the 
world  of  speculative  thinking.  But  to  convert  this  indefinite 
postulate  of  a  "  soul  of  truth  "  to  be  discovered  in  the  different 
related  systems  of  philosophical  thinking  into  the  definite 
knowledge  of  what  that  truth  is,  requires  the  use  of  philo- 
sophical method.  And  if  the  material  for  treatment  is  gained 
from  historical  study  rather  than  from  a  study  of  the  present 
conclusions  of  the  particular  sciences,  it  no  less  demands  that 
we  should  regard  it  sceptically  and  critically  before  we  accept 
it  as  material  for  a  positive  synthesis. 

Dogmatism,  scepticism,  criticism  ;  and  then  a  new  positive 
construction  of  those  results,  that  have  stood  the  test  of  critical 
analysis,  which  in  its  turn  comes  to  be  regarded  by  scepticism  as 
unverifiably  dogmatic,  —  it  is  through  these  changes  of  mental 
attitude  that  philosophical  inquiry  is  compelled  to  pass.  This 
is  the  order  of  the  different  phases  necessary  to  the  growth  of 
the  organism  of  rational  knowledge.  The  proposition  might  be 
illustrated  by  the  experience  of  every  individual  thinker  and  by 


DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,  AND   CRITICISM.  147 

that  of  the  race.  This  order  applies  to  the  consideration  of 
every  particular  problem  of  philosophy  ;  it  applies  also  to  the 
development  of  systems  and  schools.  But  in  every  individual 
and  in  the  race,  whether  the  formation  of  views  touching  some 
particular  problem  or  the  development  of  an  entire  system  is 
concerned,  these  different  phases  are  not  distinctly  separated. 
Every  thinker  is  likely  to  be  positively  confident,  or  dogmatic, 
respecting  his  own  answer  to  certain  problems  of  philosophy  ; 
sceptical  and  agnostic  with  regard  to  any  answer  to  other 
problems  ;  and  more  or  less  thoroughly  critical  toward  certain 
answers  to  still  other  problems.  Similar,  in  this  regard,  to  the 
mental  attitude  of  each  individual  thinker  is  that  of  the  multi- 
tude in  any  given  age. 

At  present,  for  example,  the  Zeitgeist  is  inclined  to  be  confid- 
ingly dogmatic  toward  metaphysical  postulates  put  forth  in  the 
name  of  physical  science,  but  intensely  sceptical  toward  those 
upon  which  repose  the  traditional  views  on  subjects  of  morals 
and  religion.  An  hypothesis  like  the  conservation  or  correla- 
tion of  energy,  or  like  Darwinian  evolution,  gains  a  compara- 
tively easy  credence  from  otherwise  sceptical  minds.  It  may 
even  put  forth  the  virtual  claim  adequately  to  represent  the 
ultimate  principles  of  the  life  of  all  that  is  really  Existent. 
But  the  dogma  of  Theism,  that  this  really  Existent  is  One  self- 
conscious  and  rational  Person,  can  with  difficulty  obtain  a  fair 
hearing  even  when  it  appears  in  the  shape  of  a  modest  petitioner 
for  the  place  of  an  hypothesis. 

Philosophy  began  among  the  Greeks  in  the  form  of  a  dogma- 
tic solution  offered  to  the  problem  of  cosmology.  The  three 
most  ancient  schools  posited,  without  any  adequate  sceptical  and 
critical  examination,  certain  assumed  substantial  causes  of  the 
Being  of  Things.  Ileracleitus  and  his  successors  in  the  same 
line  of  inquiry  (Ernpedocles,  Leucippus,  and  Anaxagoras)  dealt 
in  similar  dogmatic  fashion  with  the  problem  of  Change  and 
Motion.  The  dogmatism  of  all  this  period  touching  the  problems 
of  morals  and  religion  was  expressed  in  unquestioned  custom, 


M8  DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM. 

ceremony,  law,  and  popular  belief,  rather  than  in  definite  at- 
tempts at  a  system  of  philosophical  tenets.  It  was  chiefly  with 
reference  to  this  dogmatism  that  the  scepticism  of  the  Sophists 
found  its  field  of  action.  They  have  fitly  been  called  by 
Zeller  "the  exponents  and  agents  in  the  Greek  illumination 
(AufJdarung)  of  the  fifth  century  b.  c.  ;"  like  all  such  would- 
be  philosophers,  their  scepticism  was  dogmatic  and  uncritical. 
They  readily  leaped  to  the  conclusion  :  "  Objectively  true  science 
is  impossible,  and  our  knowledge  cannot  pass  beyond  subjective 
phenomena."  The  Sophists  thus  exhibit  the  typical  issue  of 
uncritical  dogmatism  in  dogmatic  agnosticism. 

The  germ  and  spirit  of  criticism  belong  to  the  maieutic  of  Soc- 
rates. This  new  form  of  scientific  life  was  designed  to  separate 
between  the  rational  and  the  irrational  in  that  experience  over 
all  of  which  an  uncritical  scepticism  had  thrown  the  shadow  of 
doubt.  Toward  the  speculations  of  the  philosophy  of  nature,  as 
conducted  in  his  time,  Socrates  remained  a  complete  sceptic ; 
but  in  respect  of  ethical  matters  he  maintained  and  defended 
a  theory  of  cognition  which  holds  that  real  truth  is  attainable 
by  the  method  of  dialectic.  By  this  method  our  notions  may 
be  brought  to  a  strict  harmony  with  what  is  in  itself  true  and 
just.  While  the  other  disciples  of  Socrates,  and  the  schools 
which  they  founded,  showed  little  or  no  power  to  use  his 
method  of  reflective  analysis,  and  upon  it  to  erect  a  relatively 
consistent  system  of  synthetic  philosophy,  it  was  not  so  with 
Plato.  This  great  thinker  developed  the  maieutic  of  Socrates 
into  something  resembling  a  scientific  methodology.  He  ex- 
tended the  results  of  analysis  so  as  to  include  many  subjects 
hitherto  treated  by  the  philosophy  of  morals  only  very  imper- 
fectly ;  and  upon  these  results  he  founded,  as  a  vast  expansion 
of  the  Socratic  doctrine  of  concepts,  "a  grand  system  of  an 
idealistic  nature,  the  central  point  of  which  lies  on  the  one  side 
in  the  intuition  of  ideas,  on  the  other  in  inquiries  about  the 
nature  and  duties  of  man."  He  thus  gave  to  the  world  the  first 
body  of  positive  propositions  arrived  at  by  the  method  of  philo- 


DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,  AND   CRITICISM.  149 

sophical  reflection,  —  this  reflection  being  conducted  through 
the  stages  of  scepticism  and  criticism  to  a  stage  of  reconstructed 
dogmatism.  Platonism  has  therefore  a  permanent  and  absolute 
value  in  the  evolution  of  speculative  thinking. 

Among  the  immediate  disciples  of  Plato,  only  Aristotle  is  of 
any  significance  for  the  development  of  philosophy  or  fur  the 
study  of  the  method  of  its  advance.  But  judged  by  the  stan- 
dard of  his  age,  Aristotle  comprehended  in  his  system  more  of 
the  complete  content  of  philosophical  truth,  as  he  made  a  more 
thorough  and  consistent  use  of  the  complete  method  for  ascer- 
taining and  verifying  such  truth,  than  any  other  thinker  of 
antiquity,  and  perhaps  of  all  tune.  His  attitude  toward  Plato- 
nism was  sceptical  and  critical  upon  many  points  of  minor  im- 
portance, and  especially  upon  the  central  point  of  the  doctrine 
of  ideas.  But  notwithstanding  this,  he  gave  both  to  the  conclu- 
sions and  to  the  method  of  the  Platonic  philosophy  an  incalcu- 
lably great  and  positive  expansion  and  reconstruction.  More 
especially,  Aristotle  founded  several  of  the  particular  sciences 
on  which  corresponding  departments  of  philosophy  are  depen- 
dent ;  and  he  labored  with  amazing  skill  and  success  to  create  a 
philosophical  terminology  and  to  place  his  synthetic  philosophy 
upon  a  basis  of  comprehensive  empirical  knowledge.  Aristo- 
telianism  is  therefore  the  second  great  system  which  has  a 
permanent  and  absolute  value  in  the  evolution  of  speculative 
thought. 

The  post-Aristotelian  schools  were  founded  in  the  attempt, 
without  any  consistent  and  thorough  process  of  criticism,  to 
formulate  certain  problems  of  philosophy  —  pertaining,  for  the 
most  part,  to  the  life  of  sensitivity  and  conduct  —  so  as  to 
satisfy  in  a  practical  way  the  immediate  needs  of  the  individual. 
They  therefore  involve  a  crude  mingling  of  the  sceptical  and  the 
dogmatic  positions  with  a  disuse  of  the  true  method  of  philoso- 
phy. These  "schools"  are  therefore,- — including  the  so-called 
"sceptical,"  —  in  the  main,  all  dogmatic.  The  Peripatetics,  who 
were  the  immediate  successors  of  Aristotle,  busied  themselves 


150  DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,  AND   CRITICISM. 

with  certain  minor  points  in  his  system ;  they  did  not  attempt 
by  a  change  of  method,  or  by  a  mure  thorough  use  of  the 
established  dialectic  and  the  investigation  of  nature,  to  solve 
any  of  the  greater  philosophical  problems.  The  Stoics  and 
Epicureans,  in  respect  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the 
theory  of  Being  and  Knowledge,  retrograded  from  the  points 
reached  by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  In  respect  of  ethics,  upon 
which  they  concentrated  their  attention,  their  positions,  al- 
though of  no  great  scientific  value,  were  distinctly  critical;  and 
the  positive  conclusions  they  reached  have  a  certain  amount  of 
permanent  value  in  the  development  of  philosophy.  They  mark 
the  outcome  of  the  Greek  mind  in  its  efforts  to  deal,  by  use  of 
philosophical  method,  with  the  phenomena  and  the  ideals  of 
ethical  life.  So,  too,  does  the  later  Greek  scepticism  show  that 
placid  agnosticism  which  "  accepts  the  impossibility  of  knowl- 
edge as  a  natural  destiny,"  —  a  thing  difficult,  if  not  impos- 
sible, for  m in ds  that,  like  ours,  have  inherited  the  mental 
peculiarities  of  centuries  of  Christian  belief  and  opinion. 

Neo-Platonism,  as  well  as  its  precursors  and  comrades  in 
philosophy,  shows  the  results  of  new  attempts  at  constructing 
a  system  of  thinking  in  one  chief  department  of  philosophy. 
These  attempts  are  all  critical  of  the  ancient  dogmatic  conclu- 
sions on  which  they  are  founded,  but  only  in  a  partial  way. 
They  introduce  us,  however,  to  phases  of  the  philosophy  of  re- 
ligion with  the  recurrence  of  which,  under  changes  of  garb  and 
presentation,  the  history  of  philosophy  is  familiar.  They  exhibit 
that  strong  tendency  to  some  form  of  Monism  which  belongs  of 
necessity  to  all  philosophical  inquiry  when  it  is  pushed  to  the 
consideration  of  those  supreme  problems  in  which  the  reason  of 
man  as  a  religious  being  is  interested.  From  all  the  earlier 
forms  of  Monism  a  sceptical  reaction,  to  be  followed  by  efforts 
at  a  new  critical  reconstruction,  arose  as  the  result  of  the  de- 
mands of  a  scientific  psychology,  especially  in  the  department 
of  ethics. 

The  relation  of  dogmatism,  scepticism,  and  criticism  as  the 


DOGMATISM,  SCEPTICISM,  AND   CRITICISM.  151 

three  perpetual!)'  recurring  attitudes  of  mind  toward  philo- 
sophical truth,  might  he  further  illustrated  by  an  appeal  to 
the  entire  mediseval  period.  The  illustrations  would  be  com- 
paratively scanty,  however,  on  account  of  the  comparatively 
stationary  character  of  philosophy  during  that  period.  The 
theology  of  the  period  was,  nevertheless, — in  spite  of  any  claims 
to  a  special  source  in  revelation  either  through  the  inspired 
writings  or  the  inspired  judgment  of  the  Christian  Church, — 
a  form  of  the  philosophy  of  religion.  It  was,  that  is  to  say,  the 
result  of  rational  activity  in  reflective  analysis  and  speculative 
synthesis,  excited  by  the  great  facts  of  the  Christian  faith  and 
life.  Among  the  earlier  Church  Fathers  (notably  Origen  and 
Augustine)  there  was  exhibited  no  little  power  of  free  thought 
in  the  use  of  genuine  philosophical  method.  Some  of  the  con- 
clusions of  these  thinkers  are  parts  of  the  permanent  positive 
results  of  the  philosophy  of  religion.  "Without  these  we  can- 
not establish  an  organic  evolution  of  speculative  thought  from 
the  Greeks  down  to  modern  times. 

And  even  in  the  so-called  "  dark  "  ages,  when  the  principle 
of  authority  was  recognized  as  unquestioned,  and  is  often  sup- 
posed to  have  reigned  supreme,  there  was  considerable  room 
still  left  for  sceptical  and  critical  attitudes  from  which  to 
regard  the  prevalent  dogmatism.  Scepticism  and  criticism 
were  of  course  theoretically  possible  only  in  the  case  of  dogmas 
upon  which  the  Church  had  not  pronounced.  I  kit  in  fact 
there  were  not  wanting  serious  attempts  to  treat  matters  scep- 
tically and  critically  which  fell  under  the  content  of  established 
dogmas.  Doubt  might  at  least  be  expressed  as  to  the  way  of 
understanding  what  the  Church  Fathers  or  the  ecclesiastical 
councils  had  held ;  criticism  also  might  be  applied  to  different 
prevalent  ways  of  expressing  that  about  the  substantial  truth 
of  which  there  was  general  agreement.  The  monk  Gaunilo,  for 
example,  might  in  a  measure  anticipate  the  critical  freedom  of 
Kant,  in  his  examination  of  the  Anselmic  ontological  argument. 
Nor  was  the  great  debate  between   the  positions  of  Platonism, 


152  DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,  AND   CRITICISM. 

and  those  of  Aristotelianism  ever  quite  settled  by  Churchly 
dogmatism.  The  strife  of  Kealism  and  Nominalism,  although 
the  agnostic  rationalism  of  the  latter  seemed  to  threaten  the 
reality  of  the  Trinity  itself,  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  a 
modified  positive  view  containing  elements  from  both,  rather 
than  in  the  complete  suppression  within  the  Church  of  the 
sceptical  and  critical  movement. 

With  Uescartes  the  necessity  of  the  sceptical  attitude  toward 
all  conclusions  of  philosophical  dogmatism,  and  the  intelligent 
use  of  reflective  analysis  as  an  instrument  for  the  discovery  of 
philosophical  truth,  become  emphasized.  But  this  thinker,  who 
in  this  regard  gave  its  characteristics  to  the  modern  era,  was 
also  the  founder  in  direct  line  of  certain  great  dogmatic  sys- 
tems which  were  broken  into  fragments  by  the  sceptical  and 
critical  method  of  Kant.  Spinozism  is  intensely  and  consis- 
tently dogmatic  from  beginning  to  close.  Its  value  in  the  evo- 
lution of  thought  consists  in  three  things  ;  by  its  failure  it 
demonstrates  the  inapplicability  of  the  strictly  deductive  and 
mathematical  method  to  the  problems  of  philosophy.  At  the 
same  time  it  shows  by  use  of  this  deductive  method  how  much 
can  be  done  to  explain  the  world,  as  known  by  the  particular 
sciences,  with  reference  to  the  conception  of  a  bare  Unity  of 
Substance  ;  and  it  affords  a  system  of  dogmatic  propositions 
from  which  sceptical  and  critical  analysis  may  take  its  start  in 
estimating  every  new  system  of  abstract  modal  and  monistic 
Pantheism. 

In  Leibnitz  we  find  the  same  fertile  and  skilful  use  of  criti- 
cism upon  the  existing  content  of  philosophy,  combined  with  the 
introduction  from  the  particular  sciences  of  new  material,  and 
the  same  free  spring  from  this  basis  upward  to  a  higher  level  of 
synthesis,  which  characterized  the  work  of  Aristotle.  But  the 
speculative  results  of  this  thinker  soon  united  with  other  ele- 
ments to  form  the  system  of  reigning  dogmatism  which  awaited 
the  criticism  of  Kant. 

The  half-use  of  the  sceptical  and  critical  attitude,  and  the 


•    DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM.  153 

corresponding  development  of  philosophical  method,  which 
were  characteristic  of  Locke's  philosophy,  bore  abundant  fruit 
in  two  different  directions.  In  the  one  direction  this  movement 
resulted  in  that  mixture  of  dogmatic  scepticism  and  equally 
dogmatic  sensationalism  which  established  itself  in  England, 
and  especially  in  France.  In  another  direction  it  developed, 
through  the  critical  but  extreme  idealism  of  Berkeley,  into  the 
relatively  consistent  and  critical  scepticism  of  Hume.  [We 
cannot  agree  wholly  with  Kant  in  placing  this  thinker  among 
the  ranks  of  dogmatic  scepticism.]  It  was  the  scepticism  of 
Hume  which  made  possible  the  modern  attempts  at  a  critical 
reconstruction  of  the  theory  of  knowledge. 

The  modern  era  of  deliberate,  intelligent  employment  of 
reflective  analysis,  in  the  maintenance  of  the  candid  and  free 
critical  attitude,  begins  with  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Eeason."  Yet 
its  author,  as  we  have  already  remarked,  always  remained  in 
the  dogmatic  attitude  toward  several  of  the  most  important  of 
those  problems  whose  consideration,  and  even  whose  statement, 
is  involved  in  the  problem  he  undertook  to  solve.  This  made 
necessary  a  subsequent  application  of  the  Kantian  criticism  to 
Kant's  own  dogmatic  views  respecting  the  nature  of  the  mind 
and  its  faculties,  and  to  his  dogmatic  presuppositions  respecting 
the  a  priori  synthetic  character  of  the  body  of  truth  taught  by 
mathematics  and  physics.  The  work  of  critical  analysis  and 
reconstruction  from  the  Kantian  point  of  view  is  by  no  means 
as  yet  completed.  Meanwhile,  a  vast  accumulation  of  truths 
and  conjectures,  due  to  the  modern  advance  of  the  particular 
sciences,  —  especially  of  physics,  biology,  and  psychology,  —  is 
making  a  demand  for  recognition  and  treatment  at  the  hands  of 
philosophy.  Toward  this  accumulation  the  attitude  of  philoso- 
phy is  for  the  most  part  receptive  and  positive ;  but  it  must 
also  be  in  part  critical,  if  not  sceptical. 

Since  Kant  the  philosophical  spirit  has  been  strongly  imbued 
with  the  critical  principle.  No  attempt  at  the  construction  of 
a  new  synthetic   philosophy  can    now  gain   attention  without 


154  DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM. 

appearing,  at  least,  to  stand  toward  all  previous  schools  and 
thinkers  in  the  position  of  a  free  sceptic  and  critic.  And  yet 
it  is  since  Kant  that  the  most  stupendous  systems  of  philo- 
sophical dogma  have  arisen  —  though  chiefly  upon  German 
soil  —  which  the  world  has  ever  known.  Fichte,  Schelling, 
Hegel,  and  all  the  earlier  luminaries  shining  largely  by  light 
borrowed  from  them  and  from  Kant,  and  now  later  Schopen- 
hauer, Von  Hartmann,  and  Herbert  Spencer  have  built  up 
great  synthetic  structures  with  extreme  scepticism  toward  the 
results  of  previous  thinking,  and  with  equally  extreme  confi- 
dence in  their  own  power  to  attain  something  approaching  a 
final  philosophy.  Each  thinker  has  perhaps  contributed  some- 
thing permanent  toward  that  completer  system  of  associated 
principles  of  all  Being  and  Knowledge  which  constitutes  phi- 
losophy. But  each  system  seems  destined  in  turn  to  have 
many  of  its  positive  conclusions  regarded  as  unwarrantably 
dogmatic,  and  subjected  to  a  new  process  of  sceptical  analysis 
and  critical  reconstruction. 

The  rapid  rise  and  fall  of  great  systems  of  synthetic  philoso- 
phy has  been  characteristic  of  the  century  since  Kant.  It  is 
one  proof  of  the  extraordinary  mental  activity  of  the  age,  of  the 
wonderful  new  growths  of  the  particular  sciences  regarded  as 
critics  and  purveyors  of  philosophy,  and  of  the  unabated  in- 
fluence of  the  spirit  of  the  Kantian  criticism.  It  is  not  strange 
that  the  result  has  been  to  create  a  widespread  distrust  in  the 
value  of  all  attempts  at  philosophical  system.  The  fact  is  also 
noteworthy  that  many  of  the  most  acute  and  rdent  students 
of  the  subject  have  devoted  themselves  to  the  critical  and 
historical  consideration  of  particular  problems,  and  have  aban- 
doned all  attempts  at  proposing  new  solutions  for  those  prob- 
lems. The  last  half  of  the  century  since  Kant  has  seen  a 
multitude  of  workers  who  emphatically  deny  that  they  seek 
a  system  of  their  own,  or  will  follow  the  system  of  any  other ; 
and  who  even  express  despair  of  the  possibility  of  framing 
again  a  philosophical  whole  that  shall  command  an  intelligent 


DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM.  155 

and  enthusiastic,  if  only  a  temporary,  adherence.  But  unless 
the  method  and  attitude  which  render  progressive  the  self- 
knowledge  of  reason  have  met  with  some  secret  constitutional 
change,  an  era  of  new  great  syntheses  in  philosophy  awaits  us 
in  the  future. 

The  naturalness  of  those  changes  of  mental  attitude  which 
lead  from  dogmatism,  through  scepticism  and  critical  inquiry, 
back  to  a  positive  reconstruction,  is  seen  in  the  consideration 
of  each  particular  problem  of  philosophy.  The  tenets  of  the 
schools,  with  which  each  of  these  problems  is  answered,  illus- 
trate the  truth  still  further. 

The  first  important  problem  which  scientific  psychology  — 
just  at  the  point  where  it  touches  metaphysics — hands  over 
to  philosophy  for  a  more  nearly  ultimate  solution,  is  the  problem 
of  Perception  by  the  senses.  Naive  unreflecting  consciousness 
is  frankly  dogmatic  as  respects  the  solution  of  this  problem. 
To  it,  indeed,  a  problem  can  scarcely  be  said  to  exist ;  for  it  has 
never  been  sceptical  toward  the  native  presupposition  which 
takes  all  "  Things  "  really  to  be  as  they  seem.  But  experience 
quickly  forces  a  measure  of  the  sceptical  attitude.  That  the 
senses  cannot  always  be  trusted,  is  soon  learned ;  and  that  the 
light  and  color,  smell,  taste,  sound,  and  feeling  (so  far  at  least 
as  heat  and  cold  are  concerned)  of  things  are  not  objectively  as 
they  are  to  us,  the  modern  school-boy  knows  enough  of  physics 
to  assert.  At  this  stage  of  analysis  certain  systems  of  philoso- 
phy have  attempted  to  call  a  halt  to  the  progress  of  scepticism 
and  criticism.  But  the  conclusions  of  these  systems  cannot 
bear  for  a  moment  the  more  searching  inquiry  into  the  nature 
of  the  object  immediately  known  by  the  senses,  or  into  the 
nature  of  the  process  of  cognition. 

Another  stand  against  scepticism  and  critical  inquiry  is 
made  when  the  whole  science  of  modern  physics  is  summoned 
positively  to  solve  the  problem  concerning  the  nature  of  that 
which  is  known  in  sense-perception  as  a  really  existent  "Thing." 
Science,  is  cited  in  proof  of  philosophical  dogmatism.     Then, 


156  DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM. 

indeed,  a  wonderful  new  world  of  .Reality  is  disclosed  to  us  as 
the  result  (though  only  very  indirectly)  of  cognition  by  the 
senses.  The  real  world  which  physics  knows  and  propounds 
as  a  tinal  barrier  to  philosophical  scepticism,  is  a  world  of 
atoms,  —  colorless,  silent,  without  smell  or  taste,  discrete  and 
without  continuity  of  extension,  restlessly  mobile,  inherently 
possessors  of  occult  energies,  and  blindly  obedient  to  countless 
numbers  of  laws. 

But  the  philosophical  inquirer  declines  to  stay  the  march  of 
scepticism  and  criticism  at  this  point.  For  the  authority  of 
scientific  dogmatism  is  no  more  terrifying  to  him  than  the 
authority  of  cloddy  "  common-sense."  What  sort  of  a  Eeality 
have  we  here?  he  asks.  Is  this  so-called  "real"  world  any 
other  than  a  system  of  well-ordered  conceptions,  introduced  in 
the  name  of  physical  science,  to  account  for  the  world  which 
must  always  remain  more  real  to  every  man,  because  it  is  the 
world  he  "  immediately  "  knows  ?  And  what  is  the  essence  of 
a  world  of  conceptions  if  it  be  not  a  mental  world  ?  Moreover, 
what  one  tie,  or  ties  many,  can  be  known  to  bind  into  a  Unity 
in  Reality  this  restless  multitude  of  discrete  atomic  beings  ? 
For  forces  and  laws  are  but  names  derived  from  the  modes  of 
being  and  action  of  what  really  is. 

When,  then,  scepticism  dissolves  the  dogmatic  syntheses  of  a 
scientific  physical  realism,  and  hands  the  problem  over  again  to 
philosophy  for  further  critical  inquiry,  the  issue  of  this  final 
attempt  at  analysis  and  reconstruction  may  be  manifold. 
Agnosticism  denies  that  the  Being  which  "  Things  "  have  can 
ever  be  known ;  perhaps,  also,  that  we  can  ever  know  whether 
things  have  any  real  being  or  not.  Scepticism  becomes  dog- 
matic, and  positively  affirms  that  Things  have  no  reality. 
Idealism,  which  has  approached  and  followed  the  same  prob- 
lem along  somewhat  different  lines,  agrees  with  scepticism  in 
this  negation  of  reality  to  the  object  of  sense-perception.  Posi- 
tively, it  adopts  the  principle  of  esse  est  percipi  ;  and,  in  some 
form  of  reconstructed  dogmatism,  identifies  the  reality  of  things 


DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM.  157 

with  the  reality  of  the  subject  acting  to  construct  its  objects, 
according  to  its  own  mental  laws.  Realism,  again,  "  transfig- 
ured "  in  some  worthy  way  by  .the  process  of  criticism,  specula- 
tively discusses  the  nature  of  this  extra-mental  existence,  in 
whose  being  all  things  have  such  reality  as  they  possess.  And, 
finally,  critical  philosophy,  in  its  supreme  effort,  discerns  the 
possibility  of  reconciling  the  valid  claims  of  both  idealism  and 
realism  by  a  synthesis  which  shall  establish  such  a  Unity  of 
Subject  and  Object  in  Ultimate  Reality  as  shall  best  explain  all 
the  groups  of  phenomena  to  which  the  different  conclusions 
appeal. 

The  problem  of  Self-consciousness,  like  the  problem  of  sense- 
perception,  illustrates  the  naturalness  of  reason's  progress  by 
the  three  attitudes  of  dogmatism,  scepticism,  and  criticism. 
For  naive  unreflecting  consciousness  this  problem  also  has  no 
existence.  For  it  the  conviction  that  I  really  am,  and  that  I 
know  what  I  really  am,  seems  neither  to  need  explanation  nor 
to  admit  of  debate.  This  easy-going  common-sense  realism  is 
attacked  and  overthrown  by  philosophical  doubt.  That  I  think 
(cogito),  may  not  indeed  admit  of  settled  and  serious  doubt ; 
and  that  I  am,  in  some  sort,  when  I  think  (Cogito,  ergo  sum), 
may  be  considered  a  proposition  equally  beyond  all  the  suc- 
cessful assaults  of  scepticism.  But  am  I  when  1  do  not  think, 
when  T  swoon  or  deeply  sleep  ?  And  do  we  by  the  Cartesian 
phrase  —  seeming,  as  it  does  to  all  reflecting  minds,  to  skim 
the  surface  of  that  depth  of  being  which  we  long  to  explore 
—  tell  all,  or  even  the  most  and  best,  of  what  1  really  am  ] 
Now  that  the  phenomena  of  trance,  hypnotism,  insanity,  and 
other  abnormal  conditions  of  conscious  or  unconscious  (?)  idea- 
tion and  volition  are  being  brought  into  the  clear  light  of 
science,  will  the  old  answers  satisfy  the  demands  of  proof  for 
the  traditional  tenets  of  rational  psychology  ?  What  shall  we 
say  of  the  apparent  existence  of  layer  beneath  layer  of  con- 
sciousness in  the  sub-conscious  being  of  that  which,  in  reflec- 
tive self-consciousness,!  call  "myself"?     What  shall  we  say 


158  DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CKITICISM. 

of  the  partial  or  total  loss  of  the  sense  of  personal  identity ;  of 
that  complete  becoming  other  than  one's  self  which  takes  place 
in  hypnotic  and  insane  conditions ;  of  double  consciousness, 
recurring  intermittently  or  periodically  ?  What  are  we  to 
think  of  those  wonderful  phenomena  of  genius  —  akin  indeed 
to  madness  and  to  inspiration,  from  certain  points  of  view  — 
that  seem  to  give  token  of  the  presence,  in  the  one  whom 
we  call  our  Ego,  of  another  One,,  a  mysterious,  all-compre- 
hending Life  ? 

When  the  sceptical  and  critical  examination  of  the  older 
dogmatic  positions  respecting  the  answer  to  the  problem  of 
self-consciousness  has  been  reinforced  by  considerations  like 
the  foregoing,  it  is  not  strange  that  difficulty  is  found  in  re- 
constructing the  synthetic  philosophy  of  mind.  As  respects 
this  problem,  too,  agnosticism  may  dogmatically  proclaim  the 
impossibility  of  any  knowledge  of  that  reality  which  souls  have ; 
scepticism  and  materialism  may  deny  that  souls,  in  sooth  !  can 
have  any  reality ;  idealism  may  affirm  that  their  only  reality 
is  the  activity  of  self-conscious  ideation  itself;  and  realism 
may  speculate  as  to  what  extra-mental  being  can  be  affirmed 
of  that  sort  of  existences  whose  very  nature  appears  to  itself 
to  be  purely  mental.  But  genuine  philosophy,  with  a  wise 
moderation  of  scepticism  and  a  patient  use  of  critical  analysis, 
will  review  and  modify  its  syntheses  in  this  department  as  the 
progress  of  psychology  and  psycho-physics  affords  the  required 
means. 

The  more  abstract  consideration  of  both  the  two  problems 
already  mentioned  constitutes  the  sphere  of  metaphysics.  This 
branch  of  philosophical  discipline  considers  the  nature  of  that 
Being  which  we  attribute  to  all  —  both  Things  and  Minds  — 
that  we  call  "  real."  In  its  original  dogmatic  form  it  consists 
of  those  crude  and  unreflecting  presuppositions  which,  for  the 
ordinary  man,  bind  his  experience  into  the  unity  of  reality 
which  it  seems  to  its  possessor  to  have.  To  natural,  unreflec- 
ting consciousness  things  are  as  they  appear  to  minds;  and 


DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM.  159 

minds  are  as  each  mind  appears  to  itself  to  be.  A  host  of 
relations  also  exists,  above,  around,  and  between  minds  and 
things,  and  these  relations  compel  each  being  to  govern  its 
own  behavior  in  view  of  the  behavior  of  other  beings.  It 
is  not  necessary  to  trace  the  steps  by  which  sceptical  doubt 
and  critical  inquiry  enforce  the  reconstruction  of  conceptions 
like  these.  The  changing  attitudes  of  mind  toward  this  more 
complex  problem  of  general  metaphysics,  and  toward  the  dif- 
ferent principal  answers  proposed  for  this  problem,  are  essen- 
tially the  same  as  those  already  described. 

The  earliest  dogmatism  of  the  mind  toward  the  problem  of 
Cognition  in  general  is  even  more  unquestioning  and  pronounced 
than  that  toward  the  problem  of  feeing.  To  doubt  whether 
I  truthfully  represent  some  particular  form  of  reality, 
whether  of  matter  or  of  mind,  is  far  easier  than  to  doubt 
whether  I  can  know  reality  at  all.  It  is  indeed  of  the  very 
nature  of  reason  and  of  philosophical  inquiry  that  it  should 
be  so.  For  the  confidence  of  reason  in  itself,  which  is  the 
same  thing  as  the  confidence  that  knowable  truth  exists  for 
it,  is  a  primary  postulate  of  all  reflective  thinking.  In  the 
criticism  of  all  other  presuppositions  this  one  remains  as  a 
kind  of  fixed  point  of  standing ;  from  which,  if  only  it  can 
be  maintained,  reason  expects,  with  a  never-tiring  cheerful- 
ness, to  lift  upward  the  whole  world  of  thought.  But  even 
this  postulate  may  be  made  the  object  of  sceptical  attack ; 
it  must,  in  the  interests  of  synthetic  philosophy  itself,  be 
made  the  subject  of  critical  inquiry.  And  even  if  it  were 
not  to  be  doubted  at  all  that  I  may  know  the  really  Exis- 
tent, the  various  dogmatic  statements  as  to  how  I  may  know 
this  Existent,  and  how  much  of  it  I  may  know,  require  to  be 
subjected  to  a  sceptical  and  critical  inquiry.  The  theory  of 
cognition  thus  passes  in  order,  and  again  and  yet  again,  by 
the  path  of  dogmatism,  scepticism,  and  criticism,  to  the  form 
of  a  higher  and  newly  re-constructed  synthesis. 

The  application  of  considerations  like  the  foregoing  to  the 


160  DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM. 

Ideals  of  Reason  need  not  detain  us  long.  The  faet  of  appli- 
cation is  readily  made  apparent.  To  the  unreflecting  ethical 
or  testhetical  feeling  the  current  dogmatism  of  assertion  as  to 
what  is  morally  good  or  truly  beautiful  passes  unquestioned. 
This  dogmatism,  in  the  solution  of  these  great  problems,  is 
practical  rather  than  speculative.  To  it  the  existing  maxims, 
customs,  laws,  precepts,  and  modes  of  conduct  present  and 
sufficiently  define  what  is  morally  right  and  good.  The  sur- 
rounding forms  of  nature,  or  —  more  probably  ■ —  the  traditional 
rules  and  products  of  personal  adornment  and  other  art,  present 
and  define  the  aesthetically  good,  — "  the  beautiful,"  so  called. 
But  doubt  disturbs  the  repose  of  this  attitude  of  unquestioning 
acceptance.  Sceptical  doubt  must  be  operative  in  this  way  if 
a  science,  and  then  a  philosophy,  of  the  good  and  the  beauti- 
ful, are  to  arise.  But  scepticism  never  produces  of  itself  any 
improvements  in  science,  any  new  and  better  solutions  of 
philosophical  problems. 

The  positive  sciences  of  ethics  and  aesthetics  represent  a  next 
higher  stage  of  achievement  in  synthesis.  They  show  what  men 
in  general,  in  various  ages  and  by  progressive  approaches,  have 
agreed  upon  as  the  rules,  maxims,  or  laws  of  the  beautiful  and 
the  morally  good.  But  philosophy  seeks  the  rational  and  the 
universal.  It  aims  so  to  know  the  essence  of  these  ideals  of  its 
own  as  to  connect  them  with  each  other  (since  they  are  both  its 
own  ideals),  and  with  that  Unity  of  Ultimate  Reality  which 
reason,  of  necessity,  postulates.  It  then  proceeds  by  a  sceptical 
and  critical  examination  of  the  principles  alleged  by  a  scientific 
ethics  and  aesthetics,  which  it  regards  as  too  dogmatic  for  the 
supreme  uses  of  philosophy,  with  its  attempts  at  a  higher  syn- 
thesis. These  attempts  too,  like  all  those  made  by  philosophy 
to  solve  its  problems,  constitute  the  progressive  self-knowledge 
of  reason  and  its  progressively  higher  knowledge  of  the  world. 
Every  new  effort  rises  upon  the  preceding  by  leaping  from  the 
truth  left  undissolved  by  the  severer  critical  analysis  to  a  grander 
and  more  comprehensive  synthesis. 


DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM.  161 

In  the  Philosophy  of  Keligion,  the  highest  department  of  all 
philosophical  discipline  and  the  essentially  synthetic  branch  of 
philosophical  system,  the  same  truth  holds.  How  shall  we 
solve  the  problem  of  that  Supreme  and  Ultimate  Unity  in 
which  the  presuppositions  and  ideals  of  reason,  and  all  the 
principles  of  the  sciences,  both  of  nature  and  of  mind,  may 
find  their  ground?  To  this  problem  all  the  other  problems 
of  philosophy  point  the  way.  In  its  complete  solution  would 
be  found  involved  the  solution  of  all  the  others.  Therefore  the 
stages  by  which  they  severally  advance  are  effective  in  giving 
conditions  to  the  advance  of  this  supreme  problem.  If  the 
problem  of  knowledge,  for  example,  receive  the  answer  of  ag- 
nosticism or  scepticism,  then  we  must  deny  that,  or  doubt 
whether,  man  can  know  God.  If  the  problems  considered  by 
the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of  mind  receive 
the  solution  proposed  by  materialism,  then  the  ultimate  Eeality 
cannot  be  known  as  the  personal  Absolute  "  whom  faith  may 
call  God."  If  the  problem  of  the  Ideals  of  Keason  —  the 
problem  touching  the  ultimate  nature  and  ground  of  the 
beautiful  and  the  good  —  are  to  be  answered  after  the  manner 
of  a  certain  kind  of  idealism,  then  the  Absolute  One  cannot  be 
the  realization  of  the  perfectly  beautiful  and  the  perfectly  good- 
Scepticism  and  criticism  are  then  as  necessary  for  the  best 
progress  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  as  for  the  advance  of  any 
other  department  of  philosophy.  Only  thus  does  reason  rise 
on  the  assured  results  of  its  previous  efforts  at  this  supreme 
synthesis  to  a  result  more  comprehensive  and  satisfying  to 
its  deepest  needs.  Only  thus  can  all  the  accumulating  knowl- 
edge and  wisdom  of  the  sciences  of  nature,  life,  and  conduct 
contribute  to  the  higher  and  broader  knowledge  of  God. 

When,  however,  the  attitude  of  scepticism  toward  philosophi- 
cal truth  is  praised  for  its  own  sake,  or  maintained  as  though 
in  this  way  alone  progress  in  philosophical  knowledge  were 
secured,  its  relation  toward  the  true  method  and  aim  of  phi- 
losophy is  totally  misconceived.     When  criticism  is  ceaselessly 

11 


162 


DOGMATISM,   SCEPTICISM,   AND   CRITICISM. 


carried  on,  without  any  assured  and  positive  result  becoming 
apparent,  and  when  philosophizing  issues  in  no  philosophy 
beyond  a  system  of  negations  and  warnings,  then  the  well- 
deserved  reproach  of  all  merely  critical  efforts  is  brought  to 
mind.  Then  we  hear  men  remarking  how  wearisome  and 
profilless  it  is  to  be  always  whetting  the  knife,  with  no  hope 
of  carving  anything;  to  be  always  tuning  the  instruments, 
with  no  prospect  that  the  concert  will  ever  begin.  But  all 
such  procedures  may  remind  us  that  the  true  method  of 
philosophy  is  one  of  positive  advance  by  reflective  analysis 
and  synthetic  reconstruction  of  its 'material ;  although  the  em- 
ployment of  this  method,  in  the  case  of  finite  minds,  involves 
a  passing  through  the  stages  of  unsatisfactory  dogmatism, 
sceptical  doubt,  renewed  criticism,  and  higher  attainment  of 
truth. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   DIVISIONS    OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

THE  proper  method  of  dividing  the  entire  domain  of  phi- 
losophy has  occasioned  almost  as  much  discussion  as 
the  proper  definition  of  this  domain.  Indeed  the  two  subjects 
of  discussion  are  almost  unavoidably  connected.  For  the  con- 
ception which  is  held  as  to  the  nature  of  this  rational  pur- 
suit, and  of  the  whole  circle  of  problems  which  it  involves, 
cannot  fail  to  influence  the  distribution  of  the  individual 
problems  among  its  different  so-called  departments  or  divisions. 
No  objection  can  therefore  be  raised  to  the  legitimate  result 
of  this  very  natural  connection.  But  since  the  result  itself 
is  one  of  such  unfortunate  disagreement,  the  temptation  is 
strong  to  deny  the  legitimacy,  or  even  the  possible  advantage, 
of  paying  any  attention  to  the  connection.  To  this  temptation 
Lotze  has,  in  our  judgment,  yielded  somewhat  unwarrantably 
when  he  claims  that  each  one  of  the  different  groups  of  philo- 
sophical problems  "  appears  to  be  self-coherent  and  to  require 
an  investigation  of  a  specific  kind."  "  We  attribute,"  he  goes 
on  to  say,  "  little  value  to  the  reciprocal  arrangement  of  these 
single  groups  under  each  other."  1  From  this  somewhat  ex- 
treme distrust  of  all  systematic  attempts  to  derive  the  divisions 
of  philosophy  from  our  conception  of  its  nature,  the  same 
author  seems  to  depart,  in  a  measure,  when  he  agrees  with 
Herbart  in  holding  that  there  are  as  many  independent  sections 
(of  Metaphysic)  as  there  are  different  distinct  problems  to  serve 

1  Grundziige  der  Logik  und  Encyclopiidie  der  Philosophie,  ed.  1883,  §§  92  f., 
and  Translation  of  edition  of  1885,  Boston,  1887,  p.  152  f. 


164  THE  DIVISIONS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

as  separate  causes  of  our  philosophizing  at  all.  For  the  number 
and  nature  of  the  ultimate  philosophical  problems  which  we 
recognize  certainly  depends  upon  the  conception  we  hold  of 
philosophy. 

The  reconciliation  of  such  an  apparent  conflict  between  the 
interests  of  logical  consistency  and  the  interests  of  convenience 
or  of  regard  for  real  truth,  is  not  difficult.  The  main  cause  of 
the  prevalent  divergence  of  views  respecting  the  divisions  of 
philosophy  is,  of  course,  a  divergence  of  views  respecting  the 
definition  of  philosophy.  But  it  has  already  been  shown  that 
all  these  conceptions,  however  different,  agree  in  their  principal 
factors.  The  different  ways  of  stating  these  views  arise  chiefly 
from  the  wish  of  each  thinker  to  identify  philosophy  as  such 
with  his  own  system  of  philosophical  tenets.  In  other  words, 
the  statements  too  often  tell  not  what  philosophy  is,  but  what 
in  the  judgment  of  their  authors  philosophy  ought  to  be.  It  is 
to  be  expected,  then,  that  those  divisions  of  philosophy  which 
are  derived  from  the  different  conceptions  of  what  philosophy 
ought  to  be,  will  themselves  differ.  This  general  fact  may  now 
be  illustrated  by  a  number  of  historical  examples. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  what  has  already  been  said 
(see  page  15  f.)  to  show  that  Kant's  division  of  philosophy  was 
determined  by  his  peculiar  views  touching  the  nature  and  the 
results  of  philosophizing.  These  views  do  not  admit  of  more 
than  two  legitimate  and  really  serious  departments  of  philos- 
ophy. These  are  theoretical  and  practical,  —  the  former  being 
absorbed  in  Noetics,  or  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  the  latter 
being  the  doctrine  of  the  categorical  imperative  as  the  a  priori 
ground  of  conduct.  In  the  case  of  Fichte  such  a  thing  as  a 
consistent  attempt  to  divide  philosophy  was  not  possible.  In 
his  view  the  only  philosophy  is  WissenscJiaftslehre,  science  of 
science  itself.  With  Hegel  the  two  fundamental  principles  — 
namely,  the  principle  of  the  identity  of  Eeason  and  Being,  and 
the  principle  of  the  dialectic  —  lead,  of  necessity,  to  the-  well- 
known  threefold  division  of  philosophy.     "The  division  of  the 


THE   DIVISIONS   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  165 

Hegelian  system  is,  in  consequence  of  the  course  which  thought 
pursues  in  it  (and  we  might  add,  in  consequence  of  its  assumption 
that  this  course  of  thought  is  the  course  of  the  self-unfolding 
of  Eeality),  threefold."  Logic,  or  the  philosophy  of  Being-in- 
itself,  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  and  the  Philosophy  of  Spirit, 
are  its  necessary  three  main  divisions.  By  application  of  the 
same  principles  the  process  of  dividing  and  subdividing,  in  the 
same  threefold  manner,  everywhere  with  a  dull  monotony  char- 
acterizes the  Hegelian  system. 

Herbart,  too,  though  not  as  an  uncritical  follower  of  Hegel, 
adopts  the  threefold  division  of  philosophy.  With  Herbart  this 
division  follows  from  his  peculiar  conception  of  the  nature  of 
philosophy.  This  he  defines  as  "the  elaboration  of  conceptions." 
The  first  stage  of  elaboration  clarifies,  distinguishes,  and  relates 
the  conceptions  in  the  form  of  valid  judgments  and  conclusions. 
Hence  results  Logic,  the  first  branch  of  philosophy.  The  sec- 
ond stage  eliminates  those  conflicting  elements  in  the  concep- 
tions which  appear  when  we  endeavor  to  combine  them  into 
an  harmonious  view  of  the  world ;  this  occasions  the  need  of 
Metaphysics.  ^Esthetics,  the  third  division  of  philosophy,  arises 
when,  to  the  conceptions,  we  add  ideas  of  value,  —  conceptions 
that  "  occasion  an  increment  of  consciousness  in  the  form  of  a 
judgment  expressing  assent  or  dissent."  * 

A  host  of  later  and  less  celebrated  writers  on  philosophical 
discipline  illustrate  the  same  truth.  Each  -  finds  a  larger  or 
smaller  number  of  divisions  necessary  or  convenient,  according 
to  the  system  of  philosophical  tenets  which  he  wishes  to  advo- 
cate, or  according,  at  least,  to  his  dominating  conception  of  what 
philosophy  ought  to  be.  One  writer,  who  considers  that  philos- 
ophy is  but  the  science  and  critique  of  cognition,  would  divide 
it  into  (1)  a  general  Theory  of  Science,  and  (2)  a  Theory  of  Con- 
duct.2 This,  of  course,  reminds  us  at  once  of  Kant.  Another 
writer,  in   the   spirit  of  Hegel,  maintains  that  there  must  be 

1  Lehrbueh  zur  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  ed.  Leipzig,  1850,  p.  47  f. 

2  Riehl,  Philosophischer  Kriticismus,  Band  II.,  Theil  ii.,  p.  1  ff. 


166  THE  DIVISIONS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

three  main  divisions  of  philosophy,  since  the  one  totality  dis- 
tinguishes itself  into  two  fundamental  and  essential  parts,  and 
then  unites  itself  into  a  higher  Unity.  Accordingly,  we  are  to 
divide  the  whole  field  into  (1)  Philosophy  of  Nature,  (2)  Philos- 
ophy of  Spirit,  and  (3)  Philosophy  of  Life.1  Yet  another,  who 
believes  that  the  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  give  us  both  a  view 
of  the  world  at  large  and  a  theory  of  life,  would  have  us  dis- 
tinguish —  (1)  a  general  World-schematism ;  and  this  naturally 
breaks  up  into  (2)  the  doctrine  of  the  Principles  of  Nature,  and 
(3)  the  doctrine  of  the  Kingdom  of  Man.2 

But  that  view  of  philosophy  which  aims  to  unite  in  one  sys- 
tem the  principles  of  all  Being  and  all  Knowledge  naturally 
finds  something  like  the  following  divisions  necessary :  (I.)  Phi- 
losophy of  Cognition,  which  subdivides  into  (1)  Doctrine  of 
Ideation  and  (2)  Doctrine  of  Knowledge ;  and  (II.)  Philosophy 
of  the  Existent,  comprehending  (1)  the  philosophy  of  the  bodily- 
existent,  or  Philosophy  of  Nature,  (2)  philosophy  of  the  spirit- 
ually existent,  or  Psychology,  and  (3)  Philosophy  of  Human 
Conduct.  The  last  subdivision  comprises  Ethics,  ^Esthetics,  and 
the  Philosophy  of  Religion.3  The  division  proposed  by  Professor 
Ferrier  in  his  "  Institutes  of  Metaphysic  " 4  is  obviously  based 
upon  the  same  conception  as  that  of  the  writer  last  cited.  Fer- 
rier makes  Epistemology,  or  the  answer  to  the  question,  What  is 
Knowledge  ?  and  Ontology,  or  the  answer  to  the  question,  What 
is  true  Being  ?  the  "  two  main  divisions  of  philosophy."  Strangely 
enough,  —  and  somewhat  inconsistently  with  the  conception  un- 
derlying this  main  division,  since  the  question,  What  is  the 
limit  of  knowledge  ?  is  epistemological,  —  he  introduces  a  third, 
"intermediate  section  of  philosophy,"  which  he  calls  Agnoio- 
logy.    This  is  the  theory  of  true  ignorance  (A.6709  t%  ayvoias). 

1  Biedermann,  Philosophie  als  Begriffswissenschaft,  Theil  i.,  Vorrede. 

2  Diihring,  Cursus  der  Philosophie  als  streng  wissenschaftlicher  Weltanschau- 
ung und  Lebensgestaltung,  p.  10  f. 

8  For  this  elaborate  and  in  many  respects  satisfactory  scheme  of  philosophical 
discipline,  see  J.  H.  von  Kirchmann,  Katechismus  der  Philosophie. 
*  See  p.  47  f. 


THE  DIVISIONS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  167 

Another  class  of  writers  make  the  division  of  philosophy  sub- 
ordinate to  their  conception  of  the  relations  it  sustains  to  re- 
ligious belief  or  to  the  life  of  conduct.  Thus  one  author,1  who 
holds  that  philosophy  is  the  science  of  what  is  supreme  and 
most  important  for  human  welfare,  and  has  for  its  business  to 
guide  our  choices  in  accordance  with  ideas  of  "  value,"  or  worth, 
divides  the  entire  field  into  four  distinct  parts.  These  four  are 
theology,  metaphysics,  cosmology,  and  the  theory  of  conduct. 
Another  writer  takes  his  point  of  starting  from  the  proposition 
that  philosophy  deals  only  with  the  supersensible  Ileal,  and  pre- 
supposes as  its  subject  man  as  a  spirit  in  the  image  of  God,  the 
Absolute  Spirit.  Philosophy  of  Nature  is  then  a  contradiction. 
The  main  divisions  of  philosophy  are,  accordingly,  given  as : 
(1)  Philosophy  of  Eeligion,  (2)  of  Morals,  (3)  of  Rights,  (4)  of 
Art,  or  the  Supersensible  in  Nature.2 

The  most  recent  important  work  aiming  at  a  system  of  phi- 
losophy is  by  Professor  W.  Wundt.  As  might  be  expected  from 
its  author,  this  treatise  on  synthetic  philosophy  is  everywhere 
conceived  and  executed  in  a  spirit  of  fidelity  to  the  method  and 
results  of  the  particular  sciences.  We  have  already  seen  that 
Wundt  regards  philosophy  as  a  universal  science,  having  for  its 
problem  to  unite  the  cognitions  of  the  particular  sciences  into 
a  consistent  system.  On  account  of  the  relation  in  which  it 
stands  to  these  sciences,  its  divisions  must  be  based  on  the  divi- 
sion of  the  sciences.  Two  main  problems  are  therefore  given  to 
philosophy  in  its  effort  to  treat  synthetically  all  the  particular 
sciences.  The  first  of  these  problems  relates  to  knowing  in  a 
process  of  becoming ;  the  second,  to  knowing  already  become 
( Wissen,  Werdende  and  Gewordem).  Hence  the  two  main  divi- 
sions of  philosophy  are  (1)  Science  of  Cognition,  (2)  Science 
of  Principles.  These  two  divisions  are  then  developed  into  a 
scheme,  which  may  be  tabulated  as  below  : 3  — 

1  F.  A.  von  Hartsen,  Grundriss  der  Philosophie,  p.  6  f. 

8  Lichtenfels,  Lehrbuch  zur  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  p.  10  f.,  17. 

3  System  der  Philosophie,  Leipzig,  1889,  p.  33  f. 


168 


THE  DIVISIONS   OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


I.  Science 
of  Knowledge. 


II.  Science 
of  Principles. 


Division  of  Scientific  Philosophy. 

1.  Formal  (Formal  Logic). 
'  A.  History  of  Knowledge. 

B.  Theory  of  Knowledge,  which,  in  connection 
with  formal  logic,  constitutes  Logic  in 

2.  Real.  \  *^e  w^er  meaning  of  the  word,  is  then 
further  subdivided  into  — 

a.  General  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

b.  Theory  of  Special  Methods  as 
applied  to  scientific  investi- 
gation. 

1    p  ,       (  The  systematic  exposition  of  the  fundamental 

M  t     h    '     "  conceptions  and  fundamental  laws  of  all 

science. 

A.  Philosophy  of  Nature,  which  is  subdivided 
into  — 

a.  General  Cosmology. 

b.  General  Biology. 

B.  Philosophy  of  Spirit,  which  has  three  sub- 
divisions — 

a.  Ethics. 

b.  Esthetics. 

c.  Philosophy  of  Religion. 


2.  Special. 


On  the  foundation  of  the  three  divisions  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Spirit,  and  with  the  help  of  a  comprehensive  survey  of  human 
development,  stands  the  Philosophy  of  History.  Its  aim  is  to 
give  a  picture  of  the  whole  external  and  internal  life  of  man. 

Without  detracting  from  the  value  of  any  of  the  foregoing 
attempts  to  divide  the  domain  of  philosophical  discipline,  none 
of  them  seems  to  us  quite  satisfactory.  They  all  either  include 
too  much  that  is  not  philosophy,  or  else  exclude  some  one  of 
the  important  branches  of  philosophy.  These  faults  of  redun- 
dance or  deficiency  arise  in  each  case  from  the  fact  that  the 
division  follows  from  an  inadequate  or  redundant  conception  of 
the  thing  to  be  divided.     It  is  noteworthy  that,  in  the  various 


THE  DIVISIONS   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  169 

schemes  for  dividing  philosophy  which  we  have  examined,  each 
of  the  four  principal  conceptions  of  philosophy  has  found  ex- 
pression. But  these  conceptions  were  found  either  to  include 
factors  that  do  not  belong  to  philosophy,  or  else  to  neglect  cer- 
tain of  its  important  elements.  The  scheme  of  Wundt,  for  ex- 
ample, provides  for  much  under  the  general  cover  of  the  term 
philosophy  which  belongs  to  the  particular  sciences,  —  espe- 
cially to  the  sciences  of  logic,  psychology,  and  ethics.  This  is 
pretty  nearly  inevitable,  unless  we  start  our  effort  at  division 
with  a  conception  of  philosophy  which  distinguishes  it  more 
clearly  than  does  Wundt  from  a  mere  systematic  sum-total  of 
the  particular  sciences.  On  the  other  hand,  those  schemes  of 
division  which  confine  the  domain  of  philosophical  discipline  to 
special  metaphysics  (ontology)  or  to  the  theory  of  knowledge, 
and  those  which  over-emphasize  the  treatment  of  the  ethical 
and  religious  ideals,  omit  to  mention  certain  important  depart- 
ments of  philosophy. 

It  is  not  necessary,  in  classifying  the  departments  of  phi- 
losophy, to  commit  the  error  of  following  one's  philosophical 
tenets  to  either  of  two  extremes.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  un- 
safe to  derive  this  classification,  with  the  show  of  necessity  be- 
longing only  to  mathematical  demonstration,  from  one's  peculiar 
and  personal  conception  touching  what  philosophy  ought  to  be 
and  to  hold  for  true.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  unnecessary 
to  carry  our  protest  against  the  systems  called  "  absolute,"  and 
the  deductive  method  they  aim  to  employ,  so  far  as  to  deny  the 
possibility  of  any  logical  division  of  the  different  philosophical 
problems.  In  such  a  matter  as  this  the  middle  path  is  safer. 
The  divisions  of  philosophy  are  naturally,  if  not  with  a  strict 
logical  necessity,  related  to  the  true  and  comprehensive  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  philosophy.  But  this  conception  itself 
should  be  formed  by  a  study  of  the  history  of  philosophy  com- 
bined with  such  an  analysis  of  the  work  of  reason  as  is  adapted 
to  show  the  relation  in  which  its  strictly  philosophical  results 
stand  to  those  of  the  particular  sciences.     If  a  conception  of 


170  THE   DIVISIONS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  whole  domain  of  philosophical  discipline  has  been  formed 
in  this  way,  the  separation  of  its  departments  or  branches  is 
easy  and  safe. 

There  are,  then,  as  many  divisions  of  philosophy  as  there  are 
distinct  problems  proposed  by  the  particular  sciences  to  reason 
for  its  more  ultimate  consideration.  These  problems  all  con- 
cern aspects  of  the  one  great  problem  of  philosophy,  —  ques- 
tions subordinate  to  its  supreme  question.  This  one  supreme 
problem  is  the  formation  of  a  rational  system  of  the  principles 
presupposed  or  ascertained  by  the  particular  forms  of  human 
cognition,  under  the  conception  of  an  ultimate  Unity  of  Keality. 
The  particular  branches  of  philosophy  are  as  many  as  the  par- 
ticular forms  taken  by  the  inquiries  subordinate  to  the  main 
inquiry.  So  peculiar,  however,  is  the  relation  in  which  psycho- 
logy stands  to  the  special  discipline  called  philosophical  that 
all  the  problems  of  the  latter  are  virtually  proposed  to  it  only 
when  raised  and  presented  in  form  already  elaborated  by  the 
psychological  method. 

Can  man  know  reality  ?  and,  What  is  the  nature  of  the 
reality  known  to  man  ?  These  are  twin  questions,  born  of  the 
movement  of  rational  life.  They  are  so  related,  both  as  re- 
spects the  character  of  the  inquiries  they  raise,  and  also  as 
respects  the  method  of  their  pursuit  and  the  influence  they 
exert  upon  each  other,  that  they  must  forever  stand  side  by 
side  in  philosophy.  The  consideration  of  either  of  these  ques- 
tions cannot  dispense  with  the  consideration  of  the  other. 
Neither  question  can  be  answered  before  the  other,  once  for 
all  time ;  neither  has  such  logical  priority  as  to  admit  of  treat- 
ment without  borrowing  certain  assumed  conclusions  from  the 
other.  Both  must  receive  their  elaboration  and  development 
in  reciprocal  dependence. 

On  the  one  side,  then,  we  may  be  compelled  to  admit  that  no 
scientific  ontology,  no  metaphysical  system  of  principles  per- 
taining to  real  Being  as  known,  can  be  constructed  unless  we 
have  first  made  sure  that  reason  can  attain  the  knowledge  of 


THE   DIVISIONS   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  171 

real  Being.  Who,  that  has  not  faithfully  listened  to  the  cry  of 
the  Kantian  critique,  shall  confidently  proceed  with  a  synthetic 
ontological  philosophy  ?  But,  011  the  other  side,  it  may  be 
claimed,  in  an  equally  irrefutable  way,  that  it  is  absurd  to  ask 
reason  to  approbate  by  reasoning  its  own  fundamental  postu- 
lates, or  to  proceed  without  a  movement  that  is  inspired  and 
guided  by  the  same  principles  which  it  is  engaged  in  critically 
examining.  Such  a  demand  has  fitly  been  compared  to  the 
demand  that  one  shall  learn  to  swim  without  going  near  the 
water,  or  that  the  hound  shall  run  fast  enough  to  outstrip  his 
own  shadow.  Whose  reason  is  it  which  summons  reason  to 
answer  for  itself  ?  Surely,  it  is  no  other  than  the  same  reason 
with  that  which  is  summoned.  What  instrument  of  rational 
critique  is  to  be  employed  in  vindicating  the  ultimate  truthful- 
ness of  reason,  or  in  convicting  it  of  untrustworthiness  ? 
Plainly,  the  same  instrument  as  that  which  is  being  critically 
inspected.  Will  the  knife  cut  ?  Shall  the  knife  settle  the  ques- 
tion of  its  own  ability  by  a  perpetual  examination  of  its  own 
keen  edge,  or  by  undergoing  a  ceaseless  process  of  sharpening  ? 
Shall  it  not  rather  try  the  issue  and  wait  the  result? 

Further  remarks  upon  the  relation  in  which  the  two  prob- 
lems just  proposed  stand  to  each  other  will  fitly  be  made  in 
other  connections.  It  is  enough  at  present  to  call  attention  to 
their  reciprocal  dependence.  The  consideration  of  the  first  of 
these  problems  gives  rise  to  the  department  of  philosophy 
called  "Theory  of  Knowledge"  (or  Noetics,  or  Epistemology). 
In  the  erection  of  this  department  of  philosophy  it  is  implied 
that  the  science  of  descriptive  psychology,  with  its  introspective 
or  historical  method,  doea  not  directly  furnish  the  complete 
answer  to  the  problem  of  knowledge.  This  science  simply  tells 
the  story  in  what  forms  and  under  what  circumstances  the 
related  states  of  consciousness  arise  and  pass  away.  But  in 
telling  this  story,  it  is  obliged  to  make  note  of  a  remarkable 
fact.  The  psychical  states  are  not  all  regarded  by  the  mind  as 
alike  related  to  an  extra-mental  reality  of  Being.     Convictions 


172  THE  DIVISIONS   OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  truth  or  of  falsehood  attach  themselves  to  the  conceptions  of 
this  reality.  Sceptical  doubt  assails,  and  critical  analysis  pa- 
tiently examines  and  expounds,  the  meaning  and  value  of  these 
conceptions  and  their  accompanying  convictions.  And  hence 
arises  a  department  of  philosophy. 

The  inquiry,  What  is  Eeality  ?  gives  rise  to  the  second  divi- 
sion of  this  first  principal  department  of  philosophy.  More 
precisely,  the  main  inquiry  of  this  department  may  be  stated 
thus  :  What  is  the  content  of  our  complete  and  most  rational 
knowledge  of  the  really  Existent  ?  This  division  of  philosophy 
is  Metaphysics  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word,  or  Ontology 
in  its  widest  defensible  meaning.  It  proposes  a  general  inves- 
tigation of  the  essential  Being  that  all  real  existences  have. 

The  inquiry,  What  is  Eeality  ?  —  according  to  that  twofold 
differentiation  of  its  objects  which  reason  inevitably  devel- 
ops —  naturally  divides  itself  into  two  inquiries.  General 
Metaphysics  has,  therefore,  two  subordinate  departments.  The 
problems  of  ontology  require  a  more  special  and  detailed  con- 
sideration of  the  necessary  conceptions  and  presuppositions  be- 
longing to  the  two  main  classes  of  being.  We  inquire,  then, 
What  is  the  real  Being  of  the  Object  known  as  Not-tne  ?  More 
precisely,  one  division  of  metaphysics  occupies  itself  with 
considering  the  essential  nature,  connection  in  reality,  and  rela- 
tion to  the  Unity  of  all  Being,  which  the  system  of  "  Things  " 
has.  The  other  division  of  metaphysics  raises  the  inquiry  as 
to  the  real  nature  of  the  knowing  Subject  which  is  also  Object 
known  to  itself  as  Me.  It  investigates  the  essential  nature, 
connections  in  reality,  and  relations  to  the  Unity  of  all  Being 
which  Minds  have.  General  Metaphysics  has,  therefore,  two 
subordinate  branches ;  these  are  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  and 
the  Philosophy  of  Mind  (speculative  or  rational  Psychology). 

Theory  of  Knowledge  and  Metaphysics  (in  the  narrower 
meaning  of  the  word)  are  the  two  divisions  of  the  Philosophy 
of  the  Beal.  This  main  department  of  philosophy,  inasmuch 
as  both  its  divisions  have  to  do  with  the  really  Existent, — 


THE   DIVISIONS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  173 

with  the  possibility,  certainty,  and  limits  of  the  knowledge  of 
it,  and  the  systematic  exposition  of  the  content  of  what  is  said 
really  to  he,  —  may  have  the  name  of  Metaphysics,  in  the  wider 
meaning  of  the  word.  It  is  chiefly  in  this  meaning  that  Meta- 
physics is  not  infrequently  identified  with  philosophy. 

But  the  entire  domain  of  philosophical  research  and  philo- 
sophical system  is  by  no  means  covered  by  the  conception  of 
known  Eeality,  whether  it  be  of  Things  or  of  Minds.  The 
more  penetrating  analysis  of  the  constitution  of  reason  discloses 
the  presence  and  influence  of  certain  rational  Ideals.  The  prob- 
lem of  the  essential  nature  and  ground  of  these  Ideals  in  this 
world  of  Eeality  is  one  of  those  problems  in  the  solution  of 
which  psychological  science  acts  as  the  propaedeutic  of  philoso- 
phy. The  task  of  philosophy  with  this  problem  also  is  one  of 
further  analysis,  elaboration,  and  synthetic  reconstruction.  The 
material  thus  prepared  for  philosophical  handling  is  gathered 
from  many  sources  and  from  over  an  exceedingly  wide  area. 
Its  preparation  recpiires  not  only  a  study  of  the  developing  psy- 
chical life  of  the  individual,  but  also  of  the  developing  life  of 
the  race.  The  latter  expresses  itself  in  manners  and  morals, 
in  laws  and  political  association,  in  the  growth  of  every  form 
of  artistic  production,  and  of  the  appreciation  of  whatever  is 
called  beautiful,  in  the  actual  world  of  physical  and  psychical 
existences. 

But  a  department  of  philosophy  begins  to  be  founded  only 
when  these  phenomena  and  the  generalizations  which  they 
sustain  are  considered  from  the  philosophical  point  of  view, 
and  are  treated  with  the  method  of  analysis  and  synthesis  pe- 
culiar to  all  philosophical  investigations.  These  presupposi- 
tions and  discovered  principles  of  all  those  sciences  which  deal 
with  groups  of  phenomena  called  ethical  or  resthetieal,  consti- 
tute the  problem  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Ideal.  The  analysis 
of  the  factors  of  this  problem  shows  the  relation  of  the  Ideal  in 
General  to  the  constitution  of  human  reason.  The  effort  of 
philosophy,  in   its  synthetic  and  constructive  function,   is   to 


174  THE   DIVISIONS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 

found  this  ideal  and  rational  world  upon  the  world  of  recog- 
nized reality.  Hence,  we  derive  the  second  main  division  of 
philosophical  discipline,  for  which  the  word  "  Idealology "  (or 
rational  Teleology)  seems  to  offer  a  fitting  expression. 

The  Ideals  of  Keason,  to  which  the  second  main  division  of 
philosophy  has  reference,  are  two,  —  the  Ideal  of  Conduct,  and 
the  Ideal  of  Art.  This  principal  division  is,  therefore,  sub- 
divided into  Ethics  and  ^Esthetics,  —  both  the  titles  being 
understood  to  apply  to  the  philosophical,  as  distinguished  from 
the  merely  scientific,  pursuit  of  these  subjects  (Metaphysics  of 
Ethics,  and  philosophical  —  as  distinguished  from  physiological, 
or  technical  —  ^Esthetics).  Philosophical  ethics  moves  in  the 
sphere  of  that  unique  conception  which  we  designate  by  such 
phrases  as  "  the  ought,"  the  morally  "  obligatory,"  the  ethically 
"  right."  The  uniqueness  and  importance  of  this  conception, 
and  of  the  problems  which  it  suggests  and  determines,  consti- 
tute the  valid  reason  for  devoting  to  it  an  entire  department  of 
philosophy.  In  this  department  philosophy  touches  life  in  its 
innermost  and  highly  sensitive  centres.  It  aims  to  show  how 
the  grounds  and  issues  of  conduct  take  hold  on  the  world  of 
Reality ;  and  how  its  ideals  spring  from  that  world  as  consti- 
tutive and  regulative  norms  of  all  reason.  It  establishes  and 
explicates  the  rational,  and  therefore  the  universal  and  eternal, 
character  of  these  ideals.  But  if  it  is  faithful  to  the  law  of  its 
dependence  upon  the  particular  sciences,  it  so  accomplishes  its 
task  as  not  to  warp  and  violate,  but  to  unfold  the  rational  sig- 
nificance and  to  establish  on  real  grounds,  the  testimony  of 
ethical  phenomena. 

Something  similar  philosophy  essays  to  do  with  the  concep- 
tion of  "  the  beautiful,"  in  the  department  of  ^Esthetics.  This 
conception,  too,  —  however  much  it  be  a  matter  of  evolution 
as  respects  the  particular  forms  of  those  objects  which  are 
esteemed  beautiful,  —  is  a  unique  conception.  Its  character  as 
an  Ideal  of  Reason,  and  its  relations  to  the  world  of  reality, 
philosophy  attempts  to  explicate  and  to  set  in  place  in  a  system 


THE   DIVISIONS   OF  PHILOSOPHY.  175 

of  all  philosophical  truth.  No  doubt  the  sphere  of  this  depart- 
ment of  philosophy  is  especially  indefinite  as  to  its  limit.  The 
content  of  admitted  philosophical  truth,  which  previous  investi- 
gations have  won  in  this  field,  has  been  particularly  meagre. 
The  reasons  for  these  defects  are  not  difficult  to  assign ;  but 
they  do  not  concern  us  at  present.  That  under  the  term 
"^Esthetics"  we  may  fitly  describe  one  of  the  two  subdivi- 
sions of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Ideal,  there  can  be  no  reason- 
able doubt. 

The  suggestion  of  Lotze 1  that  "  for  these  two  investigations 
a  third,  common  to  both,  may  be  conceived,  —  namely,  an  in- 
vestigation concerning  the  nature  of  all  determinations  of  value 
(corresponding  to  Metaphysic),"-  -does  not  seem  practicable,  for 
the  further  division  of  philosophy.  Indeed,  he  himself  admits 
that  the  suggestion  has  hitherto  never  been  carried  out.  The 
problem  of  determining  the  nature  of  the  general  conception  of 
"  value"  apart  from  the  problem  of  determining  the  nature  of 
the  ethically  and  aesthetically  good,  is  scarcely  of  the  sort  to 
serve  as  the  foundation  for  a  division  of  philosophy. 

The  foregoing  two  main  divisions  of  philosophical  discipline, 
and  all  the  subdivisions  of  both,  lead  up  to  the  supreme  syn- 
thetic effort  of  philosophy.  This  effort  is  to  establish  and  ex- 
plicate the  conception  of  an  ideal  Reality,  a  realized  Ideal  of 
Reason,  in  the  light  of  whose  Unity  all  the  principles  of  the 
particular  sciences,  and  therefore  all  the  other  departments  of 
philosophy,  may  be  systematized  and  explained. 

May  the  world  of  Reality  be  known,  and  What  is  the  content 
of  this  real  world,  as  knowable  and  known  ?  What  is  the  na- 
ture of  that  which  we  call  "morally  right,"  and  of  that  which  we 
call  "  beautiful ;  "  and  What  the  relation  in  which  these  Ideals 
of  Reason  stand  to  the  world  of  Reality  ?  These  are  the  prob- 
lems whose  attempted  solution  divides  the  domain  of  philoso- 
phy, and  also  determines  the  classification  of  its  schools  and 

1  Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophy,  p.  154. 


176 


THE   DIVISIONS   OF   PHILOSOPHY. 


systems.  But  under  the  influence  of  strong  practical  neces- 
sities and  desires,  as  well  as  of  the  never-ceasing  intent  of 
reason  to  unify  and  idealize,  all  these  problems  point  the  way 
toward  and  help  onward  the  consideration  of  a  final  and  su- 
preme problem.  Is  this  Unity  of  Reality,  in  which  all  things 
and  all  minds  have  their  being,  to  be  regarded  as  also  the  ulti- 
mate ground  and  the  supreme  realization  of  the  ideals  of  con- 
duct and  of  art  ?  Is  the  All-Being  the  alone  supremely  beautiful 
and  the  alone  supremely  good  ?  May  we  know  such  a  Being  ; 
and  How  shall  we  mentally  represent  the  content  of  such  a 
Being  ?  The  answer,  so  far  as  answer  there  be,  to  the  first 
of  these  questions,  carries  us  back  to  the  department  called 
"  theory  of  knowledge."  The  attempt  to  answer  the  second 
question  introduces  us  to  the  highest  and  final  problem  of 
philosophy.  The  department  which  specifically  deals  with 
this  problem  we  call  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  The  an- 
swer to  this  problem  is  the  crowning,  but  at  the  same  time 
the  most  complicated  and  profound,  of  the  achievements  of 
philosophy. 

The  departments  of  philosophical  discipline  we  divide  accord- 
ing to  the  character  and  interrelation  of  the  great  problems  pro- 
posed to  it  by  the  particular  sciences,  in  the  manner  shown  by 
the  following  tabulated  scheme :  — 


I.   Philosophy  of  the  Real 

(Metaphysics,  in  the 
wider  meaning  of  the 
word). 


II.    Philosophy     of     the 
Ideal  (Idealology,  or  • 
Rational  Teleology), 


1.  Theory  of  Knowledge  (Noetics,  or  Epistemology). 

A.  Philosophy  of  Nature. 


2.  Metaphysics     (Onto- 
logy, in  the  wider  ' 
meaning     of     the 
word). 


B.  Philosophy  of  Mind. 


1.  Ethics  (which  considers  the  Ideal  of  Conduct,— 
Metaphysics  of  Ethics,  Moral  Philosophy,  or 
Practical  Philosophy). 


2.  ./Esthetics  (which  considers  the  Ideal  of  Art). 
III.   The  Supreme  Ideal-Real  (The  Philosophy  of  Religion). 


THE   DIVISIONS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  177 

The  other  great  branches  of  research,  although  conducted 
in  the  philosophical  spirit  and  with  philosophical  ends  in 
view,  —  such  as  the  philosophy  of  history,  the  philosophy  of 
the  state,  etc.,  —  are  not  distinct  departments  of  philosophy. 
They  are  rather  complex  discussions,  drawing  their  material 
and  method  from  several  sciences  and  from  the  results  of 
the  investigation  of  several  of  the  subordinate  philosophical 
problems. 


It 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

THE  second  edition  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason "  is 
undoubtedly  more  apologetic,  both  in  its  tone  and  in  its 
conclusions,  than  is  the  first  edition.  It  is  in  this  second  edi- 
tion that  we  read  declarations,  touching  the  need  and  nature 
of  a  philosophical  theory  of  knowledge,  like  the  following: 
"  Philosophy  requires  a  science,  to  determine  a  priori  the 
possibility,  the  principles,  and  the  extent  of  all  cognitions."1 
Elsewhere  we  are  told :  "  Our  '  Critique,'  by  limiting  specu- 
lative reason  to  its  proper  sphere,  is  no  doubt  negative,  but 
...  it  is  in  reality  of  positive,  and  of  very  important  use, 
if  only  we  are  convinced  that  there  is  an  absolutely  necessary 
practical  use  of  pure  reason  (the  moral  use),  in  which  rea- 
son must  inevitably  go  beyond  the  limits  of  sensibility,"  etc. 
Further  on  Kant  declares  :  "  All  speculative  knowledge  of  reason 
is  limited  to  objects  of  experience ;  but  it  should  be  carefully 
borne  in  mind  that  this  leaves  it  perfectly  open  to  us  to  think 
the  same  objects  as  things  by  themselves,  though  we  cannot 
Tcnow  them."  And  again :  "  I  had  therefore  to  remove  Tcnovrt- 
edc/e,  in  order  to  make  room  for  belief.  For  the  dogmatism  of 
metaphysic  —  that  is,  the  presumption  that  it  is  possible  to 
achieve  anything  in  metaphysic  without  a  previous  criticism 
of  pure  reason  —  is  the  source  of  all  that  unbelief,  which  is 
always  very  dogmatical,  and  wars  against  all  morality."2 

1  Table  of  Contents,  Introduction,  III. 

2  Preface  of  the  second  edition  (1787). 


THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE.  179 

It  is  sentences  such  as  the  foregoing  which  disclose  to  us  the 
essential  method,  spirit,  and  content,  of  the  Kantian  critical 
philosophy.  This  philosophy  is  a  critique  of  all  those  alleged 
necessary  truths  of  reason  which  the  so-called  science  of 
metaphysics  is  accustomed  to  systematize.  This  critique  is 
conducted  by  reason  itself  in  the  use  of  the  analytical  and 
dialectical  method,  with  intent  to  promote  the  interests  of  a 
rational  belief  in  the  principles  of  right  conduct.  Kant  de- 
signed to  begin  with  the  sceptical  attitude  toward  metaphysics, 
to  continue  in  the  critical  method,  and  to  end  with  the  final 
refutation  of  dogmatic  unbelief  and  the  establishment  of  ra- 
tional faith. 

The  procedure  and  conclusions  of  the  Critical  Philosophy 
were  themselves  acutely  criticised  by  the  greatest  thinker 
among  the  immediate  successors  of  Kant.  "  A  very  important 
step,"  says  Hegel,1  "  was  undoubtedly  made  when  the  terms  of 
the  old  metaphysic  were  subjected  to  scrutiny.  .  .  .  The  old 
metaphysicians  accepted  their  categories  as  they  were,  as  a  sort 
of  a  priori  datum  not  yet  investigated  by  reflection.  The 
critical  philosophy  reversed  this.  Kant  demands  a  criticism  of 
the  faculty  of  cognition  as  preliminary  to  its  exercise.  That  is 
a  fair  demand,  if  it  mean  that  the  forms  of  thought  must  be 
made  an  object  of  knowledge.  Unfortunately  there  soon  creeps 
in  the  misconception  of  seeking  knowledge  before  you  know. 
.  .  .  True,  indeed,  the  forms  of  thought  should  be  subjected  to 
a  scrutiny  before  they  are  used :  yet  what  is  this  scrutiny  but 
ipso  facto  a  cognition  ?  So  that,  what  we  want  is  a  combina- 
tion in  our  process  of  knowledge  of  the  action  of  the  forms  of 
thought  with  a  criticism  of  them.  The  forms  of  thought  must 
be  treated  on  their  own  merits,  apart  from  all  other  conditions ; 
they  are  at  once  the  object  of  research  and  the  action  of  that 

1  Encyclopadie  der  philosophischen  Wissenschaften  im  Grundrisse,  Heidelberg, 
1827  (or  sixth  vol.  Collected  Works)  §§  40  ff.,  and  notes  taken  in  lecture  by  Hen- 
ning,  Hotho,  and  Michelet  ;  Translation,  The  Logic  of  Hegel,  by  Wallace,  1874, 
p.  69  f. 


180  THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

object.  Hence  they  must  examine  themselves,  determine  the 
limits  and  show  the  defects  attaching  to  their  very  nature." 
Thus  much  from  Hegel,  upon  the  Kantian  view  of  the  relation 
existing  between  the  critical  theory  of  knowledge  and  a  syn- 
thetic philosophy. 

As  to  the  conclusions  of  Kant  respecting  the  possibility  and 
the  limits  of  knowledge,  Hegel  —  of  course  —  takes  many  ex- 
ceptions. "  Thoughts,  according  to  Kant,"  says  he,  "  although 
universal  and  necessary  categories,  are  only  our  thoughts,  —  sepa- 
rated by  an  impassable  gulf  from  the  thing,  as  it  exists  apart 
from  our  knowledge.  But  a  truly  objective  thought,  far  from 
being  merely  ours,  must  at  the  same  time  be  what  we  have  to 
discover  in  things,  and  in  every  object  of  perception.  .  .  .  Though 
the  categories,  such  as  unity,  or  cause  and  effect,  are  strictly 
within  the  province  of  thought,  it  by  no  means  follows  that 
they  must  be  ours  merely,  and  not  also  characteristic  of  the 
objects.  Kant,  however,  confines  them  to  the  subject  mind, 
and  his  philosophy  may  be  styled  subjective  idealism."  "A 
general  remark  may  still  be  offered,"  says  Hegel,  farther  on, 
"  concerning  the  result  at  which  the  critical  philosophy  arrived 
as  to  the  nature  of  knowledge,  —  a  result  which  has  grown  one 
of  the  axiomatic  beliefs  of  the  day.  In  every  dualistic  system, 
and  especially  in  that  of  Kant,  the  fundamental  defect  makes 
itself  visible  in  the  inconsistency  of  unifying  at  one  moment, 
what  a  moment  before  had  been  explained  to  be  independent 
and  incapable  of  unification.  And  then,  when  unification  has 
been  alleged  to  be  the  right  state,  we  suddenly  come  upon  the 
doctrine  that  the  two  elements  (i.  e.,  Being  and  Knowledge), 
which  had  been  denuded  of  all  independent  subsistence  in 
their  true  status  of  unification,  are  only  true  and  actual  in  their 
state  of  separation.  ...  In  the  Critical  doctrine,  thought  —  or, 
as  it  is  there  called,  Eeason  —  is  divested  of  every  specific  form, 
and  thus  bereft  of  all  authority.  The  main  effect  of  the  Kan- 
tian philosophy  has  been  to  revive  the  consciousness  of  Eeason, 
or   the  absolute  inwardness  of   thought.  .  .  .  Henceforth,  the 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  181 

principle  of  the  independence  of  Eeason,  or  of  its  absolute 
self-subsistence,  will  be  a  general  maxim  of  philosophy,  as  well 
as  a  current  dogma  of  the  time." 

The  views  of  Kant  and  Hegel,  as  indicated  by  the  foregoing 
quotations  and  as  fully  to  be  understood  by  a  critical  study  of 
their  writings,  represent  the  two  opposed  positions  of  modern 
philosophy  touching  the  problems  raised  in  the  attempt  to  form 
a  theory  of  knowledge.  Indeed,  these  views  cover  nearly  all 
that  is  essential  which  can  ever  be  said  upon  the  subject  of 
Nbetics.  For  this  department  of  philosophy,  from  its  very 
nature,  can  scarcely  hope  to  derive  important  new  material 
from  the  growth  of  the  particular  sciences.  Its  business  is  the 
critical  and  synthetic  treatment  of  the  presuppositions  of  all 
knowledge,  with  a  view  to  determine  the  nature,  extent,  and 
certification  of  knowledge  itself. 

It  is  true  that  we  may  speculatively  hold  before  the  mind 
the  representation  of  an  evolution  of  reason  which  shall  affect 
fundamentally  its  own  essential  nature  as  reason.  But  out  of 
the  bare  possibility  of  such  an  act  of  imagination  we  can  derive 
nothing  for  the  purposes  of  a  scientific  and  philosophical  theory 
of  knowledge.  If  the  process  of  evolution  is  thought  of  as 
involving  an  essential  change  in  the  fundamental  forms  of 
reason  itself,  then  all  possibility  of  establishing  the  reality 
of  an  evolutionary  process,  and  of  thinking  its  nature  and  laws, 
is  at  an  end.  That  we  may  have  mistaken  the  unessential  for 
the  essential,  the  changing  and  developing  for  the  eternal  princi- 
ples of  all  change  and  development,  is  indeed  thinkable.  But 
to  trust  reason  for  the  discovery  and  validating  of  a  universal 
law  of  evolution,  which  is  to  be  so  conceived  of  as  to  annul 
the  validity  of  the  universal  elements  of  all  law,  is  certainly 
impossible.  So  also  is  it  thinkable  that  the  progress  of  psy- 
chological science  should  disclose  important  new  principles 
as  regards  the  avenues,  sources,  and  expansion  of  human 
knowledge.  But  even  the  attempt  to  think  of  these  avenues 
and  sources,  and  of  this  expansion,  as  validating  what  is  con- 


182  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

tradictory  of,  or  foreign  to,  the  constitutional  function  of  reason, 
ends  in  absurdity. 

As  regarded  in  one  aspect,  then,  we  find  that  the  profoundest 
and  most  difficult  problems  of  philosophy  belong  to  the  depart- 
ment of  Noetics.  This  is  true  if  we  measure  their  depth  and 
difficulty  by  the  acuteness  and  comprehensiveness  of  reflective 
analysis  necessary  to  explicate  them.  They  are  profound  be- 
cause they  lie  buried  in  all  concrete  experience,  —  buried  and 
concealed  in  such  manner  that  ordinary  analysis  does  not  serve 
even  correctly  to  state  or  clearly  to  raise  these  problems.  They 
rise  into  reflective  self-consciousness  with  a  scientific  shaping, 
late  in  the  history  of  the  individual  and  of  the  race.  They  are 
difficult,  because  no  method  of  apparent  solution  prevents  their 
being  brought  up  anew,  and  yet  in  substantially  the  same  form, 
for  further  consideration.  They  are  like  ghosts,  with  which  it 
is  hard  to  grapple,  and  even  yet  harder  to  lay  so  that  they  will 
not  make  again  a  troublesome  apparition.  Every  age  and  every 
thinker  may  ask  the  question  :  Is  then,  after  all,  the  truth  at- 
tainable ?  Is  not  all  the  labor  and  acquisition  of  reason  itself 
illusory  ? 

But,  in  another  aspect,  the  only  possible,  or  best  feasible, 
solution  of  the  problems  of  Noetics  lies  not  far  below  the 
surface.  The  problems  are  comparatively  easy  of  solution,  if 
we  apply  the  measure  of  specific  research  and  technical  in- 
formation necessarily  involved  in  the  attempt.  The  philos- 
ophy of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of  mind,  philosophical 
ethics  and  aesthetics,  and  the  philosophy  of  religion,  may  always 
expect  an  indefinite  expanse  of  their  horizon,  as  the  result  of 
the  development  of  the  particular  sciences  on  which  they  de- 
pend. But  the  theory  of  knowledge  will,  so  far  as  we  can  anti- 
cipate, require  only  that  the  inquirer  should  move  over  the 
same  narrow  circle  of  analytical  reflection,  to  the  end  of  time. 
Lengthy  and  learned  treatises  upon  the  main  questions  of  No- 
etics will  scarcely  seem  to  bring  their  authors,  or  the  rest  of 
mankind,  much  nearer  to  the  final  truth.     The  strength  of  con- 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDG-E.  183 

viction  which  attaches  itself  to  the  affirmative  answer  to  the 
inquiry,  Is  there  in  the  entire  content  of  self-consciousness  any 
certification  possible  of  the  truth  of  reality  ?  cannot  be  made 
to  correspond  to  the  wealth  in  details  of  the  arguments  adduced 
to  support  the  conviction.1  The  whetting  of  the  knife  is  neces- 
sary, but  need  not  occupy  us  long.  The  tuning  of  the  instru- 
ments is  also  necessary,  and  may  profitably  be  done  before  the 
audience ;  but  it  should  only  last  until  we  feel  confident  that 
they  are  capable  of  producing  a  harmony.  And  even  this  con- 
fidence we  shall  never  attain,  until  more  or  less  of  harmony 
has  actually  been  produced  by  playing  them  when  already  in 
fair  tune. 

This  somewhat  peculiar  mixture  of  embarrassments  and 
advantages  which  belongs  to  the  discussion  of  the  theory  of 
knowledge  should  not  be  lost  out  of  mind.  It  may  serve  to 
make  us  the  more  satisfied  for  the  present  with  the  brief 
remarks  which  the  limits  of  this  chapter  permit.  These 
remarks  will  keep  in  view  the  excellences  and  the  defects  of 
both  the  Kantian  and  the  Hegelian  positions  toward  the  prob- 
lems of  Noetics. 

First  of  all,  something  should  be  added  to  what  has  already 
been  said  (page  170  f.)  concerning  the  logical  relation  in  which 
this  department  stands  to  the  other  departments  of  philosophy. 
It  is  not  mere  excess  of  arbitrary  scepticism  which  has  caused 
the  great  multitude  of  modern  thinkers  since  Locke,  and  espe- 
cially since  Kant,  to  insist  upon  a  thorough  and  satisfactory 
criticism  of  man's  power  to  know  as  a  logical  prius  of  any 
metaphysical  system.  The  scepticism  involved  in  this  demand, 
and  the  critical  examination  necessary  even  provisionally  to  sat- 
isfy the  demand,  are  of  the  very  essence  of  that  method  which 
must  be  employed  in  philosophy.  But  the  scepticism,  just  so 
far  as  it  scientifically  establishes  limits  to  knowledge,  limits 

1  This  statement  might  be  confirmed  by  railing  attention  to  the  fact  that 
Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  and  Hegel's  Logic  aro  both,  at  the  same  time,  the 
most  important  and  suggestive,  and  the  most  diffuse  and  repetitious,  of  philo- 
sophical treatises. 


184  THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

itself ;  it  is  self -limiting.  The  critique  of  reason,  the  more  thor- 
ough it  becomes,  explicates  the  more  thoroughly  the  grounds 
and  nature  of  the  self-confidence  of  reason.  It  demands  for 
its  own  procedure  this  same  self-confidence  ;  for  it  is,  essentially 
considered,  the  self-criticism  of  rational  mind. 

A  theory  of  knowledge  can,  therefore,  never  legitimately  end 
in  scepticism ;  to  bring  it  to  this  issue  is  to  terminate  the  pro- 
cess of  reflective  analysis  in  absurdity  or  in  the  dogmatic  refusal 
to  think  at  all.  The  beast  when  driven  till  tired  may  refuse  to 
stir ;  or  maddened  by  goading,  may  leap  the  barriers  and  run 
blindly  amuck.  But  either  form  of  behavior  in  man  is  an 
obvious  abandonment  of  rational  method.  If  we  were  gods, 
commissioned  to  examine  and  test  the  fidelity  of  human  thought 
and  knowledge,  in  its  highest  forms,  to  extra-mental  reality,  it 
is  thinkable  that  we  should  find  grounds  for  a  favorable  or  an 
unfavorable  report.  But  if  we  were  gods,  and  were  as  such 
stimulated  by  curiosity  to  examine  critically  the  grounds  of  our 
own  divine  knowledge,  it  is  unthinkable  that  the  final  result  of 
this  examination  should  be  in  principle  any  more  reassuring  than 
that  attainable  by  us  as  rational  men.  Divine  knowledge  is 
still  knowledge,  though  it  be  divine ;  as  knowledge  it  must  in 
some  form  bear  within  itself  the  grounds  and  evidence  of  its 
correlation  with  reality. 

No  theory  of  knowledge,  however  far  the  critical  process 
employed  in  its  construction  be  pushed,  can  discover  other 
grounds  for  the  certification  of  knowledge  than  those  which 
lie  in  the  content  of  knowledge  itself.  No  point  of  view  outside 
of  reason,  as  it  were,  from  which  to  criticise  reason,  is  possible 
of  attainment.  If  this  be  a  disadvantage,  it  is  a  disadvantage 
not  peculiar  to  our  knowledge  and  our  truth,  but  to  knowledge 
and  truth  as  such.1  Whenever  we  even  attempt  to  think  of  a 
knowledge  that  takes  the  knowing  subject  out  of  and  beyond 
the    fundamental    forms    of    his    own    knowledge,    and    that 

1  Comp.  Lotze,  System  of  Philosophy,  Part  I.,  Logic,  Bosanquet's  Translation, 
1884,  pp.  414  ff. 


THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE.  185 

envisages  him  with  a  truth  of  reality  which  is  something  more 
than  truth  known  as  universally  valid  to  this  subject,  we  land 
ourselves  at  once  in  absurdity.  This  limitation  of  the  grounds 
and  the  certification  of  knowledge  to  the  content  of  knowledge, 
need  not,  however,  be  regarded  as  a  deprivation  peculiar  to  man. 
On  the  contrary,  we  certainly  have  the  choice  —  and  there  are 
grounds  on  which  it  is  wise  to  make  it  —  of  regarding  this  power 
of  reason  to  raise  and  press  the  critical  inquiry,  even  to  the  very 
foundations  on  which  it  itself  reposes,  and  to  make  its  own 
self-limitation  and  self-consistency  the  goal  of  all  this  inquiry, 
as  a  chief  possession  and  pride  of  reason. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  no  possible  or  thinkable  way  exists 
of  certifying  the  truth  of  what  is  known,  except  the  way  of 
subjecting  the  content  of  knowledge  to  a  critical  analysis,  with 
a  view  to  determine  what,  when  most  thoroughly  and  consis- 
tently envisaged  and  explicated,  it  actually  is.  So  far  as  Kant 
and  his  followers  insist  upon  this  truth,  their  conclusions  are 
beyond  all  possibility  of  successful  assault.  Furthermore,  no 
psychological  doctrine  of  a  faith-faculty,  or  of  a  form  of  rational 
activity  called  "  belief,"  no  hypothesis  of  an  intellectual  intui- 
tion or  transcendental  dialectic,  no  claim  for  exceptions  in 
behalf  of  certain  species  of  truth  called  ethical  or  religious,  can 
possibly  withstand  this  critical  conclusion.  Strangely  enough, 
—  so  it  would  seem  to  any  one  who  does  not  keep  constantly 
in  mind  the  historical  fact  that  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
was  in  its  author's  purpose  subsidiary  to  the  Critique  of  Prac- 
tical Reason,  —  few  writers  on  philosophy  have  appeared  to 
be  greater  sinners  in  this  respect  than  Kant  himself.  In  the 
passages  already  quoted,  as  all  through  his  critical  philosophy, 
he  would  limit  speculative  "  knowledge  "  of  reason  to  objects  of 
experience.  Objects  that  are  really  existent,  like  God,  the  Soul, 
and  Free  Will,  we  may  "  think,"  but  cannot  "know."  The  think- 
ing may,  indeed,  be  with  belief,  but  cannot  be  called  knowledge. 
"  I  had  therefore,"  says  he,  "  to  remove  knowledge,  in  order  to 
make  room  for  belief." 


186  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

But  the  Kantian  language,  and  all  the  argument  of  which  it  is 
the  expression  and  outcome,  most  unfortunately  reverses  the  real 
distinction  between  thinking  and  knowledge  as  dependent  upon 
a  connection  with  belief.  Belief  is  not  a  rational  act  opposed 
to  or  contrasted  with  knowledge  ;  but  to  convert  thinking  into 
knowledge,  the  thinking  must  be  not  only  rationally  consistent 
and  rationally  grounded,  but  suffused  and  supported  by  convic- 
tion or  rational  belief.1  That  which  we  may  simply  think,  we 
cannot  be  said  to  believe  any  more  than  to  know.  Knowledge 
requires  conviction  as  truly  as  it  requires  thought;  and  in 
knowledge  both  thought  and  conviction  imply  a  reference  to 
reality.  All  truth  known  is  truth  both  rationally  thought  and 
rationally  believed  in.  The  thought  and  the  belief,  if  they 
belong  to  knowledge  (as  distinguished  from  opinion,  from  the 
mere  passive  having  or  active  forth-putting  of  states),  implicate 
—  their  very  nature  is  such  —  a  correlated  reality. 

The  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  also,  of  necessity,  breaks 
down  when  it  virtually  tries  to  vindicate  for  the  metaphysics  of 
ethics  and  the  practical  reason  what  it  had  denied  as  forever 
impossible  in  the  functioning  of  the  pure  speculative  reason. 
"We  say  "  virtually,"  for  its  author  obviously  foresaw  that  both 
scepticism  and  dogmatism  would,  from  their  respective  points 
of  view,  attack  his  transcendental  ethical  system  ;  and  he  strove 
hard  to  defend  it  against  the  charge  of  inconsistency.  Kant 
will  not  call  the  practical  reason  "  pure,"  because  he  wishes  not 
to  assume  a  pure  practical  reason,  in  order  rather  to  show  that 
it  exists.  But  its  existence  being  shown,  he  considers  that  it 
stands  in  no  need  of  a  critique  to  hinder  it  from  transcending  its 
limits  ;  for  it  proves  its  own  reality  and  the  reality  of  its  con- 
ceptions by  an  argument  of  fact.  We  may  know  the  funda- 
mental  law  of   the  practical  reason ;    it  bears  the  form  of  a 

1  Comp.  Wundt,  System  der  Philosophie,  p.  90.  "  Alles  Erkeiinen  ist  somit 
ein  Denken,  mit  welchem  sich  die  Ueberzeugung  von  der  Realitat  solcher  Objecte 
und  objectiver  Beziebungen  verbindet,  die  dem  Vorstellungsinbalte  der  Gedanken 
entsprechen." 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  187 

command,  —  a  categorical  imperative :  "  Act  so  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  thy  will  can  at  the  same  time  be  accepted  as  the 
principle  of  a  universal  legislation."  "Whatever  principles  are, 
as  necessary  convictions,  attached  to  this  principle,  are  postu- 
lates of  the  pure  practical  reason.  Hence  we  find  Freedom, 
Immortality,  and  God  restored  from  the  spaces  swept  empty 
by  the  critique  of  speculative  reason. 

But  Kant's  categorical  imperative  is  itself  only  an  imperfect 
and  faulty  generalization  from  empirical  data  of  ethical  feeling, 
judgments,  and  conduct.  It  is  not  even  an  exact  summary  of 
the  testimony,  in  reality,  of  human  moral  consciousness.  Were 
it  a  true  generalization,  however,  and  therefore  worthy  to  be 
itself  called  a  knowledge,  it  could  be  shown  to  be  dependent 
for  its  validity  upon  many  subordinate  conceptions  and  con- 
victions which  must  also  have  the  validity  of  known  truths. 
Otherwise,  the  categorical  imperative  itself  is  condemned  as  a 
vague  and  illusory  dream  of  the  individual  consciousness. 
Metaphysical  postulates,  other  than  the  three  acknowledged 
postulates  of  the  pure  practical  reason,  with  that  inseparably 
adhering  conviction  which  makes  them  principles  of  all  knowl- 
edge as  well  as  of  all  thought,  enter  into  the  very  substance  of 
this  categorical  imperative.  Beings,  with  powers  called  "  wills," 
rationally  answering  to  ends  that  involve  other  beings  not  them- 
selves but  like  constituted,  and  who  may  be  expected  to  act  as 
hound  with  their  fellows  in  a  system  of  moral  order,  —  all  this, 
and  much  more,  is  involved  in  the  main  principle  of  the  practi- 
cal reason.  But  what  an  infinity  of  knowledge,  made  knowledge 
by  the  suffusion  of  rational  thinking  with  rational  conviction, 
and,  in  some  sort,  placing  the  mind  of  the  individual  face  to  face 
with  a  world  of  reality,  is  here !  Some  of  these  are  the  very 
things  of  which  we  have  been  told,  as  the  result  of  the  critical 
process  applied  to  speculative  reason,  that  they  may  not  be 
spoken  of  as  "  known,"  but  may  only  be  permitted  to  thought, 
without  hope  of  finding  content  for  the  empty  form,  no  matter 
how  much  we  extend  the  bounds  of  experience.     If  these  postu- 


188  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

lated  entities  and  relations  are  not  real,  then  the  categorical 
imperative  and  all  it  implicates  is  hut  a  dream,  —  nay,  it  is  only 
the  dream  of  a  dream.  Must  we  not  then,  in  consistency,  either 
include  all  —  and  especially  the  categorical  imperative  with  its 
accessory  postulates  —  under  the  condemnation  uttered  hy  con- 
sistent scepticism,  or  else  retrace  the  steps  passed  over  in  the 
criticism  of  speculative  reason,  and  discover  grounds  for  a  larger 
"  knowledge,"  with  its  eternal  accompaniment  of  rational  faith  ? 

The  same  fate  must  await  all  those  theories  of  knowledge 
which  end  in  scepticism,  as  the  result  of  critical  processes.  Nor 
is  the  fate  much  better  of  those  theories  which  endeavor  to  save 
from  scepticism  certain  portions  of  the  content  of  human  knowl- 
edge, while  denying  in  general  the  possibility  of  validating  knowl- 
edge as  such.  The  principle  of  self-consistency  is  of  the  last 
importance  to  reason.  It  is,  in  fact,  only  one  form  of  stating 
the  undying  self-confidence  of  reason.  The  practical  exhorta- 
tion of  experience  in  noetical  philosophy  is  then :  Let  us  by 
all  means  maintain  a  rational  consistency. 

The  maxim  of  maintaining  a  rational  consistency  is  violated 
by  those  theologians  who  decry  speculation  and  have  no  confi- 
dence in  metaphysics,  while  at  the  same  time  they  assume  for 
themselves  a  knowledge  of  God,  or  even  a  rational  faith  in  him. 
It  is  violated  by  those  students  of  physics  who  remain  agnostic 
toward  all  possibility  of  establishing  a  rational  knowledge  of 
those  objects  with  which  theology  and  philosophy  are  con- 
cerned ;  while  at  the  same  time  they  assert  a  valid  and  indu- 
bitable knowledge  of  physical  entities  and  forces,  and  of  the 
laws  of  the  behavior  of  these  assumed  realities.  "We  cannot 
play  fast  and  loose  with  agnosticism,  in  our  forming  and  hold- 
ing of  a  theory  of  knowledge.  The  only  legitimate  outcome 
of  applying  the  sceptical  and  critical  process  to  man's  power 
of  knowledge  is  the  more  consistent  reconstruction  of  the 
system  which  the  content  of  knowledge  involves.  This  is 
possible  only  through  that  faith  in  the  work  of  reason  which 
is  its  inalienable  possession  and  right. 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  189 

To  sum  up  the  case,  then  a  sceptical  view  of  the  possibility 
of  knowledge  is  self-limiting ,  its  inevitable  issue  is  the  recog- 
nition of  the  absurdity  and  self-destructive  character  of  unlim- 
ited doubt.  A  critical  view  of  the  actual  process  and  content 
of  knowledge  is  necessary  to  indicate  what  knowledge  is,  and 
what  are  its  limits.  For  the  principles  of  knowledge,  its  nature 
and  limitations,  are  to  be  discovered  only  as  they  are  implicated 
in  the  act  and  product  of  knowledge  itself.  They  are  not  extra- 
neous to  it ;  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  imposed  upon  it  from 
without.  The  certification  of  knowledge  also  can  be  found  only 
by  the  method  of  reflective  analysis  applied  to  the  actual  content 
of  knowledge.  No  certainty  derived  from  outside  of  or  beyond 
this  content  of  knowledge  itself  can  ever  be  gained ;  no  such 
form  of  certification  is  even  thinkable.  To  expect  more,  to 
claim  more,  even  to  try  to  conceive  of  more,  ends  in  irrational 
absurdity.  It  is  like  the  effort  to  think  how  a  being  would 
know  who  had  no  formal  laws  or  actual  content  of  knowledge. 
If  reality  is  to  be  known,  the  attempt  to  establish  by  a  critique 
of  reason  a  tenable  theory  of  knowledge  assures  us  that  the 
reality  must  be  envisaged  or  implicated  in  the  content  of 
knowledge. 

Such  a  positive,  intelligent,  and  intelligible  theory  of  knowl- 
edge, as  can  alone  claim  all  the  valid  and  advantageous  results 
of  both  scepticism  and  criticism,  can  do  nothing  more  than  to 
exhibit  the  consistent  system  of  all  those  principles — laws,  pre- 
suppositions, and  concomitant  convictions  —  which  it  finds  in- 
volved in  the  actual  process  and  products  of  knowledge.  And 
when  we  say  process  and  products,  we  are  only  testifying  to 
the  power  of  reflective  analysis  to  envisage  and  regard  knowl- 
edge in  two  related  aspects.  These  are  the  aspect  of  the  for- 
mative activity,  the  knowing  subject ;  and  the  aspect  of  the 
formed  material  of  knowledge,  the  object  known.  In  the  actual 
life  and  growth  of  knowledge  the  two  aspects  exist  in  indis- 
soluble union ;  subject  is  subject  in  reference  to  object,  and 
object  is  object  in  reference  to  subject. 


190  THE  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

But  the  question  may  be  asked,  —  it  is  a  fair  and  important 
one,  —  What  if  no  amount  of  philosophical  thought,  however 
penetrating,  comprehensive,  and  candid,  succeeds  in  producing 
a  "  consistent  system "  of  the  principles  of  all  knowledge  ? 
Must  we  not  then  resort  to  a  dogmatic  scepticism  or  to  ag- 
nosticism in  this  department  of  philosophy  ?  Or  if  we  shrink 
back,  on  ethical  or  aesthetic  grounds,  from  being  thoroughly 
consistent  in  denying  the  possibility  of  all  knowledge,  may  we 
not  save  the  reality  of  certain  special  objects  of  religious  cogni- 
tion by  introducing  them  through  some  scheme  of  faith,  or  of 
revelation,  to  the  human  soul  ?  The  affirmative  answer  to 
petitions  like  the  foregoing  has  been  given,  by  no  means  in- 
frequently, in  the  history  of  human  thought.  But  it  has 
always  ended  in  failure,  shame,  and  distress  for  both  those 
who  have  given  and  those  who  have  received  it.  In  saying 
this,  we  do  not  deny  the  value  and  rational  nature  of  faith  ; 
on  the  contrary,  we  are  engaged  in  maintaining  views  of  phi- 
losophy which  support  the  claims  of  rational  conviction.  Nor 
do  we  deny  the  possibility  of  revelation,  or  of  the  conveyance 
of  truth  concerning  non-sensuous  reality  through  other  means 
than  sense-perception  and  ratiocination.  We  cannot  admit  con- 
clusions, however,  which  involve  the  contradiction  of  reason's 
confidence  in  the  existence  of  rational  truth,  and  in  the  possi- 
bility that  this  truth  may  be  known  by  activity  of  reason. 

Positively,  however,  the  theory  of  knowledge  should  take  into 
account  the  application  of  the  definition  of  all  philosophy  to  its 
own  case.  Philosophy  is  progressive  rational  system.  The  self- 
knowledge  of  reason  in  the  formation  of  a  theory  of  knowledge  is 
therefore  progressive.  The  lesson  to  be  learned  from  failure  to 
construct  the  principles  of  knowledge  into  a  consistent,  and  so 
into  an  acceptable  and  defensible  system,  is  not,  therefore,  a  les- 
son of  utter  scepticism  or  of  despairing  agnosticism.  It  is  rather 
an  invitation  to  do  over  again  the  work  of  thinking  in  its  applica- 
tion to  knowledge.  It  is  a  call  to  a  better  acquaintance  with  the 
actual  processes  of  knowledge,  in  perception  and  self-conscious- 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  191 

ness,  as  made  known  by  empirical  psychology.  It  is  a  call  to 
better  acquaintance  with  the  laws  and  processes  of  thought,  as 
modern  logic,  after  centuries  of  slumbering  in  the  nursing  arms 
of  the  giant  Aristotle,  has  awakened  to  investigate  and  describe 
them.  It  is  a  call  to  a  more  profound  metaphysics,  to  a  more 
thorough  analytical  and  synthetic  reconstruction  of  those  prin- 
ciples which  we  ascribe  to  all  that  is  really  existent.  In  brief, 
it  is  a  demand  for  doing  over  again  and  more  thoroughly  the  hith- 
erto only  partially  successful  work  of  this  branch  of  philosophy. 

General  considerations  like  the  foregoing  must  maintain 
themselves  in  the  discussion  of  the  subordinate  problems  of 
the  philosophical  theory  of  knowledge.  These  problems  may 
be  presented  in  the  following  three  questions :  What  is  knowl- 
edge ?  What  are  the  limits  of  knowledge  ?  How  comes,  and 
what  is,  the  certainty  of  knowledge  ?  The  internal  relations 
among  these  questions  are  such  that  the  answer  of  each  in- 
volves the  answer  of  the  other  two;  the  answer  of  all  three 
depends,  in  turn,  on  the  view  we  take  of  the  one  problem  with 
which  this  department  of  philosophy  deals. 

Strictly  speaking,  the  answer  to  the  question,  Wliat  is  knowl- 
edge ?  cannot  be  derived  by  either  deduction  from  some  more 
general  principle,  or  by  induction  from  particular  experiences  of 
knowledge.  Strictly  speaking,  then,  knowledge  cannot  be  de- 
fined. It  can,  however,  be  so  described  as  to  render  it  possible 
of  recognition  from  among  other  psychical  processes  and  states ; 
its  content  can  by  reflective  analysis  be  so  explicated  as  to 
make  the  factors,  presuppositions,  and  laws  of  all  knowledge 
clear.  To  recognize  the  impossibility  of  defining  knowledge, 
we  have  only  to  consider  that  definition  itself  implies  a  complex 
and  elaborated  knowledge ;  this  is  more  rather  than  less  true 
when  the  definition  is  of  a  subject  so  involved  in  all  concrete 
experiences  as  is  the  nature  of  knowledge  itself.  The  true  and 
perfect  definition  of  knowledge  would  therefore  be  a  highly  de- 
veloped and  complicated  instance  of  that  which  in  its  sim- 
plicity we  seek  to  define. 


192  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

But  the  psychological  investigation  of  the  origin  of  knowl- 
edge does  not  of  itself  serve  even  to  describe  —  in  accordance 
with  the  demands  of  the  noetical  problem  —  the  nature  of 
knowledge.  Nor  is  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  knowledge, 
properly  speaking,  a  question  of  the  philosophical  theory  of 
knowledge.  If  philosophy  were  speculatively  to  discuss  the 
origin  of  knowledge  at  all,  such  discussion  would  belong  to  an- 
other of  its  departments  ;  namely,  to  the  philosophy  of  the 
mind.  But  what  the  sciences  of  psychology,  anthropology,  and 
(we  add,  with  a  deferential  protest)  biology  have  ascertained 
touching  their  peculiar  problems,  does  but  serve  to  make 
more  definite  and  clear  the  nature  and  limits  of  the  genuinely 
noetical  problem.  Knowledge  is  what  it  is,  in  spite  of  all 
agreement  or  dispute  over  the  questions  which  are  raised  in 
the  legitimate  attempt  accurately  to  describe  how  it  came  to 
be.  Whether  knowledge,  as  a  potentiality  of  the  race,  be  a 
direct  gift  from  heaven,  bestowed  at  once  with  ungrudging 
hand  when  God  made  man  in  his  own  image ;  or  whether  it 
be  the  result  of  evolution  from  some  bioplasmic  stuff  quite 
incapable  of  knowledge,  although  presumably  a  psychic  centre 
of  the  lowest  forms  of  sensation-complexes,  —  at  any  rate,  the 
factors,  presuppositions,  and  laws  of  its  present  constitution 
remain  unchanged.  A  descriptive  science  of  its  origin  —  were 
it  possible  to  make  such  a  science  indubitable  at  every  point 
and  complete  —  would  not  furnish  the  solution  of  the  problem 
which  the  philosophical  theory  of  knowledge  seeks. 

It  is  true,  however,  that  the  light  which  science  can  throw 
upon  the  processes  and  products  of  knowledge,  as  respects  the 
order  of  their  succession  and  their  dependence  upon  cognate  or 
inferior  psychical  phenomena,  is  needed  to  guide  the  investi- 
gator in  the  field  of  Noetics.  Here  the  light  from  psychology, 
the  science  of  the  individual  human  mind,  is  far  clearer,  and 
therefore  more  helpful,  than  that  which  can  be  bestowed  by 
anthropological  or  biological  theories  of  the  evolution  of  knowl- 
edge in  the  race.     We  would  not  deny  all  value  and  cogency 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE  193 

to  the  latter,  however ;  on  the  contrary,  we  would  use  them  to 
confirm  or  to  invite  to  re-examination  the  conclusions  of  human 
and  comparative  psychology. 

Among  the  considerations,  which  the  psychological  study  of 
the  rise  of  knowledge  offers  to  the  philosophical  theory  of 
knowledge,  the  following  may  properly  be  emphasized.  Knowl- 
edge must  always  be  distinguished  from  the  mere  having  of 
psychical  states.  This  proposition  remains  unshaken,  however 
highly  complex  or  valuable,  from  the  ethical  and  sesthetical 
points  of  view,  the  psychical  states  in  themselves  considered 
may  be  conceived  to  be.  That  there  should  be  psychical  exist- 
ences whose  experience  consists  solely  of  a  succession  of  enjoy- 
able states  of  sensation  or  of  feeling,  without  reference  of  the 
states  to  reality,  may  perhaps  be  thinkable.  Such  beings,  how- 
ever, would  be  without  "  knowledge."  For  all  states  of  knowl- 
edge imply  reference  to  somewhat  beyond  themselves  regarded 
as  mere  psychical  states,  —  however  true  it  may  be  that  this 
somewhat  and  the  reference  to  it  must  be  given  to  knowledge 
as  implicated  in  the  states. 

Knowledge  is  therefore  chronologically  a  later  and  logically 
at  once  a  higher  and  more  fundamental  activity  of  the  mind. 
Even  in  its  earlier  and  more  elementary  stages  of  the  percep- 
tion of  Things  and  the  consciousness  of  Self,  knowledge  emerges 
only  as  preceded  by  a  process  of  evolution.  The  psychical  ex- 
istence, called  man,  does  not  know  anything,  at  first  and  for 
a  considerable  time  after  birth.  He  has  states,  —  presumably 
of  various  kinds.  These  states  may  be  tentatively  described 
as  sensation-complexes,  feeling-complexes,  memory-images,  voli- 
tions, or  motor  activities  with  their  accompaniments  of  pe- 
ripherally or  centrally  originated  feelings  of  effort,  etc.  But 
knowledge  has  not  yet  dawned  within  the  mind.  How  knowl- 
edge can  arise  out  of  these  states,  —  if  by  the  inquiry  we  mean 
to  ask  for  anything  more  than  a  narrative  of  the  successive 
stages  by  which  perception  and  self-consciousness  emerge  and 
clarify   themselves,  —  descriptive   and   explanatory   science   of 

IS 


194  THE  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

mind  cannot  say.  Such  science  reminds  us,  however,  of  the 
important  truth  that  knowledge,  in  the  case  of  every  indivi- 
dual man,  comes  as  the  result  of  a  development.  The  develop- 
ment is  conditioned  upon  factors  and  processes  of  which  we 
gain  information  only  as  an  acquisition  of  complicated  and 
indirect  scientific  research. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  knowledge  implies  memory  and 
thought.  This  is  as  true  of  those  objects  called  "  Things,"  as 
known  in  immediate  perception  by  the  senses,  and  of  that 
object  called  "Self,"  as  known  in  self-consciousness,  as  it  is  of 
those  objects  whose  existence  is  inferred  by  the  most  complex 
and  circuitous  processes  of  scientific  investigation. 

At  this  point  not  a  little  embarrassment  may  be  occasioned 
to  the  conclusions  of  analytical  reflection  by  the  customary 
theories  and  terminology  of  empirical  psychology.  This  science 
is  accustomed  to  reduce  all  forms  of  consciousness  to  three,  of 
which  knowledge  is  a  distinct  and  separable  one.  Memory  and 
thought  are  then  regarded  as  subordinate  forms  of  knowledge, 
consequent  upon  perception  and  self-consciousness.  We  do, 
indeed,  need  a  term  to  distinguish  the  general  knowledge-ele- 
ment in  all  psychical  states,  —  the  element  or  aspect  of  intel- 
lection, as  distinguished  from  the  elements  or  aspects  of  feeling 
and  volition.  On  the  other  hand,  knowledge,  as  the  philosophi- 
cal department  of  Noetics  discusses  its  problem,  implies  mem- 
ory and  thought.  These  processes  cannot,  then,  be  considered 
as  stages  of  knowledge,  subsequent  in  time,  or  logically,  to 
knowledge  by  perception  and  by  consciousness  of  self.  They 
are  words  expressive  of  psychical  facts  and  processes  on  which 
knowledge  by  perception  and  self-consciousness  is  dependent. 

But  memory  and  thought  do  not,  of  themselves,  constitute 
knowledge,  although  they  condition  its  attainment.  Memory- 
images  might  rise  and  fall  in  consciousness  forever ;  but  unless 
the  reference  of  them  to  a  world  of  reality  were  consciously 
made,  no  knowledge  would  be  implied  or  would  result.  And 
thought  might  elaborate  the  psychical  states  as  such  in  an  end- 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  195 

less  concatenation ;  but  unless,  beyond  the  reference  which 
thought  implies  to  related  states  of  ideation,  there  were  impli- 
cated the  reference  which  all  knowledge  makes  to  a  world  of 
reality,  our  psychical  existence  would  fall  short  of  the  solidity 
of  a  consistent  dream.     Thinking,  as  such,  is  not  real  life. 

But  perception  (Wahrnehm-umj)  is  taking  hold  on  the  truly 
real,  the  really  true  ;  and  so  is  also  that  knowledge  of  self 
which  is  called  sometimes  "  internal  perception,"  or  self-con- 
sciousness. For  there  is  no  reality,  which  is  knowable  in 
immediate  knowledge,  except  the  object  known  (not  simply 
imaged  or  thought)  in  perception  or  self-consciousness.  Em- 
pirical psychology,  with  its  scientific  description  and  explana- 
tion of  related  psychical  states,  can  trace  the  stages  which 
mark  the  birth  and  development  of  knowledge.  It  shows  that 
comparison,  analysis,  and  synthesis  —  whether  consciously  or 
unconsciously  l  performed  —  are  pre-conditions  of  all  knowl- 
edge, whether  of  things  or  of  one's  self.  But  it  also  shows 
that  the  full  meaning  and  complete  content  of  knowledge  can- 
not lie  in  the  application  of  this  relating  activity  of  the  mind 
to  the  elaboration  of  its  own  states.  It  shows  that  reality  is 
envisaged  in  every  mental  act  which  belongs  under  those  cate- 
gories needed  to  describe  an  act  of  knowledge.  This  reality  is 
not  "  pure  being,"  or  "  being  as  such  ;"  it  is  the  concrete  object 
given  to  consciousness  as  implicated  in  that  complex  form  of 
living  which  we  call  by  the  term  "  knowledge." 

The  "  I  icing"  of  which  the  Hegelian  dialectic  treats  may  be 
regarded  by  the  critics  of  Hegel  as  but  a  systematic  ordering 
of  abstract  conceptions.  But  the  Being  that  is  known  by  the 
most  unthinking  mind,  in  every  act  of  perception  or  self-con- 
sciousness, is  concrete,  indubitable  reality.  The  friendly  student 
of  Hegel,  moreover,  cannot  fail  to  see  that  this  most  abstract 

1  Compare  Wundt,  Grundziige  der  physiologischen  Psychologie,  vol.  ii.,  sections 
on  Psychologische  Entwicklung der  Gesichtsvorstelluug,  Bedingungor  undGrenzen 
des  Bewustseins,  etc.  ;  Hartmann,  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  vol.  i.  chapter 
on  The  Unconscious  in  the  Origin  of  Sense-perception;  Ladd,  Elements  of  Physio- 
logical Psychology,  part  ii.,  chapters  vi.  and  vii. 


196  THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

(with  the  exception  perhaps  of  Fichte)  of  all  philosophers 
everywhere  manifests  a  wholesome  dislike  of  mere  abstractions. 
This  apparent  (and  in  a  measure  real)  inconsistency  of  Hegel  is 
largely  due  to  his  exaltation  of  thought,  not  only  to  a  supreme, 
but  even  to  an  exclusive,  position  in  the  realm  of  rational  life. 
Thought  serves,  indeed,  to  condition  and  to  explicate  the  con- 
tent of  knowledge.  It  is  therefore  necessary  both  to  the  earliest 
forms  of  immediate  knowledge  and  to  the  extension  of  knowl- 
edge by  scientific  and  philosophical  method.  [We  here  use  the 
terms  "  scientific  "  and  "  philosophical "  in  their  most  general 
meaning,  as  expressive  of  all  the  further  and  logically  higher 
elaboration  of  immediate  knowledge.]  In  knowledge,  however, 
reality  is  implicitly  given,  as  concrete  object  envisaged  by  the 
subject  in  the  unity  of  a  self-conscious  life.  It  is  the  business 
of  science  and  philosophy  to  explicate  the  content  and  to  inter- 
pret the  meaning  of  these  acts  of  knowledge.  But  behind  or 
above  the  concrete  acts  neither  science  nor  philosophy  can 
place  itself,  either  to  criticise  or  to  explain.  This  inability  — 
if  one  please  so  to  call  it  —  is  of  the  very  nature  of  knowledge. 
Yet  this  fact  is  not  significant  of  the  inability  of  knowledge 
to  give  us  reality ;  it  is  rather  significant  of  the  inability  of 
thought,  as  a  ratiocinative  process,  to  comprehend  or  explain 
either  the  origin  or  the  nature  of  knowledge.  In  so  far  as 
there  is  knowledge,  there  is  reality  known  ;  in  so  far  as  there 
is  real  knowledge,  there  is  power  to  know.  This  is  the  secret 
of  the  weakness  of  Hegel  and  his  followers,  that  they  identify 
reality  solely  with  a  dialectical  process,  instead  of  showing  that 
in  all  complex  rational  life,  and  in  all  scientific  and  philosophi- 
cal elaboration  of  the  content  of  this  life,  the  presence  of  reality 
is  involved.  "  Objective  thought  "  —  to  use  Hegel's  term  —  is 
the  object  known  as  real,  because  realizing  itself,  in  all  self- 
conscious  rational  life. 

It  is  also  as  accompanied  with  and  suffused  by  conviction 
that  knowledge  distinguishes  itself  from  the  mere  having  of 
psychical  states.     That  which  is  known  is  necessarily  believed 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  197 

in  as  real.  To  distinguish  knowledge  and  faith  as  separate 
avenues  of  receiving  truth,  and  then  to  exalt  one  over  the 
other  as  critic  and  judge,  involves  a  irpayrov  -\Jrev8os,  a  primal 
and  fatal  heresy,  toward  reason  itself.  It  is  true  enough  that 
most  men  to  a  wide  extent,  and  all  men  to  a  certain  extent, 
believe  firmly  and  passionately  in  what  they  cannot  be  said  to 
know.  It  is  also  true  that  the  grounds  of  much  of  this  so- 
called  faith  are  to  be  found  in  a  too  easy  acceptance  of  current 
views,  in  prejudices  arising  from  the  emotional  activities  of  the 
soul.  Much  of  so-called  faith  is,  indeed,  of  yet  lower  origin  ; 
it  is  born  of  base  sloth  or  of  selfishness  ;  it  is  unintellectual, 
unspiritual,  visceral.  But  similar  things  may  be  said  of  much, 
indeed  of  most,  which  passes  current  for  knowledge.  Science 
itself  is  only  just  learning,  but  is  far  indeed  from  having  fully 
learned,  how  to  free  itself  from  such  so-called  knowledge. 

The  foregoing  facts  militate  no  more  against  the  possibility 
of  knowledge  than  against  the  rational  power  of  that  convic- 
tion which  inseparably  belongs  to  knowledge.  Indeed,  the 
same  process  and  attitude  of  mind  toward  truth  may  be  called 
either  belief  or  knowledge.  No  one  can  be  said  to  know  an 
object  or  a  relation  in  the  reality  of  which  he  does  not  believe ; 
neither  can  he  be  said  to  believe  in  the  reality  of  that  which  he 
does  not  seem  to  himself  to  know.  The  words  "  seem  to  him- 
self," however,  mark  the  fact  that  all  our  language,  as  descrip- 
tive of  our  experience,  recognizes  in  knowledge  a  factor  of 
intellection  and  a  factor  of  feeling  as  well.  The  mistaken 
identification  of  the  former  factor  with  the  sum-total  of  that 
concrete  and  living  experience  which  is  fitly  called  knowledge, 
results  in  separating  in  thinking  what  is  never  separated  in 
life.  No  knowledge  is  without  belief;  it  is  this  inseparable 
factor  which  constitutes  one  of  its  chief  constituents. 

At  this  point  psychological  science  might  be  summoned  to 
the  instruction  and  support  of  Noetics.  This  science  shows  us 
that,  although  it  has  been  customary  to  speak  of  perception  and 
self-consciousness  as  forms   of  knowledge  only,  in   distinction 


198  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

from  feeling  and  volition,  perception  and  self-consciousness  as 
knowledge  actually  involve  ever  present  feeling  and  volition. 
The  theory  of  perception  by  the  senses  doubtless  needs  recon- 
struction from  this  point  of  view.  As  reconstructed  it  shows 
that  knowledge  of  "  Things "  does  not  come,  and  could  not 
come,  by  pure  intellection.  The  series  of  sensation-complexes, 
by  synthesis  and  localization  and  projection  of  which  the  per- 
ception of  external  objects  takes  place,  is  as  truly  defined  and 
combined  by  its  "  pleasure-pain  "  quality  as  by  its  merely  in- 
tellectual distinctiveness.  An  ever-present  activity  of  volition 
is  also,  we  believe,  the  necessary  condition  of  that  externality 
which  things  must  have,  —  or  else  they  are  not  Things.  How 
a  being  which  did  not  feel  and  will,  as  well  as  have,  compare, 
and  combine  sensations,  could  know  a  world  of  material  objects, 
it  is  impossible  even  to  conceive.  The  activity  in  which  the 
"  Thing "  is  envisaged  as  a  reality  is  one,  indivisible  fact  of 
knowledge ;  but  the  description  of  this  activity  recognizes  feel- 
ing and  willing,  as  well  as  intellection,  among  its  necessary 
factors.  And  the  same  truth  holds  with  respect  to  that  form 
of  immediate  knowledge  which  is  called  self-consciousness. 

It  belongs  to  the  detailed  theory  of  knowledge  to  describe 
more  fully  the  nature  of  the  conviction  which  belongs  to  all 
knowledge,  whether  of  things  or  of  self.  The  same  department 
of  philosophical  disquisition  is  called  upon  to  defend  this  con- 
viction against  the  assaults  of  scepticism.  Such  defence  can 
be  successfully  conducted  only  by  allowing  scepticism,  under 
the  control  of  critical  analysis,  to  run  its  course  to  the  inevit- 
able issue  of  showing  itself  absurd.  What  we  may  learn  as  to 
the  meaning,  grounds,  and  limitations  of  that  conviction  which 
is  an  inseparable  factor  of  all  knowledge,  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge must  itself  undertake  to  disclose.  In  general  it  may  be 
said  that  the  readjustment  of  belief,  as  respects  the  particular 
objects  or  relations  to  which  it  attaches  itself,  and  as  respects 
the  subjective  intensity  with  which  —  so  to  speak  —  the  attach- 
ment is  formed,  is  a  dependent  part  of  the  evolution  of  knowl- 


THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE.  199 

edge  itself,  in  the  individual  and  in  the  race.  What  to  hold 
for  true,  as  certainly  known  and  because  known,  cannot  be 
determined  once  for  all  by  processes  of  ratiocination.  The 
progressive  development,  as  respects  comprehensiveness  and 
consistency,  of  the  system  of  knowledge  is  the  only  cure  for 
false  belief  as  it  is  for  false  knowledge.  "False"  knowledge! 
We  feel  a  strong  repugnance  to  the  use  of  such  a  phrase ;  and 
with  good  reason,  for  it  calls  out  all  the  protest  latent  in  the 
indestructible  self-confidence  of  reason  itself.  And  yet  how 
much  that  has  been  called  "knowledge,"  in  every  field  tra- 
versed by  the  knowing  mind,  has  been  all  too  clearly  shown 
to  be  false !  How  much  more,  now  not  only  firmly  believed  in, 
but  also  —  if  the  testimony  of  the  majority  be  received  —  most 
indubitably  known,  will  in  the  future  be  shown  to  be  false ! 
Is  not  this  as  true  of  those  objects  of  which  we  suppose  our- 
selves to  have  immediate  and  indisputable  knowledge  by  percep- 
tion and  self-consciousness,  as  it  is  of  those  more  remote  and 
occult  objects  and  relations  in  which  modern  physical  science 
so  firmly  believes  ?  Our  reply  to  questions  like  this  must  be 
an  affirmative. 

But  on  the  other  hand,  the  philosophical  theory  of  knowl- 
edge endeavors  to  show  how,  rightly  explicated  and  interpreted, 
all  these  primal  beliefs,  which  enter  into  the  essence  of  knowl- 
edge, may  be  allowed  to  stand.  The  growth  of  knowledge  by 
successive  purification  of  false  beliefs  does  not  prove  these 
primal  beliefs  to  be  guilty  of  falsehood.  And  indeed  how 
could  they  be  proved  guilty  of  falsehood  ?  For  in  them  reposes 
the  mind's  attachment  to  truth  in  distinction  from  falsehood ; 
and  even  its  power  to  discover  and  appreciate  the  distinction  at 
all.  Ultimately,  thou,  it  is  positive  and  progressive  rational 
system,  disclosing  and  harmonizing  more  and  more  clearly  and 
completely  the  content  of  rational  life,  which  affords  the  only 
antidote  for  philosophical  scepticism,  Inasmuch  as  every  such 
rational  life,  in  the  very  forms  of  its  manifestation,  actually 
though   unintelligently  partakes  of  this   unchanging  universal 


200  THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

reason,  it  has  knowledge,  with  its  constituent  factor  of  confi- 
dence in  itself,  as  an  envisaging  of  reality.  But  philosophy,  as 
theory  of  knowledge,  explicates  the  content  of  knowledge  and 
the  nature  of  its  constituent  conviction,  and  so  renders  us  in- 
telligent as  to  what  is  really  known  and  believed  in  as  known. 

Further  remarks  in  this  line  are  prohibited  for  a  treatment 
so  brief  as  ours ;  and,  indeed,  to  treat  of  what  is  really  known, 
belongs  to  another  department  of  philosophy.  This  department 
is  Metaphysics,  —  a  department  whose  problem,  with  its  answer, 
has  been  seen  to  be  the  twin  sister  of  Noetics. 

The  philosophical  theory  of  the  nature  of  knowledge  may  be 
further  illustrated  by  special  application  to  the  different  Stages 
or  kinds  of  knowledge.  For  this  purpose  a  division  may  be 
made  into  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge  (of  perception 
and  self-consciousness),  scientific  knowledge,  and  philosophical 
knowledge.  To  all  these  the  general  remarks  just  made  are 
applicable,  though  in  different  manner  and  different  degrees. 
What  it  is  to  know,  as  all  men  have  experience  of  knowledge 
in  the  perception  of  things  and  in  the  consciousness  of  self,  has 
already  been  for  the  present  sufficiently  described. 

Scientific  knowledge,  considered  from  the  philosophical  point 
of  view,  appears  to  differ  from  ordinary  knowledge  chiefly  in 
the  following  two  respects.  Its  improved  means  of  perception 
increase  the  field  of  intuitive  knowledge;  it  thus  seems  to 
open  to  view  a  world  of  wonders  that  is  more  real  than  that  of 
our  customary  experience.  Its  carefully  guarded  inferences, 
its  verifiable  and  verified  manner  of  forming  conceptions  into 
judgments  in  a  systematic  and  orderly  way,  extend  the  field  of 
ratiocinative  knowledge  ;  it  thus  seems  to  demonstrate  the 
nature  of  things  and  minds  as  they  most  really  exist.  But  the 
reality  of  things  as  seen  through  microscope  or  telescope  is,  in 
the  sight  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  not  in  the  least  more 
unassailable  by  scepticism ;  nor  is  it  ethically  and  aesthetically 
more  valuable  than  the  realities  of  ordinary  vision.  If  the 
reality  of  the  world  of  external  perception  is  not  to  be  known 


THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE.  201 

by  use  of  the  naked  eye,  it  is  not  to  be  known  by  the  use  of 
microscope  or  telescope.  The  objects  thus  seen  by  the  trained 
observer  are  not  a  whit  more  easy  to  verify  as  essentially  real 
than  are  those  which  the  swineherd  daily  beholds.  It  the 
latter  are  relative  and  their  reality  subject  to  doubt,  so  are 
the  former.  If  the  former  imply  an  indubitable  conviction  of 
the  presence  of  a  known  reality,  so  do  the  latter.  In  this  sense 
of  the  word,  all  knowledge  is  relative, — that  given  in  scientific 
observations  as  well  as  that  given  in  the  observations  of  all 
men.     The  metaphysics  of  the  two  is  the  same. 

But  what  a  world  of  reality  does  physical  science  open  to 
imagination  and  thought  when  we  follow  its  modern  lofty 
flights  of  reasoning,  —  accomplished,  shall  we  say  ?  with  one 
wing  of  hypothesis  and  the  other  of  experimental  verification  ! 
Occult  beings  called  atoms,  with  wondrous  powers  of  changing 
their  states  and  their  relations  to  other  atoms,  are  ceaselessly 
weaving  events  and  combining  themselves  into  new  aggrega- 
tions in  that  world  which  no  sense-intuition  can  ever  know, 
but  which  is  contrasted  with  the  world  of  sensible  things  as 
the  alone  eternal  and  real  with  the  fleeting  and  the  illusory. 
Scientific  knowledge  is  of  that  which  is  non-sensible  and  yet 
real.  The  reality  of  the  objects  thus  scientifically  known  de- 
pends, however,  upon  classes  of  postulates  too-often  forgotten. 
It  depends  upon  the  reality  of  the  objects  known  through  the 
senses  or  in  self-consciousness  ;  for  these  objects  afford  the 
only  data  from  which  the  objects  known  by  science  can  be 
inferred.  It  depends  upon  the  validity  of  the  thought-processes, 
because  it  is  derived  by  these  thought-processes  from  data  of 
sense-perception  and  self-consciousness.  Only  on  the  presup- 
position, then,  that  immediate  perception  gives  knowledge  of 
reality,  and  that  the  processes  of  thought  are  valid  in  reality. 
can  the  realitv  of  the  world  which  science  discloses  be  vindi- 
cated.  And,  indeed,  scientific  knowledge,  as  scientific,  is  not 
concerned  with  realitv  ;it  all.  Its  formula  of  thought  is  the 
hypothetical    judgment.     It  reasons, —  If  this  is  so,  then  that 


202  THE  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

is  so,  or  will  be  so.  Its  only  test  is  consistency  of  thinking 
Science  is  satisfied  if  it  becomes  a  harmonious  system  of 
conceptions. 

What !  —  it  may  be  asked,  with  the  air  of  being  startled  at 
the  fear  of  losing  so  much  wealth  of  reality  from  our  grasp,  or 
of  being  puzzled  at  hearing  that  form  of  knowledge,  which  calls 
itself  "  science  "  pre-eminently,  so  sceptically  attacked,  —  Is  it 
then  to  be  maintained  that  all  this  goodly  fabric  of  modern 
physics  is  nothing  more  real  than  a  fairly  self-consistent  dream  ? 
Certainly  ;  unless  in  perception  and  self-consciousness  there  is 
knowledge  of  reality  involved,  and  unless  the  movement  of 
that  elaborative  thought  which  science  employs  is  representa- 
tive of  processes  that  occur  in  the  really  existent.  A  positive 
system  of  metaphysical  beliefs,  adopted  after  an  intelligent  and 
thorough  criticism  of  human  reason,  can  alone  save  the  modern 
system  of  physical  science  from  a  final  banishment  into  the 
"  death-kingdom  of  abstract  thought."  Without  such  positive 
svstem,  so-called  scientific  evolution  is  even  more  abstract 
and  unreal  than  the  monotonous  tit-tat-too  of  the  Hegelian 
logic.  But  these  beliefs  are  of  the  mind,  integral  and  insepar- 
able constituents  —  or  rather  themselves  regulative  and  consti- 
tutive —  of  all  those  perceptions  and  conceptions  out  of  which 
scientific  system  is  made. 

It  is  therefore  to  a  reflective  analysis  of  knowledge  itself 
that  science  must  appeal  for  its  validating.  Science  necessarily 
assumes  a  position  of  trust  toward  the  fundamental  modes  of 
the  behavior  of  mind  in  thought ;  otherwise  it  cannot  itself  be 
"  science,"  even  in  so  far  as  science  involves  merely  the  con- 
sistent elaboration  of  mental  images.  But  if  science  is  to  be 
regarded  as  somewhat  more,  —  namely,  as  knowledge  of  a 
world  of  really  existent  things  standing  in  knowable  rela- 
tions, —  then  it  is  bound  hand  and  foot  to  the  fate  of  noetics 
and  of  metaphysics.  Its  devotees  may  affect  or  actually  feel 
indifference,  or  they  may  laugh  and  even  sneer;  but  they  will 
not  thus  escape  their  condition  of   dependency  on  philosophy. 


THE  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  203 

They  certainly  will  not  improve  their  condition  by  substituting 
a  mixture  of  uncritical  credulity  and  dogmatic  agnosticism  for 
a  well-reasoned  theory  of  knowledge.  The  ascertained  prin- 
ciples of  science  can  be  held  to  extend  our  knowledge  of 
reality  only  as  we  receive  in  good  faith,  after  critical  exam- 
ination, both  the  testimony  of  intuitive  perception  and  the  ob- 
jective validity  of  the  forms  and  principles  of  thinking. 

The  objective  validity  of  the  forms  and  principles  of  all 
thought  is  therefore  a  postulate  of  science,  if  science  is  to  be 
called  knowledge  in  the  meaning  we  have  attached  to  this 
word.  The  term  "objective"  has  been  ambiguous  in  philos- 
ophy ;  it  will  probably  continue  to  be  used  ambiguously.  It 
had  different  meanings  in  the  two  great  systems  of  Noetics 
with  a  reference  to  which  this  chapter  begun.  Kant,  no  less 
than  Hegel,  and  in  his  sceptical  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  as 
well  as  in  his  dogmatic  positing  of  the  categorical  imperative, 
affirmed  the  objectivity  of  thought.  In  the  Kantian  view  the 
categories,  or  constitutional  modes  of  the  functioning  of  the 
understanding,  give  to  thought  the  objectivity  it  has.  These 
"  subjective  conditions  of  the  spontaneity  of  thought "  (as  Kant 
himself  in  writing  against  Eberhard  calls  them)  are  constitutive 
of  this  objectivity.  They  make  our  ideas  to  be  objects,  appear- 
ances of  extra-mental  reality  (the  phenomenally  real). 

But  besides  the  categories,  and  as  seemingly  necessary  to  give 
actual  content  to  the  otherwise  merely  empty  form  of  percep- 
tion and  thought,  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  implies  the 
Ding-an-sich.  This  "  thing-in-itself,"  however,  can  never  get 
into  consciousness,  can  never  become  known.  Every  concrete 
and  actually  known  Thing  has  its  own  content,  or  material,  fur- 
nished by  sensation.  But  sensations  are  eminently  subjective, 
and  cannot  constitute  a  knowledge  of  aught  beyond  themselves. 
They  cannot,  then,  give  knowledge  of  reality  at  all.  Neither 
can  we  regard  the  existence  and  nature  of  this  reality  as  known 
indirectly  by  inference  to  be  the  extra-mental  cause  of  our  sen- 
sations.    For  cause  is  itself  one  of  these  purely  "  subjective  con- 


204  THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

ditions  of  the  spontaneity  of  thought."  The  same  is  true  of 
reality.  Kant's  Ding-an-sich  can,  then,  never  be  an  object  of 
knowledge,  or  even  of  imagination  or  of  thought.  It  cannot 
legitimately  be  an  object  of  belief.  For  what  we  can  neither 
imagine,  think,  nor  know,  in  that  we  cannot  believe ;  and  vain 
and  illogical  are  all  the  efforts  of  practical  reason  to  find  a 
rational  ground  in  reality  for  conduct,  when  knowledge  and 
reality  have  once  and  forever  parted  company. 

But  with  Hegel  the  objective  validity  of  the  forms  and  prin- 
ciples of  all  thought  means  something  more  and  better  than  was 
provided  for  by  the  Kantian  critique.  With  Hegel  it  is  just 
these  forms  and  principles,  not  as  dead  and  barren  forms,  but 
as  factors  ("  moments ")  in  a  living  and  eternally  true  self- 
evolution  of  thought,  which  are  the  true  and  only  reality. 

The  satisfactory  theory  of  knowledge  accepts  the  critical 
method  of  Kant,  but  pursues  it  with  more  thoroughness  and 
fidelity  than  its  author  employed.  It  therefore  does  not  come 
to  Kant's  sceptical  and  inconsistent  outcome.  It  finds  with 
Hegel,  as  against  Kant,  that  the  purely  negative  and  limiting 
conception  of  Ding-an-sich  represents  nothing  important  or 
actual  in  the  processes  and  objects  of  knowledge  or  thought. 
It  may  therefore  be  consigned  to  the  dark  and  chaotic  places 
where  mere  abstractions  wander,  as  the  ghosts  conjured  up  by 
speculative  minds.  It  also  finds  that  the  positive  content  of 
the  conception,  missed  by  a  sceptical  analysis,  is  to  be  found 
present  in  every  act  of  knowledge.  That  extra-m.&a.td\  reality 
is,  all  acts  of  knowledge  imply.  That  it  is,  they  all,  as  concrete 
instances,  demonstrate.  What  it  is,  the  growth  of  knowledge 
makes  progressively  clear.  This  is  true  of  the  individual,  and 
it  is  true  of  the  race.  Therefore,  the  true  theory  of  knowl- 
edge also  decides  against  the  system  of  Hegel,  who  selected  a 
single  form  of  thought,  and  by  a  systematic  arrangement  of 
abstract  conceptions  aimed  to  tell  us,  once  for  all,  what  is  the 
Reality  which  all  knowledge  envisages  and  implies.  This  true 
theory  turns  rather  to  science  for  an  extension  of  knowledge  as 


THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE.  205 

to  what  the  nature  of  the  really  Existent  is.  Physics  enriches 
the  content  of  the  now  positive  conception  of  the  Ding-an-sich. 
Psychology,  ethics,  aesthetics,  sociology,  history,  and  the  science 
of  religion  contribute  to  the  same  end.  Philosophy  in  all  these 
departments,  and  with  use  of  all  these  data,  builds  up  its  positive 
system  of  knowledge  concerning  this  ultimate  Unity  of  Reality. 

What  are  the  precise  forms  of  all  thinking,  upon  the  postu- 
lated validity  of  which  the  conclusions  of  the  sciences  can  be 
accepted  as  knowledge,  it  is  the  business  of  logic  in  particular 
to  consider.  It  is  of  these  forms  —  conception,  judgment,  syl- 
logism, induction,  deduction,  etc.  —  that  logic  treats.  But  the 
further  reflective  analysis  which  philosophy  bestows  upon  these 
forms  shows  that  it  is  in  the  particular  form  of  judgment  that 
knowledge  is  expressed.  The  truth  of  intuitive  knowledge  is 
stated  in  the  so-called  primary  or  psychological  judgments ;  the 
truth  of  science  is  stated  in  judgments  that  refer  to  other  judg- 
ments as  grounds.  For  validating  in  reality  these  forms  of 
scientific  observation  and  inference,  and  so  for  enriching  and 
expanding  by  scientific  progress  our  knowledge  of  reality,  No- 
etics  has  no  other  method  than  the  one  of  reflective  analysis 
and  successive  syntheses.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  it  can  only  clear 
away,  as  much  as  possible,  the  obscurities  and  apparent  contra- 
dictions which  attach  themselves  to  the  knowledge  of  knowl- 
edge, as  to  every  kind  and  form  of  knowledge.  It  can  then  the 
more  intelligently  reaffirm  the  confidence  of  reason  in  its  own 
modes  of  self-conscious  life. 

The  so-called  principles  of  all  thinking  (as  distinguished  from 
the  logical  forms  of  all  thought)  the  philosophical  theory  of 
knowledge  examines  with  especial  care.  These  it  tends,  espe- 
cially since  the  days  of  Leibnitz,  to  reduce  to  two :  they  are,  of 
course,  the  principle  of  Identity,  and  the  so-called  principle  of 
Sutncient  Reason.  In  the  statement  and  explication  of  these 
principles  —  especially  of  the  latter  —  the  development  of  the 
theory  of  knowledge  finds  one  of  its  most  important  and  fruitful 
themes. 


206  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

The  principle  of  identity  —  in  its  obverse  form  called  the 
principle  of  non-contradiction  —  is  reason's  law,  binding  it  in- 
exorably to  consistency.  This  principle  does  not  warrant  the 
affirmation  that  any  unchanging  beings,  whether  things  or 
minds,  must  be  assumed  to  exist;  much  less  that  reason  is 
compelled  to  accept  the  self-contradictory  task  of  telling  what 
sort  of  Being  such  things  and  minds  could  have.  It  does  not 
mean  that  some  rigid  and  permanent  core  of  a  substance,  or 
Ding-an-sich,  must  be  possessed  by  all  things  and  all  minds, 
on  peril  of  their  losing,  otherwise,  all  claim  to  be  called  "  real." 
The  principle  of  identity  conveys  no  knowledge  whatever  as 
to  the  essence  of  any  particular  reality,  or  as  to  the  unchanging 
modes  of  the  behavior  of  aught  that  is  real.  It  simply  states 
two  ultimate  facts  pertaining  to  all  thought,  —  two  facts  united 
in  one  principle.  The  truth  of  knowledge  elaborated  by  thought 
is  necessarily  expressed  in  the  categorical  judgment;  and  in  the 
categorical  judgment  the  constituent  factors  of  the  judgment 
must  remain  self -same.  But  it  may  be  asked :  What  is  "  self- 
sameness  "  but  identity ;  and  does  not  the  law  compelling  self- 
sameness  apply  to  all  factors  of  all  judgments  and  to  all 
constituents  of  all  things  ?  Does  it  not,  moreover,  hold  true 
of  every  real  being,  whether  it  be  a  thing  or  a  soul,  that  it 
must  be  always  identical  with  itself  ? 

The  full  reply  to  questions  like  the  foregoing  would  take  us 
into  details  concerning  the  nature  of  conception  and  judgment, 
and  concerning  the  meanings  attached  to  words  such  as  "  Thing  " 
or  "  Soul,"  which  it  is  beyond  our  present  limits  to  follow.  Two 
or  three  suo^estions  as  to  the  character  of  some  of  these  details 
must  suffice.  In  reality  the  psychical  occurrences  which  we 
represent  under  the  terms  of  logic  —  conception,  judgment, 
reasoning  —  are  never,  as  actual  occurrences,  stationary  con- 
ditions of  mind.  Thought  is  a  never-ceasing  movement  of  ide- 
ating mind ;  and  the  movement  is  at  every  step  suffused  with 
factors  of  rational  conviction  and  controlled  by  law.  A  logical 
theory  which  can  appeal  to  psychical  facts  will  then  be  morpho- 


THE   THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  207 

logical,  evolutionary.  The  general  fact  that  the  states  of  self- 
conscious  ideation  called  comparison,  abstraction,  generalization, 
etc.,  unfold  themselves  into  each  other  in  an  orderly  way,  is  the 
general  fact  which  underlies  the  theory  of  conception,  judgment, 
and  the  other  logical  forms.  But  every  actual  conception,  or 
rather  process  of  so-called  conceiving,  and  every  act  of  judg- 
ment, or  rather  process  of  judging,  is  necessarily  a  growth. 
This  growth  is  not  in  violation  of  the  principle  of  identity ; 
were  it  so,  no  conception  could  actually  take  place. 

All  conceptions  of  all  objects  are  susceptible  of  change  under 
the  principle  of  identity.  So,  too,  actual  judgments  are  not 
stationary  combinations  established,  by  the  sign  of  equality, 
between  ready-made  entities  called  concepts.  They  too  spring 
into  existence  as  successive  self-evolving  states  of  conscious 
ideation.  Regarded,  however,  as  forms  of  thought,  both  con- 
ception and  judgment  may  always  be  referred  to  intuitive 
knowledge,  in  order  to  see,  as  it  were,  whether  they  will  form 
themselves  anew  with  their  customary  content  unchanged. 
The  form  of  conceiving  or  judging  which  stands  this  test,  so 
often  as  repeated,  is  called  "  true  ; "  it  represents  in  thought  the 
reality  of  immediate  knowledge.  And  where  (as  is  generally 
the  case)  the  mind,  on  inquiring  what  conception  or  judgment 
to  frame,  cannot  settle  its  inquiry  by  immediate  knowledge,  it 
reasons  its  way  to  the  affirmation  it  seeks.  That  is,  it  connects 
the  required  judgment  (determines  the  direction  and  end  to 
which  the  process  of  related  states  of  ideation  shall  grow)  with 
other  judgments,  in  which  the  former  shall  find  its  grounds. 
But  knowledge  is  not  reached  by  thought,  nor  is  truth  of 
thought  affirmed,  until  the  mental  action  takes  the  form  ex- 
pressed by  the  categorical  judgment.  S  is  P,  is  then  the  uni- 
versal formula  for  positing  the  knowledge  of  truth  elaborated 
by  thought.  To  this  formula  all  the  knowledge  which  thought 
affords  may,  for  its  legitimate  expression,  be  reduced. 

But  neither  S  nor  P  can,  in  knowledge  elaborated  by  thought, 
represent  a  simple  "  moment "  or  single  factor  of  self-conscious 


208  THE  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

life.  Both  S  and  P  must  stand  for  a  composite  of  such  factors. 
What  composite  we  call  S,  and  what  P,  or  that  we  shall  always 
signify  the  same  potential  or  actual  combination  by  this  word, 
the  principle  of  identity  does  not  provide.  We  may  change  our 
conception  of  the  nature  of  any  particular  S,  and  of  the  nature 
of  any  particular  P;  and  as  well  of  the  relation  maintaining 
itself  between  them.  But  if  we  are  going  to  tell  "  the  truth  " 
in  pronouncing  the  judgment  S  is  P,  the  principle  of  identity 
binds  us  inexorably  to  rational  consistency.  The  same  elements 
of  ideation,  combined  in  the  self-same  way,  must  be  represented 
by  S ;  the  same  by  P ;  and  the  same  by  the  copula  expressing 
the  relation  between  S  and  P.  Otherwise,  S  is  P  cannot  be 
tolerated  as  a  judgment  expressive  of  the  truth. 

The  customary  formula  of  logic  for  the  principle  of  identity 
in  its  positive  aspect  is  A  =  A  ;  in  its  negative  aspect  A  is  not 
=  non-A,  or  A  is  not  —  B.  But  all  forms  of  statement  imply 
the  principle  itself.  For  if  the  principle  of  identity  do  not 
apply  to  the  A  which  is  in  the  place  of  S,  to  the  A  which  is 
in  the  place  of  P,  and  to  the  relation  signified  by  the  sign  of 
equality,  then  the  formula  itself  cannot  stand.  Yet  every 
attempt  to  apply  this  principle  to  each  of  these  three  con- 
stituents of  the  judgment  must  itself  take  the  form  of  a  cate- 
gorical judgment  falling  in  its  turn  under  the  principle  of 
identity.  All  expression  of  this  principle  therefore  implicates 
it,  as,  from  the  beginning,  controlling  the  expression  itself. 

The  principle  of  identity  cannot,  of  course,  be  proved,  in  any 
sense  of  the  word  "  proof,"  or  in  any  of  the  many  degrees  of 
probability  attaching  themselves  to  the  proof  of  all  kinds  of 
existences  and  occurrences.  All  proof,  as  all  attempts  to  think 
at  all,  imply  the  working  of  this  principle  with  a  strictness  that 
admits  of  no  degrees.  Moreover,  no  particular  existence  or 
conception  of  the  existent  can  be  substituted  in  the  formula 
A  =  A,  which  shall  receive  merely  by  its  substitution  the 
sanction  of  the  principle.  Physics  cannot  substitute  for  A 
one  of  its  elementary  realities  called  atoms ;  and  so  maintain, 


THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  209 

in  the  name  of  the  principle  of  all  thinking,  that —  for  example 
—  the  nature  of  the  oxygen  or  hydrogen  atom  is  forever  self- 
same. Psychology  cannot  substitute  for  A  —  A  a  categorical 
judgment  affirming  that  in  reality  the  soul  remains,  through  all 
changes  of  states,  identical.  Not  even  philosophy  can  follow 
Fichte  in  his  subtle  but  fallacious  transmutation  of  the  formula 
A  =  A  into  the  formula  Eyo  —  Eyo.  Physics  may  show 
grounds  in  experience  for  believing  that  the  nature  of  the 
atoms  does  not  change.  Psychology,  after  pointing  out  what 
can  properly  be  meant  by  personal  identity,  may  defend  the 
proposition,  even  by  appealing  to  an  invincible  belief,  in  the 
case  of  the  soul.  But  of  atom  and  Ego  alike,  —  and  yet  no 
more  than  of  our  mental  representation  of  the  meanest  and 
most  trivial  occurrence,  —  if  we  have  knowledge  elaborated  by 
thought  at  all,  this  knowledge  must  be  expressed  by  the  cate- 
gorical judgment  under  the  principle  of  identity. 

No  other  subject  in  Noetics  has  been  treated  with  so  wide- 
spreading  and  mischievous  laxity  of  thought  and  speech  as  the 
so-called  "  principle  of  sufficient  reason  "  (Principium  rationis 
suffi,cioitis :  Satz  des  Grundes).  In  the  name  of  this  principle, 
physical  science  has  often,  almost  with  the  same  breath,  decried 
all  metaphysics  and  a  priori  constructions  of  reality,  and  main- 
tained the  rational  necessity  and  universality  of  some  one  or 
more  of  its  most  recent  conceptions  of  force  and  law.  In  the 
name  of  the  same  principle  science  has  joined  hands  with  phi- 
losophy in  the  denial  of  the  being  of  that  "personal  Absolute 
whom  faith  calls  God ; "  and,  as  well,  in  the  denial  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  human  mind.  In  its  name,  as  an  ultimate  rational 
necessity,  the  claims  of  scientific  knowledge  have  been  so  ex- 
tended as  to  reduce  all  the  problems  concerning  the  world, 
man,  and  God,  to  the  terms  of  molecular  physics.  Tims  in 
the  name  of  reason  certain  highest  and  most  valued  ideals  of 
reason  — freedom,  God,  and  immortality — are  made  to  confess 
their   inability  to  find   for  themselves   a  ground   in  reality. 

That  gifted  and  suggestive  but   perverse  thinker,  Schopen- 

14 


210         THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

hauer,  has  nowhere  else  done  better  service  for  philosophy  than 
in  his  treatment  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason.  This 
service  took  the  two  directions  of  analysis  of  the  principle,  and 
exposition  of  certain  fallacies  connected  with  its  use.  In  his 
work  on  the  "  Fourfold  Eoot  of  the  Principle  of  Sufficient  Eea- 
son,"  Schopenhauer  discusses  the  principle  with  a  view  to  dis- 
cover both  the  common  elements  of  all  the  forms  it  takes  (the 
"  Eoot "),  and  also  its  division  into  cognate  but  distinguishable 
modes  of  application  (for  the  root  is  "  fourfold  ").  Frequently 
in  his  philosophical  writings  he  exposes  with  ridicule  the 
attempts  of  physical  science  to  understand  everything  under 
its  own  peculiar  ways  of  applying  this  principle,  without  resort 
to  metaphysical  explanations ;  while  at  the  same  time  it  intro- 
duces clandestinely  a  whole  host  of  unexplained  and  uncritical 
causes  occultoe.  Without  accepting  the  accuracy  and  suffi- 
ciency of  Schopenhauer's  treatment,  we  refer  to  it  as  a  legiti- 
mate warning  against  supposing  that  physical  science  can 
dispense  with  metaphysical  causes,  and  yet  maintain  a  claim 
to  explain  the  world  of  reality. 

The  statement  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  of  the 
greatest  importance  for  a  theory  of  knowledge.  And  yet  it  is 
doubtful  whether  scientific  precision  can  be  given  to  any  at- 
tempt at  its  statement.  The  reason  for  difficulty  here  is  not  pre- 
cisely the  same  as  that  which  has  been  noted  with  regard  to  the 
principle  of  identity.  In  the  case  of  the  latter  we  observe  its 
simplicity  and  absolutely  fundamental  character,  apart  from  all 
consideration  of  the  nature  of  particular  experiences.  In  the 
case  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  the  difficulty  of  dis- 
cussing it  arises  rather  from  its  manifoldness  of  formal  applica- 
tion and  the  way  in  which  it  enters  into  the  conditions  of 
different  kinds  of  experience.  Ethical  and  sesthetical  consid- 
erations also  appear  to  militate  strongly  against  certain  forms 
of  conceiving  and  stating  this  principle.  That  we  cannot  say, 
"Every  being  must  have  a  cause,"  is  clear  from  the  fact  that 
even  all  scientific  explanation,  under  the  law  of  physical  causa- 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  211 

tion,  postulates  uncaused  beings  as  the  very  ground  of  its 
explanation.  Physics  explains  all  physical  events,  and  the 
genesis  and  changes  of  all  physical  beings,  out  of  the  postu- 
lated and  unexplained  being  of  the  atoms.  The  philosophy  of 
religion,  too,  finds  in  the  Unity  of  the  Absolute  its  ground  for 
that  interrelation  of  the  phenomena  which  —  so  science  con- 
siders —  demands  the  affirmation  of  universal  force  and  uni- 
versal law.  Neither  can  we  say,  "Every  event  must  have 
a  cause ; "  unless  we  are  ready  to  modify  our  conception  of 
cause  so  as  to  include  under  it  the  relation  of  motive  to  voli- 
tion, and  of  the  being  that  acts  to  his  own  particular  action, — 
however  mysterious  the  nature  of  such  being  and  the  sponta- 
neity of  certain  forms  of  its  behavior  may  be. 

To  us  it  seems  that  the  so-called  principle  of  sufficient 
reason  may  best  be  described  in  something  like  the  following 
way.  If  the  description  appears  loose  and  indefinite,  it  may 
on  that  account  the  better  fit  all  the  different  classes  of  phe- 
nomena which  fall  under  the  principle. 

Psychological  science  shows  us  that  knowledge  is  elaborated 
by  relating  different  ideation-states  in  uniform  ways.  In  all 
knowledge  indirectly  attained  through  processes  of  reasoning, 
besides  the  mere  fact  of  the  association  of  the  states,  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  relation  must  be  recognized.  Knowledge 
elaborated  by  thought  implicates  therefore  the  being  aware 
of  an  orderly  and  rational  procedure.  But  knowledge  also 
involves  conviction  which  has  reference  to  reality  ;  for  knowl- 
edge is  not  of  ideation -states,  as  such,  but  of  objects,  —  of  things 
or  minds.  Indirect  or  mediate  knowledge  implies,  then,  the 
consciousness  of  fixed  relations,  interconnected  modes  of  being 
and  action,  belonging  to  the  objects.  In  and  by  this  rational 
procedure  all  experience  becomes  articulated,  as  it  were ;  and 
as  far  as  knowledge  seems  to  go,  so  far  goes  the  belief  in  the 
reality  of  the  related  objects,  and  of  the  relations  of  the  objects. 
This  every  rational  mind,  developed  to  self-consciousness,  neces- 
sarily has.     This,  too,  is  the  basis,  in  the  normal  and  necessary 


212  THE   THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

procedure  of  the  mind,  upon  which  rest  those  extensions  of  the 
limits  of  ordinary  knowledge  which  science  aims  to  make.  But 
science,  or  —  in  particular  —  physical  science,  has  no  prescrip- 
tive right  upon  this  principle  ;  it  has  no  claim  to  define  or 
limit  it,  as  a  principle  of  all  thought,  so  as  to  shut  out  from 
its  legitimate  use  the  unscientific  multitude  or  the  little  group 
of  thinkers  who,  in  spite  of  physics,  claim  to  have  a  rational 
faith  in  Freedom,  God,  and  Immortality. 

It  would  almost  seem  that  the  essence  of  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason  as  employed  by  the  sciences  can  be  best  stated 
in  a  practical  maxim  :  Always  try  to  explain.  But  scientific 
explanation  consists  in  relating  the  changes  of  one  being  to 
those  of  another  being,  under  the  form  of  fixed  and  uniform 
sequences.  It  might  also  be  said  that  another  maxim,  as  a 
warning,  must  be  added :  Remember  that  all  scientific  explana- 
tion postulates  the  presence  of  the  unexplained.  For  as  reflec- 
tive analysis  shows,  and  as  science  when  it  comes  to  rational 
self-consciousness  admits,  scientific  explanations  tell  only  the 
story  of  the  uniform  modes  of  behavior  of  those  beings  whose 
existence  and  natures  science  postulates  as  the  ground  of  all 
explanation,  but  can  never  explain. 

The  philosophical  theory  of  knowledge  defends  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  all  thinking  against  a  sceptical  issue  to 
their  critical  examination.  It  thus  validates  that  extension  of 
knowledge  which  science  proclaims.  The  further  examination 
of  these  principles,  and  of  the  conceptions  and  presuppositions 
implied  in  their  use,  belongs  to  Metaphysics,  —  in  its  main 
division  under  this  name,  and  in  its  two  subdivisions  as  Phi- 
losophy of  Nature  and  Philosophy  of  Mind.  Without  this 
positive  outcome  to  Noetics,  however,  neither  of  the  two 
branches  of  Metaphysics  can  claim  to  do  anything  more  than 
to  represent  a  consistent  schematizing  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness. But  then  without  this  outcome  science  itself  is  nothing 
more. 

Knowledge   as   extended   by  thought   is,  in   its   latest   and 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  213 

highest  stage,  philosophical  knowledge.  This  knowledge  has 
often  been  called  a  priori  or  intuitive.  But  as  customarily 
employed,  both  these  terms  are  likely  to  mislead  those  who 
use  them.  By  a  priori  we  can  mean,  in  this  connection,  noth- 
ing more  than  the  universal  and  necessary  modes  of  the  be- 
havior of  rational  mind.  The  term  "universal"  we  cannot 
understand  so  as  to  deny  that  the  multitude  of  men  do  not 
self-consciously  recognize  the  so-called  categoi'ies,  while  phi- 
losophy itself  has  not  yet  succeeded  to  the  satisfaction  of  all 
in  either  explicating  or  cataloguing  them ;  but  also  that  their 
employment  as  formal  principles  by  the  individual  requires 
psychical  development.  If  the  categories  are  forms  of  being, 
they  are  so  because  they  are  the  necessary  forms  of  psychical 
becoming.  By  the  term  "  intuitive  "  we  cannot  mean  that  it 
is  possible  to  envisage  these  modes  of  the  behavior  of  rational 
mind,  as  it  were,  in  their  naked  and  abstract  essential  char- 
acter. We  can  mean  only  that,  while  their  explication  is  a 
matter  of  reflective  analysis  and  discursive  thinking,  such 
mental  effort  infallibly  finds  them  implicated  in  all  knowledge 
by  thought ;  as  well  as,  also,  that  to  doubt  that  the  experience 
which  implicates  them  is  knowledge,  or  that  the  knowledge  is 
of  reality,  is  impossible  in  consistency  with  the  nature  of 
reason  itself. 

We  cannot,  then,  claim  with  Fichte  that  knowledge  of  knowl- 
edge, philosophical  knowledge,  is  alone  worthy  to  be  called 
science.  Hut  we  can  claim  that  the  objects  of  philosophical 
knowledge  are  capable  of  being,  not  merely  imagined  or  thought, 
but  also  known. 

Little  need  be  added  concerning  the  application  of  the  gen- 
eral principles  of  a  theory  of  knowledge  to  the  remaining  two 
of  its  subordinate  inquiries.  The  true  and  safe  answer  to  the 
question,  What  are  the  Limits  of  Knowledge  ?  follows  easily 
upon  reflection  from  the  very  nature  of  these  principles.  The 
limits  of  knowledge  cannot  be  dogmatically  fixed,  whether 
the    dogmatism    which    attempts    this    impossible    task    call 


214  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

itself  by  its  right  name,  or  take  the  title   of  scepticism  or  of 
agnosticism. 

The  formal  principles  which,  in  a  certain  sense,  exist  as 
limitations  of  knowledge,  are  those  fundamental  modes  of  the 
functioning  of  mind  which  philosophical  criticism  distinguishes 
as  implied  in  all  knowledge.  Using  a  figure  of  speech  that  is 
perhaps  legitimate,  but  represents  only  the  shadowy  outlines  of 
the  dark  region  of  so-called  negative  thinking,  the  fundamental 
forms  and  laws  of  every  kind  of  knowledge  may  be  represented 
as  barriers  beyond  which  the  mind  cannot  pass.  Some  of  the 
current  impressions  of  being  "  limited  "  or  "  bound  "  in  knowl- 
edge are  the  result  of  an  uncritical  and  sentimental  refusal  to 
undergo  the  labor  of  accurate  observation  and  persistent  think- 
ing. The  impression  is  increased  through  a  confusion  of  the 
different  stages  and  modes  of  knowledge,  with  a  resulting 
attempt  to  apply  terms  and  conceptions,  which  belong  appro- 
priately only  to  one  stage  or  mode,  to  other  stages  and  modes 
where  they  do  not  belong.  How  many  a  one,  for  example, 
has  tried,  with  mourning  over  the  "limitations"  of  his  knowl- 
edge, to  fancy  how  an  atom  of  oxygen  would  look  and  feel, 
if  only  one  were  organically  constructed  so  as  to  see  and 
touch  it  ! 

Elaborate  doctrines  and  systems  of  nescience  have  been 
founded  on  inquiries  no  more  discriminating  than  the  one 
just  suggested.  We  venture  to  assert  that  the  entire  system 
of  Kantian  antinomies  may  be  largely  resolved  into  the  mis- 
taken attempt  to  apply  the  terms  of  sensuous  perception  and 
imagination  to  subjects  that  admit  only  of  a  philosophical 
knowledge.  Spencerian  agnosticism,  and  those  vagaries  of 
Hamilton  and  Mansel  on  which  this  agnosticism  as  proclaimed 
in  the  "  First  Principles  "  is  based,  have  scarcely  so  good  a 
right  as  the  Kantian  antinomies  to  represent  the  limits  of 
human  cognition.  That  one  cannot  sensuously  picture  how 
the  boundaries  of  a  space  would  look  in  which  there  is  noth- 
ing to  see  and  no  eye  to  see  with ;  or  finds   it  impossible  to 


THE  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  215 

"  conceive  "  as  a  member  of  the  causal  nexus  a  Being  that  is 
ex  hypothesi  the  Ground  of  all  that  interrelated  action  which 
science  both  assumes  and  discovers  ;  or  declines,  in  the  name  of 
reason,  to  make  the  effort  to' jumble  together  innumerable  con- 
tradictory so-called  attributes  and  call  the  compound  by  a 
sounding  title  (be  it  God,  the  Absolute,  or  the  Unknowable),  — 
all  this,  and  much  more  of  the  same  sort,  is  nut  enough  to 
establish  insuperable  formal  limitations  to  all  our  knowledge. 

That  psychological  and  philosophical  analysis,  when  pushed 
to  its  final  outcome,  discloses  facts  and  laws  of  rational  life 
which  must  be  accepted  as  they  are  given,  and  cannot  be 
explained,  is  undoubted.  This  is  the  legitimate  result  of  the 
analysis ;  and  until  its  outcome  can  be  regarded  as,  in  this 
direction,  final,  the  self-criticism  of  reason  cannot  be  satisfied. 
Such  facts  and  laws  may  be  said  to  represent  the  formal  limits 
of  the  mind's  action.  The  possibility  of  a  different  set  of  facts 
and  laws,  under  different  extra-mental  conditions,  or  in  the 
case  of  other  psychical  existences,  as  a  bare  possibility,  is  indeed 
tolerable  to  the  imagination.  But  the  very  effort  to  question 
certain  of  these  facts  and  laws,  involves  the  mind  in  an  intoler- 
able inconsistency.  One  may  ask,  for  example,  How  do  things 
seem  to  an  animal  with  scores  of  eyes,  or  with  a  single  periph- 
eral area  sensitive  to  light  but  unorganized  into  an  optical 
instrument  ?  or,  How  do  things  appear  to  angels  or  to  fairies  ? 
But  one  cannot  ask,  How  do  things  seem  to  beings  that  are 
devoid  of  all  sense-perception  ?  without  either  taking  all  intel- 
ligible meaning  out  of  the  phrase  —  "things  seem"  —  or  else 
landing  one's  self  in  irrational  consequences.  So  also  may  one 
indulge  in  the  pleasing  fancy,  and  even  call  it  a  science  of 
mental  evolution,  precisely  how  it  is  that  oysters  and  jelly-fish 
and  amoebas,  or  even  undifferentiated  drops  of  vegetable  bio- 
plasm and  blood-corpuscles,  are  conscious.  But  the  inquiry 
after  a  Being  which  is  to  be  mentally  represented  under  terms 
like  "  Will,"  "  Final  Purpose,"  "  Thought,"  "  Unity,"  "  Reason," 
"  The  Idea,"  and  at  the  same  time  as  foreign  to  all  the  actual 


216  THE  THEORY   OF   KNOWLEDGE. 

self-conscious  life  of  human  reason,  must  indeed  end  in  bring- 
ing upon  itself  insuperable  limitations. 

How  absurd  it  is  to  try  to  think  what  thought  would  be,  if 
the  "  barriers "  of  the  principles  of  identity  and  of  sufficient 
reason  were  removed,  scarcely  any  one  needs,  it  would  seem, 
to  be  reminded. 

As  to  material  limitations  of  knowledge,  or  the  fixing  of 
definite  barriers  to  the  content  of  what  may  be  known,  the 
theory  of  knowledge  has  nothing  whatever  to  propose.  That 
can  be  known  which  is  known  ;  and  in  the  progress  of  knowl- 
edge experience  is  constantly  widening  the  realm  of  the  known. 
As  to  what  we  may  know,  the  empirical  conditions  belonging  to 
each  kind,  stage,  and  condition  of  knowledge,  practically  deter- 
mine. Here  science  is  powerful  to  assert  or  to  deny ;  but  both 
its  assertions  and  its  denials  are,  so  far  as  they  preserve  the 
forms  of  strict  science,  merely  hypothetical.  It  may  say,  for 
example :  If  the  conditions  of  perception  by  the  senses  remain 
the  same,  then  the  limit  of  such  perception  is  to  be  fixed 
approximately  at  such  a  fraction  of  an  inch ;  or  at  a  distance 
travelling  from  which  light  would  have  too  small  intensity  to 
excite  sensations  of  sight,  etc.  But  science  is  becoming  in  all 
its  branches  more  cautious  about  arbitrarily  fixing  the  perma- 
nent limits  of  its  own  positive  domain.  Possibly  we  may  soon 
have  it  proclaimed  as  a  necessary  corollary  of  evolution  that 
man  will  at  some  time  in  the  future  pass  the  present  barriers 
of  nescience  in  matters  of  rational  psychology  and  the  philosophy 
of  religion.  Then  the  race  will  have  developed  the  knowledge 
of  God,  the  Soul,  Freedom,  and  Immortality,  and  will  have 
become  as  certain  of  these  truths  and  existences  —  that  they 
are,  and  what  they  are  —  as  of  the  real  grounds  for  the  theory 
of  evolution  itself. 

As  to  the  Certification  of  Knowledge  —  how  it  comes,  and 
what  it  is — we  shall  content  ourselves  for  the  present' witli 
pointing  back  to  the  remarks  made  in  the  earlier  part  of  this 
chapter.     In   effect  they  may  be  summed  up  in  the  following 


THE   THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  217 

declarations.  Verification  of  the  processes  of  knowledge,  as 
valid  in  reality,  that  is  external  to  the  actual  life  of  the  know- 
ing mind,  can  never  be  attained.  Even  the  proposal  to  search 
for  such  verification  is  intrinsically  absurd.  Only  by  that 
knowledge  of  knowledge  which  reflective  analysis  bestows,  can 
a  well-founded  certainty  of  knowledge  be  gained.  The  theory 
of  knowledge  is  itself,  touching  the  problem  of  certifying 
knowledge,  only  the  explication  of  that  which  is  implicated  in 
all  acts  of  knowledge.  To  know,  is  to  be  certain  ;  knowledge 
validates  itself.  But  precisely  what  it  is  that  knowledge  vali- 
dates, —  this  is  an  inquiry  with  which  Noiitics  can  deal  only  by 
way  of  handing  it  over  to  Metaphysics.  The  latter  critically 
examines  the  content  of  what  is  really  known. 

Moreover,  to  reach  reality  otherwise  than  as  implicated  in 
knowledge,  is  impossible.  Thought  elaborates  the  content  of 
what  is  known ;  but  mere  thinking  never  certifies  the  reality 
of  what  is  thought.  On  the  other  hand,  all  knowledge  is  of 
reality  ;  and  to  know,  is  to  be  certain  that  somewhat  really  is. 
What,  in  its  immediate  reality,  and  what  in  its  larger  signifi- 
cance and  relation  to  the  ideals  of  reason,  is  the  somewhat 
known  as  certainly  existent,  —  this  it  belongs  to  the  succeeding 
branches  of  philosophy  to  explore  and  describe. 


CHAPTER    IX. 


METAPHYSICS. 


THE  present  attitude  of  many  thoughtful  minds  toward 
that  branch  of  philosophy  which  is  technically  called 
Metaphysics  is  an  interesting  psychological  phenomenon.  This 
attitude  is  sometimes  one  of  strange  vacillation  between  shame- 
faced interest  and  expressed  distrust.  It  is  sometimes  also  a 
confession  of  a  previous  philosophical  movement  which,  within 
the  minds  of  those  who  maintain  the  attitude,  either  through 
the  exhaustion  of  ineffective  exertion  or  inherent  lassitude  or 
traditional  confusion,  has  sunk  below  the  horizon  of  a  clear 
self-consciousness.  Thus  it  often  implies  a  preference  for  un- 
scientific and  incomplete  metaphysical  analysis  to  that  which, 
at  least,  aims  at  being  thorough  and  scientific.  And  so  we  hear 
preachers  and  even  theologians  uttering  their  scorn  for  meta- 
physics while  confidently  discoursing  the  most  stupendous  onto- 
logical  generalizations  touching  supreme  realities.  Students  of 
the  particular  sciences  there  are  —  both  of  the  physical  and  of 
the  psychological  —  who  with  unwavering  confidence  claim 
theoretically  to  construct  the  universe  in  precise  conformity  to 
what  is  really  Existent,  and  yet  have  small  respect  for  a 
critical  discussion  of  those  concepts  of  Eeality,  Space,  Time, 
Matter,  Motion,  Cause,  etc.,  which  they  are  themselves  so 
constantly  employing. 

There  has  been  much  in  the  history  of  speculative  thinking, 
even  since  the  establishment  of  the  Kantian  criticism,  to  give 
occasion  for  a  weariness  of  metaphysics.  And  yet  this  feeling 
is  itself,  both  in  its  origin  and  its  form  of  manifestation,  a  proof 


METAPHYSICS.  219 

that  it  is  vain  to  hope  for  the  final  exclusion  of  metaphysical 
inquiry  from  human  minds.  The  cure  for  the  weariness  is  not 
a  scornful  or  an  indifferent  attitude  toward  further  effort  of  a 
similar  kind.  Its  cure  is  rather  (perhaps  after  a  period  of  rest 
—  if  the  need  of  rest  be  felt  by  the  individual  or  by  the  spirit 
of  the  age)  to  be  found  in  the  cheerful  acceptance  of  the  task  of 
achieving  a  better  metaphysics.  "  Jacobi,  Fichte,  and  Schelling 
all  belong,"  says  Herbart,1  "  to  the  age  when  people  were 
singing,  — 

"  Da  die  Metaphysik  vor  Kurzem  unbeerbt  abging, 

Werden  die  Dinge  an  sich  jetzo  sub  hasta  verkauft,"  — 

a  summons  which  may  be  rendered  into  the  following  elegant 
couplet :  — 

"  Hear  ye  !     Things-in-tbemselves  will  be  sold  under  the  hammer  ! 

Since  Metaphysics  lately  deceased  without  leaving  an  heir." 

However,  as  Herbart  at  once  proceeds  to  remark,  we  now  know 
this  age  pretty  well  ;  and  there  are  good  grounds  for  the  sup- 
position that,  in  the  case  of  its  authors  also,  Metaphysics  simply 
assumed  other  names,  and  under  cover  of  them  continued  its 
existence,  —  essentially  the  same  as  before.  This  latter  interest- 
ing historical  fact  Mr.  Shad  worth  Hodgson2  has  embodied  in 
two  lines  of  his  own  composition.  They  are  a  reply  to  all 
would-be  auctioneers  of  the  effects  of  a  deceased  metaphysics, 
and  run  as  follows  :  — 

"  What  though  Things-in-themselves  have  been  dispersed  by  an  auction, 
Who  was  the  auctioneer?     Why,  Metaphysic  herself." 

The  warning  from  experience  and  history,  that  thinking  man 
cannot  safely,  and  indeed  cannot  long  at  all,  neglect  a  serious 
inquiry  into  the  nature  of  Eeality,  might  be  illustrated  and 
enforced  at  indefinite  length.  Further  argument  of  the  case 
does  not  fall  within  the  limits  of  a  brief  treatise  like  ours. 
Moreover,  nothing  new  could  be  said  in  direct  answer  to  that 

1  Allgemeine  Metaphysik,  vol.  i.  §  94. 

2  Philosophy  of  Reflection,  i.  162. 


220  METAPHYSICS. 

sceptical  inquiry  which  would  invalidate  everything  that  the 
most  careful  analysis  and  constructive  thinking  can  do  in 
dealing  with  ontological  subjects.  This  inquiry  will  now  be 
considered  to  have  been  met  in  the  noetical  department  of  phi- 
losophy. Accordingly,  we  raise  the  question,  What  is  that 
which  is  known  as  really  existent  ?  after  having  shown  that  all 
knowledge  erects,  as  of  its  very  nature,  a  barrier  to  the  sceptical 
questioning  of  man's  power  to  know  the  really  existent.  Not 
that  sceptical  inquiry  can  be  regarded  as  at  once  and  forever 
settled  by  any  theory  of  knowledge.  We  only  claim  the  un- 
doubted right  to  proceed  to  Metaphysics  with  the  self-confidence 
of  reason  in  the  principles  of  its  own  life  as  those  principles 
are  re-affirmed  by  a  positive  attitude  toward  the  problem  of 
Noetics. 

The  inquiry,  What  is  Reality  ?  gives  rise  to  that  division  of 
philosophy  which  we  call  Metaphysics,  in  the  more  specific 
meaning  of  the  word.  More  precisely,  the  metaphysical  prob- 
lem may  be  stated  thus  :  What  is  the  content  of  our  knowledge 
of  the  really  Existent  ?  Bearing  in  mind,  then,  the  method  of 
all  philosophical  inquiry,  we  may  define  this  branch  of  philoso- 
phy as  follows :  Metaphysics  is  the  critical  and  systematic 
exposition  of  those  necessary  conceptions  and  presuppositions 
which  enter  into  our  cognition  of  that  which  we  call  real. 

But  the  metaphysical  problem  perpetually  recurs  in  each  one 
of  the  principal  divisions  of  philosophy.  This  is  the  necessary 
result  of  that  conception  of  philosophy  which  sees  in  it  the 
search  for  a  rational  system  of  the  principles  of  all  the  particular 
sciences  in  their  relation  to  an  ultimate  Eeality.  Indeed,  the 
actual  organization  of  human  experience  compels  speculative 
thinking  to  consider  its  problems  with  reference  to  Nature,  to 
Mind,  and  to  the  Absolute.  Even  for  its  own  ideals  of  the 
beautiful  and  the  morally  good,  reason  strives  to  find  ground 
in  that  which  really  exists.  We  have,  then,  to  undertake  the 
philosophical  treatment,  first  of  those  most  general  conceptions 
and  presuppositions  which  constitute  the  essence  of  all  which 


METAPHYSICS.  221 

we  call  "  Keal "  (whether  Things,  Minds,  or  God)  ;  second,  of  the 
more  particular  conceptions  and  presuppositions  determining 
the  nature  of  the  two  classes  of  realities  into  which  we  find  our 
experience  of  reality  divided.  The  resulting  departments  of 
philosophy  are  :  Metaphysics  (in  the  narrower  sense,  or  On- 
tology), Philosophy  of  Nature,  and  Philosophy  of  Mind.  The 
conclusions  reached  in  these  departments  will  necessarily  influ- 
ence those  to  be  reached  in  the  subsequent  treatment  of  Ethics, 
./Esthetics,  and  especially  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Metaphysics  therefore  requires  the  most  careful  analysis  of 
the  meaning  of  a  conception  which  has  hitherto  been  employed 
in  a  vague  and  indefinite  way.  This  conception  has  been  pre- 
sented under  the  terms  "  Reality,"  or  "  the  really  Existent,"  etc. 
But  what  do  we  mean  by  these  terms;  or  rather  —  since  meta- 
physical inquiry  is  not  concerned  with  the  meaning  of  terms 
any  further  than  is  necessary  to  the  clearness  and  complete- 
ness of  its  analysis  —  What  is  it  really  to  be  ?  In  its  ability 
to  answer  this  question  metaphysical  analysis  takes  its  chief 
interest  and  finds  the  most  important  test  of  the  value  of  its 
conclusions.  We  must  not,  however,  expect  that  the  analy- 
sis will  result  in  explaining,  descriptively  or  syllogistically, 
the  ultimate  elements  which  it  discovers  in  the  answer  to  this 
question.  Just  because  the  elements  it  seeks  are  ultimate,  they 
do  not  admit  of  such  explanation.  There  are  indeed  no  more 
general  or  specific  terms  in  which  to  envisage,  think,  or  express 
them  ;  otherwise  the  analysis  would  be  condemned  as  incom- 
plete. Nor  do  the  fundamental  "  conceptions  "  of  so-called  On- 
tology  admit  of  being  established  by  processes  of  induction  or 
deduction  ;  they  are  themselves  those  momenta,  or  terminal  fac- 
tors of  mental  representation  and  belief,  which  enter  into  all 
knowledge,  and  so  condition  and  make  possible  the  processes  of 
induction  and  deduction.  Neither  are  they  explicable  by  an- 
alysis resolving  them  into  what  are  more  fundamental  forms 
of  knowledge  or  of  objects  known  ;  they  are  explicated  by 
analysis  as  given  {data),  as  implicated  in  all  forms  of  knowing 


222  METAPHYSICS. 

all  objects  that  are  known.  It  is  only  with  this  understanding 
of  the  nature  of  its  subject-matter  and  of  the  words  used  in 
speaking  of  them  that  metaphysics  can  proceed. 

The  primary  and  most  inclusive  category  which  it  belongs 
to  metaphysics  to  discuss  is  therefore  that  of  "  Eeality,"  or 
"the  really  Existent."  The  terms  "pure  Being,"  "Nothing," 
"  Becoming,"  and  propositions  such  as  "  pure  Being  =  Nothing," 
or  "  Becoming  =  Unity  of  Being  and  Nothing  "  have  no  place 
in  metaphysics.  Indeed,  the  discussion  of  such  propositions 
is  absolutely  without  value  in  any  department  of  philosophy. 
In  proof  of  this  statement  might  be  adduced  the  fact  that  the 
Dialectic  of  Hegel  moves  wholly  in  the  sphere  of  empty  abstrac- 
tions (abstractions,  that  is,  that  not  simply  disregard  certain 
forms  of  our  knowledge  of  reality,  but  all  forms  of  all  knowl- 
edge) and  of  negative  thinking,  until  it  plants  itself  upon  the 
category  of  Eeality.  This  fact  in  part  explains  the  wearisome 
repetitiousness  of  the  Hegelian  Logic.  Plainly,  all  the  catego- 
ries are  here  made  to  do  duty  several  times  over,  —  either  as 
mere  forms  of  thinking  without  content,  or  as  forms  of  knowl- 
edge with  a  real  content  introduced  we  know  not  whence,  or  as 
forms  of  being,  assumed  without  sufficient  appeal  to  actual 
experience. 

The  view  of  Hegel  is  opposed  by  Lotze  when  explaining  his 
own  conception  of  the  sphere  of  metaphysics.  This  sphere  the 
latter  limits  —  and,  as  we  think,  rightly  —  to  the  real  or  the 
actual.  "  Eeal  (ivirklicli)"  says  Lotze,  "is  a  term  which  we 
apply  to  things  that  are,  in  opposition  to  those  that  are  not ; 
to  events  that  happen,  in  distinction  from  those  that  do  not 
happen ;  to  actually  existing  relations,  in  contrast  with  those 
that  do  not  exist." 1     This  language  is  unfortunate,  and  does 

1  Quoted  from  Bosanquet's  Translation  of  the  Metaphysic,  book  i.,  Introduc- 
tion. The  translation  of  the  passage  is  perhaps  not  altogether  a  happy  one, 
the  German  being  as  follows  :  "  Wirklich  nennen  wir  die  Dinge,  welche  sind, 
im  Gegensatze  zu  denen,  welche  nicht  sind  ;  wirklich  die  Ereignisse,  die  ge- 
schehen,  im  Unterschiede  von  denen  die  nicht  geschehen  ;  wirklich  auch  die 
Verhaltnisse,  welche  bestehen,  im  Vergleich  mit  denen,  welche  nicht  bestehen." 


METAPHYSICS.  223 

not  bring  out  the  desired  contrast.  For  things  "  that  are  not," 
are  not  things  at  all;  events  "that  do  not  happen,"  are  not 
events  at  all ;  and  relations  that  do  not  "  actually  exist,"  are 
not  relations  at  all.  The  contrast  which  is  implied  but  not  well 
expressed  in  this  statement  is  a  contrast  between  mere  states 
of  ideation  regarded  as  representing  unknown  things,  events,  or 
relations,  and  things,  events,  or  relations  as  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. But  even  the  representative  states  are  known  to  the 
subject  of  them  directly,  and  to  other  minds  indirectly,  as 
actual  events  implying  real  relations  (of  a  psychical  kind). 
Moreover,  if  we  use  the  somewhat  uncouth  and  inappropriate 
word  "  Things  "  to  indicate  all  concrete  knowable  realities,  we 
must  say  that  the  representative  states  are  themselves  actual 
events  in  real  being,  —  that  is,  actual  states  of  things. 

We  repeat  then  our  declaration  that  the  most  primary  and 
comprehensive  question  of  Metaphysics  is  this:  What  is  it 
really  to  be  ?  or,  in  other  words,  What  content  must  the  object 
known  have  in  order  that  it  may  be  known  as  really  existent  ? 

In  attempting  an  answer  to  the  foregoing  inquiry  our  an- 
alysis soon  discloses  the  fact,  that  that  to  which  the  act  of 
knowledge,  with  its  corresponding  conviction,  attaches  itself 
as  having  reality,  is  never  a  simple  factor.  Reality  is  never 
a  simple  being,  existing  in  no  particular  state  or  as  pure  being ; 
it  is  never  a  simple  indivisible  state,  that  may  be  considered  as 
state  of  no  being,  or  as  state  unrelated  to  any  other  state  ;  it  is 
never  a  simple  relation,  that  may  be  envisaged  or  felt  as  a 
relation  without  implying  beings  that  are  related  in  respect 
of  their  states.  Being,  state,  and  relation  —  all  these  and 
perhaps  much  more  —  must  be  implicated,  in  order  that  reality 
may  exist  to  knowledge ;  in  order  that  there  may  be  Things 
known,  Minds  known,  God  known,  —  in  any  manner  or  degree 
whatever. 

The  correlate  of  the  foregoing  conclusion  in  metaphysics  is 
the  fact  of  psychology,  that  knowledge  (which,  as  distinguished 
from  any  form  of  mere  mental  representation  or  of  mere  think- 


224  METAPHYSICS. 

ing,  is  the  only  psychical  state  that  implicates  and  guarantees 
reality)  is  a  relatively  complex  and  late  development  of  mind. 
Nay,  more  ;  it  is  an  unceasing  and  never-to-be-perfected  growth, 
which,  as  it  expands,  embraces  more  and  more  of  reality.  In 
nothing  of  the  nature  of  psychical  activity  which  falls  short  of 
knowledge  is  reality  implicated,  with  any  content  whatever ; 
but  in  the  simplest  act  of  knowledge  the  unchanging  principles 
of  reality  are  all  implicated.  In  the  development  of  knowledge 
by  sense-perception  and  self-consciousness,  by  scientific  investi- 
gation, and  by  philosophical  reflection,  the  system  of  real 
beings  —  their  natures,  relations,  and  laws  of  being  —  becomes 
the  object  of  knowledge. 

The  primary  and  indubitable  reality,  back  of  which  or  above 
which  or  underneath  which  it  is  impossible  to  go,  is  the  fact  of 
knowledge  itself.  This  fact  is  not  only  an  actuality  that  can 
neither  be  explained  nor  doubted,  but  it  is  itself  the  type,  the 
source,  the  guarantee  of  all  that  is  actual.  That  which  is  first 
of  all,  really  and  indubitably  existent,  is  this  fact  of  knowledge. 
It  is  here  that  modern  metaphysics  plants  itself,  if  it  is  to 
make  a  final  and  secure  stand  against  the  scepticism  which 
would  invade  and  reduce  under  the  misrule  of  fancy  or  of 
despair  the  entire  domain  of  reality.  It  is  to  this  fact,  with 
all  which  is  implied  in  it,  that  the  Cartesian  maxim  applies. 
If  by  cogito,  ergo  sum,  or  cogito  as  equal  to  cogitans  sum,  we 
mean  only  to  assert  the  primary  and  indubitable  reality  of  this 
fact,  we  cannot  be  gainsaid  or  disputed.  Self-conscious  cogni- 
tion is :  it  is  an  actual  datum ;  and  the  very  attempt  to  be 
sceptical  thereupon  does  but  lead  to  confirmation  by  repetition, 
of  this  fact  of  reality.  For  even  the  dubito  =  dubitans  sum  = 
dubito,  ergo  sum.  But  the  ergo  is  not  expressive  of  a  conclu- 
sion drawn  in  the  region  of  mere  thinking;  it  is  rather 
expressive  of  that  rational  conviction  respecting  an  envisaged 
reality  which  all  knowledge  involves. 

Objections  will  undoubtedly  be  brought  against  the  posi- 
tion  just    taken,   by    some    on    the   ground   of  its   being   too 


METAPHYSICS.  225 

narrow,  and  by  others  on  the  ground  of  its  being  too  com- 
prehensive. Objectors  on  the  former  ground  would  maintain 
that  mere  consciousness  and  real  existence,  necessarily  im- 
plicated, are  the  true  correlates.  We  are  therefore  told  that 
"  consciousness  and  existence  are  mutually  limited  and  limit- 
ing," and  that  non-objective  existence  and  non-real  con- 
sciousness are  terms  without  meaning.  "  It  is  the  lasting- 
service,"  says  Mr.  Shad  worth  Hodgson,  "of  the  post-Kantian 
philosophers,  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel,  each  in  his  degree, 
to  have  established  the  doctrine  of  the  perfect  coextensiveness 
and  mutuality  of  existence  and  consciousness."1  This  same 
writer  even  goes  so  far  as  to  declare :  "  The  absolute,  the  infi- 
nite, the  Ding-an-sich,  like  all  other  objects,  can  exist  only  in 
consciousness  ;  the  only  questions  are,  what  is  their  nature  and 
analysis,  and  what  is  their  origin."  This  view  appears  to  iden- 
tify, both  positively  and  negatively,  not  only  the  knowledge  of 
reality,  but  the  really  existent  itself,  with  the  sum-total  of  con- 
crete psychical  states ;  and  this  without  distinction  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  states,  or  admission  of  the  possibility  that  fund- 
amental beliefs  of  the  mind  can  ever  avail  to  give  evidence  of 
the  existence  of  aught  besides  their  own  occurrence  as  states  of 
consciousness  of  that  peculiar  kind  which  we  call  "  belief." 

On  the  other  hand  stands  that  doctrine  which  depreciates  all 
knowledge  by  the  senses  and  immediate  self-consciousness  as 
incapable  of  defining  what  is  real ;  and  thinks  by  processes  of 
ratiocination,  or  by  impacts  of  a  faith-faculty  superadded  to 
knowledge,  to  attain  reality,  as  it  were,  in  a  roundabout  way. 
To  such  theories  it  is  by  "  pure  thinking,"  or  by  "  intellectual 
intuition,"  or  by  "  faith,"  which  is  the  superior  of  knowledge,  that 
the  question  must  be  answered:  What  is  it  really  to  be  ?  V>y 
such  doctrine  it  is  deemed  possible  gradually  to  break  down  or 
overleap  at  once  the  barriers  erected  by  the  fundamental  forms 
of  all  knowledge  of  the  concrete  and  real.  "  Things "  and 
"  souls  "  are  then  resolved  into  abstractions ;  and  the  problem 

1  Time  and  Space,  p.  26. 
15 


226  METAPHYSICS. 

of  knowing  the  actual  content,  however  partially,  of  that  most 
concrete,  real,  and  "  content-full "  of  all  existences,  the  life  of  the 
rational  and  personal  Being  whom  we  call  God,  becomes  a  mat- 
ter of  passing  judgments  of  relation  between  concepts  that  have 
no  correlates  among  objects  known. 

In  opposition  to  all  views  like  the  foregoing  we  desire  to 
maintain  the  identity  of  knovjledgc  and  of  being  as  known.  It 
is  not  every  state  of  consciousness  that,  as  such,  is  identical  with 
the  really  existent ;  neither  is  the  knowledge  of  this  real  con- 
fined to  psychical  states  that  have  attained  the  heights  where 
the  thin  air  of  "  pure  thinking,"  "  intellectual  intuition,"  or  ra- 
tional "  faith,"  prevails,  or  where .  the  high-climbers  alone  can 
get  breath  and  keep  their  feet.  The  state  of  consciousness,  in 
order  to  be  co-extensive  with  a  reality,  must  be  known  as  a 
state  of  some  being,  either  immediately  through  self-conscious- 
ness by  the  being  whose  state  it  is,  or  through  perception  by 
some  other  being.  If  it  be  indirectly  known  by  science,  its  data 
must  be  mentally  represented  as  knowable  in  one  of  these  ways. 
That  is  to  say,  it  is  in  terms  of  knowledge,  of  the  known  and 
the  kqowable,  and  not  in  the  general  form  of  consciousness  and 
state  of  consciousness,  that  reality  is  implicated.  The  meanest, 
most  thoughtless  being  that  knows,  that  is  conscious  of  Self  or 
perceives  a  Thing,  is  in  that  very  knowledge  certain  of  real  ex- 
istence. But  without  such  knowledge,  or  unsupported  by  such 
knowledge,  pure  thought  and  intellectual  intuition  and  faith 
have  nothing  to  do  with  reality. 

Against  this  truth  the  psychological  fact  does  not  militate 
that  even  we,  self-conscious  and  rational  as  we  esteem  our- 
selves to  be,  often  evince  our  real  existence  by  states  of  con- 
sciousness that  cannot  be  called  states  of  knowledge.  Let  it 
be  granted  that  one  often  wakes  up,  as  it  were,  simultaneously 
to  the  knowledge  of  self  and  to  the  memory  of  having  passed 
through  a  series  of  psychical  states  which,  as  remembered,  seem 
to  bear  not  a  trace  of  having  been,  while  occurring,  actually  re- 
ferred to  any  real  subject,  —  not  even  to  the  self  whose  states 


METAPHYSICS.  227 

they  really  were.  Some  such  psychical  states  are  undoubtedly 
of  a  highly  complex  order ;  as,  for  example,  those  passed 
through  by  one  sunk  in  deep  revery,  or  absorbed  in  listening 
to  music,  or  in  viewing  a  spectacle.  They  may  even  consist  of 
highly  complicated  trains  of  ideation  supported  upon  a  basis  of 
complex  unuttered  language ;  such  as  are  the  trains  of  ideation 
through  which  the  mathematician  goes  when  intent  upon  solv- 
ing some  problem.  To  psychological  research  must  be  left  the 
question  whether  such  states  ever  actually  occur  without  im- 
plying a  reference  to  the  real  subject  whose  states  they  are ; 
that  is,  whether  as  states  they  occur  in  mental  form  resem- 
bling that  in  which  we  recall  them  when  we  mentally  repre- 
sent their  occurrence  by  an  act  of  memory  so-called.  But  if 
they  were  not,  in  their  occurrence,  actual  states  of  knowledge, 
then  no  real  existence  was  implied  in  them.  Yet  even  mentally 
to  represent  them,  after  their  occurrence,  as  having  occurred,  it 
is  necessary  to  endow  them  with  the  features  common  to  all 
states  of  knowledge.  This  is  the  same  thing  as  to  make  them 
knowable,  and,  as  such,  real  by  implication. 

In  other  words,  all  states  of  consciousness  imply  reality  only 
in  as  much  as,  and  in  so  far  as,  they  are  states  of  knowledge; 
only  as  states  of  knowledge  have  they  anything  to  yield  in 
answer  to  the  question :  What  is  it  really  to  be  ?  States  of 
mind  (occurrences  referable  to  the  psychical  subject)  and  states 
of  things  (occurrences  referable  to  the  subject  that  is  not 
me),  not  as  such,  but  as  known  and  knowable,  involve  real 
existence. 

Implicated,  of  necessity,  in  this  primary  reality  of  the  fact 
of  knowledge,  metaphysical  analysis  discovers  the  four  so-called 
categories  of  Substantiality,  Quality,  Causality,  and  Relation. 
These  four  are  implied  as  belonging  to  reality,  —  concretely  given, 
and  co-existent.  No  one  of  the  four  can  be  resolved  into  any 
of  the  others.  Each  of  the  four  implies  all  of  the  others;  and 
each  is  to  be  explicated  (not  to  say  explained,  since,  strictly 
speaking,   this  is  not  possible)  with  constant  reference  to  all 


228  METAPHYSICS. 

of  the  others.  [Indeed,  this  dim  light,  or  faint  shadow,  which 
the  different  categories  throw  over  each  other  —  serving,  as  it 
does,  less  to  make  any  one  of  them  stand  out  in  clear  and  bold 
relief  than  to  keep  them  all  in  a  phantasmagorial  shifting  under 
the  attempts  of  analysis  to  limit  their  shapes  —  is  one  of  the 
most  interesting  and  yet  embarrassing  of  the  results  which 
attend  the  consideration  of  metaphysical  problems.] 

Substantia  lit//  cannot  be  resolved  into  really  existing  quality; 

0 

but  quality  cannot  be  known  as  really  existing  without  refer- 
ence to  substantial,  or  real,  subject  of  such  quality.  Quality  is 
always  of  some  subject ;  and  the  latter,  if  known  as  real,  may 
be  called  a  "  substance,"  to  distinguish  it  from  a  merely  gram- 
matical or  logical  subject.  Causality,  as  a  category,  is  not  to 
be  resolved  into  mere  relation ;  but  as  predicated  of  the  subject 
in  reference  to  the  quality  it  appears  under  the  terms,  as  it 
were,  of  a  fundamental  relation.  On  the  other  hand,  relation, 
in  order  to  have  reality  as  distinguished  from  mere  appearance 
of  relation,  implies  causality  as  existent  on  the  part  of  the  sub- 
stantial subject  with  reference  to  its  quality.  To  this  subject 
all  qualities  may  be  said  to  be  related  under  the  category  of 
causality. 

The  conceptions  to  which  these  four  terms  correspond,  and 
the  propositions  in  which  the  descriptions  of  metaphysics  ex- 
press the  nature  of  the  terms,  are  all  derived  by  processes  of 
reflection  from  the  individual  facts  of  knowledge.  As  actually 
experienced,  they  are  concrete  momenta  implicated  in  all  the 
facts  of  knowledge.  Every  fact,  or  actual  occurrence,  of  knowl- 
edge has  then  a  manifold  and  concrete  content  which  involves 
these  four  categories.  This  manifoldness  of  the  concrete  con- 
tent  of  every  actual  state  of  knowledge  may  be  described  in 
terms  somewhat  like  the  following :  Every  fact  of  knowledge 
implies  a  subject  knowing  as  determined  by  its  relation  to  an 
object  known  more  or  less  definitely  as  such  and  no  other 
object.  But  in  every  act  of  knowledge  through  self-conscious- 
ness the  subject  knowing  is  regarded  as  having  become  the 


METAPHYSICS.  229 

object  of  knowledge  to  itself.  The  very  essence  of  the  knowl- 
edge called  se//-consciousness  consists  in  this,  that  the  subject 
knowing  as  it  is  determined  by  relation  to  an  object,  and  the  ob- 
ject known,  is  one  and  the  self-same  being.  Out  of  this  fact  of 
knowledge,  which  is  called  self-consciousness,  we  may  (perhaps 
rightfully)  refuse  to  derive  any  theory  as  to  the  real  unity,  or 
permanent  identity  in  reality,  of  the  mind.  We  may  be  unable 
psychologically  to  explain  the  fact  of  self-consciousness.  In  the 
interests  of  this  inability  we  may  try  to  adopt  and  defend  an 
atomic  view  of  the  nature  of  all  consciousness ;  we  may  repre- 
sent the  case  as  though  the  mind  could  never  so  far  catch  up 
with  itself  as  not  to  be  at  least  one  step  behind  the  act  of 
self-realization  in  the  unity  of  self-consciousness.  But  neither 
in  these  ways  nor  in  any  other  way  can  we  invalidate  the 
primar}'  fact  of  knowledge,  with  all  the  conviction  of  being 
really  existent  which  it  involves.  Indeed,  without  invali- 
dating this  primary  fact,  we  may  make  a  variety  of  sceptical 
admissions. 

We  may  doubt  whether  the  being  that  now  knows  is  the 
same  being  as  that  which  knew  a  moment  since  ;  I  have  only 
the  authority,  as  we  say,  of  memory  for  that.  But  that  the 
being,  which,  as  subject,  knows  in  the  self-conscious  act,  is 
really  one  and  the  same  with  the  being  known,  as  object  in 
the  selfsame  act,  —  this  is  a  known  reality  which  it  is  impos- 
sible to  doubt.  Subject  and  state  —  the  latter  known  as  be- 
longing to  the  former  —  are,  then,  terms  expressive  of  what 
is  in  reality  involved  in  every  fact  of  self-consciousness.  It 
is  from  this  ultimate  psychical  reality  that  metaphysics  derives 
the  categories  of  substantiality  and  quality. 

In  every  fact  of  knowledge  there  is  also  implicated  an  object 
known  more  or  less  definitely  as  this  particular  object,  and  no 
other.  If  the  knowledge  be  by  perception  through  the  senses 
(by  mental  states  that  involve  somewhat  more  than  the  hav- 
ing <>f  localized  sensation-complexes,  states  that  have,  as  it 
were,  matured  into  knowledge),  then  the  object  is  known  as  a 


230  METAPHYSICS. 

"  Tiling "  having  determinate  states,  and  as  related  to  other 
things  co-existing  in  time  and  space.  If  the  knowledge  be 
through  self-consciousness,  then  the  object  is  known  as  the 
"  Self "  in  such  or  such  determinate  state,  and  related  to  co- 
existing realities.  That  is  to  say,  the  object  of  every  act  of 
knowledge  is  known  as  a  subject  of  states,  existing  when 
known  in  some  determinate  one  of  these  states. 

But  in  the  case  of  those  objects  which  are  known  as  things, 
the  relation  of  the  object  known  as  real  to  the  subject  really 
knowing  is  one  of  non-identity.  No  object  is  known  as  a 
"  Thing  "  unless  it  is  known  as  not-me.  In  the  case  of  those 
objects  which  are  known  as  self,  the  relation  of  subject  and 
object  is,  as  has  already  been  said,  one  of  identity  in  reality. 
In  both  classes  of  cases,  however,  the  relation  of  subject  to  its 
own  states  is  implied  as  belonging  to  the  object  of  knowledge. 
The  object  of  perception  cannot  be  known  as  a  "  thing,"  as  in- 
volving anything  beyond  the  subjective  occurrence  of  mere 
sensation-complexes,  without  mental  recognition  in  it  of  that 
peculiar  relation  which  exists  between  every  real  subject  and 
its  actually  occurring  states.  Nor  can  the  object  of  self-con- 
sciousness be  known  as  "  Self,"  that  is,  be  an  object  of  self- 
consciousness  at  all,  except  upon  the  same  terms.  For  these 
reasons  it  is  that  all  knowledge  involves  the  mental  affirmation 
of  actually  existing  states  as  belonging  to  those  real  subjects 
which  we  call  either  tinners  or  minds. 

When  we  come  to  inquire  into  the  peculiarity  of  that  rela- 
tion which  is  known  to  exist  (or,  should  any  one  wish  to 
emphasize  the  conviction  which  belongs  to  all  knowledge,  he 
may  say,  believed  to  exist)  between  a  real  subject  and  its 
states,  we  find  its  very  indescribable  essence  to  be  what  meta- 
physics denominates  a  "  real  cause."  All  states  are  of  their 
subjects ;  they  are  not  self-produced.  For  the  term  "  self"  desig- 
nates the  subject  whose  the  states  are,  rather  than  the  states, 
which  are  actual  only  as  they  are  states  of  some  really  exist- 
ing subject.     Hence  it  is  from  the  ultimate  psychical  reality, 


METAPHYSICS.  231 

the  fact  of  knowledge,  as  implicated  in  it,  that  metaphysics 
derives  the  category  of  causality. 

The  foregoing  analysis  of  the  fact  of  knowledge  need  not  be 
repeated  in  order  to  discover  that  the  reality  of  relations,  as 
known,  is  implied  in  this  fact  over  and  over  again.  Indeed,  it 
is  this  which  gives  its  truth  to  those  definitions  of  knowledge 
which  tell  us,  "To  know  is  to  relate;"  or  to  those  definitions 
of  being  which  advocate  the  formula,  "To  be  is  to  be  related." 
The  modern  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  is,  so  far  as 
it  is  true,  well  grounded  in  this  ultimate  truth  of  all  experi- 
ence. The  Logic  of  Hegel  affirms  it,  even  at  its  beginning, 
when  it  exclaims :  Let  Thought  and  Eeality  in  their  Identity 
now  be !  For  its  first  product  is  a  proposition  positing  under 
the  relation  of  equality  Pure  Being  and  Nothing.  That  the 
primary  fact  of  knowledge  implicates  the  reality  of  the  category 
of  relation,  if  it  implicate  any  reality  whatever,  there  can  be 
found  no  one  to  doubt. 

The  detailed  discussion  of  the  so-called  "  categories  "  is  the 
work  of  metaphysical  system.  The  discussion  must  be  critical 
and  reflective,  but  must  also  keep  itself  constantly  in  touch 
with  the  concrete  realities  of  experience.  It  must  avoid  the 
pretence  of  profundity  which  explains  those  forms  and  presup- 
positions of  all  knowledge  that,  of  course,  are  the  basis  and 
authority  of  every  attempt  at  explanation  ;  it  must  also  shun 
that  frivolous  or  naive  self-confidence  which  is  satisfied  with 
insufficient  analysis,  or  else  with  the  refusal  to  analyze  at  all. 
Neither  scepticism,  nor  positivism,  nor  faith  (so-called  intellec- 
tual or  so-called  religious),  nor  easy-going  "  common-sense,"  nor 
off-hand  appeal  to  the  opinions  of  boors  and  charlatans,  will 
worthily  fill  the  place  in  reason  of  a  thorough  and  patiently 
elaborated  but  progressive  metaphysical  incpiiry.  Our  brief 
sketch  of  the  nature  of  Metaphysics  as  one  branch  of  phi- 
losophy must  content  itself  with  the  barest  outline  of 
the  field  to  be  thoroughly  covered  by  every  metaphysical 
system. 


232  METAPHYSICS. 

Substantiality  is,  then,  the  category  which  covers  our  knowl- 
edge, and  its  conviction,  respecting  a  "  real  subject "  of  those 
states  that  are  known  to  be  actual  states,  of  Things  or  Minds. 

This  real  subject  is  the  so-called  "  substance  "  whose  existence 
and  nature  have  been  the  cause  of  endless  metaphysical  debate. 
Critical  philosophy  must  first  of  all  strip  this  category  of  those 
misleading  figurative  conceptions  which  have  come  to  surround 
and  even  to  penetrate  it.  By  substance  we  cannot  fitly  mean 
to  designate  some  undifferentiated  material  or  spiritual  "  stuff  " 
out  of  which  (by  the  addition  of  "  form "  or  the  process  of 
differentiation)  the  concrete  realities  of  experience  are  produced. 
"  Atoms,"  if  known  to  be  really  existent  at  all,  are  (each  one) 
concrete  individual  substances  in  possession,  as  it  were,  of  a 
full  complement  of  qualities.  And  by  so-called  "  mind-stuff  " 
nothing  that  is  known  or  knowable  can  be  designated  except 
the  mental  abstraction  which  the  thinker  chooses  this  uncouth 
term  to  represent.  There  is  no  known  or  conceivable  substance 
(real  subject  of  states)  in  general ;  there  really  is  only  the 
known  or  knowable  individual  subjects  of  actual  states. 

We  may  indeed  speak  intelligibly  of  a  so-called  "  universal 
substance."  But,  if  so,  we  must  mean  to  designate  by  this  term 
that  concrete  reality  which  may  be,  or  must  be,  regarded  as  the 
subject  of  all  states.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the 
popular  impression,  which  tends  to  picture  some  core  of  reality 
as  contained  in  all  things,  or  as  underlying  and  supporting 
them  all,  results  from  the  natural  mythology  of  the  knowing 
mind.  It  is  the  inevitable  product  of  the  attempt  to  represent 
in  terms  of  sensation  that  which  is  known  as  indeed  implicated 
in  sense-perception,  but  is  not  to  be  given  to  thought  in  terms 
of  sensation.  Human  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of  being 
that  is  both  sensuous  and  metaphysical.  The  very  word  "  sub- 
ject "  is  itself  this  embodied  figure  of  speech. 

NT  or  is  critical  philosophy  satisfied  to  substitute  for  the  term 
"  substance,"  as  giving  all  it  implies  respecting  reality,  such 
phrases  as  that  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  so  celebrated  in  English 


METAPHYSICS.  233 

philosophy ;  namely,  "  permanent  possibility  of  sensation." 1 
This  celebrated  phrase,  if  by  it  we  understand  nothing  more 
than  the  declaration  that  with  every  mental  representation  of  a 
thing  we  may  also  experience  the  expectation  of  a  possible 
repetition  of  a  certain  series  or  group  of  sensation-complexes, 
may  be  taken  for  what  it  is  worth  in  the  region  of  descriptive 
psychology.  As  a  specimen  of  reflective  analysis  in  meta- 
physics, the  dictum  can  scarcely  be  called  successful.  For  so 
far  as  it  attempts  to  explicate  the  notion  of  substance  at  all,  it 
only  somewhat  vaguely  repeats  this  notion.  That  "  substance  " 
is  indeed  "  the  permanent,"  in  contrast  with  changing  states,  is 
a  statement  sufficiently  familiar  to  Metaphysics.  That  sub- 
stance is  to  be  regarded  as  the  potentiality  of  states,  is  a  dec- 
laration involving  not  only  the  category  of  substantiality,  but 
also  that  of  causality.  That  it  is  the  "  permanent  possibility 
of  sensation,"  is  a  decided  under-statement  of  the  legitimate 
conclusions  from  all  our  experience ;  for  it  limits  the  real 
being  and  causal  action  of  the  subject  of  the  states  to  the 
potential  production  of  a  limited  kind  of  changes  in  us  (and 
these  of  the  purely  subjective  order  called  "  sensation" ).  But 
the  question  recurs :  What  is  permanent  and  potential  of  future 
states  ?  Certainly  not  the  sensations  themselves,  and  not  the 
expectations  of  a  possible  recurrence ;  for  both  of  these  are 
fleeting,  and  impotent  to  produce,  in  reality,  any  changes  at  all. 
It  is  to  this  "  subject "  of  the  states  that  we  attribute  the  per- 
manence, and  also  the  potentiality,  of  all  present  and  future 
states. 

Further  and  still  negatively,  we  never  envisage  or  otherwise 
know,  in  its  naked  simplicity  as  it  were,  this  "  permanent 
potentiality,"  this  subject  of  the  states,  the  so-called  substance, 
whether  physical  or  psychical.  It  can  only  be  said  to  be  known 
as  necessarily  implicated  to  reason,  present  and  actually  exis- 
tent in  every  object  known.  It  is  envisaged  only  as  an  object 
known  to  be  in  some  particular  state.     Neither  can  it  be  said 

1  An  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  chap.  xi. 


234  METAPHYSICS. 

to  be  known  as  the  result  of  reasoning  alone.  It  is  true  that 
thought  is  implied  in  all  knowledge  of  the  really  existent ;  and 
that  all  such  knowledge  conies  to  the  individual  as  the  result 
of  a  development.  Knowledge  of  the  really  existent  follows 
upon  processes  of  psychical  analysis  and  synthesis  which  we 
may  feel  obliged  to  describe  as  involving  instinctive  inference. 
But  it  is  also  true  that  knowledge  is  the  basis  and  guarantee  of 
all  that  we  more  properly  call  "  thought,"  so  far  as  it  implicates 
reality.  No  knowledge  of  the  really  existent  is  possible  that 
is  not  rooted  in  the  immediate  cognitions  and  convictions  of 
self-consciousness  and  sense-perception. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  seem  that  for  this  primary 
knowledge,  in  both  of  its  two  forms,  the  category  of  substance 
is  expressive  only  of  a  vague  (and,  we  may  even  say,  "  blind  ") 
yet  inevitable  belief  that  there  is  the  really  existent.  This 
belief,  as  yet  undefined  and  inexplicable  as  to  its  origin  and 
significance,  enters  into  all  perception  and  into  all  self- 
consciousness.  It  so  characterizes  these  processes  that  they 
are  processes  of  knowledge,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  con- 
sider them  as  mere  successive  acts  of  mental  representation. 
It  clings  to  all  the  further  elaboration  of  knowledge  by  science 
and  philosophy.  It  binds  the  workman  in  these  fields  to  the 
persuasion  that  the  object  of  his  labors  is  not  mere  seeming 
{Schein).  It  reappears  under  a  variety  of  terms,  from  the 
Ding-an-sicli  of  Kant  —  which,  even  if  we  regard  it  as  the  re- 
sult of  merely  negative  thinking,  is  no  less,  prized  and  cherished 
in  positive  conviction  —  to  Mill's  "  permanent  possibility "  of 
sensation.  It  may  seem  an  exceedingly  slender  thread,  so  far 
as  content  goes,  but  it  appears  strong  and  important  enough 
when  we  make  it  serve  to  connect  us  with  the  world  of  reality, 
—  with  those  subjects  of  states  which  we  called  "  Things,"  and 
"Souls,"  and  "God." 

But  why  not,  it  may  be  asked,  consign  this  category  of  sub- 
stantiality, once  and  forever,  to  its  appropriate  place  in  the 
"  death-kingdom"  of  abstract  and  negative  thoughts  ?     To  this 


METAPHYSICS.  235 

question  we  may  reply,  first,  we  could  not  if  we  would.  It 
refuses  to  be  oanished  ;  it  refuses  to  die.  Metaphysics  must  at 
least  recognize  it  as  a  persistent  and  invincible,  if  blind,  belief  ; 
and  also  as  a  belief  which  so  enters  into  all  knowledge  as  to 
make  knowledge,  in  distinction  from  mere  mental  representation, 
a  possible  thing.  But  we  may  reply,  second  :  We  would  not  if 
we  could.  For  further  elaboration  of  the  category  of  substan- 
tiality, as  conjoined  with  the  other  categories,  and  so  making 
possible  and  valid  the  scientific  and  philosophical  extensions  of 
knowledge,  shows  it  to  have  an  incomparable  significance  and 
value.  Even  in  general  metaphysics  we  shall  be  obliged  again 
to  refer  to  what,  of  an  ideal  character,  is  implied  in  this 
category. 

Quality  (or  attribute)  is  a  term  which  we  apply  to  a  gen- 
eralization from  repeatedly  recurring  similar  states  of  a  subject 
conceived  of  as  the  same.  The  truth  implicated  in  the  primary 
fact  of  knowledge  is  this,  that  the  act  of  knowing  and  the 
object  known  are  always  mutually  defined  in  the  one  fact  of 
knowledge.  The  act  of  knowing  is  a  knowing  of  this  rather 
than  some  other  object ;  the  object  known  —  to  declare  the  same 
truth  from  another  point  of  view  —  is  known  as  this  rather 
than  some  other  object.  The  psychological  account  of  the 
genesis  and  nature  of  knowledge  must,  at  this  point,  again  call 
attention  to  the  truth  that  all  knowing  involves  memory  and 
the  so-called  relating  faculty.  Metaphysics  marks  the  funda- 
mental and  essential  form  of  knowledge  as  implicating  being, 
by  its  doctrine  of  the  category  of  quality. 

In  reality,  however,  there  are  no  qualities  or  attributes ;  in 
reality  there  are  only  the  present  concrete  and  definite  states  of 
the  subjects  called  Things  or  Minds.  In  reality  also  —  as  will  be 
further  explained  later  —  by  the  "states"  we  can  understand 
only  the  concrete  and  definite  "  modes  of  the  behavior  "  (to  em- 
ploy a  term  of  Lotze's,  which,  though  figurative,  as  all  terms  for 
the  categories  must  be,  is  nevertheless  expressive  of  the  truth) 
of  the   real  subjects  themselves.     The  repeated   recurrence  of 


236  METAPHYSICS. 

similar  modes  of  behavior  progressively  defines  to  knowledge 
what  is  the  object  known.  Quality  is  the  "  what-sort-ness  "  of 
the  object  as  known.  But  by  that  instinctive  metaphysics 
which  enters  into  all  knowledge,  the  recurring  modes  of  the 
behavior  of  the  object  are  ascribed  to  the  potential  nature  of 
the  object  regarded  as  a  "  Thing."  The  real  subject  of  the 
states  is  not  simply  posited  with  an  indefinite  faith  in  its  bare 
existence,  but  as  definitively  known  by  its  own  modes  of  be- 
havior. It  is  known  as  really  having  qualities  or  attributes 
which  define  it  as  related  to  other  more  or  less  similarly  con- 
stituted things.  Obviously,  in  this  metaphysical  realization  of 
states  and  subjects  of  states,  the  categories  of  causality  and 
relation  are  again  involved. 

Causality  is  the  category  under  which  metaphysics  brings  all 
application  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  to  the  world  of 
reality.  We  have  already  seen  that  this  principle,  as  neces- 
sarily employed  in  the  elaboration  of  knowledge  by  processes 
of  conscious  reasoning,  guarantees  only  the  consistency  of  the 
system  of  mental  representations.  What  we  call  "  pure  sci- 
ence," and  indeed  all  science  regarded  as  cut  loose  from  either 
naive  or  intelligent  metaphysics,  goes  no  farther  than  this. 
What  we  call  pure  science  is  then  only  a  systematic  and  logical 
arrangement  of  abstract  conceptions  ;  the  purer  it  becomes, 
the  farther  does  it  remove  from  reality,  which  is  always  con- 
cretely manifold,  beyond  the  power  of  all  the  combined  sciences 
adequately  to  describe  it.  Furthermore,  the  claims  of  the  purest 
science  to  be  science  at  all,  depend  upon  its  valid  application  of 
this  principle  of  causality,  as  a  principle  of  thinking,  to  the 
ultimate  facts  of  knowledge.  It  is  this  which  distinguishes 
science  from  consistent  and  logical  dream-life,  if  such  there  be. 
Therefore,  when  we  examine  the  grounds  on  which  all  science 
reposes  its  claim  to  extend  the  realm  of  knowledge,  we  find  this 
category  involved  in  them. 

All  the  talk  of  science  touching  "  forces  "  (or  modes  and 
degrees  of  energy),  "causes,"  "action,"  "influence,"  "laws,"  etc., 


METAPHYSICS.  237 

is  symbolical.  The  symbols  do  not  clearly  express  the  true  find- 
ings of  the  reflective  analysis  of  facts  of  knowledge.  It  belongs 
to  that  branch  of  philosophical  discipline  which  we  call  the 
Philosophy  of  Nature,  more  specifically  to  point  this  out. 
There,  too,  if  anywhere,  must  we  expect  to  find  stated  the  true 
significance  of  these  terms.  None  of  them,  however,  can  claim 
to  give  the  essential  meaning  of  the  primary  fact  of  knowledge. 
In  this  fact  the  reality  of  causality  is  found  implicated  as  a 
persuasion  that  the  states  of  the  self-knowing  subject  and  of  the 
object  known — that  all  states,  indeed  —  have  their  origin  in 
the  reality  of  the  subject  of  the  states.  States  can  never  be 
known  or  conceived  of  as  passing  over  from  one  subject  to 
another.  Neither  is  any  real  transaction  defined  or  expressed 
by  declarations  concerning  the  "  influence "  of  one  thing  upon 
another,  or  of  one  mind  upon  another,  —  beyond  the  further 
limitation  of  that  causal  relation  in  which  every  real  subject 
stands  to  its  own  states.  To  be  sure,  we  are  obliged  here  to 
introduce  a  possibly  indefinite  expansion  of  our  application  of 
the  category  of  causality  in  our  knowledge  of  reality. 

Suppose  (as  is  indeed  true,  and  were  it  not  true,  experience 
and  especially  science  would  be  impossible)  that  we  observe 
everywhere  evidences  that  certain  changes  of  states  of  different 
so-called  real  beings  (e.  g.,  X  and  Y)  occur  together  in  a  fixed 
order.  Accordingly,  we  say  that  the  being  X  depends,  for 
its  passing  through  the  succession  of  its  states  a,  b,  c,  d,  e, 
etc.,  upon  the  being  Y  passing  through  the  states  a,  /?,  <y,  S,  e, 
etc. ;  or  the  latter  is  the  cause  of  the  former.  By  "cause,"  in 
this  use  of  the  word,  we  mean  to  state  something  more  than 
the  observed  general  fact  that  the  changes  occur  in  a  fixed 
order;  we  mean  to  state  that  the  changes  in  one  being  deter- 
mine the  changes  in  another  being.  But  here  again  that  which 
determines  —  the  ground  of  the  related  changes  —  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  changes  themselves,  nor  in  aught  of  the  nature  of 
"  influence  "  or  "  force  "  so  called,  that  passes  between  them.  In 
reality  there  is  the  fact  of  the  changes  of  one  being,  and  the 


238  METAPHYSICS. 

fact  of  the  changes  of  the  other  being ;  in  each  case  the  word 
"  causality,"  as  representative  of  a  real  relation,  applies  primarily 
to  the  subject  of  the  changes  and  its  changing  states. 

When  then  we  endeavor  to  apply  the  conception  of  causality 
in  reality  to  an  entire  system  of  changes,  regarded  as  recipro- 
cally determining,  a  wonderful  kind  of  postulate  with  reference 
to  the  real  nature  of  the  subject  of  these  changes  seems  to 
become  necessary.  It  seems  to  become  necessary  to  regard 
them  all  as  changes  of  one  real  subject,  whose  states  they 
are.  Only  in  this  way  does  it  appear  possible  to  realize, 
as  it  were,  the  mystery  of  the  general  fact  of  all  knowl- 
edge ;  of  the  fact,  namely,  that  the  changes  of  states  of  one 
thing  or  mind  determine  the  changes  of  states  of  another 
thing  or  mind.  To  the  examination  and  criticism  of  such 
an  apparently  justifiable  postulate  as  this  a  large  measure 
of  metaphysical  philosophy  may  fitly  be  devoted.  For  the 
postulate  has  an  important  bearing  on  other  of  the  categories 
customarily  named.  It  is  also  seen  on  further  consideration 
to  lie  at  the  base  of  that  "  Unity  of  Nature  "  of  which  we  hear 
so  much  (that  is,  if  this  unity  is  a  unity  that  has  reality  and 
is  more  than  a  transitory  unifying  actus  of  the  imagination  of 
the  individual  mind) ;  and  it  certainly  forms  the  very  core 
of  the  supreme  Unity  of  Reality  which  the  philosophy  of  re- 
ligion seeks  to  explicate.  We  shall  therefore  have  further 
occasion  to  refer  to  this  category  of  causality. 

Relation  is  a  term  which  covers,  in  the  most  absolutely  uni- 
versal manner,  all  knowledge  of  reality.  We  may  indeed  find 
fault  with  Lotze  for  insisting  that  "  to  be "  =  "  to  stand  in 
relations."  For  if  by  "  being "  we  mean  "  being  in  reality," 
then  it  is  indeed  true  that  all  real  beings  are  actually  related ; 
but  it  is  not  a  true,  because  an  insufficient,  description  of  the 
content  of  our  notion  of  real  being,  to  say  that  it  is  equivalent 
to  the  one  category  of  relation.  But  if  by  "  being  "  we  do  not 
mean  to  designate  reality,  then  we  may  as  well  say  with  Hegel 
that  it  equals  "  Nothing,"  as  to  say  with  Lotze  that  it  equals 


METAPHYSICS.  239 

"  to  stand  in  relations."  With  Lotze,  however,  as  against  Hegel 
and  Herbart  alike,  we  must  insist  upon  the  truth,  that  the 
content  of  real  being  is  not  =  "  to  be  unrelated "  (whether 
called  "  pure  being  "  or  "  simple  position  ") ;  but  on  the  con- 
trary, unrelated  real  being  is  a  contradiction  in  terms. 

As  a  category,  relation  can  neither  be  defined  nor  simplified 
by  reduction  to  more  primary  terms.  The  analysis  of  the  most 
primary  fact  of  knowledge  finds  the  category  always  implied  as 
belonging  to  the  really  existent.  In  knowledge  itself,  regarded 
as  a  psychical  act  or  process,,  there  is  involved  the  relation  of 
subject  and  object.  In  the  subject  of  knowledge  and  its  chan- 
ging states,  there  is  involved  that  peculiar  relation  which  we 
have  called  real  cause,  or  ground.  But;  on  the  other  hand, 
causality  cannot  be  reduced  to  mere  relation.  Between  the 
states  there  are  always  implied  relations  of  similarity  or  dis- 
similarity, of  sequence,  etc.  So  true  is  it  that  "to  know  is 
to  relate ; "  and  that  the  very  essential  content  of  that  being, 
which  all  that  is  really  existent  has,  involves  the  actuality  of 
relations. 

Other  more  complicated  and  yet  irreducible  forms  of  knowl- 
edge, that  are  also  forms  of  being  as  given  in  each  most  primary 
fact  of  knowledge,  are  discovered  by  the  analysis  which  meta- 
physics undertakes.  Two  of  these  are  the  categories  of  Change 
and  Number.  Every  being  that  we  know,  or  conceive  of,  as 
really  existent  is  a  "  substance,"  a  ground  of  states,  in  relation  to 
other  reality.  This  implies  that  every  being  is  known  as  the  real 
subject  of  actual  change,  and  as  a  unity  of  discrete  manifoldness  ; 
that  is,  as  having  number.  Substantiality,  quality,  causality, 
relation,  are  categories  that  imply,  but  are  not,  the  categories  of 
change  and  number.  As  the  subject  of  its  own  states,  and  as 
related  to  other  subjects  of  states,  every  real  existence  is  capa- 
ble of  change  ;  so,  and  only  so,  is  every  real  existence  a  unity 
implying  manifoldness,  a  being  falling  under  the  category  of 
number. 

Change  belongs  to  reality ;  this  declaration  follows  from  an 


240  METAPHYSICS. 

analysis  of  the  primary  fact  of  knowledge.  Iu  so  far  as  it  is 
possible  to  regard  those  objects  of  perception  which  we  call 
"  Things  "  as  without  extra-mental  being,  and  thus  as  owing 
the  reality  they  have  to  the  fact  that  our  expectation  of  the 
"  permanent  possibility  of  sensation  "  accompanies  and  fuses  with 
the  actual  processes  of  sensation,  it  is  possible  also  to  regard 
all  changes  called  "  physical  phenomena "  as  not  extra-mental, 
as  unreal.  It  is  also  possible  to  hold  that  all  changes  in  ex- 
ternal nature  so-called  are  but  the  expressions  in  us  of  the  action 
of  beings  who  are  not  themselves  the  subjects  of  like  change. 
It  is  even  possible  to  resolve  the  entire  ground  in  reality  of  the 
apparent  changes  of  external  nature  into  the  changes  of  posi- 
tion in  space  of  physical  beings  whose  interior  states  remain 
unchanged.  Something  like  this  modern  physics  attempts  when 
it  tries  to  account  for  all  physical  phenomena,  as  due  to  the 
motions  of  atoms  that  have  unchanging  natures  and  undergo 
no  changes  of  interior  states.  But  all  such  theories  at  most, 
as  says  Lotze,1  "  can  only  suffice  to  eliminate  from  external 
nature  any  change  in  reality  itself,  and  to  reduce  it  to  mere 
variation  in  relations  (to  us  as  percipient  minds)  ;  no  less, 
on  the  contrary,  but  the  more  inevitably,  must  an  actual  in- 
terior changeableness  find  a  place  for  itself  in  that  real  being 
for  which,  as  for  the  perceiving  subject,  the  above-mentioned 
appearance  of  an  objective  change  is  assumed  to  originate." 

We  may  fitly  go  much  beyond  the  theories  just  mentioned, 
however,  in  claiming  an  indubitable  knowledge  of  the  reality 
of  change.  This  category  is  known  to  apply  to  the  entire  world 
of  things.  The  truth  of  the  statement  is  implied  in  the  fact  of 
the  knowledge  of  things.  For  to  be  a  "  Thing "  is  to  be  the 
subject,  not  of  one  state,  but  of  various  states ;  that  is,  to  be 
the  subject  of  change.  In  so  far,  then,  as  perception  is  the 
knowledge  of  things,  it  is  the  knowledge  of  a  substance  chan- 
ging its  states.  This  confidence,  which  belongs  to  the  earlier 
condition  of  the  ordinary  knowledge  of  nature,  attends  the  whole 

1  Grundziige  der  Metaphysic,  §  32. 


METAPHYSICS.  241 

theory  of  modern  physics  as  to  the  constitution  of  the  world 
of  things.  Physics,  to  be  sure,  affirms  that  the  real  subjects 
of  all  the  changes  in  this  world  of  things  are  the  so-called 
"  atoms."  But  the  atoms  themselves  are  said  to  have  un- 
changeable natures,  because  they  are  found  unchangeably  (that 
is  uniformly,  so  far  as  experience  reaches)  to  behave,  under 
similar  circumstances,  in  similar  ways.  The  one  kind  of  change 
in  these  elements  of  material  reality  which  physical  theory 
recognizes  is  motion.  To  unfold  the  content  of  this  concep- 
tion, in  its  application  to  reality,  belongs  to  the  philosophy 
of  nature. 

Yet  again,  the  validity  of  that  view  of  nature  to  which  all 
the  scientific  knowledge  of  the  modern  age  stands  most  com- 
pletely pledged,  and  upon  which  it  has  (however  rashly)  risked 
its  claim  to  confidence  with  the  multitudes  for  a  century  to 
come,  depends  upon  the  reality  of  change.  We  refer  of  course 
to  the  theory  of  evolution.  What  a  vast  amount  of  metaphys- 
ics—  much  of  it  crude  and  over-confident  enough  surely — is 
involved  in  this  scientific  theory !  As  a  scientific  theory,  phi- 
losophy cannot  assume  the  place  of  a  judge  over  its  claims.  As 
involving  a  philosophy  of  nature,  however,  the  theory  must 
enter  the  lists  with  other  contestants  for  the  place  of  suprem- 
acy, asking  and  giving  no  favors,  but  relying  upon  the  careful 
application  of  philosophical  method  to  whatever  of  well-founded 
scientific  generalizations  it  can  produce.  But  a  metaphysics  of 
evolution  is  impossible  without  admitting  the  reality  of  change 
in  external  nature.  Indeed,  the  theory  of  evolution  is  nothing, 
if  not  a  descriptive  history  of  change.  Is  this  history  simply 
a  history  of  the  growth  of  human  knowledge;  or  is  it  a  his- 
tory of  an  evolution  of  nature,  —  of  the  really  existent  object 
of  knowledge  ?  If  the  principle  of  "  Becoming  "  had,  since  the 
days  of  Heraclitus,  and  until  lately,  fallen  at  all  from  its  su- 
preme position  among  the  eternal  ideas,  it  has  surely  been 
reinstated  by  the  modern  theory  of  evolution. 

Modern  psychology,  making  use  of  experiment  and  the  genetic 

16 


242  METAPHYSICS. 

method  of  study,  looks  upon  each  so-called  state  of  conscious- 
ness, as  well  as  upon  the  entire  history  of  every  soul,  in  the 
light  of  development.     A  state  that  is  statical,   merely   state, 
does  not  exist.     Psychical  reality  would  seem  to  be  conceived 
of  as  existing  in  a  rigid  form,  if  we  judge  the  case  by  much  ofc 
the  language  which  lingers  in  works  on  logic  and  psychology. 
But  in  reality  no  "rigid"  state  of  consciousness  actually  exists, 
or  can  exist,  —  not  even  in  the  minds  of  the  writers  of  the 
works  who  discourse  upon  it.     Neither  is  the  conscious  life  of 
mind  to  be  symbolized  as  a  constantly  flowing  stream,  so  thin 
as  to  admit  of  not  more  than  a  drop  or  two  of  water  side  by 
side  within  its  banks.     The  rather  is  it  like  a  kaleidoscope 
kept  turning,  now  more  slowly,  and  now  more  swiftly,  some- 
times with  a  steady,  and  sometimes  with  an  unsteady  hand ; 
sometimes,   too,   the   field  is  in  obscurity  amounting   to   quite 
total  darkness,  and  sometimes   in   wonderfully  brilliant   light. 
But  however  we  account  for  the  varying  rate  or  scope  of  con- 
sciousness, and   however   we   figuratively  represent   its    facts, 
the  one  fact  of  knowledge  at  all  involves  the  reality  of  change. 
To  say  "  I  think  "  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  movement, 
which  belongs  to  all  psychical  life,  is  realizing  itself.     Not  to 
change  in  reality  is  not  to  think  at  all.     The  mental  picture  of 
an  unchanging  being,  could  we  frame  such  a  picture,  would  be 
the  equivalent  of  no  real  being;  it  would  not  even  be  equal 
to  the  seeming  to  be   (Schcin) ;   it  would   be   equal   only    to 
nothing,  to  no  being  at  all  {Niclits). 

From  the  days  of  the  Eleatics  to  those  of  Hegel's  subtle 
dialectic,  plentiful  oppositions,  contradictions,  and  dilemmas 
have  been  discovered  by  metaphysics  in  the  conception  of 
reality  as  the  subject  of  change.  But  the  oppositions,  contra- 
dictions, or  dilemmas  are  specious  rather  than  real ;  and  the 
solution  of  them  belongs  to  logic  rather  than  to  metaphysics. 
They  consist  in  thinking  obscurely ;  they  do  not  belong  to 
the  knowledge  of  reality.  The  reasons  for  their  origin  and 
persistence  are  chiefly  twofold,  —  the  same  reasons  which  have 


METAPHYSICS.  243 

given  origin  and  persistence  to  the  old-time  puzzles  of  Achilles 
and  the  tortoise,  of  the  arrow  always  flying  and  yet  at  each 
moment  at  rest,  and  to  similar  logical  curiosities.  One  of  these 
reasons  is  found  in  the  attempt  to  bring  the  category  of  sub- 
stantiality under  the  terms  of  sensuous  imagination,  or  of  — 
what  Hegel  called  —  "figurate  conception."  The  other  is  the 
paralogism  so  frequent  in  "  pure "  science,  which  consists  in 
forming  by  generalizations  from  experience  a  highly  abstract 
conception,  elaborating  it  by  processes  of  thinking,  and  then 
covertly  introducing  into  its  alleged  application  the  very  factors 
drawn  from  reality,  which  the  process  of  abstraction  had  agreed 
to  disregard.  Instead  then  of  dwelling  upon  the  cheap  logical 
puzzles  connected  with  the  inquiry,  for  example,  how  real  and 
pure  being  can  remain  self-identical  and  yet  pass  over  into 
other  being,  etc.,  metaphysics  notes  the  factor  ("  moment ") 
of  change  as  essentially  belonging  to  all  real  being.  Every 
thing  and  every  mind  which  answers  the  question,  What  is  it 
really  to  be  ?  does  so  in  the  actuality  of  a  living  and  inter- 
related movement,  does  so  not  as  statical  and  pure  being,  or 
as  being  with  unchanging  relations  and  states,  but  as  a  suc- 
cession of  changes  realized. 

A  real  unity  of  the  actually  manifold  is  also  implied  in  every 
primary  fact  of  knowledge.  Hence  the  so-called  category  of 
Number,  as  implying  oneness  and  manifoldness  belonging  ac- 
tually to  all  that  really  exists.  This  primary  fact  of  knowl- 
edge, in  its  subjective  aspect,  implies  a  dividing  and  a  unifying 
actus  as  entering  essentially  into  every  act  of  knowing.  It  is 
customary  to  point  out  that  knowledge  implies  analysis  and 
synthesis.  Rightly  understood,  the  statement  is  true.  But 
such  analysis  and  synthesis  as  belong  essentially  to  all  know- 
ing cannot  be  identified  With  those  conscious  and  voluntary 
processes  which  we  call  by  these  terms.  A  description  of 
the  psychical  processes  themselves  serves  to  show  how  it  is 
that  we  number  things  and  build  up  abstract  systems  of  knowl- 
edge in  the"  discussion  of  that  conception  of  "  discrete  manifold- 


244  METAPHYSICS. 

ness  "  with  which  mathematics  deals.  Such  an  elaboration  of 
knowledge  is  made  possible,  however,  only  by  the  nature  of  the 
primary  fact  of  knowledge.  In  this  fact  the  reality  of  change 
is  shown  to  belong  to  the  very  life,  so  to  speak,  of  the  subject 
of  change.  It  implies  the  act  of  separating  and  uniting  as  an 
integral  factor  in  that  process  of  self-realization  which  the  act 
of  knowledge  is. 

In  its  objective  aspect,  as  the  being  known,  the  fact  of 
knowledge  involves  the  same  category.  Every  object  of  knowl- 
edge is  necessarily  one  and  yet  manifold,  —  a  being  exhibiting  its 
qualities,  as  it  were,  in  changing  relations  to  other  beings  and 
in  a  succession  of  changing  states.  As  substantial  and  real 
cause,  every  being  is  necessarily  regarded  as  a  unity  ;  as  having 
changing  states  and  entering  into  changed  relations,  it  is  neces- 
sarily regarded  as  manifold.  It  is,  then,  a  unity  of  the  mani- 
fold. If  not  the  former,  then  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  real ; 
and  if  not  the  latter,  then  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  this  being 
rather  than  some  other  being,  and  is  reduced  to  the  condition  of 
an  "abstract  being,  of  a  "  pure  "  being  =  nothing. 

The  system  of  thinking  ascribed  to  Pythagoras,  which  found 
in  number  the  one  formal  principle  of  all  that  really  is,  seems 
fanciful  enough  to  modern  thought.  But  like  the  Eleatic  phi- 
losophy, and  the  philosophy  of  Heraclitus,  it  seized  upon  one  of 
the  categories  and,  misunderstanding  its  nature,  elevated  it  to 
the  place  of  supreme  and  absolute  sovereignty.  That  its  prin- 
ciple was  a  principle  indeed,  and  so  entitled  to  a  place  in  the 
system  of  metaphysics,  because  implicated  in  all  knowledge  of 
reality,  does  not  admit  of  doubt.  All  that  is  known  as  real, 
whether  of  "  Things  "  or  of  "  Minds,"  whether  in  the  intuition 
of  perception  and  self-consciousness,  or  by  the  elaborations  of 
science,  is  both  one  and  manifold.  There  is  no  unity  in 
reality,  no  one  real  being,  that  is  not  also  manifold  in  respect 
of  its  changing  relations  and  states.  There  is  no  actual  mani- 
foldness  of  relations  and  states  that  does  not  implicate  a  unity 
of  some  real   being ;    there  is  no  multiplicity  of   real   beings 


METAPHYSICS.  245 

that  does  not  involve  a  unity  in  reality  of  the  world  of  such 
beings. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  two  foregoing  categories,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  avoid  the  confession  that  the  vague  character  of  the 
category  of  substantiality  exercises  upon  us  a  constant  influence. 
Change  is  real ;  and  the  real  is  always  manifold,  and  yet  one. 
But  change  without  limit  is  never  known  as  real ;  indeed  the 
very  attempt  to  conceive  of  absolutely  limitless  change  in  that 
which  is  really  existent  ends  in  the  irrational  and  the  absurd. 
Neither  can  the  unlimitedly  manifold  realize  itself  as  one. 

What,  then,  is  it  that  limits  change,  —  what  but  the  subject  of 
the  changes  ?  What  is  it  that,  as  it  were,  connects  into  a  unity 
the  otherwise  wholly  discrete  manifold,  but  the  one  "  Ground  " 
of  the  many  connected  elements  ?  We  may  call  this  cause  of 
the  limitation  by  the  terms  "  nature,"  or  "  character,"  or  "  es- 
sence," or  by  some  other  similar  term.  We  may  speak  of  the 
nature  of  each  particular  thing  or  species  of  things ;  of  the 
nature  even  of  the  atoms,  —  those  hypothetical  elements  of  ma- 
terial reality  out  of  which  scientific  thinking  aims  to  build  up 
the  unities  that  particular  things  are,  as  well  as  the  Unity  of 
the  universe  of  things.  We  may  also  ascribe  a  nature  or  char- 
acter to  souls,  whether  of  men  or  of  the  lower  animals  ;  we  may 
even  carry  this  important  fiction  over  into  the  phenomena  of 
the  life  of  plants.  But  by  all  these  terms  we  simply  introduce, 
in  disguised  form,  an  amplification  of  essentially  the  same  fac- 
tor of  all  knowledge  to  which  the.  name  of  "  substance "  has 
been  given.  "  "Nature  "  and  "  character,"  -  -  this  signifies  the 
sum-total  of  the  unchanging  norms  or  modes  of  the  behavior 
of  the  subject  of  the  changing  relations  and  states. 

It  may  be,  however,  that  we  try,  in  the  interests  of  scientific 
clearness  and  accuracy,  to  describe  our  knowledge  of  reality 
by  a  more  popular  and  attractive  phrase.  It  is  the  fashion  in 
these  days  to  talk  much  of  "law,"  or  of  "uniformity  of  nature," 
as  a  general  expression  for  the  presence  everywhere  of  the  so- 
called   "  reign   of  law."     This  conception  is   thus  made  a  cate- 


246  METAPHYSICS. 

goiy ;  nay,  it  is  hypostasized  and  even  deified.  Law  is  every- 
where ;  law  reigns,  controls,  compels,  forbids,  produces  ;  it  sits 
'•  over  "  or  "  between  "  or  "  underneath  "  the  real  beings,  and 
compels  them  unceasingly  to  feel  and  to  acknowledge  its  po- 
tent sway.  But  nothing  exactly  corresponding  to  this  word 
"  law  "  belongs  to  the  realm  of  real  existences  as  a  something 
related  to  them,  with  an  existence  of  its  own.  We  have  here 
to  deal  with  a  convenient  figure  of  speech  somewhat  similar  to 
that  which  we  employ  in  speaking  of  qualities  or  attributes  as 
though  they  were  actual  existences  attached  to  every  so-called 
"Thing."  In  its  subjective  aspect,  "law  "is  the  formula  pre- 
scribed to  the  movement  of  the  life  of  mind.  The  prescription 
is  as  follows :  You  may,  or  you  must,  think  the  changes  of  X 
and  the  changes  of  Y  as  reciprocally  dependent  in  the  following- 
more  or  less  definite  way.  In  its  subjective  aspect,  then,  every 
law  is  realized  only  as  the  actual  movement  of  a  knowing  mind. 
What  then  becomes  of  the  "laws  of  nature  "  and  of  that  general 
deference  to  a  fixed  order,  —  amounting,  in  the  estimate  of  mod- 
ern physical  science,  to  an  unswerving  obedience,  —  which  is 
called  the  "  uniformity  of  nature "  ?  Have  we  valid  reasons 
for  affirming  that  the  conformity  to  law  actually  belongs  to 
the  external  object  of  knowledge  ?  In  what  terms,  further- 
more, are  we  to  describe  that  content  of  the  really  Existent 
which  fixes  limits  to  the  changes  of  every  so-called  "  Thing," 
as  well  as  of  the  world  of  physical  reality  at  large  ? 

This  foregoing  problem  may  be  proposed  in  a  somewhat  dif- 
ferent way.  Anything,  —  called,  for  example,  X,  —  in  order 
really  to  be  a  "  Thing "  at  all,  must  be  the  subject  of  only 
such  changes  of  states  and  relations  as  belong  under  a  series 
Xa,  Xb,  Xc,  etc.  The  thing  called  Y,  in  order  also  really  to  be, 
must  be  the  subject  of  another  series,  Ya,  Yb,  Yc,  etc.  More- 
over, all  things,  taken  together  in  their  ceaselessly  changing 
states  and  relations  to  each  other,  must,  as  subjects  of  these 
states  and  relations,  observe  some  principles  of  reciprocal 
limitation,  in  order  that  the  world  as  an  orderly  and  beautiful 


METAPHYSICS.  247 

totality  may  really  exist.  To  say  this  is  to  claim  that  the 
causes  of  the  limitations  of  the  changes  are  to  be  found  in  the 
subjects  of  the  particular  series  of  changes ;  and,  since  the 
series  unite  in  higher  series,  the  claim  extends  itself  so  as  to 
take  in  a  total  unity,  in  that  one  subject  which  we  call  "  Na- 
ture" or  "  the  World."  But  how  can  these  particular  subjects 
of  change  maintain  their  relative  unity,  and  how  can  the  one 
subject  of  all  the  changes  maintain  its  absolute  unity,  except 
by  conformity  to  law? 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  analysis  of  general  metaphysics 
leaves  much  which  is  obscure  clinging  to  this  conception  of  a 
real  subject  of  the  changing  states.  How  can  each  particular 
subject  be  self-limiting  as  respects  its  own  changes,  and  yet 
related  to  other  real  subjects,  in  the  unity  of  one  "  Nature "  ? 
But  it  must  also  be  admitted,  it  seems  to  us,  that  the  analysis 
discloses  the  presence  of  another  category  which  is  needed  in 
order  to  give  the  complete  essence,  so  to  speak,  of  that  conception 
of  substantiality  to  which  we  found  a  sort  of  blind  but  inevita- 
ble attachment  in  every  fact  of  knowledge.  We  inquire,  then, 
after  a  suitable  expression  for  this  additional  factor  discovered 
by  the  analysis.  We  will  attempt  such  an  expression  by  lay- 
ing down  the  following  proposition :  Every  real  existence  is 
known  as  a  "  realized  idea."  But  no  one  using  such  a  phrase 
as  this  could  regard  it  as  marking  the  stage  of  clearest  and 
most  nearly  ultimate  analysis  of  that  strange  presupposition 
respecting  the  real  subject  of  changing  states  and  relations 
which  the  fact  of  knowledge  undoubtedly  implies.  Let  us 
then  confess  it :  the  phrase  is  figurative.  But  what  of  concep- 
tion or  belief  that  is  not  merely  "  figurate  "  does  this  phrase 
express  \  In  order  really  to  be,  every  subject  of  states  must 
be  self-limiting  of  its  own  states.  This  self-limitation  does 
not  have  respect  merely  to  the  number  of  the  states  actual  or 
possible.  The  manifold  states  must  also  be  so  realized  as 
accords   with    the  unity   of   an   idea.     What  is  true  of  every 


248  METAPHYSICS, 

grouping  or  series  of  states  is  true  of  all  the  more  manifold 
groups  and  series  of  the  relations  existing  in  the  reality  of  one 
World.  The  world  is  known  to  be  real  only  as  the  universal 
subject  of  all  the  states  and  relations  is  known  under  similar 
terms,  —  the  terms,  namely,  which  correspond  to  the  phrase,  a 
"  realized  Idea."  To  be  known  as  real  is  to  be  known  as  the 
ground  of  the  occurrence  of  the  states  and  relations,  in  con- 
formity to  an  idea. 

In  this  meaning  of  the  words,  therefore,  metaphysical  analy- 
sis discloses  the  category  of  "  Finality  "  (or  end)  as  necessarily 
involved  in  the  answer  to  the  question  :  What  is  it  really  to 
be  ?  The  judgment  which  states  the  belief  corresponding  to 
this  category  is  not :  Every  event  must  have  a  final  purpose ; 
or,  everything  must  be  constructed  according  to  some  (ex- 
traneous) idea ;  or,  the  whole  world  depends  on  final  purpose, 
or  shows  evidence  of  its  existence  everywhere.  These  proposi- 
tions may  be  true,  but  the  proof  of  them  is  not  categorical ;  it 
is  not  given  or  implicated  in  the  fact  of  knowledge  as  determin- 
ing the  content  of  the  object  really  known.  Neither  can  it  be 
claimed  that  every  primary  fact  of  knowledge  seems  to  involve 
the  cognition  and  belief  corresponding  to  the  term  "finality." 
The  knowledge  which  involves  this  category  seems,  in  some 
sort,  to  imply  a  larger  growth  of  experience  and  a  deepening 
of  the  reflective  insight  of  the  mind.  But  certainly  our  larger 
knowledge  of  a  World  of  Things  —  unities  of  the  manifold 
standing  in  a  regular  way  related  to  other  like  unities  — 
implies  finality.  And  this  is  true  whether  the  so-called  world 
be  that  of  the  most  primitive  savage  or  that  of  the  most  scien- 
tific and  philosophical  minds.  Knowledge  of  the  real  is  inter- 
pretation ;  and  interpretation  of  the  real  implies  the  actuali- 
zation of  the  ideal.  But  the  further  unfolding  of  this  truth 
belongs  to  subsequent  departments  of  philosophy. 

Two  other  categories,  or  norms  of  knowledge  determinative 
of  the  content  of  what  is  really  existent,  remain  to  be  men- 


METAPHYSICS.  249 

tioned.  They  are  Time  and  Space.  It  is  customary  to  dis- 
tinguish these  from  categories  like  the  foregoing  by  calling 
them  "  formal,"  or  by  introducing  the  discussion  of  them  (so 
Lotze)  in  the  cosmological  rather  than  the  ontological  division 
of  metaphysics.  The  distinction  thus  emphasized  undoubtedly 
exists.  It  is  not,  however,  in  our  judgment  a  sufficient  reason 
for  following  the'  common  custom.  To  be  a  subject  of  changing 
states  and  changing  relations,  whose  manifoldness  is  realized  in 
the  unity  of  an  idea,  —  this  it  is  to  be,  as  all  real  existences  are. 
I5ut  to  be  "  time,"  or  to  be  "  space ; "  or  even  to  be  the  subject  of 
time  or  space,  —  such  phrases  as  these  do  not  represent  fitly 
what  is  implied  in  our  knowledge  of  that  which  we  call  real. 

Our  experience  follows  norms  which  compel  us  to  drop  the 
preposition  "  of  "  and  make  use  of  the  preposition  "  in,"  when 
speaking  of  the  relation  of  real  existences  to  the  conceptions  of 
time  and  space.  Those  real  subjects  which  we  call  things  are 
said  to  be  known  as  existing  in  space ;  those  which  we  call 
minds,  as  well  as  those  which  we  call  things,  are  said  to  be 
known  as  existing  in  time.  It  would  seem  then  that  the 
reality  of  these  two  categories,  and  the  nature  of  the  relation 
in  which  all  real  existences  stand  to  them,  as  well  as  the 
manner  in  which  the  fact  of  knowledge  may  be  said  to  im- 
plicate them,  are  of  a  somewhat  special  kind. 

Metaphysics  does  not  need  to  show  that  Space  is  no  extra- 
mental  existence,  infinitely  spread  out  as  a  medium  in  which 
ready-made  particular  existences  called  things  can  be  con- 
veniently set.  The  sciences  of  psychology  and  of  physics  have 
now  effectually  disposed  of  theories  built  upon  any  remnant 
of  conceptions  so  crude  as  these  terms  imply.  The  elabora- 
tion of  knowledge  by  modern  physical  science  has  (it  claims) 
shown  that  the  real  correlate  of  that  which  is  perceived  as 
statical,  extended,  and  continuous,  is  an  indefinite  manifold- 
ness of  discrete  and  moving  beings,  that  are  not  only  imper- 
ceptible, but  are  also  unrepresentable  in  terms  of  the  sensuous 


250  METAPHYSICS. 

imagination.  When  then  we  inquire,  How  would  atoms  look 
or  feel  as  extended  in  space  ?  we  appear  to  be  asking :  How 
would  that  look  or  feel  which,  ex  hypothesi,  can  never  be  seen 
or  felt ;  or  how  would  that  seem  as  extended  to  sight  and 
touch  to  which  these  senses  have  no  conceivable  applicability 
whatever?  On  the  other  hand,  the  modern  psychology,  es- 
pecially by  following  the  methods  of  experimental  analysis 
and  speculative  construction,  has  led  to  similar  conclusions. 
It  has  rejected  the  old-time  distinction  of  the  attributes  of 
matter  into  primary  and  secondary,  as  not  implying  a  funda- 
mental difference  in  genesis  and  validity  ;  and  it  has  presented 
something  like  an  uninterrupted  history  of  the  conditions  on 
which,  and  the  processes  by  which,  the  perception  of  extended 
things  is  gained.  Nay,  more  ;  it  has  tried,  with  some  success, 
to  sketch  the  development  of  the  conceptions  of  the  spatial 
attributes  and  relations  of  things.  Psychology  cannot,  indeed, 
be  said  to  have  explained  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  space.  In 
all  its  attempts  at  explanation  it  comes  upon  the  necessity 
of  admitting  either  that  the  space-idea  as  a  formative  principle 
is  present  and  unaccounted  for ;  or  else,  that  it  is  necessary  at 
some  particular  point  in  the  evolution  of  sense-perception,  to 
introduce  it,  without  being  able  to  say  why  it  should  be  in- 
troduced at  just  that  point,  rather  than  some  other,  or  indeed 
why  it  should  be  introduced  at  all. 

For  these  reasons  the  metaphysical  analysis  of  the  content  of 
the  object  known  as  real  leads  to  the  recognition  of  space  as  a 
formative  principle  of  the  perceiving  mind.  Space  is  the  uni- 
versal and  necessary  mode  of  the  perception  of  things  by  the 
senses.  The  so-called  objects  of  sense  are  not  "  Things  "  until, 
or  unless,  they  are  perceived  in  this  form.  But  necessary  forms 
of  perception  by  the  senses  are  also  necessary  forms  of  repre- 
sentation in  all  sensuous  imagination,  and  in  all  "  figurate  "  con- 
ception. We  say,  then  :  all  things  are  necessarily  in  space. 
This  category  then  gives  the  content  of  the  real,  because  it 


METAPHYSICS.  251 

is  the  universal  and  necessary  mode  of  the  actual  process  of 
the  mind  in  knowing  all  physical  beings  by  the  senses. 

But  is  this  all  that  is  signified  by  so  much  as  there  is  of 
categorical  character  and  significance  belonging  to  space  ?  The 
cognitions  and  beliefs  implied  in  knowledge  seem  to  compel  us 
to  a  negative  answer.  The  subject  of  those  changing  states 
and  relations  which  we  know  as  "  not-ourselves "  maintains 
itself  as,  in  some  way,  the  extra-mental  ground  for  the  space- 
principle  of  the  perceiving  mind.  We  find  ourselves  compelled 
to  believe  and  say,  —  not  simply  all  things  are  perceived,  or  are 
mentally  representable,  only  as  in  space,  but  all  things  are  in 
space.  And  these  two  declarations  can  never  be  made  the 
exact  equivalents  of  each  other. 

So  often,  therefore,  as  the  conclusion  of  idealism  affirms,  on 
what  appear  the  best  of  grounds,  the  subjectivity  of  space,  so 
often  does  the  blind  instinctive  realism  which  lurks  in  every 
fact  of  knowledge  through  the  senses,  affirm  some  sort  of  extra- 
mental  reality  for  space.  What  mode  of  their  real  being  "  in 
space,"  considered  as  distinct  from  being  mentally  represented, 
the  subjects  of  physical  changes  and  relations  can  possibly 
have,  this  realism  cannot  say.  So  often  as  it  proposes  a  definite 
description,  the  #  idealistic  theory  convicts  it  of  the  folly  of 
trying  to  tell  us  how  things  would  look  and  feel,  if  nobody 
saw  or  felt  them  ;  how  they  would  appear  extended,  in  case 
they  appeared  to  nobody  at  all.  The  theory  of  the  subjec- 
tivity of  space  is,  therefore,  always  right  in  denying  all  such 
reality  to  the  so-called  "  intuitions "  of  spatial  properties  and 
relations  as  implies  that  these  intuitions  are  copies  of  somewhat 
existing,  that  is  not-mental,  and  yet  really  exists,  as  it  is  copied 
off  by  the  mental  process  itself.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ap- 
parent demonstration  that  space  is  merely  mental,  that  it  has 
no  ground  in  what  is  other  than  the  mind  "  intuiting  "  it,  can 
never  satisfy  our  minds.  If  any  answer  to  the  inquiry,  What 
that  is   not  grounded  in  the  perceiving  mind  is  the  reality  of 


252  METAPHYSICS. 

space  ?  is  ever  to  be  discovered,  it  must  come  through  the  ex- 
tension of  knowledge  by  science  and  philosophy.  If  we  know, 
even  partially,  what  the  reality  called  "  matter  "  is,  we  may  dis- 
cover in  it  the  answer,  at  least  in  part,  to  our  inquiry  after  the 
nature  of  the  reality  we  assign  to  space.  If  we  knew  fully 
what  matter  is,  we  should  have  the  complete  answer  to  this 
inquiry. 

The  general  metaphysical  discussion  of  the  category  Time 
corresponds  to  that  of  space.  The  similarity  is  such,  however, 
as  to  permit  of  several  important  differences.  The  likenesses 
and  unlikenesses  of  the  two  categories  in  their  relations  to 
reality  are  most  easily  brought  to  view  in  a  symbolical  way. 
But  to  psychology  does  it  chiefly  belong  to  discuss  the  "  line  of 
time "  and  the  "  line  of  space."  The  important  metaphysical 
difference  between  the  two  conceptions  —  time  and  space  —  is 
that  which  leads  us  to  apply  the  former  both  to  things  and 
to  minds  ;  while  it  requires  various  modifications  of  our  mean- 
ings if  we  attempt  to  apply  the  latter  to  minds  at  all.  Con- 
nected with  this  important  difference  is  another.  It  may  be 
stated  in  the  form  of  a  question  :  Do  we  not  so  know  things 
in  perception,  and  especially  the  mind  by  self-consciousness, 
as  to  affirm  that  they  and  it  must  be  in  time,  in  order  really 
to  be  at  all  ? 

It  is  plain  also  that  the  relation  of  time  to  the  other  cate- 
gories differs,  in  an  important  way,  from  that  of  space.  We 
find  nothing  in  our  knowledge  as  implying  substantiality, 
quality,  causality,  relation,  or  change  and  number,  that  makes 
these  conceptions  dependent,  as  it  were,  for  their  realization  on 
the  eatfra-mental  reality  of  space.  In  other  words,  reflective 
analysis  appears  to  give  us  no  ground  for  affirming  that  space 
is  necessary  to  the  reality  of  the  subject  of  changes  and  rela- 
tions, or  to  the  actuality  of  the  changes  and  relations.  But  the 
case  is  not  the  same  with  the  category  of  time.  The  subject  to 
be  the  real  ground  of  its  states  must  be  conceived  of  as  perma- 


METAPHYSICS.  253 

nent  in  time.  The  reality  of  change,  in  states  and  relations,  re- 
quires the  reality  of  time.  The  primary  fact  of  knowledge,  then, 
whether  as  perception  or  as  self-consciousness,  and  all  the  elab- 
oration of  knowledge  by  science  and  philosophy,  implicates  the 
reality  of  time.  What  further  can  be  meant  by  such  reality, 
and  how  it  is  implied  by  the  sciences  of  nature  and  of  mind, 
it  belongs  to  the  two  subdivisions  of  general  metaphysics  to 
discuss. 


CHAPTER    X. 

PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE   AND    PHILOSOPHY   OF  MIND. 

FOE  purposes  of  further  and  more  detailed  investigation 
the  general  inquiry,  What  is  the  content  of  that  object 
which  is  known  really  to  be  ?  divides  itself  into  two  branches. 
One  of  these  relates  to  the  system  of  things  which  we  call 
"  Nature,"  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  word  ;  the  other  relates 
to  those  objects  which  we  call  "  souls  "  or  "  minds."  This  two- 
fold division  of  the  problems  of  being  arises,  of  necessity,  in  the 
very  development  of  knowledge  itself ;  the  experience  on  which 
it  is  based  can  scarcely.be  said  to  be  divided  by  scientific  re- 
search or  by  philosophical  reflection.  It  is  rather  appropriate 
to  employ  the  phrase  just  given ;  and  to  say,  the  sum-total  of 
knowledge  "  divides  itself,"  as  a  primary  condition  of  knowl- 
edge, in  this  twofold  manner. 

As  to  the  possibility  of  uniting  in  one  system  the  two  halves 
of  reality  known,  whether  by  some  higher  intellectual  intuition, 
or  in  the  final  outcome  of  that  synthesis  which  philosophy  aims 
to  accomplish,  this  is  not  the  place  to  remark  at  length.  It 
has  already  been  assumed  that  the  reality  of  the  knowing  sub- 
ject as  object  to  itself,  and  the  reality  of  the  object  known  by 
the  subject  as  not-itself,  are  both  implicated  in  the  fact  of 
knowledge.  This  fact  then  is  itself  a  demonstration  of  the  pos- 
sibility, —  nay,  of  the  actuality,  —  of  some  sort  of  unity  between 
the  two.  The  process  of  knowledge  is  such  a  unifying  actus. 
At  the  same  time  the  duality  of  the  two  kinds  of  objects,  and 
the  incomparability  of  their  qualities  and  changes  of  states,  is 
also  part  of  the  content  of  knowledge. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE   AND   MIND.  255 

Indeed,  that  things  and  minds  are  not  the  same  realities  is  a 
truth  which  enters  into  our  ordinary,  and  even  into  our  scien- 
tific convictions,  far  more  deeply  and  comprehensively  than 
any  conviction  of  either  a  more  primary  or  a  higher  unity. 
Developed  intelligence  does  not  confuse  things  with  ourselves, 
—  not  even  when  we  have  as  yet  no  conception  of  the  self 
as  separable  from  the  sentient  organism.  Even  the  errors 
of  localization  and  projection  with  which  experimental  psycho- 
logy is  familiar  depend,  for  their  existence  as  errors  simply, 
upon  the  "  diremption  "  of  our  experience.  To  every  self-con- 
scious mind  all  else  is  known  as  a  "  Thing,"  set  over  against  — 
as  we  are  wont  to  say  —  the  existence  of  the  "  Self."  Physical 
science  is  distinguished  from  psychological  in  that  both  its 
objects  and  its  methods  are  markedly  different,  with  a  constant 
dependence  upon  this  act  of  "  diremption."  The  thorough  discus- 
sion of  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  of  the  philosophy  of  mind, 
as  distinct  branches  of  metaphysical  inquiry,  must  then  always 
precede  the  final  synthesis  of  philosophy.  And  any  attempt  at 
such  synthesis  which  omits  or  relatively  depreciates  either  of 
these  two  branches  is  thereby  doomed  to  failure. 

In  prosecuting  these  two  more  special  branches  of  metaphy- 
sics, the  method  of  reflective  analysis  as  used  for  the  explica- 
tion of  the  categories  will  no  longer  suffice.  The  general  forms 
of  all  being  are  indeed  implicated  in  all  knowledge.  But  the 
satisfactory  answer  to  the  questions,  What  is  the  real  being  of 
the  system  of  Things  ?  and  What  is  the  real  nature,  and  rela- 
tions in  reality  to  the  World,  to  its  fellows,  and  to  God,  of  the 
human  Mind  ?  implies  a  vast  accumulation  of  positive  scien- 
tific knowledge.  Accordingly,  the  validity  and  completeness  of 
any  answer  to  these  questions — and  this  is  the  same  thing  as 
the  truth  and  comprehensiveness  of  our  philosophy  of  nature 
and  of  mind  —  depend  upon  its  attainments  in  scientific 
knowledge,  and  upon  its  ability  to  give  a  philosophical  treat- 
ment to  such  knowledge.  For  philosophy  employs  for  its 
material,  not  only  the  principles  presupposed  in  all  knowledge. 


256  PHILOSOPHY   OF   NATURE 

but  also  the  principles  ascertained  by  the  particular  sciences. 
It  does  not  aim  to  construct  the  world  of  physical  and  psychi- 
cal existences  as  a  system  of  pure  thoughts,  or  even  to  know  it 
as  such  a  system.  It  aims  rather  to  know  what  these  exist- 
ences really  are,  in  accordance  with  the  growth  of  knowledge 
derived  from  all  the  particular  sciences. 

The  philosophy  of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of  mind  are 
therefore  subjects  for  the  most  detailed  and  comprehensive 
scientific  examination.  This  examination,  however,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  strictly  scientific,  is  preliminary  to  philosophy  rather  than 
part  of  it.  The  appropriate  particular  sciences  hand  over  their 
principles  to  philosophy  for  its  subsequent  handling.  This 
handling  consists  in  subjecting  the  principles  to  further  criti- 
cism by  reflective  analysis,  and  to  the  interpretation  of  their 
categorical  or  metaphysical  intent ;  it  consists  also  in  illumin- 
ing them  all  by  the  light  of  philosophy's  supreme  synthesis, 
while  employing  them  all  in  the  perfecting  of  this  synthesis. 

It  is,  of  course,  impossible  for  us  even  fully  to  sketch  the  two 
great  departments  of  philosophical  discipline  whose  titles  stand 
at  the  head  of  this  chapter.  The  bare  mention  of  some  of  the 
principal  subjects  which  they  cover,  with  an  occasional  sug- 
gestion or  explanatory  remark,  must  suffice.  But  undoubtedly 
a  very  brilliant  future  for  them  both  is  near  at  hand.  How 
indeed  can  it  be  otherwise,  since  the  interests  of  philosophy 
are  perennial,  and  the  modern  sciences  of  physics,  biology,  and 
psychology  are  raising  and  illumining  so  many  philosophical 
problems  ? 

That  a  philosophy  of  nature  is  possible,  we  do  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  argue.  It  is  true  that  Newton  bade  physics  "  be- 
ware of  metaphysics."  But  it  is  also  true  that  Schelling  sum- 
moned men  to  "  come  to  physics  and  behold  the  eternal."  If  we 
understand  the  warning  as  simply  directed  against  all  attempts 
unduly  to  influence  physical  theories  from  points  of  view  taken 
in  a  system  of  pure  thinking  so-called,  it  must  certainly  stand. 
It  is  as  important  for  the  philosopher  as  for  the  physicist.     Let 


AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  257 

the  former  learu  from  the  latter  what  is  known,  by  those  pro- 
cesses of  elaborating  knowledge  which  science  understands  so 
well  how  to  employ,  concerning  the  principles  of  things.  But 
if  the  Newtonian  warning  involves  the  exhortation  not  to  at- 
tempt to  take  philosophical  account  of  physical  principles,  not 
to  consider  each  of  them  in  the  light  of  every  other,  and  all  of 
them  in  the  light  of  the  supreme  syntheses  of  philosophy,  - 
why,  then,  the  warning  was  neither  observed  by  its  author,  nor 
should  it  be  observed  by  any  thoughtful  man.  Schelling's  ex- 
hortation, too,  must  be  heard.  But  it  does  not  fitly  woo  us  to 
those  beautiful  dreams,  supposed  to  be  representative  of  the 
real  life  of  nature,  which  the  systems  of  philosophical  Abso- 
lutism devised.  It  encourages  us  rather  to  attempt  the  philo- 
sophical understanding  of  nature's  life,  as  it  is  actually  presented* 
in  the  accumulations  of  physical  principles  that  have  stood  the 
test  of  experiment,  criticism,  and  continued  research. 

The  modern  science  of  that  system  of  things  we  call  "  the 
World  "  may  be  said,  so  far  as  its  discovered  principles  are 
necessary  to  a  Philosophy  of  Nature,  to  have  two  main  divi- 
sions. The  first  of  these  is  physics,  including  astronomy  and 
mechanics  as  dependent  upon  the  physical  theory  of  masses  at 
rest  or  in  motion,  and  chemistry,  thermics,  magnetism,  etc.,  and 
all  the  special  forms  of  atomic  and  molecular  combinations  and 
motions.  The  second  of  these  is  biology,  which  on  the  one 
hand  is  reaching  downward  to  find  its  basis  in  molecular  phy- 
sics, and  on  the  other  hand  is  reaching  upward  to  make  its 
application,  if  possible,  to  the  life  of  souls,  or  minds.  [In  mak- 
ing this  twofold  division  we  should  not  forget,  but  rather 
affirm,  the  statement  of  the  late  Clerk  Maxwell :  *  "  Chemistry 
is  extending  .  .  .  into  regions  where  the  dynamics  of  the  pres- 
ent day  must  put  her  hand  upon  her  mouth."  A  similar  remark 
is  appropriate  on  considering  the  utter  inability  of  biology  as 
a  merely  physical  theory  to  follow  the  extensions  of  modern 
experimental  and  speculative  psychology.] 

1  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  (ninth  ed.),  xix.  3. 
17 


258  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

The  unobserved  real  subject  of  all  physical  changes  is  called 
"  Matter."  What  matter  is  in  reality,  we  are  accustomed  to  be 
told  cannot  be  known.  But  such  a  statement  rests  upon  the 
same  misconception  of  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  its  impli- 
cation of  reality  known,  as  that  with  which  the  theory  of 
knowledge  made  us  familiar.  Undoubtedly  the  term  "  matter  " 
may  be  used  to  cover  a  bare  abstract  conception  of  one  or  more 
so-called  physical  qualities,  —  a  conception  insufficiently  gene- 
ralized from  a  few  only  of  the  many  modes  of  behavior  ex- 
hibited by  the  known  physical  objects.  In  this  sense,  of 
course,  there  is  no  real  matter  corresponding  to  the  conception 
of  matter.  There  is  indeed  no  matter,  in  general.  But  there 
is  also  no  mind,  in  general ;  no  quality,  in  general ;  no  cause, 
in  general ;  no  motion,  in  general ;  no  energy  or  force,  in  general. 
That  which  is  in  general  merely  is  not  real.  The  "  pure  "  being 
called  matter  is  the  equivalent  of  a  pure  material  nothing ;  that 
is  to  say,  it  is  no  "  Thing,"  and  has  no  real  existence. 

But  matter  as  known  is  the  subject  of  every  change  of 
physical  state,  of  every  motion,  of  every  so-called  physical 
quality ;  it  is,  therefore,  the  real  cause  of  all  changes  in  the 
world  of  physical  beings  and  events.  What,  more  precisely, 
matter  is,  it  is  the  very  business  of  the  sciences  of  nature 
to  tell  us  ;  for  they  are  sciences  only  as  they  are  knowledge 
of  those  objects  which  we  call  material.  Such  knowledge 
comes  through  the  intuitions  of  sense-perception,  and  through 
the  elaboration  of  scientific  research  and  philosophical  reflec- 
tion. The  more  we  gain  in  knowledge  of  the  manifoldness  of 
the  life  of  that  one  subject,  to  whose  existence  all  discourse 
of  matter  and  the  physical  universe  refers,  the  more  are  the 
certainty  and  comprehensiveness  of  the  physical  sciences  se- 
cured. It  is  he  that  imperfectly  generalizes  respecting  the 
whole  from  some  one  or  more  of  the  infinite  modes  of  the  life 
of  this  subject,  and  then  considers  his  own  meagre  generaliza- 
tion as  adequate  to  describe  the  concrete  wealth  of  reality,  who 
is  most  inclined  to  deny  to  others  all  knowledge  of  this  reality. 


AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  259 

The  pride  of  a  superior  wisdom,  a  startling  discovery  of  some 
so-called  law,  is  the  forerunner  of  a  fall  into  the  most  abject 
depths  of  agnosticism. 

Matter  as  known  by  the  senses  is  an  external  and  extended 
object,  having  properties  which  are  as  many  as  those  perpetu- 
ally recurring  modes  of  experience  through  the  different  senses 
which  define  the  immediate  knowledge  of  this  object.  Of  these 
extension  itself  is  the  most  primary  and  essential.  Without 
extension  no  object  of  sense-perception  exists.  The  object 
perceived  is  necessarily  extended ;  its  extension  is  of  its  very 
essence  as  object.  Of  its  externality  the  same  statements  may 
be  made.  Without  externality  no  object  of  the  senses  exists. 
The  object  perceived  is  necessarily  external ;  its  externality  is 
of  its  very  essence  as  object. 

But  the  analysis  of  psychology,  helped  to  its  conclusions  by 
philosophical  reflection,  shows  us  that  we  are  warranted  in 
attributing  these  qualities  of  extension  and  externality  only  to 
the  object  which  is  immediately  known  as  having  them.  This 
is  the  object  perceived  —  by  the  senses  of  the  skin  and  of  the 
eye.  Such  analysis,  in  connection  with  a  more  or  less  specu- 
lative theory  of  the  evolution  of  sense-perception,  attributes 
to  the  mind  the  action  constructing  the  perceived  object.  It 
shows  that  the  laws  of  this  evolution,  so  far  as  we  know  them, 
are  chiefly  laws  of  the  mind.  While  then  it  affirms  that,  if  we 
mean  by  "  matter  "  simjohj  that  which  is  given  to  us  as  object  in 
every  process  of  sense-perception,  we  may  say  it  is  all  necessarily 
extended  and  external,  we  cannot  say  this  of  matter  as  possibly 
known  or  knowable  in  other  ways  than  by  immediate  perception. 

Somewhat  similar  courses  of  discussion  belong  to  that  attri- 
bute of  impenetrability  which  we  ascribe  to  matter.  In  this 
case,  however,  our  knowledge  of  the  quality  ascribed  to  the 
object  is  apparently  less  immediate  and  direct.  We  seem  to 
ourselves  to  become  gradually  aware  of  the  impenetrability  of 
objects  as  we  have  increasing  experience  of  the  difficulty  of 
making  them  cover  the  same  places  in  space,  —  whether  in  the 


260  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 

field  of  sight  as  gathered  from  different  points  of  view,  or, 
more  particularly,  in  the  field  of  touch  and  muscular  sensation. 
But  we  never  become  by  the  senses  persuaded  of  the  impene- 
trability of  matter  in  such  manner  that  we  can  deny  a  priori 
the  possibility  that  two  atoms  may  coincide.  All  attribution 
of  extension,  externality,  and  impenetrability,  to  matter  must 
then  be  limited  to  matter  as  object  known  by  the  senses,  or 
as  imaged  by  that  sensuous  imagination  which  necessarily  fol- 
lows the  forms  of  sense-perception.  But  that  matter  as  further 
known  to  physics  or  to  philosophy,  as  considered  irrespective 
of  its  being  an  object  of  sense-perception,  must  have  these 
qualities,  neither  so-called  "  common-sense  "  nor  "  physical  real- 
ism "  has  any  right  to  affirm.  As  said  Clerk  Maxwell,1  "  many 
persons  cannot  get  rid  of  the  opinion  that  all  matter  is  ex- 
tended in  length,  breadth,  and  thickness.  This  is  a  prejudice 
.  .  .  arising  from  our  experience  of  bodies  consisting  of  im- 
mense multitudes  of  atoms." 

What  may  be  (though  it  usually  is,  only  with  some  difficulty) 
seen  to  be  true  of  the  qualities  of  extension,  externality,  and 
impenetrability,  is  more  readily  admitted  with  reference  to  all 
the  other  qualities  of  matter.  Such  are  its  heaviness  or  light- 
ness, its  hardness  and  softness,  its  roughness  and  smoothness, 
its  toughness  and  pliability,  or  its  friable  character;  such  are 
all  the  other  modes  of  the  behavior  of  external  objects  as  given 
chiefly  by  use  of  the  muscles,  tendons,  joints,  and  skin.  Such 
are  its  size  and  shape  as  known  chiefly  by  sight.  All  our  ex- 
perience, as  embodied  in  our  language,  explains  itself  upon  the 
theory  that  the  color,  smell,  taste,  and  sound  of  things  are  to 
be  regarded  as  known  events  in  us,  referred  for  their  cause  to 
that  which  is  object  perceived  as  extended  and  external  by  the 
senses  of  the  eye  and  the  skin. 

But  it  has  already  been  remarked  that  all  the  discoveries  of 
the  relative  character  of  that  object  of  sense-perception  which 
we  call  matter  do  not  in  the  least  affect  the  persuasion  that  in 

1  Encyclopaedia  Britamiica  (ninth  ed.),  iii.  37. 


AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  261 

knowing  this  object  we  have  the  certification  of  its  reality.  It 
is  known  as  a  real  subject  of  changing  states  and  relations,  that 
is  not-ourselves,  but  that  possesses  an  independent  and  manifold 
life  in  the  unity  of  its  own  "Ground."  We  affirm,  then,  with 
so-called  "  common-sense,"  the  reality  of  the  object  known  by 
the  senses  ;  and  we  turn  to  the  special  sciences  of  nature  with 
our  further  inquiry  as  to  what  is  the  real  nature  of  this  object 
thus  known. 

That  real  subject  of  physical  changes  which  we  call  matter  is 
known  to  modern  physics  as  having  Mass.  If  we  take  for  the 
moment  no  account  of  the  hypothesis  that  electricity  is  a  physi- 
cal entity  which  has,  however,  no  mass,  we  may  say  that  the 
declaration,  —  all  matter  has  mass,  —  is  equivalent  to  affirming 
this  quality  as  universally  and  necessarily  characteristic  of  this 
real  subject.  Indeed,  the  proof  that  the  mass  of  any  portion  of 
matter  is  unalterable,  and  the  inference  that  the  entire  mass  of 
the  physical  world  is  unalterable,  have  been  declared  to  be  the 
most  convincing  ground  we  have  for  believing  that  matter  is 
real.  Mass  is  the  absolute  and  unchanging  quantum  of  any 
portion  of  matter  considered  by  itself,  and  of  the  entire  system 
of  material  entities  considered  as  a  unity.  It  is  the  business 
of  philosophy  to  inquire  what  is  involved  in  this  accepted  prin- 
ciple of  all  physical  science.  It  is  its  business  to  show  in  de- 
tail how  the  permanence  of  a  real  subject,  conceived  of  as  a 
ground  or  real  cause  of  changing  states  and  relation,  with  a 
fixed  adherence  to  an  end,  as  it  were,  is  involved  in  the  con- 
ception which  physics  has  of  mass.  Thus  the  categories  of 
substantiality,  causality,  relation,  change,  and  number,  are  all 
implied  when  we  ascribe  this  quality  to  matter.  This  is,  how- 
ever, because  the  quality  of  mass  cannot  be  considered  as  the 
only  quality  of  matter.  For  change  and  causality  do  not  belong 
to  matter  as  merely  having  mass.  The  material  universe  con- 
sidered as  a  collection  of  mere  masses  of  matter  would  be  stati- 
cal ;  there  would  be  in  it  no  provision  for  motion,  or  life,  or  any 
form  of  change. 


262  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 

Another  universal  predicate  of  matter  is  Energy,  —  the  con- 
ception which  physical  science  strives  carefully  to  define  and 
then  to  substitute  for  the  popular  and  unscientific  conception 
of  force.     The  latter  conception, —  we  are  told,  —  since  it  is 
"  suggested  by  the  muscular  sense,"  is  too  vague  and  anthropo- 
morphic to  serve  the  highest  scientific  interests.     The  suggested 
change  of  terms  is  doubtless  worth  the  making ;  but  it  does  not 
escape  the  difficulty  experienced  when  we  try  to  tell  what,  that 
is  real  in  the  material  universe,  is  meant  by  either  term.     Mod- 
ern physics  sometimes  claims  to  consider  energy  as  an  objective 
reality  in  the  physical  universe,  "  because  it  is  conserved  in  the 
same  sense  as  matter  is  conserved."     Strictly  speaking,  such 
a  declaration  can  have  no  real  significance.     Strictly  speaking, 
what  is  meant  by  the  declaration  is  this,  that,  on  similar  grounds 
to  those  on  which  we  assume  the  unalterableuess  of  mass,  we 
assume  that  the  quantity  of  energy  is  unalterable.     Both  are 
principles  established   on  purely   empirical   grounds,  albeit  so 
firmly    as    to   serve    as   postulates   of   all  reasoning  in  general 
physics.     With  respect  to  the  conception  of  energy  also,  phi- 
losophy has  to  consider  how  far  it  represents  the  real  nature  of 
that  subject  called  matter  to  which  it  is  given  as  a  predicate  by 
physical  science.     For  philosophy  is  satisfied  neither  with  that 
"  figurate  conception,"  which  regards  forces  as  inherent  in  mat- 
ter, or  as  passing  from  one  portion  of  matter  to  another,  etc. ; 
nor  can  it  tolerate  that  dodging  of  the  metaphysical  question  to 
which  physics  resorts,  when  it  tries  to  reduce  the  essence  of 
energy  to  changes  in  amounts  and  directions  of  motion. 

When,  then,  we  learn  from  Newton  that  "  force  is  whatever 
changes  a  body's  state,"  etc.,  and  hear  that  the  phrase,  "or  tends 
to  change,"  has  been  added  to  the  Newtonian  definition ;  and 
when  we  are  told  that  energy  is  "  the  power  of  doing  work,"  or 
"  the  capacity  for  operating,  or  for  producing  an  effect "  (namely,, 
motion),  the  shifting  of  phrases  should  not  deceive  us.  We  are 
not  to  suppose  that  physics  has  thus  escaped  the  use  of  meta- 
physics, or  the  need  of  a  more  accurate  metaphysical  analysis. 


AND   PHILOSOPHY   OF  MIND.  263 

For  every  one  of  these  so-called  scientific  definitions  fairly 
bristles  with  the  old-time  presuppositions  and  beliefs.  A  Being 
of  matter,  which  makes  it  an  agent,  a  cause  of  changes,  the  pos- 
sessor of  potentialities  and  powers,  is  certainly  implied  as  known 
in  all  this. 

The  science  of  physics  strengthens  our  conviction  by  its 
division  of  energy  into  "  potential "  and  "  kinetic,"  and  by  its 
discourse  of  "  tendencies,"  "  strains,"  "  tensions,"  etc. ;  as  well 
as  by  its  statement  of  laws  such  as  affirm  that  "  to  every  action 
there  is  always  an  equal  and  contrary  reaction,"  or  that  "  every 
action  between  two  bodies"  is  a  stress.  For  every  material 
body,  the  real  subject  of  its  energy  potential  and  kinetic  is 
the  same  portion  of  matter;  and  for  the  world  at  large  it  is 
the  same  unchanging  quantum  of  universal  matter.  Every 
material  body  may  then  be  regarded  as  a  "  system,'-  more  or 
less  imperfectly  complete  in  itself ;  but  the  entire  quantum 
of  matter  is  the  universal  material  system.  The  energy  which, 
every  system  possesses,  in  virtue  of  the  relative  motions  of  its 
parts,  is  called  "  kinetic ; "  the  energy  which  every  system 
possesses,  in  virtue  of  the  relative  positions  of  its  parts,  is 
called  "  potential.'' 

For  every  system,  large  or  small,  whether  comprising  one 
body  or  many  bodies,  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  en- 
ergy holds  true.  But  in  every  system  both  forms  of  energy 
must  be  conceived  of  as  co-existing  in  reality.  The  evidence 
of  the  kinetic  energy  is  the  direct  or  indirect  knowledge  of 
actual  motion,  for  energy  is  "whatever  changes  the  state  of 
rest  or  uniform  motion  of  a  body."  But  such  a  thing  as  a 
state  of  rest  is  never  actual ;  on  the  contrary,  now  and  from 
the  beginning  every  really  existent  material  system  must  be 
known,  and  thought  of,  as  ceaselessly  in  motion.  Therefore  by 
potential  energy  also  we  mean  the  real  cause  of  motion.  For 
we  are  told,  "  the  word  '  potential '  does  not  imply  that  this  en- 
ergy is  not  real  and  exists  only  in  potentiality ;  it  is  energy, 
and  has  as  much  claim  to  the  title  as  it  has  in  any  other  form 


264  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

in  which  it  may  appear."  And,  of  course,  in  order  that  the 
sum  of  the  two  forms  of  energy  may  remain  in  any  system  the 
same,  if  the  two  co-exist  in  reality,  they  must  be  interchange- 
able. In  reality,  then,  potential  and  kinetic  energy  are  only 
two  forms  of  manifesting  the  presence  of  that  one  cause  of  all 
motion,  possible  or  actual,  which  we  call  matter. 

The  modern  theory  of  dynamics  affords  to  the  philosophy  of 
nature  the  materials  for  reflective  analysis  from  which  to  know 
the  character  and  laws  of  that  unity  of  reality  which  accounts 
for  the  existence  of  manifold  physical  changes.  These  changes 
are  all  conceived  of  as  related  to  each  other,  and  as  measurable 
quantities  of  mass  and  energy.  Motion  is  the  one  form  of  real 
change  to  which  this  theory  reduces  all  the  other  perceived 
physical  changes.  Motion  implies  the  applicability  of  the  cat- 
egories of  time  and  space  to  matter,  not  only  as  object  imme- 
diately perceived,  but  also  as  reality  scientifically  known.  But 
the  motion  of  which  we  have  immediate  knowledge  by  the 
senses  is  a  perceived  change  of  place.  The  reality  of  the 
motion,  as  a  change  in  the  real  subject,  is  no  more  certified 
as  a  copy  of  the  change  perceived,  than  is  the  reality  of  its 
extension  by  the  extension  of  the  object  perceived. 

Moreover,  we  have  just  heard  of  "  tensions,"  and  "  tendencies" 
to  move,  and  potential  energies,  that  are  not  conceivable  in  any 
terms  as  actual  correlates  of  motions  perceived.  And  yet  the 
entire  possible  round  of  changes,  which  can  take  place  in  the 
subject  called  matter,  would  seem  to  be  expressible  only  in 
terms  of  motion.  Are  space  and  time  then  necessary  as  ex- 
tended actualities  in  which  real  masses  may  actually  come  and 
go  as  do  the  perceived  objects  of  the  senses  ?  Surely  here  are 
difficulties  and  apparent  contradictions  in  the  very  core  of 
physical  science.  Shall  we  say  that  the  more  "  pure "  and 
demonstrable  it  becomes,  by  reduction  of  all  its  formulae  to 
mathematical  relations  in  the  amounts  and  directions  of  motions, 
the  more  sensuous  and  philosophically  indefensible  do  its 
conclusions  seem  ? 


AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  265 

The  property  of  mass,  considered  as  a  constant  united  with 
certain  variables,  gives  rise  to  two  other  properties  of  matter : 
these  are  Weight  and  Inertia.  If  two  bodies  having  mass  are 
placed  at  a  given  distance  from  each  other  in  space,  and  are 
unhindered,  they  at  once  develop  motion  toward  each  other ; 
or  if  in  any  way  hindered,  they  develop  some  pressure  or  strain 
indicative  of  a  so-called  tendency  to  motion.  As  capable  of  do- 
ing this  they  are  said  to  have  weight :  and  since  this  capacity  is 
measurable,  all  matter,  as  ponderable,  falls  under  the  category 
of  number.  But  since  that  which  produces,  or  tends  to  produce, 
motion  is  called  "  force,"  it  is  found  necessary  to  assume  a  spe- 
cific cause  of  the  weight  of  all  bodies  that  have  mass  ;  this 
cause  is  called  the  "  force  of  gravity."  The  uniform  modes  of 
the  variation  in  quantity  of  this  force  are  then  called  the  "  laws 
of  gravity  ; "  and  the  force  of  gravity  is  said  to  vary  directly 
as  the  mass  and  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance  of  the 
bodies  displaying  this  property. 

So  also  do  we  find  that  bodies  having  mass,  when  at  rest, 
never  begin  to  move,  and  when  already  moving  never  change 
the  velocity  or  the  direction  of  their  motion,  without  having 
regard,  as  it  were,  to  the  amounts  of  the  mass,  and  the  velocities 
and  directions  of  the  motion,  of  other  bodies.  All  matter  is 
therefore  said  to  tend  to  remain  in  its  present  state,  —  of  rest,  if 
it  be  at  rest,  and  of  motion  with  a  given  direction  and  velocity, 
if  it  be  in  motion.  This  tendency  too  is  measurable ;  and  the 
general  capacity  of  matter  to  develop  this  tendency  is  called 
"  inertia."  The  amount  of  the  unwillingness,  in  any  one  body, 
to  change  without  taking  regard  of  other  bodies,  is  considered 
to  have  its  cause  in  the  amount  of  potential  and  kinetic  energy 
possessed  by  such  body.  Thus  is  the  property  of  inertia  made 
to  imply  a  unity  of  causality  to  account  tor  the  changes 
of  position  in  space  which  the  different  masses  of  matter 
undergo. 

Tin'  manner  in  which  the  student  of  physics  works  out  and 
expresses  in  numerical  terms  the  changing  relations  of  mass, 


266  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 

weight,  inertia,  and  force  kinetic  or  potential,  should  be  instruc- 
tive and  stimulating  to  the  student  of  philosophy.  Here  a 
circulus  in  concipiendo  as  well  as  in  arguendo  is  everywhere 
apparent.  Even  with  these  comparatively  few  and  simple 
factors  to  take  into  account,  the  explanation  of  reality  by  the 
science  of  physics  is  far  from  being  complete.  But  all  attempt 
at  complete  explanation  is  made  more  difficult  by  the  apparent 
necessity  of  admitting  the  presence,  in  the  unity  of  the  physical 
universe  and  as  essential  constituents  of  it,  of  other  entities 
than  those  to  which  the  foregoing  properties  apply.  Such  an 
entity,  apparently,  is  the  so-called  ether ;  another  such  —  un- 
less the  two  shall  be  found  to  be  really  one  —  is  electricity. 
Undoubtedly,  the  inclination  to  follow  to  the  utmost  the  love 
of  simplifying  by  analogical  and  symbolic  reasoning  will  incline 
us  to  affirm  that  these  entities  must  have,  at  least  to  some 
extent,  the  above-mentioned  properties  of  other  matter.  But 
keeping  within  the  strict  limits  of  ascertained  scientific  truth, 
we  have  little  right,  at  present,  to  claim  that  this  is  so.  The 
energetic  and  skilful  efforts  of  a  Sir  William  Thomson  have 
not  as  yet  developed  any  satisfactory  theory  of  the  unknown 
medium  of  the  waves  of  light  which  will  serve  to  liken  it  to 
so-called  "  ordinary "  matter.  And  the  trend  of  discovery  in 
electricity  is  perhaps  in  a  direction  to  remove  this  entity  farther 
away  from  the  possibility  of  applying  to  it  the  laws  of  those 
bodies  that  have  mass.  Yet  these  entities  are,  as  has  been  said, 
factors  in  the  unity  of  the  material  universe. 

We  should  have  no  hesitation  then  in  enlarging  our  use  of 
the  terms  "  matter  "  and  "  mass."  Entities  like  ether  or  elec- 
tricity are  also  kinds  of  matter  ;  and  since  they  are  measur- 
able they  may  be  said  to  have  mass,  although  no  signs  of  their 
being  ponderable  can  be  discovered.  Weight  and  inertia  are 
therefore  not  essential  properties  of  the  subject  of  physical 
changes.  Indeed,  no  valid  a  priori  reason  can  be  discovered 
why  there  should  not  be  as  many  kinds  of  matter  "  in  mass  " 
as  there  are  admitted  kinds  of  atoms,  or  elements  of  material 


AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  267 

reality.  Neither  can  we  ever  establish,  on  other  than  grounds 
of  probability  by  extension  of  experience,  the  propositions  re- 
lating to  the  inertia  of  all  matter,  and  to  the  conservation  of 
mass  and  of  energy.  For  even  these  few  and  simple  factors,  — ■ 
properties,  forces,  laws,  —  already  introduced,  indicate  that  the 
unity  of  material  reality  is  such  as  to  imply  a  manifoldness  of 
life  and  being  too  great  to  express  in  terms  of  physics.  The 
manifoldness,  however,  all  falls  under  the  principle  of  finality  ; 
and  so  the  unity  is  a  realized  idea. 

The  known  physical  constitution  of  bodies,  or  mode  in  which 
sensible  quantities  of  matter  are  aggregated  to  form  a  mass 
having  observed  properties,  increases  the  complexity  of  the 
problems  which  a  general  theory  of  physics  is  required  to  solve. 
If  we  divide  all  bodies,  as  respects  their  physical  constitution, 
by  the  differences  in  changes  of  their  dimensions  resulting  from 
internal  stress,  two  great  classes  must  be  distinguished.  These 
are  solids  and  fluids,  —  the  latter  being  subdivided  into  gases 
and  liquids.  But  every  mass,  whatever  its  physical  constitution, 
tends  to  resist  changes  of  its  bulk  and  shape  ;  or  —  what  is  the 
same  thing  —  it  "requires  force  to  change  its  bulk  or  shape,  and 
requires  a  continued  application  of  the  force  to  maintain  the 
change,  and  springs  back  when  the  force  is  removed."  This 
property  of  matter  is  called  "  elasticity."  Of  this  property,  as  re- 
spects their  bulk,  all  bodies  are  said  to  have  some,  and  all  fluid 
bodies  to  possess  it  to  perfection.  Solids  possess  some  degree 
of  elasticity  of  shape  ;  fluids  no  degree  of  this  property.  The 
theory  of  the  limits,  kinds,  and  degrees  of  this  property  is  very 
complicated.  It  gives  evidence  of  a  variety  of  internal  relations 
between  the  parts  of  a  material  mass,  under  the  action  of  so- 
called  forces  of  cohesion  and  repulsion,  which  it  is  beyond  the 
power  of  the  imagination  to  depict.  As  modifications  of  this 
general  property  of  elasticity,  many  other  "  properties  "  arise. 
Such  are  the  viscosity  of  liquids,  the  "  molecular  friction " 
(also  sometimes  called  viscosity)  of  solids,  certain  qualities  of 
bodies  like  crystals,  resiliency,  pliability,  torsional  rigidity,  etc. 


268  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 

Ami  yet,  with  all  this  manifold  equipment  of  occult  properties, 
the  unity  of  the  physical  universe  is  somehow  maintained. 

But  all  this  variety  of  the  physical  constitution  of  bodies  is 
as  nothing  compared  with  that  which  modern  chemistry  brings 
to  view.  The  coarser  changes  that  result  in  the  redistribution 
of  mass  and  energy  suggest  changes  that  consist  in  the  redis- 
tribution of  the  elements  belonging  to  the  mass  and  of  the  ener- 
gies belonging  to  each  element.  This  suggestion  is  converted 
by  chemistry  into  a  demonstration.  And,  behold  !  a  world  of 
wonders  is  made  obvious  to  the  eye  of  reason,  such  as  can  never 
be  made  obvious  to  the  eye  of  sense. 

Modern  chemistry  postulates  nearly  seventy  kinds  of  elemen- 
tary material  existences,  each  having  a  most  complex  nature  of 
its  own.  Not  one  of  these  beings  ever  does  anything  without 
reference  to  the  behavior  of  other  beings  with  which  it  is  allied. 
Yet  not  one  of  them  ever  does  anything  that  does  not  strictly 
comport  with  its  own  unchanging  laws  of  behavior.  Acting 
together,  they  form  the  constitution  of  all  existing  material 
bodies,  and  by  their  changing  relations  account  for  the  varying 
properties  of  these  bodies.  The  general  fact  of  their  interrelated 
action,  according  to  the  kinds  to  which  they  belong  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  they  are  placed,  is  set  forth  by 
ascribing  to  them  the  property  of  "  affinity."  The  word  is  a 
symbol  of  the  presence  of  the  most  stupendous  mysteries. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  sets  of  properties  are  as  many  as  are  the 
so-called  kinds  of  these  atoms ;  and  the  number  of  properties 
belonging  to  each  set  is  as  many  as  are  the  different  modes  of 
the  behavior  of  each  kind  under  all  possible  relations.  And, 
since  the  motion  or  tendency  to  motion  of  the  atom,  requires  a 
postulated  cause  in  some  force,  each  atom  may  be  said  to  be 
the  happy  possessor  of  as  many  forces  as  are  these  modes  of 
behavior.  The  principal  feature  peculiar  to  these  chemical 
forces  of  the  atom  is  the  extremely  minute  distances  over  which, 
the  forces  act. 

A   distinguished  astronomer  has  said  that,  at  each  instant, 


AND   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  269 

every  body  in  the  solar  system  is  conducting  itself  as  though  it 
knew  precisely  how  it  ought  to  behave  in  consistency  with  its 
own  nature  and  with  the  behavior  of  every  other  body  in  the 
same  system.  But  no  planet  considered  as  a  physical  mass 
is  at  all  so  richly  endowed  as  is  every  atom.  The  atom  must 
know  precisely  how  to  behave,  under  an  almost  infinite  variety 
of  relations  to  an  almost  infinite  variety  (quantitative  and 
qualitative)  of  aggregations  of  other  atoms.  From  the  begin- 
ning of  that  everlasting  time  which  science  is  fond  of  postulating, 
it  has  threaded  its  way  securely  amidst  its  fellows  down  to  the 
present  hour.  It  has  danced  countless  millions  of  miles,  with 
countless  millions  of  different  partners,  many  of  which  required 
an  important  modification  of  its  mode  of  motion,  without  ever 
departing  from  the  correct  step  or  the  right  time.  Surely  the 
most  fanciful  mythology  of  physics  in  which  philosophy  has 
ever  indulged,  from  the  "  love  "  and  "  hate  "  ascribed  to  the  ele- 
ments by  the  ancients,  to  that  "  mirroring  "  of  the  world  which 
Leibnitz  ascribed  to  every  monad,  cannot  surpass  in  magical 
import  the  "  laws "  of  chemistry  concerning  the  "  affinities  " 
of  atoms. 

This  indefinitely  great  variety  in  the  natures  and  changes 
belonging  to  the  elements  of  material  reality  the  science  of 
chemistry  is  endeavoring  to  reduce  to  a  few  general  terms. 
The  number  of  elements  known  to  it  is,  however,  on  the  whole 
increasing  rather  than  diminishing.  And  since  the  majority  of 
them  are  comparatively  or  extremely  rare,  while  the  number 
of  those  combined  in  the  masses  of  which  the  earth  and  its 
plants  and  animals  are  mainly  composed  is  exceedingly  small, 
the  secret  reasons  for  precisely  such  manifoldness  in  unity  are 
still  far  removed  from  human  knowledge.  The  great  principles 
of  combination  by  weight  and  volume,  and  the  form  of  the 
atomic  theory  which  aims  to  account  for  these  principles,  are 
in  the  process  of  elucidation.  Through  these  principles  a  gleam, 
or  at  least  a  glimmer,  from  the  category  of  finality  is  always 
seen  to  appear.     A  chemical  notation  is  possible ;  the  elements 


270  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

have  "  valency,"  and  admit  of  being  arranged  as  monads,  dyads, 
triads,  according  to  their  apparent  maximum  valencies.  "  Ra- 
tional formulae  "  are  devised  in  attempting  to  account  for  the 
behavior  of  the  atoms. 

For  the  more  satisfactory  discussion  of  the  principles  of 
chemistry  the  philosophy  of  nature  will  doubtless  have  to 
await  many  years  of  scientific  exploration.  But  enough  is 
already  known  to  warrant  certain  favorite  affirmations.  The 
very  elements  of  all  known  material  reality,  the  very  beings 
whose  unchanging  natures  are  assumed  as  the  basis  of  all 
change,  proclaim  the  truth  of  metaphysics.  They  are  perma- 
nent subjects  of  all  physical  events.  They  must  be  regarded 
as  the  real  causes  of  the  changes  in  states  and  relations  of 
all  material  bodies;  but  they  always  act  as  self-limiting  na- 
tures that  are  united,  under  an  ideal  system,  into  an  orderly 
and  beautiful  whole.  They  are,  only  as  they  are  in  and 
of  that  supreme  Unity  of  Reality,  whose  essential  nature 
and  ideal  significance  philosophy  ever  strives  more  clearly  to 
define. 

The  more  complicated  inorganic  forms  which,  like  the  crys- 
tal, tax  the  "  ideal "  nature  of  the  atoms  for  a  large  contribution 
from  their  wealth  of  occult  energies,  enhance,  at  the  same  time, 
the  difficulties  of  physical  science  and  the  claims  to  a  hearing 
for  philosophy.  Meantime,  the  diverse  play  of  the  so-called 
"energy"  of  masses  and  atoms  goes  on.  Having  admitted  a 
mode  of  energy  called  "  gravity,"  and  another  called  "  heat," 
and  another  indefinitely  large  group  of  modes  called  "  affinity," 
it  is  difficult  to  see  just  where  we  can  stop  multiplying  modes, 
and  yet  maintain  our  consistency.  Magnets  are  facts  ;  crystals 
are  facts,  —  as  truly  as  are  planets  and  pulleys  and  levers. 
They  are  facts,  however,  to  account  for  which  the  law  of  the 
conservation  and  correlation  of  energy  finds  itself  inadequate. 
They  stand,  in  the  inorganic  world,  as  a  rebuke  to  the  prevalent 
unphilosophical  identification  of  this  law  with  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason  or  with  the  category  of  causality. 


AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  271 

But  when  we  pass  from  the  realm  of  the  inorganic  into  the 
realm  of  living  beings,  we  practically  leave  behind  the  equip- 
ment with  which  physics  and  chemistry  can  supply  philosophy 
for  an  understanding  of  the  world  of  material  reality.  We  have 
the  word  of  Professor  Huxley :  for  it :  "  The  biological  sciences 
are  sharply  marked  off  from  the  abiological  ...  in  so  far  as 
the  properties  of  living  matter  distinguish  it  absolutely  from 
all  other  kinds  of  things,  and  as  the  present  state  of  knowledge 
furnishes  us  with  no  link  between  the  living  and  the  non- 
living." He  will  readily  credit  this  statement  who  has  thought- 
fully watched  the  amoeba  under  the  microscope,  or  the  muscle- 
nerve  machine  under  all  varieties,  degrees,  and  circumstances  of 
irritation.  Philosophy  has  no  need  to  postulate  a  new  metaphy- 
sical entity  called  "  vital  force."  It  is  enough  to  know  that  the 
phenomena  called  "  life  "  ascribe  to  the  subject,  whose  changes 
the  phenomena  are,  an  altogether  new  set  of  predicates  and 
potencies.  If  we  confine  ourselves  to  physical  phenomena  there 
is  no  philosophical  objection  (except  that  arising  from  its  vague- 
ness) to  ascribing,  with  Mr.  Tyndall,  to  matter  (as  the  "  myste- 
rious something  by  which  all  this  has  been  accomplished  ")  the 
"  promise  and  potency  of  every  form  of  life." 

The  word  "  life "  represents  an  abstract  conception.  The 
rather  does  the  philosophy  of  nature  require  of  biological  science 
some  description  of  those  properties  which  belong  to  all  actually 
existing  beings  said  to  be  alive.  The  question  philosophy  asks 
is  herein  only  a  modification  of  its  more  general  question.  It 
wants  to  know  from  biology  what  it  is  really  to  be  as  all  living 
beings  are.  This  question  a  recent  writer  has  attempted  to 
answer,  from  the  scientific  point  of  view,  in  such  terms  as 
follows:  "A  living  being  is  a  being  composed  of  elements, 
in  incessant  chemical  renewal  and  reacting  upon  one  an- 
other in  a  way  to  maintain  the  form  and  functions  [of  the 
being]  in  a  determined  cycle  of  evolution,  similar  to  the  cycle 
traversed  by  other  living  beings  from  which  the  one  under 
1  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  (ninth  ed.),  iii.  679. 


272  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

consideration  comes  forth  or  to  which   it  is    bound    by  com- 
munity of  origin."  1 

A  living  being  requires,  then,  a  correlated  action  of  an  im- 
mense number  of  those  elements  which  chemistry  describes. 
And  yet  the  life  of  the  community,  as  it  were,  does  not  bind 
the  same  atoms  to  enter  into  and  remain  within  it ;  for  inces- 
sant renewal  and  growth  are  taking  place.  But  the  category 
of  finality  must  also  be  satisfied ;  for  an  ideal  is  followed,  both 
as  respects  the  morphology  and  the  physiology  of  the  com- 
bination. The  form  and  the  functions  are  maintained  ;  though 
the  same  elementary  beings,  which  follow  the  ideal,  are  not 
necessarily  permanently  retained.  Moreover,  a  "  cycle  of  evolu- 
tion," a  recurrent  conformity  to  the  ideal  in  consistency  with 
series  of  changes  in  form  and  function,  takes  place.  Nor  is  this 
cycle  independent  of  cycles  followed  by  other  beings  in  like 
manner  said  to  be,  or  to  have  been,  alive.  On  the  contrary,  it 
is  similar,  not  indeed  to  all  the  other  cycles  in  all  respects,  but 
to  certain  definite  kinds  of  cycles,  to  those,  namely,  from 
which,  specifically,  it  "  conies  forth,  or  to  which  it  is  bound  by 
connection  of  origin." 

But  how  is  this  similarity,  specific  and  determined,  and  yet 
admitting  of  so  much  individual  variability,  really  secured  ?  And 
what  is  it  that  really  binds  with  the  bond  called  "  community  of 
origin  "  ?  Tn  other  words,  to  what  in  the  nature  of  the  really  exis- 
tent shall  we  ascribe  this  new  and  most  marvellous  form  of  a 
unity  of  the  manifold  ?  Philosophy  insists  on  asking  such  ques- 
tions as  these.  And  scientific  biology,  solely  by  enlarging  and 
refining  its  description  of  the  correlated  phenomena,  is  unable  to 
answer  them.  It  is  early  in  the  development  of  the  compara- 
tively new  science  of  biology  to  expect  successful  attempts  to 
subject  its  principles  to  a  philosophical  treatment.  But  as  the 
biologist  is  fond  of  predicting  wonderful  triumphs  for  his  sci- 
ence in  the  near  future,  so  may  the  philosopher  indulge  the 

1  Fernand  Lataste,  in  the  Comptes  rendus  de  la  Societe  de  Biologie,  seance 
du  5  Jan.,  1889. 


AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  273 

cheering  expectation  that  his  system  of  conclusions  will  be  cor- 
respondingly enriched. 

This  is  the  place  to  mention  the  necessity  and  the  promise 
which  lie  before  philosophy  as  an  offering  from  biological  science. 
Especially  urgent  does  the  necessity  appear,  and  especially 
attractive  the  promise,  when  we  consider  the  efforts  which  biol- 
ogy and  psychology  are  making  to  clasp  hands  over  that  barrier 
which  has  hitherto  separated  them.  Those  phenomena  to  which 
Von  Hartmann  has  appealed  in  proof  of  his  principle  of  "  the 
Unconscious "  are  rapidly  being  multiplied.  They  are,  with 
great  difficulty  but  with  promise  of  an  accelerating  rate  of  move- 
ment in  the  near  future,  being  reduced  to  generalized  statement 
of  fact.  Some  of  them  provoke  philosophy  the  more  because 
they  so  completely  baffle  science.  Such  are  the  phenomena  of 
reflex  action  ;  the  phenomena  ascribed  to  "  instinct "  (that  pack- 
horse  of  explanations  that  do  not  explain)  and  to  unconscious 
cerebration  ;  the  phenomena  of  genius  (or  of  that  inborn  quality 
of  mind  which,  without  the  training  of  conscious  processes  per- 
forms feats  of  intelligence  and  skill  ordinarily  demanding  this 
training) ;  and  the  phenomena  of  unconscious  inference  (if  such 
there  be),  and  of  hypnotic  and  other  similar  conditions. 

As  problems  for  philosophy,  there  exist  in  the  same  border- 
land of  biology  and  psychology  many  other  kinds  of  interesting 
phenomena.  Both  these  sciences  are  uniting  their  forces  to 
investigate  the  states  of  trance,  clairvoyance,  ecstasy,  etc.,  and 
the  cases  of  hypersensitive  beings  (for  example,  as  alleged  by 
Eeichenbach  and  modern  experimenters  in  hypnotism),  the 
alleged  phenomena  of  thought-transference,  telepathy,  etc. 
The  philosophy  of  mind  is  deeply  interested  in  the  light  which 
such  researches  throw  upon  the  questions  of  human  personality 
and  of  the  reality  of  mind.  But  the  philosophy  of  nature  is 
interested  in  any  light  which  they  may  throw  upon  the  nature 
of  so-called  "  Nature,"  of  that  subject  called  matter  to  which 
some  investigators  would  assign  all  these  changes,  both  physical 
and  psychical. 

18 


274  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

No  fear  need  be  entertained  that  the  common  researches  of 
biology  and  psychology  will  ever  succeed  in  diminishing  the 
incomparability  of  physical  and  psychical  phenomena.  The 
atoms  may  be  found  to  move,  in  deference  to  other  atoms,  in 
ways  that  now  seem  absolutely  unimaginable;  and  psychical 
phenomena  may  become  correlated  with  the  motions  of  the 
atoms,  with  a  strictness  far  beyond  what  we  are  now  willing 
to  admit  as  likely  or  even  possible.  But  the  simplest  fact  of 
consciousness  will  remain  as  unlike  the  most  complicated  com- 
bination and  motion  of  the  atoms  as  ever. 

Philosophy  will  doubtless  be  greatly  influenced  by  biology, 
psycho-physics,  and  experimental  psychology,  as  respects  the 
construction  which  it  gives  to  the  content  of  its  notion  of  the 
real  subject  of  all  physical  change.  We  leave  the  further  eluci- 
dation of  this  content  to  another  branch  of  philosophical  disci- 
pline. We  only  gather  some  of  the  results  of  this  meagre  sketch 
of  the  work  belonging  to  the  philosophy  of  nature  into  the 
following  sentence :  All  the  different  substances,  forces,  and 
laws,  known  to  the  physical  sciences  as  belonging  to  the  most 
general  conception  of  "  Matter,"  are  to  be  regarded  as  the  related 
modes  of  the  behavior  of  one  subject,  —  really  existent,  the 
self-limiting  cause  of  all  material  change,  in  accordance  with 
immanent  ends. 

The  Philosophy  of  Mind  encounters  in  some  quarters  a  special 
opposition  because  the  reality  of  its  subject  is  denied.  Some- 
times this  denial  assumes  the  character  of  an  a  priori  necessity, 
or  at  least  of  a  conclusion  derived  from  such  a  necessity.  At 
other  times  it  is  based  upon  alleged  grounds  of  observation  and 
experiment.  The  primary  definition  and  discussion  of  this 
problem  belongs  to  psychology.  The  descriptive  branch  of  this 
science  furnishes  the  analysis  of  psychical  states  into  their 
simplest  elements,  gives  the  history  of  the  genesis  of  the  most 
complex  from  the  most  simple  states,  and  defines  those  uniform 
relations  which  are  found  actually  to  exist  among  the  different 
states. 


AND   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  275 

As  experimental,  biological,  and  psycho-physical,  psychology 
also  endeavors  to  establish  correlations  between  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness  and  the  structure  and  functions  of  the  nervous 
mechanism.  Comparative  psychology  aims  to  explain  the  psy- 
chical processes  —  whether  of  different  kinds  of  psychical  beings, 
or  of  different  races  of  men  and  eras  of  human  history  —  under 
principles  which  belong  to  all  forms  of  the  general  theory 
of  evolution.  In  whatever  way  the  science  of  psychology  is 
prosecuted,  since  it  necessarily  involves  the  preliminary  assump- 
tion of  a  subject  of  the  psychical  states  (the  so-called  Ego,  or 
the  generalized  conception  called  the  "  self  "),  it  introduces  the 
problem  of  the  reality  of  mind. 

Psychology  as  pursued  from  the  biological,  experimental,  and 
psycho-physical  points  of  view,  is  particularly  fond  of  claiming 
its  ability  to  succeed  "  without  a  soul."  Such  ability  may  be 
conceded,  in  so  far  as  it  is  satisfied  to  remain  a  science  without 
power  to  explain  actual  events,  by  really  acting  forces,  in  ac- 
cordance with  laws  that  are  valid  in  reality.  But  the  advocates 
of  "  psychology  without  a  soul  "  are  often  inconsistent  in  their 
pursuit  and  practice  as  regards  their  favorite  principle.  For 
the  postulate  of  a  single  real  subject  of  the  phenomena  (the 
Mind)  they  are  found  substituting  some  other,  less  appropriate 
and  equally  meagre  postulate.  Thus  they  make  a  particular 
congeries  of  material  molecules  with  a  peculiarly  rich  equip- 
ment of  potencies,  to  be  the  real  subject  of  all  the  psychical 
states  and  processes.  That  is  to  say,  matter,  assumed  to  be 
known  as  an  indubitable  reality,  is  the  one  real  subject  which 
somehow  has  acquired  the  power  to  develop  a  phenomenal  being 
(the  so-called  "  soul "),  in  whose  activity  alone  it  is  itself  known 
as  real  through  the  means  of  the  phenomenon  of  a  metaphysical 
postulate.  This  may  well  seem  even  to  its  most  ardent  advo- 
cates a  somewhat  extraordinary  potency  to  ascribe  to  matter. 

The  final  syntheses  of  philosophical  system  must  un- 
doubtedly recognize  that  Unity  in  Eeality  which  the  known 
universe  of  material    and  psychical   beings  certainly   implies. 


276  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

So  far  forth  it  must  certainly  be  a  monistic  system.  But  in 
order  to  be  a  true  system  it  must  be,  not  only  consistent  in 
elaborating  the  content  of  all  known  physical  and  psychical 
facts,  but  also  in  fundamental  accord  with  the  primary  fact  of 
knowledge.  This  primary  fact  of  knowledge  has  been  seen  to 
implicate  the  duality  in  reality  of  the  subject  of  knowing, 
which  is  the  object  known  in  self-consciousness,  and  the  object 
known  as  the  subject  of  physical  changes.  Indeed,  it  is  upon 
this  primary  fact  of  knowledge,  with  what  it  implicates,  that 
the  distinction  between  "  Things  "  and  "  Souls  "  is  based.  Upon 
the  same  basis  rests  the  distinction  between  the  physical 
sciences  and  the  psychological  sciences,  and  the  distinction 
between  the  "  Philosophy  of  Nature "  and  the  "  Philosophy 
of  Mind." 

But  the  reality  of  the  Mind  is  implicated  in  the  primary 
fact  of  knowledge  in  a  peculiarly  convincing  and  impregnable 
manner.  The  fact  of  knowledge  itself  is  the  first  and  funda- 
mental reality.  As  such  it  is,  in  its  very  nature,  the  self- 
realization  of  the  knowing  subject.  As  a  fact,  it  is  the  realest 
of  all  events ;  it  is  the  very  type  of  all  actuality,  —  the  occur- 
rence which  is  a  datum,  behind  which,  or  beyond  which, 
knowledge  cannot  go.  Whatever  is  implicated  in  it  is  real; 
to  attempt  to  question  this  is  to  imply  it,  and  so  is  the  attempt 
to  explain  it.  Indeed,  no  agnosticism  or  materialism  can  ques- 
tion the  reality  of  the  subject  of  knowledge  in  so  far  as  it  is 
given  in  the  fact  of  knowledge ;  neither  of  these  forms  of  think- 
ing claims  to  call  it  in  question.  And  this  reality  can  as  little 
be  explained  by  rational  psychology  as  it  can  be  questioned 
by  agnosticism  or  materialism. 

It  is  during  the  detailed  effort  to  show  precisely  in  what 
sense  we  are  to  understand  the  reality  of  mind,  that  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  philosophy  of  mind  emerge.  Here  the  attempt  to 
prove  too  much  is  as  mischievous  to  right  thinking  as  the  at- 
tempt to  disprove  what  is  plainly  implied.  The  mind,  in  the 
highest  and  widest   flights  of  self-consciousness,  never  knows 


AND   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  277 

itself  by  envisaging,  as  it  were,  its  own  simplicity  of  reality  ;  or 
by  rationally  attaching  to  any  particular  conception  which  it 
forms  of  itself  the  unquestionable  faith  of  intuitive  self-knowl- 
edge. In  the  light  of  psychological  science  and  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  general  metaphysics,  philosophy  proceeds  to  answer 
in  detail,  —  What  it  is  really  to  be  as  all  minds  are.  Its  narra- 
tive contains  as  much  of  truth  as  it  contains  of  knowledge 
gained  by  scientific  researches  and  reflective  analysis.  The 
philosophy  of  mind,  like  the  philosophy  of  nature,  is  subject  to 
a  progressively  improved  construction  as  the  psychological  sci- 
ences advance,  and  as  reflective  analysis  becomes  more  searching 
and  complete. 

At  the  same  time,  it  can  never  be  otherwise  than  true  that  the 
living  experience  of  knowledge  gives  legitimately  to  the  mind 
a  conviction,  and  a  clearness  of  representation  and  conception, 
touching  its  own  reality,  which  it  is  quite  impossible  for  it  to 
attain,  touching  the  reality  of  so-called  things.  With  the  irre- 
sistible force  of  this  living  experience  any  attempt  at  metaphy- 
sical materialism  will  always  have  to  deal.  And  psychology, 
studied  in  unprejudiced  fashion,  never  has  any  difficulty  in 
overthrowing  such  a  form  of  materialism.  So  often  as  we  try 
to  postulate  matter  as  a  reality,  out  of  which  both  physical  and 
psychical  changes  are  to  be  explained,  we  are  liable  virtually  to 
decide  the  great  question  of  metaphysics  in  disregard  of  the 
only  authority  in  metaphysics  ;  namely,  the  philosophical  mind. 

The  work  of  explicating  the  content  of  knowledge  in  answer 
to  the  question,  What  is  it  really  to  be  a  Mind?  is,  on  the 
whole,  then,  much  easier  than  the  task  of  forming  a  philosophy 
of  nature.  All  the  categories  seem  to  lose  something  of  their 
vague  and  figurative  character  when  applied  to  the  description 
of  the  reality  of  mental  life.  Of  course,  the  language  employed 
in  conveying  the  description  is  necessarily  figurative.  The 
terms  for  the  categories  are  necessarily  embodied  figures  of 
speech.  They  are  taken  from  modes  of  experience  that  are 
originally  of  things.     The  nature  of  the  development  of  Ian- 


278  '  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

cruaoe,  and  the  order  followed  in  the  development  of  experience, 
account  for  this  fact.  At  the  same  time  it  is  also  true  that  the 
conceptions  stirred  within  the  consciousness  by  the  terms  when 
applied  to  the  mind  are  not  "  figurate,"  in  the  same  way  and 
to  the  same  extent,  as  when  applied  to  an  extra-menta]  reality 
called  matter.  For  the  terms  all  find  their  legitimate  interpre- 
tation only  in  actual  experiences  of  the  self-conscious  mind. 
For  example,  we  have  concrete  actual  experiences  with  our- 
selves by  which  to  interpret  such  words  as  "  permanent  sub- 
ject," "cause,"  "force,"  "quality,"  "change  of  state,"  "unity," 
etc.  But  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  to  tell  what  these 
words  mean,  when  we  transfer  them  from  the  mental  realities 
in  which  they  are  born,  to  realities  of  which  we  have  no  knowl- 
edge (such  as  "atoms,"  "electricity,"  "ether,"  " physical  energy," 
etc.)  except  by  difficult  processes  of  inference. 

It  accords  with  the  foregoing  truth  to  say  that  the  substan- 
tiality and  causality  of  the  mind  are  terms  for  that  which  is 
realized  in  every  act  of  self-conscious  knowledge.  Every  such 
act  is  essentially  referable,  and  is  by  self -consciousness  actually 
referred,  to  one  subject  as  its  "  ground "  or  real  cause.  Thus 
also  is  every  such  act  an  actual  change  of  states,  known  to  take 
place  by  the  subject  of  all  changing  states.  Undoubtedly,  we 
find  insuperable  difficulty  involved  in  every  attempt  to  repre- 
sent, in  terms  of  the  sensuous  imagination,  any  reality  cor- 
responding to  these  terms.  This  is,  however,  because  the 
sensuous  imagination  has  no  fitness  to  represent  any  of  the 
ultimate  norms  of  knowledge,  —  the  so-called  categories.  But 
surely  no  one  would  think  of  claiming  that  the  difficulty  is 
peculiar  to  the  case  of  the  psychical  states  and  processes.  For 
who  would  think  of  claiming  that  he  can  form  an  adequate 
picture  of  what  it  is  to  be  an  atom,  and  thus  to  be  a  subject  of 
immanent  potencies  and  actual  changes  of  states  ?  Or  how 
shall  we  picture  to  the  eye,  or  on  the  skin,  or  in  the  muscles, 
the  force  of  attraction  that  binds  Mars  to  the  Sun,  or  unites  the 
atoms  of  oxygen  to  those  of  hydrogen  in  a  drop  of  water  ?     On 


AND   PHILOSOPHY  OF   MIND.  279 

the  other  hand,  the  essential  properties  of  matter,  such  as  its 
extension,  impenetrability,  or  its  mass,  weight,  inertia,  etc.,  as 
well  as  its  thermic,  electrical,  magnetic,  and  other  phenomena, 
and  the  measurement  of  the  quantities  of  these  properties  and 
of  the  relations  of  the  beings  possessing  them,  seem  to  imply  an 
inescapable  reference  back  to  processes  of  a  psychical  nature. 
But  whatever  being  has  the  actual  experience  whose  formula  is 
cogito  ergo  sum,  that  being  knows  so  as  to  need  no  telling  what 
it  is  really  to  be  the  subject  of  a  state. 

The  careful  analytic  treatment  of  all  the  principles  of  psycho- 
logical science,  from  the  point  of  view  of  reflective  analysis 
already  adopted  in  general  metaphysics,  is  the  peculiar  busi- 
ness of  the  philosophy  of  mind.  When  this  business  is  under- 
taken by  a  community  of  scholars  who  are  skilled  alike  in  the 
interpretation  of  modern  psychology  and  in  metaphysical  theory, 
a  new  and  improved  philosophy  of  mind  will  be  the  result. 
The  deeper  mysteries  of  the  soul  will  never  be  penetrated  by  in- 
vestigators who  care  for  nothing  but  to  add  some  new  fact  to 
the  somewhat  dreary  array  already  existing  in  psychometry  or 
electro-physiology.  Nor  will  these  mysteries  prefer  to  disclose 
themselves  to  him  who  is  satisfied  with  gazing  on  the  spinal 
cord  of  a  frog  while  undergoing  stimulation,  or  with  cramming 
the  latest  conceits  in  psycho-physics  from  the  German  labora- 
tories. On  the  other  hand,  the  high  and  dry  metaphysical  con- 
struction of  theory  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  is  worse  than 
inadequate. 

Of  all  the  predicates  to  be  applied,  as  involved  in  the  very 
nature  of  knowledge,  to  the  reality  called  "  Mind,"  none  is  more 
important  or  more  liable  to  misrepresentation  than  its  Unity. 
The  older  rational  psychology  endeavored  to  construct,  on  a 
basis  of  immediate  knowledge,  a  picture  of  the  soul  as  neces- 
sarily simple  or  uncoinpounded  ;  therefore  indiscerptible ;  and 
therefore  indestructible  or  immortal.  The  picture  was  copied 
after  that  of  a  hypothetical  material  reality,  —  an  uncoin- 
pounded and  indissoluble  physical  monad.     The  claim  for  the 


280  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

soul  that  it  is  such  a  unity,  with  all  the  allied  claims  as  to  its 
indestructibility,  was  lost  in  the  struggle  with  criticism  and 
scepticism.  But  why  should  the  philosophy  of  mind  concern 
itself  about  the  establishing  of  such  a  unity  for  the  subject  of 
psychical  changes  ?  For  this  is  a  kind  of  unity  which  can,  in 
reality,  have  no  existence  anywhere,  either  in  the  realm  of 
matter  or  in  that  of  mind.  In  other  words,  to  be  really  exist- 
ent, whether  as  a  "  Thing  "  or  as  a  "  Soul,"  implies  a  different 
kind  of  unity  from  that  which  the  old  psychology  ascribed  to 
the  mind  as  its  peculiar  privilege,  its  most  precious  treasure. 

The  grounds  of  the  mind's  claim  to  be  a  real  unitary  being 
are  laid  in  every  act  of  self-conscious  knowledge.  In  every 
such  act  the  subject  of  the  act  becomes,  in  the  highest  sense 
of  the  word,  really  one,  and  knows  itself  as  one.  But  to  repre- 
sent this  real  but  psychical  unity  after  the  analogy  of  a  rigid 
and  unchanging  oneness  of  being,  is  to  miss  the  very  condi- 
tions of  its  existence  at  all.  There  is,  in  reality,  no  unity  that 
is  not  an  actual  unifying  of  the  manifold.  And  this  the  mind 
is,  really,  in  every  actual  event  of  self-conscious  knowledge.  Of 
this  event  we  may  say  that  it  is,  in  its  nature,  a  realization  of 
the  highest  —  nay,  of  the  only  conceivable  —  kind  of  psychical 
unity. 

All  that  is  implicated  in  this  admitted  unity  of  consciousness, 
as  a  concrete  and  actual  and  indubitable  experience,  it  belongs 
to  the  philosophy  of  mind  to  set  forth.  The  task  is  made  more 
important  and  difficult,  as  well  as  interesting,  by  two  classes  of 
scientific  considerations.  These  are,  first,  such  as  bear  on  the 
doctrine  of  "  faculties  "  of  the  mind ;  and,  second,  such  as  have 
to  do  with  certain  abnormal  or  unusual  phenomena,  like  so- 
called  "  double-consciousness,"  etc.  But  in  the  treatment  of 
these  and  other  allied  considerations,  the  futility  of  all  attempts 
to  construct  a  doctrine  of  the  soul's  unity,  as  involving  its 
indestructibility,  upon  a  basis  of  so-called  intuitions  should  be 
conceded.  Immortality  of  mind  cannot  be  envisaged  in  self- 
consciousness.     Neither  can   it  be  intuitively  known  what  it 


AND   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  281 

would  be  to  be  really  one,  as  every  mind  is  one,  if  all  the 
peculiarities  of  the  concrete  process  of  self-knowledge  were  left 
out  of  the  account.  But  he  who  mourns  over  the  loss  of  power 
to  establish  by  intuition  the  soul's  indiscerptible  simplicity  in 
reality,  and  its  resulting  immortality,  does  his  own  soul  a  wrong 
that  is  not  necessary.  It  is  hard  to  see  what  advantage  one 
would  have,  if  one  could  really  be  an  immortal  unit  without 
the  actual  life  of  self-conscious  knowledge ;  and  equally  hard 
to  see  what  one  would  lose  by  the  dissolution  of  this  merely 
mathematical  unity,  if  only  one  could  continue  to  experience  the 
benefits  of  actually  living  the  manifold  life  of  self-consciousness. 

Modern  psychological  science,  by  its  modification  of  the  old- 
time  theory  of  faculties,  has  done  much  to  improve  the  philos- 
ophy of  mind.  In  this  work  great  credit  must  be  awarded  to 
Herbart  and  his  followers.  The  credit  is  all  the  greater  be- 
cause they  have  never  fallen  into  the  folly  of  trying  to  establish 
a  "  psychology  without  a  soul."  No  one  making  such  an  attempt 
can  rightly  claim  to  be  a  disciple  of  this  successor  of  Kant  at 
Konigsberg.1  The  unity  of  the  real  subject  of  all  the  psychical 
changes  is  a  postulate  from  which  Herbart  does  not  swerve. 
The  prevalent  doctrine  of  faculties  he  rejects  on  the  ground  of 
its  inconsistency  with  the  true  being  of  the  soul,  which  he  re- 
gards as  a  simple,  real  essence.  Like  every  such  essence,  it  can 
have  only  one  attribute ;  for  plurality  of  attributes  is  inconsis- 
tent with  real  unity  of  subject.  Its  sole  attribute  is  its  one 
mode  of  reaction,  of  "  self-preservation,"  as  it  were,  on  every 
occasion  of  its  being  in  "propinquity"  or  "connection"  (Zu- 
sammensein)  with  other  real  beings.  The  characteristic  mode 
of  the  soul's  reaction  in  self-preservation  is  ideation  ;  and  as 
combinations  and  modifications  of  ideation-processes  all  the 
psychical  life  is  to  be  explained. 

Tlic  effort  of  Herbart  to  regard  every  psychical  act,  and  every 
so-called  psychical  faculty,  as  but  a  mode  of  the  life  of  the  one 

1  Herbart's  woik  is  entitled,  Psychologic  als  Wissenschaft,  neu  gegriiudet  auf 
Eifahrung,  Metaphysik  and  Mathematik,  Konigsberg,  1824. 


282  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE 

subject,  whose  nature  unfolds  itself  in  accordance  with  its  im- 
manent idea,  is  most  praiseworthy.  But  the  form  which  he 
gave  to  this  effort  is  needlessly  narrow.  All  attributes  or  facul- 
ties are  indeed  only  modes  of  the  behavior,  under  changing  re- 
lations, of  the  one  real  subject  called  Mind.  But  the  unity  of 
this  subject  is  not  a  punctual  unity  ;  neither  is  it  a  unity  such 
as  forbids  it  to  behave  in  more  than  one  fundamental  mode  of 
reaction.  It  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  a  unity  which  implies, 
the  rather,  a  manif oldness  of  momenta  or  factors  in  every  actual 
activity ;  and,  accordingly,  a  number  of  predicates  (faculties  or 
powers)  as  shown  in  the  actuality  of  every  act. 

But  especially  is  the  unity  of  the  mind  demonstrated  in  the 
character  of  its  evolution.  Of  no  other  real  being  is  it  true,  to 
the  same  extent  or  with  the  same  remarkable  significance,  that 
what  it  really  is  can  be  known  only  by  what  it  actually  becomes. 
So  that  if  we  entertain  the  fiction  of  describing  all  that  the  mind 
really  is  in  terms  of  a  single  attribute,  we  may  select  as  this  at- 
tribute, its  "  capacity  for  development."  This  is  substantially 
what  Wundt  has  done 1  at  the  conclusion  of  his  psycho-physical 
examination  of  the  nature  of  the  soul.  "By  the  term  'soul,'" 
says  he,  "  we  mean  the  inner  being  of  the  same  unity  which, 
from  the  external  point  of  view,  we  regard  as  the  body  belong- 
ing to  it."  This  irresistibly  leads  to  the  postulate  that  "  spir- 
itual being  is  the  actuality  of  things,  and  that  its  most  essential 
property  is  development."  Little  of  scientific  or  philosophical 
value  would  be  gained,  however,  by  making  such  a  declaration 
respecting  the  one  "  essence  "  of  the  soul's  life.  The  wonderful 
variety  of  powers,  or  qualities,  implied  in  the  actual  variety  of 
its  changing  states,  remains  as  great  as  before.  These  are  all 
implied  in  its  development.  Nay,  more,  the  fact  that  its  being 
is  a  life,  which  consists  in  the  actual  unfolding  of  these  implied 
powers,  in  definite  relations  and  according  to  many  laws,  but 
with  the  unity  of  a  self-realizing  idea,  enhances  our  estimate  of 
the  number  of  its  predicates.     The  qualities  or  faculties  of  the 

1  Grundziige  der  physiologischen  Psychologic,  ed.  1880,  ii.  463  f. 


AND   PHILOSOPHY   OF  MIND.  283 

mind  can  never  be  fewer  in  number  than  those  modes  of  the 
behavior  of  all  minds  which  refuse  to  be  reduced  to  similar 
terms.  The  philosophical  doctrine  of  the  mind's  unity  is  there- 
fore not  dependent  upon  the  number  of  the  mind's  faculties 
which  the  science  of  psychology  accepts. 

The  philosophy  of  mind  can  scarcely  be  in  like  manner  indif- 
ferent to  the  scientific  description  and  explanation  of  phenomena 
like  those  of  "  double  consciousness,"  etc.  It  cannot  easily  es- 
cape the  feeling  that  some  of  the  views  still  current  as  to  the 
soul's  real  nature  may  be  profoundly  modified  by  the  progress 
of  scientific  investigation.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  al- 
leged cases  of  unconscious  surrender  of  the  will  of  one  person  to 
another,  of  attribution  to  the  wrong  will,  as  it  were,  with  self- 
condemnation  and  remorse,  of  the  results  of  conduct,  and  of 
other  abnormal  and  pathological  phenomena  of  an  ethical  order. 
In  general,  it  must  be  said  of  all  such  material  for  philosophical 
consideration  that  it  still  needs  to  undergo  a  great  amount  of 
strictly  scientific  elaboration.  In  certain  lines,  psychology  has 
during  the  last  twenty-five  years  been  among  the  most  enter- 
prising and  successful  of  all  the  empirical  sciences.  For  that 
very  reason,  it  has  acquired  an  immense  mass  of  material,  partly 
derived  from  observation  unchecked  by  experiment,  and  partly 
from  more  or  less  unsuccessful  experiment,  which  requires 
further  testing.  It  is  quite  too  soon  to  assume,  on  grounds  of 
empirical  psychology,  the  necessity  of  reconstructing  all  the 
categories.  On  the  other  hand,  that  the  speculative  theory  of 
mind,  as  well  as  many  an  ethical  and  theological  theory,  will 
need  to  be  re-shaped,  there  can  be  little  doubt.  But  the  study 
of  the  history  of  human  thinking  is  a  great  quieter  of  exagge- 
rated alarms  at  such  a  necessity.  No  form  of  elaborate  human 
knowledge  is  older,  or  rests  on  broader  foundations,  than  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  mind.  In  no  form  are  the  changes  of  important 
opinion  slower ;  in  none  are  the  great  centres  of  accepted  truth 
more  secure.  The  student  of  the  philosophy  of  mind  will  there- 
fore welcome,  as  constituting  a  basis  for  his  theory  of  mind,  all 


284  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 

the  principles  discovered  by  psycho-physics,  psychiatry,  hyp- 
notism, nervous  pathology,  and  criminal  statistics ;  but  he  will 
make  sure  that  all  alleged  principles  are  discovered,  in  fact,  and 
that  they  are  so  stated  as  to  be  properly  expressed  principles. 

A  broad  field  for  philosophical  research  opens  before  us  when- 
ever we  attempt,  on  a  basis  of  the  particular  sciences,  specula- 
tively to  determine  the  relations  of  the  human  mind  to  matter, 
to  other  finite  minds,  and  to  God.  Here  it  is  impossible  to 
resist  the  influence  of  ethical  and  sesthetical  considerations. 
And  as  a  matter  of  fact,  these  relations  lie  not  only  in  the 
sphere  of  what  actually  is,  but  also  in  the  sphere  of  what  ought 
to  be.  They  require,  therefore,  for  their  right  speculative  treat- 
ment a  thorough  equipment  in  the  sciences  of  ethics  and  aes- 
thetics. Nor  can  the  phenomena  of  the  religious  being  of  man 
be  left  out  of  the  account.  Indeed,  for  the  philosophical  theory 
of  the  relations  of  mind  to  other  mind,  and  of  all  finite  minds 
to  God,  ethics,  aesthetics,  and  the  science  of  religion  are  quite 
indispensable. 

The  general  relations  of  the  mind  of  man  to  matter  are  just 
now  being  made  the  subject  of  most  painstaking  scientific  re- 
search. All  such  relations,  in  fact,  exist  (so  far  as  we  have  any 
information  as  yet  scientifically  verifiable)  in  the  form  of  rela- 
tions between  the  human  mind  and  the  human  body.  Indeed, 
the  progress  of  science  is  more  and  more  in  the  direction  of 
treating  all  the  more  abnormal  and  astounding  phenomena  in 
terms  of  these  relations. 

The  philosophical  importance  of  studies  in  psycho-physics 
and  physiological  psychology  is  therefore  obvious.  These 
branches  of  psychology  have  already  made  important  changes 
in  the  philosophical  points  of  view,  if  not  in  the  tenets  of  phi- 
losophy. The  ancient  figures  of  speech,  which  allow  or  invite 
us  to  speak  of  the  body  as  the  "  seat,"  the  "  tabernacle,"  the 
"  organ,"  of  the  mind,  are  rapidly  being  clothed  with  a  new 
meaning.  Reflective  analysis  discovers  a  single  great  truth  as 
underlying  all  these  figures  of  speech.     The  life  of  the  mind  is 


AND   PHILOSOPHY   OF   MIND.  285 

one  of  development  in  reciprocal  dependence  on  being  that  is 
other  than  itself.  That  this  life  is  its  own  life,  remains  as  true 
to-day  as  ever  before.  That  the  development  is  a  spiritual  de- 
velopment, and  implies  a  spiritual  nature  and  spiritual  potencies 
belonging  to  the  subject  of  the  development,  psycho-physics 
can  never  disprove.  But  this  mind-life  begins  and  continues, 
a  development  related  under  law  to  the  genesis  and  develop- 
ment of  a  manifold  unity  of  interacting  material  molecules. 
It  is  quite  too  much  to  expect  that  the  physics  of  masses  or 
of  molecules,  or  that  chemistry,  or  biology,  should  adequately 
explain  the  existence  and  unfolding  of  this  series  of  spiritual 
relations.  And  we  have  no  adequate  reason  for  affirming  that 
any  of  the  principles  of  these  sciences  reign  supreme  over  such 
relations.  Indeed,  the  most  general  principles  of  these  sciences 
—  such  as  the  conservation  of  mass  and  the  conservation  and 
correlation  of  energy  —  avowedly  cannot  be  maintained  between 
brain-motions  and  psychical  states. 

At  this  point  philosophy  enters  another  protest  against  the 
current  tendency  to  bring  all  the  force  of  the  principle  of  suffi- 
cient reason  to  bear  in  favor  of  a  materialistic  theory  of  mind, 
and  even  to  make  the  working  postulate  of  physics  co-extensive 
with  the  category  of  causality.  Psycho-physics  and  physiologi- 
cal psychology  can  never,  whatever  extension  of  their  discoveries 
may  in  the  future  be  made,  invalidate  the  reality  and  spiritual- 
ity of  the  subject  of  psychical  changes.  These  sciences,  at  most, 
can  only  present  the  general  facts  of  correlation  between  psychi- 
cal changes  and  changes  in  the  relations  of  the  substance  of  the 
brain.  Phenomenally  considered,  the  correlations  are  recipro- 
cal. There  is  as  good  and  unimpeachable  evidence  to  show  that 
the  latter  are,  in  turn,  conditioned  upon  the  former,  as  that  the 
former  are  conditioned  upon  the  latter.  Considered  metaphysi- 
cally, each  class  of  changes  requires  its  own  characteristic  sub- 
ject as  its  cause  or  "ground."  If  the  regard  that  mind  shows 
for  molecules  of  matter,  and  the  regard  shown  by  them  for  it, 
is  an  ultimate  mystery,  we  are  no  worse  off  (provided  we  can 


286  PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE 

formulate  the  terms  of  this  regard,  —  "  the  laws  "  of  the  corre- 
lation) than  we  are  with  respect  to  the  real  causes  of  reciprocal 
physical  changes.  But  it  belongs  to  philosophy  in  "its  attempts 
at  a  final  synthesis  of  the  principles  of  both  Things  and  Souls, 
—  that  is,  of  all  finite  reality,  —  to  determine,  if  possible,  the 
nature  of  that  Unity  in  which  they  all  have  their  "  Ground." 

Both  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  and  the  Philosophy  of  Mind 
require  the  thoughtful  consideration  of  one  doctrine  which  is 
potent  in  both  realms.  We  refer,  of  course,  to  the  theory  of 
evolution.  The  metaphysics  of  this  theory,  as  it  is  taught  on 
purely  scientific  grounds,  is  often  extremely  crude  and  incon- 
sistent. This  is  largely  due  to  two  causes.  The  scientific 
advocate  cannot  elevate  his  interpretation  of  certain  facts  of 
observation  to  the  place  of  a  supreme  principle,  without  calling 
freely  upon  a  priori  considerations  to  fill  in  the  gaps  and  enlarge 
the  circumference  of  his  legitimate  inferences.  Moreover,  if  the 
theory  of  evolution  is  itself  anything  more  than  a  passing  fancy, 
it  is  representative  of  what  has  gone  on,  and  still  goes  on,  in 
the  world  of  reality.  Therefore,  it  is  legitimately  philosophical 
in  its  nature.  Therefore,  it  needs  not  less  metaphysics,  and 
surely  not  more  of  poor  metaphysics,  but,  the  rather,  more  of 
better  metaphysics.  And,  indeed,  what  can  be  more  inspiring 
to  the  student  of  philosophy  than  the  demand  made  upon  him 
by  the  present  condition  of  science  in  respect  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  ?  He  is  invited  to  regard  the  universe,  not  as  a  stati- 
cal affair,  a  problem  in  mechanics  admitting  of  an  a  priori  or 
mathematical  solution,  but  as  a  history  of  genesis  and  growth, 
as  one  vast  and  continuous  self-unfolding  Life.  This  require-  . 
ment  does  not  justify  the  removal  of  important  and  eternal 
distinctions.  It  is  not  as  though  the  categories  were  all  invited 
to  a  kind  of  hara-kiri.  The  theory  of  evolution  constitutes 
a  demand  for  an  enlarged  philosophical  interpretation  of  the 
world,  as  a  totality  in  all  space  and  all  time,  —  the  Unity  of 
a  progressively  self-realizing  Idea. 

The  exclusive  or  undue  emphasis  of  the  considerations  pecu- 


AND   PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.  287 

liar  to  either  of  the  two  departments  of  metaphysics  results  in 
the  one-sided  tenets  of  one  of  the  two  great  rival  schools  of 
philosophy.  Eealism  almost  invariably  starts  from  the  physi- 
cal, and  ends  in  the  philosophical  interpretation  of  all  that  is, 
and  happens,  through  natural  forces  and  laws.  Idealism  starts 
from  the  purely  psychological  interpretation,  and  ends  in  affirm- 
ing the  reality  of  Mind  alone. 


CHAPTER  XL 

ETHICS. 

WITH  the  introduction  of  distinctively  ethical  concep- 
tions and  laws  we  enter  upon  the  second  main  depart- 
ment of  philosophical  discipline.  Permission  was  taken  to 
call  this  department  the  Philosophy  of  the  Ideal  (Idealology, 
or  Philosophical  Teleology).  The  division  itself  implies  that  the 
realm  of  really  existing  beings,  considered  simply  as  respects 
what  they  actually  are  and  actually  do,  does  not  cover  the 
entire  sphere  of  philosophy.  Besides  that  which  really  is, 
reflection  must  have  reference  also  to  that  which  ougld  to  be. 
Experience  does  not  consist  wholly  of  the  monotonous  and 
indifferent  cognition  of  the  existence  and  happenings  belonging 
to  matters  of  fact.  Neither  is  all  we  know,  or  long  further 
to  know,  covered  completely  by  the  sciences  which  strive  to 
systematize,  under  terms  of  uniform  relation,  changes  of  the 
states,  as  such,  of  things  and  minds. 

That  much  which  actually  happens  ought  not  to  happen, 
has  been  the  common  belief  of  mankind  in  all  ages.  Nor 
does  that  skilful  apologizing  for  the  laws  of  physical  and  psy- 
chical existence,  which  the  scientific  spirit  affects,  succeed  in 
driving  this  belief  from  the  human  mind.  On  the  contrary,  so 
confident  do  men  in  general  continue,  of  their  ability  to  distin- 
guish the  sphere  of  actuality  from  the  sphere  of  the  ideal,  that 
they  without  hesitation  pronounce  judgment  against  Nature 
herself.  She  seems  to  them  somehow  inexcusably  deficient 
in  respect  of  conformity  to  their  ethical  and  sesthetical  ideals. 
So  bad  or  ugly  are  some  things  and   some  souls  that  —  the 


ETHICS.  289 

feeling  seems  unavoidable  —  they  certainly  ought  not  to  have 
been,  or  even  to  be  permitted  to  be.  For  the  ignorance  and 
prejudice  which  so  frequently  accompany  this  kind  of  judg- 
ment no  apology  is  offered.  But  its  persistence,  as  deeply 
rooted  in  the  most  fundamental  convictions  of  the  mind,  is  a 
fact  which  provokes  inquiry.  Nor  is  it  at  all  likely  that  the 
painful  discrepancy  between  what  is  and  what  ought  to  be 
will  be  in  the  least  diminished  by  any  discoveries  of  modern 
science.  The  "  struggle  for  existence,"  and  "  the  survival  of 
the  fittest "  only,  with  all  that  these  phrases  imply,  may  be 
clothed  by  these  discoveries  in  the  garb  of  beauty  and  benev- 
olence. But  the  facts  to  which  they  appeal  appear  awful  and 
mysterious  ;  the  laws  they  assert  meet  with  strong  repugnance 
from  important  elements  in  the  life  of  the  soul.  And  he  must 
have  become  particularly  insensitive,  on  both  the  ethical  and 
the  £esthetical  side,  whose  ideals  seem  to  be  satisfied  by  the 
world  of  reality. 

The  ideals  themselves,  therefore,  demand  that  treatment 
which  philosophy  employs.  For  their  presence  in  striking 
contrast  to  the  actual  being  and  behavior  of  things,  is  a  most 
significant  fact.  It  stimulates  reflective  analysis  to  a  remark- 
able degree.  Inasmuch  as  these  ideals  are  given  in  the  actual 
experience  of  the  human  mind  ;  and  inasmuch  also  as  the  mind 
strives  to  bring  itself  and  all  the  procedure  of  physical  forces 
and  laws  to  the  test  of  the  standards  required  by  the  ideals,  — 
synthetic  philosophy  must  take  great  account  of  them.  Philo- 
sophical Ethics  and  ^Esthetics  are  therefore  legitimate  and 
necessary  branches  of  philosophy. 

Moreover,  it  is  in  this  general  department  that  philosophy 
takes  hold  upon  the  principles  of  conduct.  Some  might  —  it  is 
possible  —  dispute  with  Matthew  Arnold  over  the  exact  frac- 
tion which  should  be  chosen  to  designate  that  portion  of  "  life  " 
which  "  conduct  "  is.  But  even  if  we  restrict  the  term  to  such 
action  as  is  performed,  with  more  or  less  of  deliberation  and 
choice,  in  the  intelligent  pursuit  of  ends,  a  philosophy  of  con- 

19 


290  ETHICS. 

duct  is  required.  Indeed,  it  is  in  its  approaches  to  the  treat- 
ment of  ethical  principles,  and  in  its  consequent  influence  on 
the  life  of  duty  and  of  religion,  that  philosophy  comes  into 
closest  contact  with  the  interests  of  men.  Were  it  possible, 
then,  for  philosophy  to  neglect  ethics  and  aesthetics  and  still 
aim  at  completeness  in  its  own  domain,  such  neglect  would  be 
impolitic. 

All  the  different  schools  of  philosophy  attempt  to  meet  the 
demand  for  philosophical  analysis  and  philosophical  system 
made  by  ethical  and  sesthetical  phenomena.  Even  agnosticism, 
which  is  no  philosophy  in  so  far  as  it  remains  consistent  ag- 
nosticism, aims  at  establishing  a  theory  of  ethics.  Just  at 
present,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  has  attached  itself  to  a  so-called 
"  ethics  of  evolution."  Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann,  also,  feel 
constrained  to  give  especial  attention  to  ethical  philosophy. 
It  is  indeed  an  integral  part  of  the  philosophical  system  of 
both  that  the  so-called  "  Ground  "  of  all  phenomena  is  neces- 
sarily unethical.  Yet  the  pessimistic  pantheism  which  these 
thinkers  advocate  aims,  in  their  case,  to  be  especially  fruitful 
in  the  interpretation  of  ethical  and  sesthetical  phenomena. 

Glimpses  of  profounder  reasons  for  the  need  which  philosophy 
has  of  ethics  and  aesthetics  come  to  us  from  the  principles 
already  established.  Even  general  metaphysics  and  the  philoso- 
phy of  nature  excited  the  conviction  that  what  we  call  "  Matter," 
as  the  cause  of  physical  events  and  the  ground  of  physical 
beings,  is  not  without  an  ideal  character.  The  unity  of  being 
which  material  things  are  known  to  have,  seemed  to  imply  the 
immanence,  as  it  were,  in  the  subject  of  all  these  changes  of  a 
self-limiting  idea.  And  when  the  sciences  of  nature  and  of 
mind  were  seen  to  be  converging  upon  the  problem  of  deter- 
mining the  most  general  relations  in  which  "Things"  and 
"  Souls  "  stand  to  each  other,  and  to  the  Unity  of  Eeality  whose 
being  and  action  determine  the  natures  and  relations  of  both, 
the  horizon  where  philosophical  knowledge  reaches  its  limit 
began    faintly  to  appear.     For,  certainly,  the   nature  of   this 


ETHICS.  291 

fundamental  Unity  of  Eeality  cannot  be  investigated,  if  the 
presence  and  meaning  of  our  ideals  are  to  be  left  out  of  ac- 
count. Herein  must  be  found  the  real  and  the  final  cause 
of  the  arising  and  growth  of  these  ideals.  We  are  persuaded 
that  much  more  than  this  will  appear  true  as  regards  the 
relation  of  "  the  Good  "  and  "  the  Beautiful "  to  that  Unity  of 
Eeality  which  philosophy  seeks.  This  very  advance  of  our 
knowledge  philosophy  aims  to  secure  by  cultivating  ethics, 
aesthetics,  and  the  philosophy  of  religion  as  important  parts  of 
its  discipline. 

The  Philosophy  of  the  Ideal  is,  then,  a  main  cognate  depart- 
ment of  philosophy,  in  distinction  from  the  department  of 
Metaphysics.  It  treats  of  that  which  men  have  the  idea  ought 
to  be,  as  distinguished  from  what  they  know  really  is.  So  far 
forth  there  is  reason  in  the  twofold  division  adopted,  for  exam- 
ple, by  Diihring,1  into  philosophy  of  science  and  philosophy  of 
life.  In  the  latter  (which  includes  ^Esthetics  and  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Eeligion)  we  seek  for  the  application  of  reflective 
thinking  to  the  ideals  of  life,  —  of  life,  in  the  widest  sense  of 
the  word.  Thus  understood,  human  living  includes,  as  its 
choicest  experiences,  the  production  and  joyous  appreciation 
of  beauty,  the  doing  and  loving  approbation  of  duty,  the 
knowledge,  trust,  and  blessed  communion  of  soul,  toward 
God.  As  Calybaus 2  has  pointed  out,  the  distinction  between 
science  and  wisdom  is  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  firmly  rooted 
in  the  popular  mind  and  in  philosophy. 

It  would  be  a  fatal  mistake,  however,  to  suppose  that  the 
Ideals,  with  which  this  department  of  philosophy  is  concerned, 
stand  in  no  empirical  relation  to  the  concrete  realities  consid- 
ered by  the  physical  and  psychological  sciences.  That  these 
ideals  —  the  conceptions  of  the  beautiful  and  of  the  morally 
good,  and  the  feelings  and  dispositions  attaching  themselves 
to  each  —  exist  in  the  form  of  concrete  psychical  states,  is  a 

1  Cursns  der  Philosophic,  p.  1  f.,  8  f.,  etc. 

2  Fundameiitalphilosophie,  p.  22  f. 


292  ETHICS. 

matter  of  fact  determined  by  observation  of  others,  and  by 
self-consciousness.  Their  existence  all  along  the  path  of 
human  evolution  is  testified  to  by  many  phenomena  of  human 
history.  But  much  more  than  this  is  indisputably  true.  The 
structure  of  human  society,  the  products  of  legislation  and  of 
art,  the  constitution  of  literature,  are  all  complex  forms  of 
reality  which  have  their  source  in  these  ideals.  Indeed,  in  a 
limited  but  not  unimportant  way  the  influence  of  these  ideals' 
has  been  felt  in  modifying  external  Nature.  Even  the  surface 
of  the  earth  and  the  course  of  the  seasons  is  not  isolated  from 
effects  more  or  less  directly  due  to  the  conceptions  of  men  re- 
specting the  Beautiful  and  the  Good.  Nor  does  our  imagina- 
tion succeed  in  defining  just  how  much  more,  with  the  growth 
of  knowledge,  may  in  time  come  into  the  sphere  of  physical 
changes  that  are  possible  through  a  wise  or  a  foolish  use  of 
means  on  the  part  of  mankind. 

When  we  consider  the  influence  of  the  real  upon  these  ideals, 
our  views  become  more  clear  and  defensible  No  one  ac- 
quainted with  the  modern  sciences  of  ethics  and  aesthetics  can 
for  a  moment  maintain  that  the  conceptions,  feelings,  and 
judgments,  which  control  human  conduct,  have  developed  in 
complete  independence  of  the  world  of  facts.  The  two  spheres 
—  the  one,  of  that  which  actually  is,  the  other  of  that  which  we 
think  ought  to  be  —  are  not  identical ;  they  are  rather  in  some 
respects  exclusive  of  each  other  or  antagonistic.  But  they  are 
certainly  not  wholly  independent.  We  rely  chiefly  upon  an 
historical  and  comparative  study  of  the  phenomena  to  show 
how  the  forces  and  laws  of  material  reality  have  influenced  the 
ideals  which  men  frame  of  the  beautiful  and  the  morally  good. 
But  it  is  not  with  the  descriptive  history  of  the  alleged 
genesis  and  development  of  these  ideals  that  philosophy  is 
primarily  concerned.  It  is  interested  rather  in  the  conclusions 
to  be  drawn  from  this  history  regarding  the  real  nature  of  these 
ideals.  It  is  also  especially  interested  in  the  effort  to  throw 
light  on  the  further  definition  of  that  Unity  of  all  Reality  which 


ETHICS.  293 

constitutes  its  final  problem  in  synthesis.  Is  this  One  that 
is  the  "  Ground "  of  all  the  manifold  life  of  related  action  in 
which  things  and  souls  engage,  to  be  conceived  of,  and  believed 
in,  as  also  the  source  and  actualization  of  the  ethical  and 
jesthetical  Ideals  ? 

The  relation  of  philosophical  Ethics  and  /Esthetics  to  phi- 
losophy at  large,  and  to  Metaphysics  in  particular,  as  well 
as  especially  to  the  final  synthesis  which  the  Philosophy  of 
Religion  attempts,  should  now  be  obvious.  We  confine  the 
remaining  discussion  of  this  chapter  to  the  first  of  these  two 
sub-divisions  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Ideal. 

The  science  whose  investigations  precede  the  philosophy  of 
morals  is  also  called  ethics.  It  is  a  branch  of  psychology,  —  a 
psychological  science,  in  the  truest  meaning  of  the  words. 
Philosophical  ethics  treats,  by  the  method  and  with  the  spirit 
peculiar  to  all  philosophical  discipline,  the  presuppositions  and 
discovered  principles  of  scientific  ethics.  Here,  therefore,  the 
relations  between  science  and  philosophy  are  particularly  inti- 
mate and  often  perplexing.  Ethical  phenomena  certainly  invite 
scientific  treatment.  They  are  certainly  also  phenomena  of  a 
psychical  origin  and  character.  They  constitute  therefore  part 
of  the  great  domain  of  facts  and  laws  with  which  the  science  of 
psychology,  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word,  has  to  do.  But 
just  as  certainly  they  are  of  a  unique  character,  and  therefore 
in  a  measure  justify  the  claims  of  ethics  to  a  somewhat  sepa- 
rate existence  as  a  science.  But  this  unique  character  does  not 
excuse  ethical  facts  and  laws  from  submitting  to  all  the  tests  of 
science  and  philosophy.  In  spite,  then,  of  the  shyness  of  ethics 
to  enter  the  arena  of  scientific  psychology  and  of  critical 
thought,  into  that  arena  it  must  come.  There  must  it  con- 
tend ;  and  by  its  ability  to  stand  against  all  the  hardest  tests 
of  science  and  against  all  the  assaults  of  scepticism,  the  reality 
of  its  conclusions  must  be  judged. 

Ethics  as  a   science  presents  to  ethics  as  moral  philosophy 
'  certain  presuppositions  and  discovered  principles  which  require 


294  ETHICS. 

critical  handling  before  incorporation  into  the  system  of  phi- 
losophical truths.  The  presuppositions  it  is  the  work  of 
philosophical  analysis  to  explicate  and  define ;  they  are  to  be 
found  actually  implicated  in  all  the  psychological  sources  and 
norms  of  conduct.  The  discovered  principles  consist  of  those 
generalizations  upon  the  basis  of  diverse  ethical  phenomena 
which  the  scientific  study  of  man,  as  capable  of  conduct  and  as 
actually  exercising  this  capacity,  has  already  established.  In 
other  words,  if  there  are,  besides  those  fundamental  principles 
(categories),  which  metaphysics  distinguishes  as  belonging  to 
all  the  actually  existent,  others  which  control  all  our  mental 
representations  of  that  which  ought  to  be,  it  is  the  task  of 
philosophical  analysis  to  point  them  out.  If  there  are  convic- 
tions, rooted  in  the  primary  facts  of  the  mind's  being,  that 
attach  themselves  to  all  ethical  phenomena,  the  philosophy  of 
the  ideal  is  concerned  with  these  convictions.  In  general,  the 
relation  of  philosophy  to  the  particular  sciences  is  such  that 
philosophical  ethics  is  bound  to  depend  for  its  conclusions  upon 
"  data  "  furnished  by  observation  and  induction. 

Scientific  ethics  has  at  present  two  main  sources  from  which 
to  derive  its  system  of  so-called  ethical  laws.  These  are,  first, 
the  observation  of  all  those  phenomena  of  consciousness  to 
which  the  title  "  ethical "  can  properly  be  attached.  It  may  be 
said  that,  since  the  springs  of  conduct  are  laid  in  entire  human 
nature  and  involve  every  possible  form  of  psychical  action, 
descriptive  and  explanatory  psychology  must  furnish  the  knowl- 
edge of  ethical  laws.  The  second  main  source  of  the  systematic 
treatment  of  ethical  phenomena  is  comparative  and  historical 
study.  This  study  covers  the  development  of  ethnic  concep- 
tions and  customs  regarding  matters  of  moral  concern.  It  may 
even  embrace  those  actions  of  different  species  of  the  lower 
animals  that  are  alleged  to  have  an  ethical  character  and  sig- 
nificance. Its  dominant  idea  is  derived,  of  course,  from  the 
modern  theory  of  evolution. 

The  observation  cultivated  by  the  science  of  ethics  should  be 


ETHICS.  295 

as  comprehensive  and  penetrating  as  possible.  It  should  not 
follow  solely  the  method  of  introspection ;  it  should  be  external 
as  well.  The  study  of  human  conduct  as  indicative  of  the 
character  of  its  psychological  impulses,  antecedents,  and  prin- 
ciples, may  profitably  include  the  debased  and  criminal  classes, 
children,  and  even  idiots  and  imbeciles.  All  the  verified  results 
of  such  induction  the  philosophy  of  morals  will  be  bound  to 
take  into  its  final  account.  It  will  be  bound  also,  however, 
carefully  to  weigh  each  result,  and  always  to  remember  that  in 
the  process  of  realizing  our  ideals  the  significance  and  character 
of  the  true  Ideal  appears  as  the  end  of  the  process.  Especially 
careful  will  philosophical  ethics  be  of  those  hasty  generaliza- 
tions, so  abundant  in  these  days  of  laudable  ambition  to  arrive 
at  exact  science,  which  are  derived  from  tables  of  statistics  and 
other  similar  data.  The  great  value  of  such  data  cannot  be 
denied.  But  even  in  less  complicated  sciences  than  ethics  the 
fruitlessness  of  merely  heaping  up  tables  of  facts  is  sufficiently 
obvious.  No  amount  of  external  observation,  and  no  hand- 
ling of  an  indefinitely  increased  amount  of  statistics,  will  ever 
enable  the  student  of  morals  to  dispense  with  the  acquaintance 
with  his  own  nature  as  gained  by  intelligent  use  of  introspec- 
tion. In  this  sphere,  pre-eminently,  the  philosopher  needs  the 
equipment  of  personal  experience.  He  needs  also,  of  course, 
the  psychological  tact  and  skill  necessary  to  analyze  and  in- 
terpret that  experience.  He  who  has  not  seen  and  felt  —  seen 
clearly  and  felt  deeply  —  in  his  own  soul  the  varied  experiences, 

—  the  aspirations,  struggles,  mortifications,  triumphs,  and  defeats, 

—  of  moral  human  nature,  is  so  far  forth  unfit  scientifically  and 
philosophically  to  portray  and  interpret  it.  In  saying  this  we 
make  no  exception  of  the  religious  elements  and  experiences  of 
human  nature  For  in  them  also  we  agree  with  Mr.  Spencer  in 
finding  a  "soul  of  truth."  We  give,  however,  to  the  facts  and 
arguments  by  means  of  which  the  conclusion  is  to  be  established 
a  far  different  interpretation  from  that  which  he  proposes. 

The  scientific  study  of  the  phenomena  of  ethical  conscious- 


296  ETHICS. 

ness  results  in  a  view  of  human  nature  which  includes  a 
number  of  important  unsolved  philosophical  problems.  This 
study  reveals  so-called  "  human  nature "  as  set  over  against 
other  "  Nature "  in  the  most  wonderful  and  sharp  contrast. 
That  it  marks  the  inherent,  universal,  and  irresistible  tendency 
of  man  to  regard  himself  as  not  classifiable  with  "  things  "  and 
as  superior  to  them,  the  fair  and  comprehensive  student  of  the 
phenomena  cannot  doubt.  All  efforts  made  in  the  interests  of 
so-called  "  science  "  to  bring  the  entire  being  of  man  into  a 
strict  and  mechanical  connection  with  the  system  of  things 
meet  with  their  most  determined  resistance  from  ethical  feelings 
and  ideas.  The  average  man  is  disposed  to  be  docile,  on  being 
told  that  he  positively  must  conform  to  the  sovereign  sway  of 
physics  and  chemistry,  —  that  he  must,  indeed,  consider  himself 
a  thinking  and  feeling  machine.  But  when  he  is  told  that 
he  must  also  believe  himself  to  be  a  moral  machine,  he  posi- 
tively cannot  think  or  feel  his  way  into  terms  corresponding 
with  the  required  conception. 

The  questions  which  philosophy  raises  respecting  the  consti- 
tution of  human  nature  as  moral,  may  be  divided  into  two 
main  groups.  Of  these  one  contains  the  problem  of  so-called 
moral  freedom,  or  "  free  will ; "  the  other  covers  a  miscellaneous 
set  of  inquiries  which  may  be  said  to  deal  with  the  problem  of 
the  nature  of  "  conscience,"  —  in  a  somewhat  loose  and  indefi- 
nite meaning  of  this  term.  Both  these  problems,  like  all  phi- 
losophical problems,  lead  the  inquirer  quickly  into  the  region 
of  those  ultimate  facts  which  are  data  of  all  experience,  and  of 
those  principles  which  are  its  unchanging  laws  or  norms. 

The  problem  of  moral  freedom  is  generally  stated  in  terms 
that  provoke  discussion  as  to  whether  we  shall  say  yes,  or  no, 
to  the  question  :  Is  the  Will  free  ?  Such  a  form  of  statement, 
while  not  necessarily  involving  us  in  error,  is  certainly  liable  to 
grave  objections.  By  such  use  of  the  term  "  Will,"  a  so-called 
faculty  must  first  be  conceived  of  as  virtually  separated  from 
the   complex  life  of  the  Soul ;   then  this  faculty  must  be  set 


ETHICS.  297 

over  against  all  the  other  so-called  faculties  as  on  some  special 
terms  of  reciprocal  relation  with  them  ;  and,  finally,  the  neces- 
sity of  thinking  this  relation  as  falling  under  the  law  of  caus- 
ality is  either  affirmed  or  denied.  The  entire  treatment  of  the 
problem  thus  becomes  alien  to  the  methods  of  procedure  em- 
ployed elsewhere  in  psychology  and  philosophy.  Both  parties 
to  the  controversy  over  the  question,  when  stated  in  this  way, 
are  apt  to  do  violence  to  the  methods  and  the  conclusions  of 
these  branches  of  human  knowledge. 

The  advocate  of  moral  freedom,  whenever  he  can  for  a 
moment  pause  in  his  defensive  fighting,  is  tempted  to  strengthen 
his  position  by  an  untenable  theory  of  "  intuitions  "  and  intui- 
tive "  beliefs."  His  view  seems  to  imply  that,  by  an  act  of 
self-consciousness,  one  may  envisage  the  entire  content  of  one's 
real  being,  and  see,  as  with  an  inner  eye,  a  faculty  of  Will  sit- 
ting in  supreme  sovereignty  upon  the  throne  of  the  soul.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  determinist  ordinarily  contends  upon  the 
assumption  that  he,  at  any  rate,  has  all  the  clear  and  positive 
knowledge,  all  that  is  worthy  to  be  called  science,  on  his  side. 
But  his  science  is  too  often  found  to  consist  in  an  utterly  un- 
warrantable application  of  a  physical  hypothesis  to  the  case  of 
the  human  soul.  His  mechanics  and  dynamics  of  the  subject 
of  psychical  states  is  the  more  pronounced,  the  more  doubtful  it 
is.  He  assumes  that  ideas  and  feelings  act  on  so-called  will, 
as  masses  act  on  masses,  or  as  atomic  entities  act  on  one  an- 
other, with  measurable  forces  and  directions.  To  self-conscious- 
ness he  concedes  only  the  power  to  behold  the  surface  of  the 
psychical  machinery.  What  he  claims  for  himself,  in  the  name 
of  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  is  the  power 
infallibly  to  tell  what  the  co-efficient  of  the  potential  part  of 
the  motive  force  must  be  assumed  to  be.  The  study  of  psy- 
chical phenomena,  unprejudiced  by  the  determination  to  make 
quasi-physical  conceptions  and  laws  apply  to  these  phenomena 
at  all  hazards,  is  quite  too  tedious  a  process  for  him  to  follow. 
One  great  principle,  however,  he  certainly  feels  compelled  to 


298  ETHICS. 

borrow  from  the  equipment  of  the  mind.  This  is  the  principle 
of  causality  itself.  But  even  this  is  summoned  to  enforce  the 
deterministic  conclusion,  after  being  subjected  to  skilful  and 
somewhat  unscrupulous  manipulation. 

It  would  be  impertinent  to  offer  a  discussion  of  the  problem 
of  moral  freedom  in  a  few  words,  —  so  often  has  the  problem 
already  been  discussed  from  the  beginning  of  philosophy  until 
now.  A  few  words  must  suffice,  however,  to  indicate  certain 
lines  along  which  the  discussion  may  most  profitably  proceed. 
At  the  very  beginning  it  is  important  to  determine  the  nature 
of  those  primary  psychological  facts  in  the  existence  of  which 
the  problem  of  freedom  is  implicated.  These  facts  may  be 
summarized  as  the  one  fact  of  self-conscious  and  responsible 
choice.  That  no  mind  is  free  until  it  becomes  free,  that  moral 
freedom,  if  possessed  at  all,  is  gained  only  after  a  certain  psy- 
chical development  is  passed  through,  is  an  indisputable  con- 
clusion from  the  study  of  psychology.  If,  however,  the  mind 
ever  attains  to  moral  freedom,  it  does  this  in  the  forth-putting 
of  self-conscious  and  responsible  choice.  It  is  not  to  mere 
volition  that  the  claim  of  moral  freedom  is  most  intimately 
attached. 

The  factors  necessary  to  those  psychical  activities  which  are 
best  entitled  to  be  called  "  acts  of  free  will "  are  the  following 
five :  (a)  Mental  representation  of  two  or  more  ends  to  be  gained 
and  of  the  means  necessary  to  their  attainment ;  (b)  excitement 
of  the  sensibility  in  the  form  of  desire ;  (c)  deliberation,  or  con- 
flict of  so-called  motives,  regulated  by  the  direction  of  attention , 
(d)  decision,  —  the  appropriation  to  self  of  one  end,  and  its  sys- 
tem of  means,  to  the  exclusion  of  others  (that  psychical  process 
which  corresponds  to  the  words  "  I  will,"  —  choice,  peculiarly  so 
designated) ;  (r)  fiat  of  will  (generally,  if  not  always,  accom- 
panied by  the  feeling  of  effort,  and  resulting,  under  psycho-phy- 
sical laws,  in  starting  the  train  of  means  necessary  to  the 
attainment  of  the  chosen  end).  It  is  evident  that,  while  these 
factors  may  be  fused,  as  it  were,  so  as  to  be  almost  simultaneous, 


ETHICS.  299 

they  constitute,  in  the  order  just  given,  the  "  moments  "  of  that 
complex  self-conscious  process  in  which  ethics  has  a  peculiar 
interest.  It  is  evident  also  that  the  fourth  one  (d)  is  of  dis- 
tinctive importance  and  value. 

The  actual  occurrence  of  psychical  processes  with  the  factors 
just  ascribed  to  deliberate  choice  admits  of  no  doubt.  Just  as 
little  doubt  can  there  be  that  to  such  processes,  pre-eminently, 
are  attached  the  conviction  of  freedom  and  the  judgment  of 
responsibility.  I  cannot  indeed  say  :  I  know  by  the  immediate 
knowledge  of  self-consciousness  that,  when  I  thus  choose,  I  am 
a  really  free  being ;  but  I  can  say,  in  the  name  of  this  authority, 
I  know  that  I  pass  through  this  psychical  process  of  choice,  and 
that  to  myself,  considered  as  the  subject  of  this  process,  I  attach 
the  idea  and  the  feeling  of  being  free  and  responsible. 

This  unique  psychological  fact  of  deliberate  choice  comes 
before  philosophical  ethics  for  an  explanation  in  accordance  with 
the  principles  which  apply  to  all  real  beings  and  actual  events. 
It  is  itself  an  actual  experience  ;  about  this  we  need  not  hesi- 
tate. It  is  a  unique  experience,  and  appears  in  some  sort  to 
separate  the  subject  of  it  from  other  real  beings  in  the  world. 
Can  the  conviction  of  freedom  justify  itself  in  the  face  of  all 
that  we  know  concerning  the  necessary  nature  of  reality  ?  The 
conviction  has  in  its  favor,  not  only  its  own  inherent  force,  but 
also  certain  conclusions  drawn  from  that  conviction  of  respon- 
sibility to  which  its  relation  is  so  unique.  For  it  is  not  easy  to 
weaken  the  force  of  that  argument  which  ethics  has  so  fre- 
quently drawn  in  these  terms,  —  to  be  morally  responsible,  one 
must  be  morally  free.  Or,  in  other  words,  the  responsibility 
of  the  subject  who  chooses  implies  his  freedom  in  choosing. 
How,  then,  is  a  place  to  be  made  for  such  convictions  in  a 
world  known  to  be  real  under  the  principles  already  disclosed 
by  science  to  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of 
mind  ? 

It  is  plain  that  the  answer  to  this  question,  so  far  as  it  can 
be  answered  at  all,  requires  the  making  of  several  distinctions. 


300  ETHICS. 

Some  of  these  have  already  been  provided  for  ;  others  of  them 
are  required  at  this  stage  in  the  discussion  of  philosophical 
ethics.  What  is  it  to  be  free  ?  What  is  it  to  be  related  under 
the  principle  of  causality  ?  Are  the  two,  in  reality,  compatible 
or  incompatible  ?  Can  we  explain  otherwise  than  by  the  prin- 
ciple of  causality  ?  If  not,  and  if  there  be  freedom  of  mental 
action  in  choice,  and  if  freedom  and  causality  be  incompatible, 
how  can  the  fact  of  such  freedom  be  explained  ?  But  if  it  be 
inexplicable,  may  it  not  still  be  fact?  Or  may  not  the  principle 
of  causality  and  the  fact  of  freedom  both  be  so  stated  as  to  seem 
not  incompatible  ?  It  is  with  questions  such  as  these  that 
philosophical  ethics  has  to  deal  in  its  inquiry  whether  the  fact 
of  choice,  with  all  that  it  appears  to  imply,  can  be  adjusted  to 
its  place  in  the  world  of  actually  existent  things  and  minds. 

In  discussing  the  foregoing  questions,  some  help  may  be 
received  from  considerations  with  which  metaphysics  has  already 
made  us  familiar.  In  all  explanation  of  physical  changes  we 
found  the  physical  sciences  constantly  assuming  the  presence 
and  determinative  action  of  the  unexplained.  For  we  found 
these  sciences  referring  all  physical  changes,  for  their  ultimate 
explanation,  to  certain  beings  in  whose  reciprocally  related 
action  the  changes  really  consist.  These  beings  all  had  to  be 
conceived  of  as  endowed  with  "  natures " ;  they  admitted  of 
classification  into  kinds  according  to  their  respective  natures. 
What  they  do  is  "explained"  as  due  to  their  fixed  and  natural 
modes  of  behavior.  They  do  what  they  do,  as  having  these 
natures,  and  yet  as  always  acting  in  view  of  the  action  of  other 
beings.  But  when  we  seek  for  an  explanation  of  the  "  natures  " 
themselves,  we  find  ourselves  only  talking  in  circles  in  the  effort 
to  explain.  So  the  atoms  behave,  because  it  is  their  nature  to. 
Such  we  know  their  nature  to  be,  because  so  they  always  behave, 
That  is  to  say,  the  explanations  of  physical  science  all  end  in 
the  assumption  that  the  real  causes  of  the  changes  are  the  beings 
whose  the  changes  are. 

But  since  the  world  is  many  atoms  and  yet  one  world,  phi- 


ETHICS.  301 

losophy  propounds  the  ulterior  view.  The  changes  of  the  differ- 
ent beings  are  correlated  changes,  because  the  subject  of  all 
their  changes  is  in  reality  One.  The  spontaneity  of  the  action 
of  this  one  Being,  as  an  ideal  Unity  of  the  manifold,  is  taken, 
therefore,  as  the  ultimate  fact,  as  the  unexplained  "  Ground," 
on  which  the  explanation  of  all  the  observed  changes  finally 
depends. 

But  when  we  turned  from  the  philosophy  of  nature  to  that 
of  mind  we  found  less  difficulty  in  conceiving  how  there  might 
take  place  in  reality  the  necessary  unifying  of  the  manifold 
changes,  according  to  an  idea.  Every  mind  is  essentially  one 
being,  subject  and  cause  of  all  its  psychical  states,  with  a 
capacity  for  development  after  the  fashion  of  an  idea.  Every 
occurrence  in  the  development  of  this  being  requires,  there- 
fore, a  reference  to  the  unity  of  the  subject  of  all  the  states, 
as  its  explanation,  real  cause  or  ground.  In  some  sort,  it  is 
true,  we  "  explain "  psychical  states  by  other  states,  either 
physical  or  psychical;  for  the  states  may  be  known  to  follow 
each  other  in  more  or  less  uniform  ways.  But  every  such 
explanation  is  only  relative ;  it  implies  the  existence  of  a 
"  nature "  of  the  soul,  considered  as  one  subject  of  all  the 
related  states.  All  psychical  processes,  however  complete  our 
knowledge  may  be  of  their  antecedent  or  concomitant  pro- 
cesses, must  be  referred  to  an  unexplained  spontaneity  of  the 
subject  of  them  all. 

It  will  at  once  be  said,  and  truly,  that  this  result  of  meta- 
physical analysis  only  secures  for  minds  the  same  spontaneity 
that  atoms  have.  The  question  as  to  whether  the  spontaneity 
of  mind  can  so  differ  from  the  spontaneity  of  atoms  as  to  in- 
clude in  the  former  a  moral  freedom  denied  to  the  latter,  does 
indeed  require  a  further  study  of  the  "  natures  "  of  the  two. 
Such  study  reveals  the  reasons  for  defining  the  spontaneity 
of  mind  so  as  to  meet  the  demands  of  moral  freedom  and 
responsibility. 

Everything  we  know  of  atoms  compels  us  to  consider  them 


302  ETHICS. 

as  incapable  of  freedom.  No  known  phenomena  suggest  the 
occurrence  in  their  case  of  interior  processes  with  factors  corre- 
sponding to  those  which  enter  into  self-conscious  choice.  On 
the  contrary,  all  the  conclusions  of  the  physical  sciences  depend 
upon  regarding  their  natures  as,  from  the  first,  fixed  and  un- 
changeable. Those  orderly,  continuous,  and  reciprocally  de- 
termining changes,  which  evolution  delights  to  describe,  depend 
upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  "  natures "  of  the  atoms  remain 
the  same.  But  we  find  that  we  must  mean  something  different 
from  this  when  we  speak  of  the  "  nature "  of  the  individual 
mind.  Here  the  modes  of  the  behavior  of  the  subject  of  them 
all  appear  as  progressively  self -determining.  The  "nature" 
of  the  subject  is  not  only  expressed  in  every  choice,  but  within 
certain  limits  it  is  dependent  for  its  characteristics  upon  every 
choice.  That  this  is  so,  many  of  the  phenomena  with  which 
all  our  science  of  life  is  familiar  tend  to  demonstrate.  For  they 
confirm  those  naive  convictions  of  freedom  and  responsibility  in 
choice,  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made.  And  if  other 
phenomena  tend  to  show  that  what  we  call  the  mind's  nature, 
as  already  acquired,  must  be  regarded  as  in  part  accounting  for 
the  character  of  each  choice,  this  truth  is  not  inconsistent  with 
the  spontaneity  of  freedom.  Indeed,  it  may  be  claimed  that  the 
contrary  of  this  would  be  incompatible  with  a  true  mental  de- 
velopment. The  spontaneity  of  mind  actually  arises  and  main- 
tains itself  as  a  living  process  of  self-determining  development. 
For  that  unexplained  and  inexplicable  spontaneity  which  we 
call  the  "  nature "  of  the  mind  is  not,  like  the  nature  of  the 
material  elements,  fixed  and  unchanging  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  of  its  activity. 

And  now  it  may  be  claimed  by  the  determinist,  and  objected 
by  the  advocate  of  free-will,  that  to  ascribe  the  determination 
of  the  choice  to  the  unexplained  nature  of  the  mind  is  a  com- 
plete surrender  of  the  freedom  of  the  choice.  For  this  "  nature  " 
of  the  mind  is  itself  as  truly  determined  by  inheritance  and 
environment  as  is  the  nature  of  the  atoms.     It  can  therefore  be 


ETHICS.  303 

said  to  be  unexplained,  only  on  account  of  our  ignorance  of  the 
causes  which  determine  it.  Individual  choices,  too,  so  far  as 
unexplained  by  the  direction  and  intensity  of  so-called  motives, 
when  referred  to  the  nature  of  the  person  making  them,  would 
all  be  explained  if  only  we  perfectly  knew  the  nature  in  which 
they  originate. 

We  reply  to  this  claim  and  to  this  objection  that  the  very 
terms  of  its  statement  unwarrantably  beg  the  whole  question, 
For  what  do  we  mean  by  "  nature,"  as  applied  to  the  mind,  but 
its  most  uniform  modes  of  behavior  ?  And  to  say  that  these  are 
from  the  beginning  strictly  determined  by  antecedent  and  ac- 
companying influences,  whether  physical  or  psychical,  is  to 
assume  to  know  that  the  nature  of  mental  reality  is  incom- 
patible with  freedom  of  choice.  The  assumption  is  unwarrant- 
able. For  no  such  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  heredity,  and  of 
the  effect  of  surrounding  influences,  can  be  attained  as  makes 
it  perfectly  clear  why  minds  develop  as  they  do ;  that  is,  why 
each  one  attains  a  personal  character,  in  a  series  of  choices,  no 
one  choice  of  which  can  ever  be  said  to  be  strictly  predictable 
as  determined  by  the  pre-existing  influences. 

When  then  the  determinist  finds  himself  unable  to  account 
for  the  choice  as  determined  by  known  influences,  and  therefore 
refers  it  to  the  pre-existing  nature  of  the  person  choosing,  as 
determined  by  this  nature,  and  therefore  not  a  free  choice,  he 
may  be  accused  of  extracting  a  real  cause  from  a  convenient 
figure  of  speech.  Every  man  chooses  as  he  does  choose,  not 
only  because  of  reasons  obvious  to  others,  but  also  because  it 
is  his  nature  to.  But  how  do  we  know  it  is  his  nature  thus 
to  choose ;  and  what  do  we  mean  by  his  nature  as  determining 
his  choice  ?  Why,  thus  he  has  just  chosen  ;  and  has  similarly 
chosen  often  enough  before.  Yet  always  with  the  conviction, 
perhaps,  that  his  choice  was  free  and  responsible. 

There  would  seem  then  to  be  no  positive  argument  for  the 
freedom  of  human  nature  that,  as  it  were,  takes  us  behind  the 
ultimate  fact  of  choice,  and  the  convictions  attaching  themselves: 


304  ETHICS. 

thereto.     That  is  to  say,  the  freedom  of  the  mind  in  choice  can- 
not be  explained.    But  the  fact  of  such  freedom  does  not  appear 
incapable  of  finding  a  place  in  the  world  of  real  beings  and  of 
actual  transactions,  if  once  we  take  in  earnest  the  legitimate 
conclusions  of  a  philosophy  of  the  mind.     Choice  is  an  indubi- 
table fact  of  mind.     Like  every  other  form  of  the  behavior  of 
mind,  it  is  conditioned  upon,  and  correlated  with,  other  transac- 
tions in  a  world  of  reality.     Unlike  every  other  form  of  the 
behavior  of  both  things  and  minds,  it  has  the  peculiarity  of 
appearing  to  the  mind  itself  as  its  own  free,  self-directing  ac- 
tivity.    It  is  the  special  kind  of  spontaneity  which  claims  for 
itself  the  convictions  of  moral  freedom  and  of  responsibility. 
Nor  is  there  anything  in  the  principle  of  causality,  as  legiti- 
mately applied  to  the  mind,  which  constitutes  a  basis  for  deny- 
ing the  validity   of  this  claim.     On  showing  thus  much,  the 
philosophy  of    ethics  must  apparently  cease  from  further  at- 
tempts to  explain. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  take  the  positions  of  determinism  in 
earnest  and  maintain  them  with  a  perfect  consistency  ends  no- 
where else  than  in  thorough-going  materialism.  Its  case  rests 
upon  the  postulate  that  all  the  psychical  processes  must  be 
wholly  "explained"  on  principles  similar  to  those  which  pre- 
vail in  physical  science.  Hence  we  are  to  take,  not  as  con- 
veniently vague  and  figurative,  but  as  true  to  reality  and 
scientifically  exact,  the  current  discourse  about  the  "  influ- 
ence" of  motives  upon  the  will,  about  the  choice  being  "de- 
termined" by  the  greatest  apparent  good,  etc.  A  complete 
psychical  dynamics  —  we  are  virtually  told  —  must  be  true ; 
although  all  human  intercourse  and  estimates  of  a  truly  ethical 
sort  assume  that  it  is  not  true.  Nor  does  such  a  science 
of  psychical  phenomena  hesitate  to  help  itself  out  by  resort  to 
metaphysics.  Its  metaphysics,  however,  makes  light  of  the 
reality  of  the  mind's  continuous  but  constantly  self-directing 
evolution ;  it  lays  emphasis  rather  on  the  "  nature  "  and  "en- 
ergy "  of  physical  masses  and  of  atoms.     In  its  most  extreme 


ETHICS.  305 

and  monstrous  form  it  adopts  the  statement  of  M.  Luys,1  and 
affirms  that  all  spontaneous  effort  of  the  mind  is  an  illusion, 
for  every  object  of  attention  or  choice  is  forced  on  us  by  that 
cunning  conjurer,  the  brain  ;  because  "  the  cell-territory  where 
that  object  resides  has  been  previously  set  vibrating  in  the 
brain."  But  in  this  form,  determinism  is  as  unintelligible  in  its 
metaphysics  as  it  is  wild  in  its  psycho-physical  hypotheses. 

The  second  important  philosophical  problem,  respecting  the 
nature  of  man  as  ethical,  is  the  constitution  of  so-called  "  Con- 
science." In  the  more  vague  meaning  of  this  word  it  includes 
also  all  the  springs,  in  sensibility,  out  of  which  conduct  arises, 
and  by  which  it  is  influenced.  The  problem  therefore  demands 
the  analysis  of  moral  human  nature  by  psychological  science.  It 
is,  however,  when  the  inquiry  concerns  the  existence  and  char- 
acter in  human  consciousness  of  certain  ideals  of  all  conduct 
that  the  problem  peculiar  to  philosophy  begins  to  emerge. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  enumerate  the  concessions  which 
must  be  made  to  the  opponents  of  all  so-called  "  intuitional " 
systems  of  morals.  Moral  ideals  are  of  course  not  inborn,  in 
the  sense  that  every  one  is  conscious  of  them  at  birth.  They 
unfold  themselves,  if  they  exist  at  all,  into  greater  clearness  as 
the  result  of  a  psychical  development.  Neither  do  they,  any 
more  than  those  categories  which  metaphysics  recognizes,  take 
such  a  shape  as  enables  them  to  be  envisaged,  in  full  content 
of  meaning  and  naked  reality,  by  the  self-conscious  mind.  They 
are  rather  found  as  implicated  in  those  judgments  which  we 
call  moral ;  and  as  needing  to  have  their  significance  and  value 
explicated  by  a  process  of  reflective  analysis.  Moreover,  it 
must  be  conceded  (and  to  this  fact  reference  will  be  made 
again)  that  the  judgments  which  embody,  as  it  were,  the  ideals 
are  the  products  of  evolution  and  the  subjects  of  change,  both  in 
the  individual  and  in  the  race. 

What  I  think  is  right ;  and,  therefore,  What  I  think  I  ought 
to  do ,  and,  therefore,  What  I  morally  approbate  in  myself  and 

1  The  Brain  and  its  Functions,  p.  254. 
20 


306  ETHICS. 

in  others,  —  all  this  is  undoubtedly  different  in  different  cases, 
places,  and  times.  To  discover  the  reasons  for  the  changes  in 
the  content  of  the  judgments  corresponding  to  these  words  is 
the  business  of  ethical  science,  chiefly  as  studied  from  the 
evolutionary  point  of  view.  But  to  maintain  this  view  is  a 
very  different  thing  from  regarding  the  ethical  ideals  them- 
selves as  wholly  explicable  by  the  effects  of  intercourse,  environ- 
ment, and  education.  That  I  have  the  ideas  of  the  right,  of 
the  ought,  and  of  the  morally  well-deserving ;  that  I  attach 
to  these  ideas  a  peculiar  value  and  significance  ;  and  that  cer- 
tain unique  convictions  accompany  every  self-conscious  act  of 
applying  the  ideas  in  concrete  judgments,  —  all  this  is  the 
problem  with  which  philosophical  ethics  has  to  deal.  In  the 
treatment  of  this  problem,  like  that  of  the  problem  offered  by 
the  categories  to  metaphysics,  philosophy  may  begin  by  dis- 
regarding all  the  attempts  of  evolution  to  account  for  the 
primary  facts. 

The  relations  of  the  moral  ideals,  as  dictating  the  form  to  all 
moral  judgments,  are  as  peculiar  and  mysterious  in  respect  of 
their  ultimate  and  unquestioned  validity,  as  is  the  relation  of 
the  categories  to  the  world  of  real  psychical  and  physical  be- 
ings. These  relations  are  found  implicated  in  the  primary  fact 
of  actual  moral  judgments.  And  as  thus  implicated,  they 
appear  original,  universal,  and  necessary,  as  do  the  categories 
themselves.  Indeed,  they  may  without  great  impropriety  be 
called  "  moral  categories,"  —  ultimate  and  irresolvable  norms 
of  all  distinctively  ethical  life.  Of  this  character  reflective 
analysis  finds  them  actually  possessed,  whether  historical 
and  descriptive  science  can  explain,  or  not,  by  what  stages 
of  evolution  they  came  into  this  possession. 

It  is  a  primary  fact  of  moral  self -consciousness  that  some 
conduct  is  pronounced,  or  judged  "  right,"  and  other  conduct 
wrong.  All  beings  known  to  have  a  moral  nature  actually  do, 
in  their  judgments,  thus  discriminate  two  kinds  of  conduct  to 
which  these  two  mutually  exclusive  and  contradictory  predi- 


ETHICS.  307 

cates  apply.  Some  men  call  that  conduct  right  which  others 
call  wrong ;  and  every  man  is  liable,  at  different  stages  of  his 
moral  development,  to  changes  of  view  as  to  precisely  what 
conduct  he  shall  call  by  either  one  of  these  two  predicates. 
But  no  individual  being,  man  or  other  animal,  can  be  esteemed 
a  subject  of  truly  ethical  experience  who  does  not  actually 
make  the  distinction.  To  make  the  distinction  at  all,  whether 
in  accordance  with  prevalent  judgments  or  not,  —  this  is, 
in  part,  what  it  is  to  be  as  all  moral  beings  are.  The 
Eight  is  then  one  of  the  universal  norms  of  all  moral  judg- 
ment. And  that  this  idea  is  not  reducible  to  lower  or  other 
terms,  may  be  shown  by  the  fullest  appeal  to  the  facts  of  ex- 
perience. If  by  "  the  Right  "  we  mean  to  designate  any  other 
standard  of  being  or  action  than  that  uniquely  ethical  one  (the 
morally  right),  then  we  mean  something  other  and  less  than 
all  men  appear  to  mean,  when  they  actually  pronounce  a 
distinctively  moral  judgment.  Nor  is  it  consistent  with  the 
facts  of  the  most  primary  ethical  experience  to  regard  the  op- 
posite of  the  right,  that  which  we  call  "wrong,"  as  merely 
negative.  By  the  wrong,  men  do  not  mean  the  merely  non- 
right.  The  predicate  wrong  is,  to  be  sure,  the  denial  of  the 
right ;  but  it  is  this  as  a  positive  violation,  and  not  an  ethically 
indifferent  negation,  of  the  ethical  ideal. 

Universally  and  necessarily  attached  to  the  idea  of  the  right, 
and  like  it  implicated  in  the  primary  fact  of  moral  judgment, 
is  the  idea  of  "the  Ought,"  of  the  binding  obligation  upon 
choice  of  that  which  is  deemed  right.  Whatever  conduct  is 
judged  right,  that  is  also,  by  virtue  of  the  intrinsic  nature  of 
this  judgment,  also  judged  obligatory.  In  conduct,  and  in  all 
actual  existence  and  action  as  far  as  dependent  upon  conduct, 
that  ought  to  be  which  is  right.  To  esteem  certain  conduct 
right  for  me,  is  inevitably  to  induce  the  judgment :  I  ought  to 
choose  this  conduct.  On  the  other  hand,  that  which  is  wrong 
in  conduct,  or  in  reality  as  dependent  on  conduct,  ought  not 
to  be.     And  as  for  me,  what  I  judge  wrong  for  me,  I  ought  not 


308  ETHICS. 

to  choose  to  do.  We  are  unable  even  to  imagine  the  possibility 
of  the  morally  right  not  being  morally  binding ;  or  of  any- 
thing but  the  right  being  morally  binding.  Although,  then, 
the  idea  of  the  ought  is  original  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot 
be  derived  from  any  other  idea,  it  has  a  certain  dependence  up- 
on the  idea  of  the  right.  Something  similar  to  this  we  have 
already  seen  as  respects  the  correlation,  but  not  identity,  of 
the  categories  of  substantiality,  causality,  change,  etc. 

Universally  and  necessarily  attached  to  the  idea  of  the  right 
as  that  which  ought  to  be  in  conduct,  and  to  the  idea  of  the 
wrong  as  that  which  ought  not  to  be,  is  the  idea  of  Moral  De- 
sert. This  idea  also  is  implicated  in  those  judgments  which 
constitute  our  primary  ethical  experience.  On  contemplation 
of  that  conduct  which  is  right  and  therefore  ought  to  be,  ethi- 
cal reason  pronounces  a  judgment  of  approbation.  Such  con- 
duct (or  rather  conduct  so  regarded)  is  necessarily  approbated. 
On  contemplation  of  that  conduct  which  is  wrong,  and  ought 
therefore  not  to  be,  a  judgment  of  disapprobation  is  necessarily 
pronounced.     Such  conduct  is  necessarily  disapproved. 

Judgments  which  pronounce  moral  obligation  and  moral 
desert  are  accompanied  by  a  peculiar  tone  of  feeling.  The 
judgments,  "  he  ought,"  or  "  I  ought,"  cannot  be  made  with 
clearness  of  ideation  and  indifference  of  feeling,  at  the  same 
time.  Here  knowledge  is  necessarily  penetrated  with  some 
warmth  of  emotion  ;  and  if  the  element  of  feeling  be  totally 
wanting,  the  judgment  lacks  something  characteristic  of  all 
ethical  judgment.  In  token  of  this  fact  we  may  instance  the 
use  of  the  word  "  feeling  "  as  applied  to  the  same  complex 
psychical  process  which  is  also  called  a  judgment.  Indeed, 
men  say  "  I  feel  that  I  ought,"  rather  than  "  I  judge  that  I 
ought ; "  and  moral  approbation  or  disapprobation  is  habitually 
expressed  in  terms  that  apply  only  to  emotion.  It  is  even 
customary  to  say  "  I  feel  this  or  that  to  be  right ; "  thus  bear- 
ing witness  to  the  peculiar  connection  of  the  two  judgments, 
'  It  is  right  for  me,"  and  "  I  ought  to  do  what  is  right,"  with 


ETHICS.  309 

the  feeling  characteristically  accompanying  the  latter  form  of 
judgment. 

The  title  "  intuitive  "  —  when  properly  explained  —  may  then 
be  applied  to  the  three  ideas  of  the  Eight,  the  Ought,  and 
the  morally  Well-deserving,  and  to  their  three  correlate  and 
contradictory  ideas.  They  signify  norms  of  the  moral  life, 
implicated  in  the  most  primary  judgments  of  every  being  that 
has  arrived  at  moral  self-consciousness.  To  put  forth  judg- 
ments conformable  to  these  norms  is  actually  to  be  a  self- 
conscious  ethical  mind.  But  in  saying  this  we  afford  only  a 
partial  solution  of  the  problem  of  moral  self-consciousness. 
Inquiry  must  further  be  made  concerning  the  genesis  and 
character  of  the  concrete  judgments  themselves.  For  these 
moral  ideas  are  never,  as  such,  intuitively  known  or  envisaged, 
as  it  were,  in  immediate  self-consciousness.  On  the  contrary, 
no  being  and  no  conduct  known  by  sense-perception  or  self- 
consciousness  present  the  picture  of  a  satisfactory  actualiza- 
tion of  these  ideas.  For  that  reason,  in  part,  they  have  been 
spoken  of  as  "Ideals"  of  moral  reason.  But  judgments  called 
moral  are  actual  occurrences  in  the  psychical  life  of  moral 
beings.  Can  they  also  be  pronounced  "  intuitive,"  in  any  de- 
fensible sense  of  the  word  ? 

In  answer  to  this  last  question  philosophical  ethics  must 
defer  to  the  results  of  psychological  and  historical  research. 
And  in  such  research  the  theory  of  the  evolution  of  moral 
judgment  is  entitled  to  have  its  voice  heard.  In  fact,  most 
adults  —  that  is  to  say,  moral  beings  who  have  become  more 
or  less  trained  experts,  as  it  were,  in  moral  judgment  —  do 
actually  pronounce,  according  to  what  appears  to  be  an  un- 
reasoned dictum  of  conscience,  some  conduct  right  and  other 
conduct  wrong.  But  in  fact  also,  all  persons,  even  the  most 
expert  in  moral  judgment,  often  hesitate  as  to  which  of  these 
two  predicates  they  shall  apply  to  a  given  form  of  conduct. 
And  that  the  greatest  variety  of  equally  honest  and  intelligent 
opinions   prevails  as  to  the  Tightness  or  wrongness   of  many 


310  ETHICS. 

ethical  transactions,  is  too  obvious  to  need  argument.  The 
more  careful  student  one  becomes  of  the  psychical  facts,  the 
more  will  one  hesitate  to  say  that  any  of  these  forms  of  moral 
judgment  do  not  result  from  a  development.  Indeed,  the 
doubt  is  warranted  whether  the  word  "  intuitive "  can,  in 
strictness,  be  applied  to  the  pronouncements  of  conscience  even 
regarding  those  dispositions  of  the  mind  which  all  theories  of 
ethics  hold  to  be  of  the  highest  and  most  essential  ethical 
significance.  That  untrained  childish  conscience  necessarily 
judges  it  right  to  choose  to  tell  the  truth,  to  do  justice,  and  to 
love  one's  fellow,  no  acute  observer  will  find  it  easy  to  believe. 
Indeed,  every  acute  observer  will  find  large  multitudes  of  his 
fellow-adults  choosing,  almost  habitually,  to  do  none  of  these 
things ;  and  yet,  apparently  with  a  large  measure  of  "  good  con- 
science" so-called,  approbating  their  choices  as  morally  right 
and  obligatory.  Who  does  not  know  that  the  vices  of  lying, 
injustice,  and  hatred,  as  habitual  dispositions  of  mind,  are 
quite  too  often  covered  up  by  the  title  of  a  virtuous  fidelity  to 
some  ecclesiastical,  political,  or  commercial  concern  ? 

When  the  discoveries  of  ethnic  and  evolutionary  and  com- 
parative psychology  are  brought  to  bear  upon  this  problem,  the 
intuitional  character  of  the  decisions  of  conscience  becomes 
more  difficult  to  maintain.  To  lie,  particularly  if  one  lies  to 
a  stranger  or  to  a  foe,  and  to  cheat,  particularly  if  it  is  largely 
and  successfully  accomplished,  has  undoubtedly  been  "  right " 
in  the  sight  of  multitudes  of  men  in  all  times.  And  was  it 
not  written  by  them  of  old  time :  "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neigh- 
bor and  hate  thy  enemy  "  ?  Must  it  not  then  be  admitted  that 
facts  are  conclusive  against  the  claim  which  makes  intuitive 
any  of  the  moral  judgments  that  concern  particular  forms  of 
conduct  ?  Are  not  even  those  forms  of  moral  disposition,  which 
(like  the  disposition  to  veracity,  to  justice,  and  to  benevolence) 
are  most  indispensable  to  a  rightly  constituted  moral  system, 
the  result  of  a  process  of  development,  in  the  individual  and 
in  the  race  ? 


ETHICS.  311 

Notwithstanding  the  facts  to  which  an  evolutionary  theory, 
of  ethics  successfully  appeals,  a  certain  relatively  intuitional 
character  for  the  judgments  of  conscience  may  still  be  main- 
tained. We  have  already  seen  that  the  hypothetical  judgment, 
"  If  this  is  right  in  conduct,  then  it  ought  to  be  done,"  is  indeed 
absolute  and  unconditional.  Such  a  judgment  states  the  un- 
alterable and  intuitively  discerned  relation  of  the  moral  ideals. 
A  certain  relatively  intuitional  character  for  the  concrete  judg- 
ments pronounced  under  these  ideas  may  also  be  maintained 
as  a  result  of  those  sesthetical  and  ethical  forces  and  laws 
which  have  control  of  human  development.  Undoubtedly,  the 
entire  constitution  of  government  and  society  among  the  civi- 
lized peoples  of  to-day  embodies  and  enforces  the  current  forms 
of  ethical  judgment.  Ethical  progress  tends  away  from  special 
rights  and  duties  toward  those  which  are  recognized  as  uni- 
versal and  necessary.  Into  this  ethical  constitution  every 
individual  is  born,  as  a  member  of  it.  In  it  and  by  it  he  is 
trained  from  the  very  beginning  to  the  end  of  life.  All  the 
experience  of  the  individual  impresses  upon  him  the  judg- 
ment that  certain  forms  of  conduct  are  right,  and  therefore 
obligatory,  and  that  certain  others  are  wrong,  and  therefore 
forbidden.  This  general  training  from  the  larger  constitution 
of  the  society  in  which  the  individual  lives  is  made  more 
special,  concrete,  and  effective  by  his  immediate  education  and 
surroundings.  Under  the  principles  of  heredity  and  influence 
from  environment  every  member  of  society  will,  therefore,  be 
predisposed  to  certain  forms  of  moral  judgment  and  feeling. 
So  strongly  will  these  influences  operate  that  the  forms  of 
judgment  and  disposition  they  tend  to  promote  will  have  their 
paths  greatly  smoothed  for  them.  In  some  cases  they  will 
operate  so  strongly  as  to  create  from  the  very  dawn  of  moral 
experience  a  special  tendency  and  a  tact  to  judge,  and  to  judge 
fitly,  between  the  right  and  the  wrong  in  choice  and  action. 
In  other  cases  the  birth  of  power  to  pronounce  and  to  feel  the 
right  and  the  wrong  of  even  those  things  upon  which  the  ethics 


312  ETHICS. 

of  advanced  and  Christian  civilization  is  clearest,  will  be  long 
delayed.  In  the  centres  of  our  civilization  at  the  present  hour 
there  are  "  consciences  "  that  do  not  judge  it  wrong  to  lie,  to 
steal,  and  to  hate. 

It  might  be  expected  that  the  time  and  occasion  of  arrival  at 
the  stage  of  a  "relative"  intuition  would  be  different  for  the 
different  formulas  of  moral  judgment.  As  a  matter  of  fact  this 
is  so.  It  is  also  a  most  interesting  truth  that,  in  the  ethical 
development  of  the  individual,  and  particularly  of  the  race, 
the  first  not  infrequently  becomes  the  last,  and  the  last  first. 
To  love  one's  neighbor,  and  especially  one's  enemy,  is  the  last 
of  the  virtues  to  be  deemed  indispensable,  in  places  and  among 
peoples  of  a  low  condition  of  moral  culture.  But  in  these  days, 
among  Christian  nations,  there  are  many  who  still  doubt 
whether  it  is  wrong  sometimes  to  be  a  coward  and  sometimes 
to  lie,  who  would  not  for  a  moment  admit  that  one  may  ever 
with  good  conscience  hate  liars  and  cowards. 

From  the  point  of  view  now  gained  we  will  return  to  the 
problem  of  the  moral  Ideals.  Historical  and  descriptive  science, 
under  the  well-known  formulas  of  evolution,  aims  at  telling  us 
how  and  why  men  have  come  to  judge  and  feel  thus  and  so  re- 
specting what  is  right  or  wrong  in  disposition  and  in  conduct 
The  success  of  science  has  been  only  partial.  The  phenomena 
to  which  it  points,  and  the  generalizations  which  it  bases  upon 
the  phenomena,  are  sufficient  to  show,  however,  that  the  ethical 
judgments  and  feelings  of  mankind  are,  in  general,  subject  to 
development.  But  here,  as  in  other  cases  of  evolution,  science 
discerns  certain  tendencies  toward  fixity  of  form  which  reveal 
the  norm  followed,  and  the  significance  of  the  process.  That  the 
so-called  altruistic  virtues  are  to  be  seen,  slowly  and  by  tortu- 
ous paths,  yet  surely,  climbing  into  ascendency,  we  can  scarcely 
doubt.  The  supreme  principle  of  love  as  the  fulfilling  of  the 
law  is  plainly  destined  to  be  in  the  future,  as  it  has  been  in 
the  past,  more  and  more  clearly  recognized.  Yet  the  virtuous 
essence    of  certain   ri"ht  forms  of  conduct  toward  self  —  the 


ETHICS.  313 

so-called  "  egoistic  virtues  "  —  cannot  readily  be  reduced  to  a 
common  statement  with  that  of  the  altruistic  virtues.  The  con- 
flict between  the  considerations  urged  by  ancient  Stoicism  and 
those  urged  by  Epicureanism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  self- 
abnegatory  side  (for  it  is  only  one  side,  albeit  the  principal  side) 
of  Christian  Ethics,  on  the  other,  cannot  be  settled  by  an  off- 
hand formularizing.  Even  the  supremacy  of  the  principle  of 
benevolence  is  a  truth  up  to  which  the  reason  and  conscience 
of  the  most  moral  have  only  partially  developed.  Nor  is  it 
likely  that  cases  of  conflict  between  the  disposition  to  benevo- 
lence and  the  demand  to  do  justice  or  to  speak  the  truth  will 
ever  cease  sometimes  to  perplex  the  man  of  a  truly  right  mind. 
These  and  all  other  generalizations  as  to  particular  duties  and 
obligations,  as  well  as  the  acceptance  by  conscience  of  the 
supremacy  of  the  principle  of  love,  and  the  power  to  apply  this 
principle,  are  subjects  of  ethical  development.  It  is  for  this 
reason,  in  part,  that  the  term  "  Ideals  "  of  moral  Eeason  fitly 
applies  to  the  moral  categories. 

The  historical  and  descriptive  science  of  ethics  is  not  com- 
petent to  explain  the  existence  or  the  nature  of  the  moral 
Ideals  themselves,  by  the  hypotheses  of  evolution.  To  narrate 
by  what  stages,  and  under  what  changes  in  environment,  man- 
kind have  come  to  judge  thus  and  so  concerning  what  they 
ought,  is  not  the  same  thing  as  philosophically  to  explain  the 
genesis,  with  its  peculiar  nature,  of  the  idea  of  mankind  that 
they  ought  always  and  unconditionally  to  do  only  what  is  right. 
The  fullest  description  of  the  molecular  motions  which  are  the 
antecedents  of  states  of  sensation,  would  not  of  itself  account 
for  the  existence  and  peculiar  nature  of  these  psychical  states. 
The  most  complete  story  of  the  arising  and  combining  of  sen- 
sations and  sensation-complexes  would  not  account  for  the 
objectivity,  for  the  metaphysical  postulate  of  the  reality,  which 
"  Things "  have.  The  consonance  and  dissonance  of  mere 
ideas,  even  if  we  could  approve  all  the  Herbartian  mathe- 
matics   as    correctly    formulating    these    psychical    processes, 


314  ETHICS. 

would  not  render  intelligible  the  first  self-conscious  sensibility 
of  the  soul.  So  the  perfectly  unique  and  absolutely  incom- 
parable nature  of  the  ideas  expressed  in  the  sentence,  "  This  is 
right  for  me,  and  therefore  I  ought  to  choose  it,"  is  made  only 
more  apparent  by  all  the  futile  attempts  at  explanation  put 
forth  by  evolutionary  science.  "Whenever  the  first  self-con- 
scious being  —  no  matter  what  ape  or  other  animal  —  had  the 
experience  of  a  single  judgment  expressible  in  terms  of  these 
ideas,  then  ethical  experience  was  born  upon  the  earth.  Nor 
can  its  ancestry  be  described  in  terms  of  other  than  ethical 
conceptions  and  feelings. 

The  idea  of  the  right  as  that  which  ought  to  be,  hovers  before 
the  minds  of  men,  an  indefinite  but  grand  and  absolutely  wor- 
thy ideal.  After  it  they  grope  blindly,  or  reach  out  with  a 
somewhat  intelligent  vision.  It  is  ever  near  at  hand,  but  only 
in  the  shape  of  some  judgment  pronounced  with  a  more  or  less 
definite  certainty  of  conviction  that  it  faithfully  corresponds  to 
the  ideal.  This  idea  is  the  guiding  star  of  humanity ;  but  it 
does  not  remain  subject  to  telescopic  measurements  in  a  fixed 
position  before  the  eye  of  conscience.  It  exists  in  some  souls 
as  a  vague  stirring  of  intelligence  and  conviction  respecting  the 
rules  of  conduct.  In  some  it  becomes  a  burning  passion.  The 
heads  and  hearts  of  men  are  bowed  before  it,  though  its  mani- 
festation is  in  forms  changeful  and  hard  to  define.  The  ex- 
perience of  the  entire  race  —  and  of  the  ethically  noblest,  most 
clearly  —  seems  to  affirm :  "  However  much  we  strive,  and 
learn,  and  pray,  we  only  dimly  know  what  is  the  right ;  but 
our  faith  never  wavers  that,  whatever  it  is,  it  and  it  alone 
ought,  in  disposition  and  conduct,  really  to  be." 

In  conjunction  with  the  problems  just  presented,  two  others 
require  treatment.  One  of  these  concerns  the  content  of 
that  which  is  entitled  to  be  called  right.  The  other  problem 
may  be  proposed  in  the  question :  Why  ought  the  right  to  be 
chosen  in  preference  to  the  wrong  ?  The  principal  points  of 
philosophical  ethics  thus  evoked  can  be  best  discussed  by  sub- 


ETHICS.  315 

stituting  for  the  term  right  another  term  of  the  same  meaning. 
That  which  we  call  right  is  the  same  as  the  "morally  Good." 
To  say  that  a  certain  disposition  or  kind  of  conduct  is  right,  is 
equivalent  to  saying  that  it  is  morally  good.  The  latter  term 
suggests  a  view  which,  in  our  opinion,  it  is  impossible  for  any 
scientific  research  or  philosophical  analysis  to  overthrow. 
"  The  Eight "  is  a  species  or  kind  of  "  the  Good ; "  but  it  is  a 
unique  species,  for  we  must  at  once  qualify  the  general  term 
"good"  by  an  adjective.  It  is,  therefore,  not  every  form  of  the 
good  which  can  be  identified  with  the  right.  But  when  we  say 
the  right  is  the  morally  good,  we  are  only  affirming  in  another 
way :  The  right  is  such  a  good  as  it  is ;  it  is  a  unique  and 
incomparable  kind  of  good. 

Two  distinct  classes  of  opinions  —  schools  in  ethical  philos- 
ophy —  emerge  through  the  attempt  to  solve  the  problems  just 
propounded.  One  of  these  replies  to  the  question,  What  is  the 
peculiar  content  of  all  that  which  is  to  be  called  right  ?  by  re- 
garding the  morally  good  as  good  only  for  an  end  lying  outside 
of  itself.  The  other  regards  the  morally  good  as  absolute  good, 
—  good  as  supreme  end  in  itself.  Almost  inevitably  the  first 
of  these  answers  results  in  a  eudsemonistic  system  of  ethics. 
For  happiness  is  the  only  conceivable  end  which  morally  right 
disposition  and  conduct  can  serve,  if  the  moral  rightness  of  dis- 
position and  conduct  be  not  itself  the  end. 

It  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  us  to  regard  the  attain- 
ment of  mere  truth  as  in  itself  constituting  a  supreme  end  of 
conduct.  Accordingly,  we  do  not  find  systems  of  ethics  based 
on  the  reasonableness  of  the  maxim  :  Act  so  that  knowledge  of 
what  is  true  may  abound,  as  the  ultimate  end  of  conduct. 
Such  a  maxim  would  neither  guide  the  moral  judgment,  nor 
satisfy  the  moral  sentiments,  nor  express  the  content  of  the 
morally  good.  Neither  is  it  possible  to  give  to  the  sesthetical 
ideal,  to  "  the  Beautiful,"  the  place  of  an  ultimate  end,  to  serve 
which  the  morally  good  is  but  a  means.  Happiness  is  then  the 
only  good  which  can  bo  a  rival  of   the  morally  good  for  the 


31 G  ETHICS. 

position  of  the  supreme  end.  The  discussion  of  this  problem  in 
ethics  has  thus  necessarily  to  be  carried  on  between  the  advo- 
cates and  the  opponents  of  some  eudasmonistic  scheme. 

The  student  of  mind  who  approaches  either  ancient  or  current 
ethical  controversies  with  the  greatest  possible  freedom  from 
prejudice  must  be  prepared  for  many  sad  departures  from 
psychological  truth  and  from  the  results  of  cautious  reflective 
analysis.  On  the  one  hand,  he  will  listen  to  arguments  for  the 
supremacy  of  the  morally  Good,  as  an  end  of  all  conduct,  that 
seem  to  assume  the  possibility  of  moral  being  and  moral  action 
devoid  of  necessary  connection  with  any  other  form  of  good. 
Doing  right  is  thus  essentially  resolved  into  a  dreary  and  mo- 
notonous activity  of  so-called  will,  in  blind  obedience  to  so- 
called  conscience,  —  and  this  without  regard  for  consequences 
affecting  the  happiness  of  one's  self  or  of  other  sensitive 
beings.  But  a  being  incapable  of  any  form  of  happiness,  and 
existing  out  of  all  relation  to  other  beings  capable  of  hap- 
piness, could  not  be  a  moral  being  at  all.  Action  that  has 
no  effect  upon  sensitive  being,  and  that  tends  to  produce 
no  results  in  modifying  some  conscious  life,  is  not  conduct  at 
all.  The  sphere  of  the  morally  Good  cannot  be  described  as 
lying  outside  of  the  sphere  of  that  well-being  which  consists 
in  states  of  sentient  souls.  This  is  rather  the  sphere  of  the 
non-moral. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  arguments  for  Eudsemonism  have 
almost  habitually  been  guilty  of  gross  breaches  of  plain  psy- 
chological truths.  This  charge  certainly  holds  good  against 
them  so  often  as  they  follow  the  example  of  their  great  an- 
tagonist Kant,  in  maintaining  that  all  happiness  is  qualitatively 
equivalent,  and  that  different  happinesses  are  to  be  only 
quantitatively  estimated,  as  more  or  less. 

The  inquiry,  What  is  the  content  of  that  which  is  right  ?  or, 
What  are  the  essential  marks  of  the  morally  good  ?  requires  a 
two-fold  consideration.  We  may  understand  the  inquiry  to 
mean,   What  is   that  disposition   of  mind  which  is  right  ?  or, 


ETHICS.  317 

What  are  the  tendency  and  significance  of  those  forms  of  con- 
duct which  men  call  right  ?  The  answer  to  both  of  these  ques- 
tions involves  an  immediate  appeal  to  experience,  —  but  to 
experience  as  explicated  by  the  process  of  reflective  analysis. 

The  morally  right  disposition  of  mind  is  the  subjective  moral 
Good  ;  from  the  point  of  view  of  conscience,  it  is  not  only  the 
supreme  good,  but  it  is  the  only  distinctively  moral  good.  In 
the  experience  of  every  man  this  disposition  is  that  which  his 
own  conscience  approves;  it  is  the  disposition,  namely,  to 
choose  and  approve  what  is  pronounced  right  in  his  moral 
judgment.  But  the  moral  judgment  of  men  has  been  seen 
greatly  to  vary,  to  be  the  subject  of  a  process  of  development 
in  the  individual  and  in  the  race.  Therefore,  the  disposition 
which  different  men  call  right  is  different  in  different  cases  and 
stages  and  times  of  ethical  development.  But  never  can  it  be 
said  that  conscience  is  in  any  case,  stage,  or  time  indifferent  as 
to  the  character  of  that  disposition  which  it  pronounces  morally 
good.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  always  required  of  the  "  good 
disposition  "  a  certain  direction  toward  ideal  forms  of  conduct, 
and  a  sufficient  intensity  and  persistence  to  overcome  tendencies 
adverse  to  such  conduct.  Judging  the  real  character  of  this 
morally  good  disposition  by  those  norms  which  the  morally 
best  persons  have  come  to  recognize  as  of  universal  value  and 
obligation,  we  may  say  that  this  disposition  is  one  of  affection- 
ate fidelity  toward  veracity,  justice,  benevolence,  etc.  In  this 
way  we  fix  to  some  extent,  although  rather  indefinitely,  the 
characteristics  common  to  every  disposition  of  mind  which  can 
be  pronounced  morally  good. 

But  truth,  justice,  benevolence,  and  every  other  commonly 
recognized  form  of  virtuous  disposition  and  conduct,  in  an 
ethical  community  of  sentient  and  rational  minds,  are  neces- 
sarily to  be  regarded  as  promotive  of  the  well-being  of  this 
community.  This  regard  is  indeed  only  partially  justified  by 
any  estimates  or  inductions  made  upon  a  basis  of  actual  facts. 
It  is  in  part  a  moral  sentiment ;  in  part,  at  least  with  many 


318  ETHICS. 

men,  it  is  a  rational  or  a  religious  faith.  But  however  the  re- 
sult comes  about,  the  morally  good  disposition,  and  the  conduct 
which  springs  from  it,  are  regarded  as  promotive  of  the  highest 
well-being  of  those  in  any  way  affected  by  such  disposition  and 
conduct.  May  we  then  say  that  the  essential  characteristic  of 
the  good  disposition  (the  "  good  will ")  is  that  it  is  the  dispo- 
sition to  promote  the  highest  well-being  of  all  beings  affected 
by  it? 

Should  such  a  general  proposition  as  the  foregoing  be  adopted, 
even  in  a  provisional  way,  it  might  at  once  be  seized  upon  by 
both  parties  to  the  conflict.  Eudaenionistic  ethics  identifies 
the  highest  "  well-being  "  with  happiness.  It  could  then  claim 
that  the  foregoing  statement  necessarily  admits  of  no  interpre- 
tation but  the  one  which  makes  happiness  the  ultimate  end, 
and  virtuous  disposition  and  conduct  good  as  means  toward  this 
end.  On  the  other  hand,  the  opponents  of  eudaemonistic  ethics 
could  try  to  show  that  "  the  disposition  to  promote  the  well- 
being  "  of  others  is  benevolence ;  and  that  by  making  this  dis- 
position the  essence  of  subjective  moral  good  we  may  reduce  to 
its  ultimate  terms  the  description  of  the  supreme  end  of  moral- 
ity. They  could  also  point  out  with  invincible  conclusiveness 
that  by  identifying  unqualifiedly  the  Good,  as  happiness,  with 
the  end  sought  by  conscientious  conduct,  we  rob  the  ideas  of 
the  Eight  and  the  Ought  of  their  peculiar  significance.  For  not 
all  that  is  good  is  also  right ;  and  it  is  not  every  form  of  good 
which  I  ought  to  seek  for  myself  or  for  others.  The  right  — 
they  could  reiterate  —  is  the  morally  good. 

The  effort  more  definitely  to  fix  the  characteristics  of  that 
disposition  which  is  morally  right  leads  to  the  discovery  of 
certain  perplexing  relations  between  happiness  and  morality,  — 
respecting  one's  disposition  toward  one's  self  and  toward  others. 
The  propositions,  "I  ought  to  promote  my  own  highest  well-being," 
and,  "  The  disposition  to  do  this  is  right,"  would  undoubtedly 
be  accepted,  if  properly  qualified,  by  the  most  thoughtful 
moralists.     But  the  proposition,  "  I  ought  to  promote  my  own 


ETHICS.  319 

happiness  as  the  only  conceivable  form  of  my  highest  well- 
being,"  would  undoubtedly  be  rejected  as  contrary  to  sound 
moral  principle.  So  would  also  the  proposition,  "I  ought  to  pro- 
mote my  own  happiness  irrespective  of  the  well-being  of  others." 
On  the  other  hand,  the  disposition  to  sacrifice  my  personal 
happiness  to  my  own  higher  well-being  and  to  the  well-being  of 
others  is  not  simply  admissible  as  a  morally  good  disposition  ; 
it  is  even  demanded  as  essential  to  such  a  disposition.  But  the 
disposition  to  sacrifice  the  happiness  of  others  to  my  own  well- 
being,  in  whatever  form,  would  (although  not  plainly  immoral) 
be  suspected  of  immorality.  The  disposition  to  sacrifice  my 
own  happiness  except  to  the  end  of  promoting  my  own  highest 
well-being,  or  the  well-being  (including  the  happiness)  of  others, 
would  also  be  condemned  at  the  bar  of  enlightened  conscience. 

In  regard  to  myself,  and  as  well  in  regard  to  others,  I  am 
obliged  to  recognize  different  kinds  of  happiness  attaching  them- 
selves as  psychical  states  to  different  forms  of  psychical  life. 
Here,  too,  conscience  makes  distinctions  that,  however  they  may 
have  been  arrived  at  through  an  ethical  development,  are  now 
universally  recognized  by  good  men  as  valid  and  obligatory. 
The  happiness  which  belongs  to  the  morally  good  disposition 
appears  to  moral  judgment  and  moral  sensibility  as  having  a 
peerless  value.  It  belongs  to  the  morally  good  disposition  to 
seek  and  to  approbate  this  happiness.  Yet  it  cannot  be  said 
that  the  essential  characteristic  of  this  disposition  is  the  desire 
to  promote  even  this  kind  of  happiness  as  such.  Above  all,  the 
priceless  valne,  the  unconditioned  worth,  of  the  morally  good 
disposition  itself  is  taken  for  granted  in  all  moral  judgment. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  conscience,  this  disposition  is  the 
supreme  thing  in  the  well-being  of  all  minds. 

It  would  appear,  then,  that  the  essential  characteristics  of  the 
morally  good  disposition  are  by  no  means  so  few  and  simple 
as  is  often  supposed.  On  the  contrary,  ethical  life  is  extremely 
complex  and  profound.  Its  foundations  implicate,  and  its  end 
involves,  all  that  enters  into  the  wealth  of  being  attained  by  r 


320  ETHICS. 

measureless  development.  If  we  say  that  to  be  good  is  to  have 
the  disposition  to  promote  one's  own  highest  well-being  and  the 
highest  well-being  of  others,  we  do  not  thus  simplify  the 
interpretation  of  ethical  experience  as  our  experience  with 
masses  of  matter  is  simplified  by  the  statement  of  the  law  of 
Gravitation.  For  we  are  immediately  obliged  to  recognize  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  well-being,  or  of  "  the  Good  "  in  general.  We 
have  also  to  note  that,  measured  by  its  own  standard,  each  of 
these  kinds  may  be  said  to  be  supreme.  Yet  we  cannot  in  our 
conceptions  follow  one  of  these  kinds  of  the  Good  without  intro- 
ducing considerations  from  the  others.  We  cannot  divorce  the 
morally  good  from  all  other  good,  and  still  conceive  of  it  as  good. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  reduce  the  morally  good  to 
terms  of  that  general  good  which  the  Utilitarian  chooses  to  desig- 
nate as  happiness.  In  this  connection,  there  are  few  more  im- 
pressive passages  in  controversial  literature  than  that  in  which 
John  Stuart  Mill  declares  his  opposition  to  Mansel's  fast-and- 
loose  method  in  dealing  with  ethical  conceptions.  "I  will  call  no 
being  good,"  says  this  great  advocate  of  eudsemonistic  ethics,  "who 
is  not  what  I  mean  when  I  apply  that  epithet  to  my  fellow- 
creatures  ;  and  if  such  a  being  can  sentence  me  to  hell  for  not 
so  calling  him,  to  hell  I  will  go."  What  an  invincible  and 
noble  confidence  must  that  be  in  the  supremacy  and  uncondi- 
tioned value  of  the  good  disposition  —  even  in  the  very  limited 
form  of  a  disposition  to  veracity  —  which  could  evoke  such 
honest  and  manly  words  as  these ! 

In  brief,  there  is  evidence  in  the  very  nature  of  the  morally 
good  disposition  that  it  is  not  the  following  of  a  fixed  formula 
which  constitutes  the  essence  of  subjective  morality.  It  is 
rather  the  reaching  of  the  soul,  always  more  or  less  blindly, 
out  after  an  ideal.  The  definition  of  this  ideal  as  it  realizes 
itself  in  a  disposition  of  mind  is  made  more  and  more  clearly, 
as  moral  reason  gathers  into  itself  the  ripened  fruits  of  all  past 
experience.  The  good  disposition  is  spiritual  life,  constantly 
organizing   itself    into    higher  and   more    intelligible    forms   of 


ETHICS.  321 

expression.  It  points  for  its  ultimate  and  supreme  realization 
to  a  perfected  and  systematic  ordering  of  all  seutient  beings  in 
relations  that  admit  of  a  union  of  all  forms  of  that  which 
is  good. 

The  second  form  of  the  inquiry,  What  is  the  content  of  that 
which  is  entitled  to  be  called  the  morally  good  ?  has  already  been 
virtually  answered.  It  was  stated  (see  p.  317)  in  the  following 
words :  What  are  the  tendency  and  significance  of  those  forms 
of  conduct  which  men  call  right  ?  It  is  in  the  attempt  to  an- 
swer this  question  that  Utilitarianism  deems  itself  most  suc- 
cessful. Its  reply  is  in  substance  a  brief  one :  Those  forms  of 
conduct  are  right  which  tend  to  produce  happiness.  In  the 
effort  to  justify  this  reply  it  has  been  obliged  greatly  to  expand 
and  to  modify  its  original  claims.  This  fact  does  not,  of  itself, 
discredit  its  scientific  authority  ;  for  such  work  of  expansion 
and  modification  belongs  to  the  very  nature  of  advance  in  all 
scientific  knowledge.  Eudtemonistic  ethics  must  be  refuted, 
if  refuted  at  all,  in  the  most  subtle  and  comprehensive  of 
its  manifestations. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  there  are  kinds,  as  well  as  amounts 
of  happiness,  to  be  distinguished.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
moral  conduct  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  happiness  of 
any  sentient  being  is  inconceivable.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
the  morality  of  many  courses  of  conduct  is  determined  by  their 
relation  to  the  problem  of  increasing  the  happiness,  or  diminish- 
ing the  misery,  of  mankind.  But  after  all  has  been  admitted, 
the  analysis  of  Utilitarianism  is  not  complete;  its  claims  to 
take  into  account  all  the  phenomena  of  an  ethical  order  are 
unjustifiable. 

It  is  impossible  to  go  further,  then,  in  describing  the  marks  of 
all  right  conduct,  than  to  say:  It  is  conduct  conformable  to  the 
highest  attainable  conception  of  the  ethical  ideals.  This  is,  of 
course,  not  a  definition  of  right  conduct,  if  by  "definition"  we 
mean  the  reduction  of  the  adjective  "  right "  to  some  simpler  and 
more  comprehensible  term.     It  is  a  description,  however,  of  the 

21 


322  ETHICS. 

character  of  that  norm,  as  it  were,  to  which  all  conduct  must 
conform  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  be  called  right.  An  ideal 
condition  of  society  has  been  found  to  be  the  vague  but  lofty 
end  —  a  condition  which  shall  realize,  in  their  highest  terms, 
all  the  forms  of  the  Good  —  to  which  the  morally  good  disposi- 
tion points.  Of  this  ideal  condition,  the  morally  good  disposi- 
tion is  not  only  a  means,  but  the  prime  constituent.  It  is  the 
condition  recognized  by  conscience  as  the  worthy  supreme  end. 
And  so  all  conduct  which  tends  toward  the  realization  of  this' 
ideal  is  to  be  called  right.  Whatever  conduct  becomes  known 
to  reason  as  necessarily  tending  toward  this  end  is  absolutely 
right,  as  conduct.  But,  so  far  as  we  distinguish  conduct  from 
disposition,  deeds  from  character,  the  Tightness  of  the  former  is 
always  the  Tightness  of  means  to  an  end. 

If  utilitarian  or  evolutionary  ethical  science  cannot  solve 
satisfactorily  the  problems  already  brought  before  it  by  moral 
philosophy,  it  certainly  cannot  be  expected  to  furnish  an  answer 
to  those  still  remaining.  Why  does  the  judgment  of  obligation, 
with  feeling  of  conviction,  follow  the  judgment  defining  the 
right  ?  Why  ought  one  to  do  the  right,  whenever  one  knows 
what  it  is  right  to  do  ?  To  this  inquiry  no  answer  is  possible 
which  does  not  consist  in  virtually  reaffirming  the  same  essential 
relation  in  which  moral  reason  necessarily  places  the  ethical 
ideals.  This  connection  of  the  Eight  and  the  Ought  is  not  one 
which  can  even  be  conceived  of  as  the  result  of  a  process  of 
development.  As  to  what  is  right,  I  need  to  learn.  Indeed,  on 
this  point  I  must  be  ever  learning.  But  that  what  is  right  in 
disposition  and  conduct  is  obligatory,  —  to  be  persuaded  of  this, 
it  is  only  necessary  to  be  a  moral  being.  And  the  whole  essence 
of  morality  is  gone  as  soon  as  a  separation  appears  thinkable 
between  the  right  and  the  ought.  Indeed,  it  may  be  said  that 
no  relation  between  the  categories  with  which  metaphysics  deals 
is  more  immediate  and  peremptory  for  the  human  reason  than 
that  existing  between  these  ethical  categories. 

The  philosophy  of  ethics,  finally,  combines  with  the  philoso- 


ETHICS.  323 

phy  of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of  mind  to  prepare  material 
for  that  supreme  synthesis  which  the  philosophy  of  religion 
seeks  to  accomplish.  What,  it  inquires,  is  the  relation  of  these 
ethical  ideals  to  the  world  of  reality  ?  In  calling  them  "  Ideals," 
and  in  discussing  them  as  such,  we  have  already  in  part  defined 
their  relation  to  the  real  being  of  the  mind.  But  is  the  being 
of  things  an  ethical  constitution  ?  Is  the  evolution  of  physical 
reality  susceptible  of  being  judged  by  ethical  standards  ?  And 
especially  with  reference  to  history,  which  implies  such  large 
reciprocal  influence  of  mind  and  external  nature,  what  meaning 
can  we  attach  to  the  attempt  to  discover  in  it  moral  forces  and 
moral  laws  ? 

That  there  are  certain  tokens  of  a  "power  not  ourselves" 
which  "  makes  for  righteousness,"  to  be  found  in  external  nature 
and  in  man,  especially  when  the  evolution  of  man  in  history  is 
regarded  with  a  due  emphasis,  we  think  it  possible  to  maintain. 
But  the  few  remarks  upon  the  existence  and  interpretation  of 
these  tokens  which  it  is  permitted  to  make  must  be  reserved  for 
another  chapter. 


CHAPTER    XII. 

ESTHETICS. 

IT  will  add  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  very  brief  treatment 
which  this  department  of  philosophy  can  receive,  if  we 
compare  its  subject-matter  with  that  already  treated  under  the 
head  of  Ethics.  The  problems  which  arise  in  considering  the 
Ideal  called  "  the  Beautiful "  are  similar  to  those  which  arise  in 
considering  the  ethical  ideals.  The  distinctions  involved  in 
the  answers  to  these  problems  illustrate  both  the  likeness  and 
the  unlikeness  of  the  two  classes  of  ideals.  The  Beautiful  is 
one  form  of  the  Good ;  to  be  and  to  enjoy  that  which  is  beauti- 
ful is  to  share  in  the  reality  of  the  Good.  But,  in  spite  of  the 
close  alliance  which  philosophical  thinking  establishes  between 
this  form  of  well-being  and  the  morally  good,  —  both  by  direct 
comparison  and  by  considering  the  relations  in  which  the  two 
stand  to  happiness,  —  no  identification  of  them  is  possible. 

The  relation  of  the  ideal  of  beauty  to  the  different  so-called 
faculties  of  the  soul  and  to  the  psychical  states  ascribed  to  these 
faculties  may  be  compared  with  that  of  the  ethical  ideals.  In 
this  way  a  philosophical  theory  of  the  content  of  the  subjectively 
beautiful  may  base  itself  upon  the  science  of  psychology.  The 
apprehension  and  appreciation  of  the  beautiful  is  inseparable 
from  pleasurable  states  of  sensuous  and  ideating  "intuition." 
Nothing  can  be  regarded  as  beautiful  —  the  ideal  of  beauty  can 
never  be  realized  —  except  as  it  is  concretely  presented  to  the 
senses  or  to  the  imagination,  in  pictorial  form,  for  contempla- 
tion ;  and  unless  on  being  contemplated,  it  produces  that  char- 
acteristic form  of  happiness  which  we  may  call  aesthetical,  within 


.ESTHETICS.  325 

the  contemplative  mind.  The  beautiful  must  be  actually  agree- 
able, whether  its  entire  essence  be  held  to  consist  in  being 
agreeable,  or  not.  If  we  speak  of  the  beautiful  as  an  idea,  or  an 
ideal,  we  must  admit  the  correctness  (though  not  necessarily 
the  completeness)  of  Hegel's  definition  of  beauty,  —  "  The  sen- 
sible manifestation  of  the  idea."  Whereas,  then,  the  intuitive 
standard  for  testing  the  morally  good  is  by  no  means  the  imme- 
diate power  of  giving  pleasure  belonging  to  that  to  which  the 
test  is  applied,  the  intuition  of  beauty  can  arise  in  no  other 
way  than  through  the  experience  of  the  effect  of  such  power. 
That  which  is  intuitively  discerned  or  otherwise  known  as 
right  produces,  on  contemplating  it,  a  peculiar  satisfaction  called 
moral.  That  is  beautiful  which,  on  being  intuited,  produces  a 
peculiar  satisfaction  called  wsthetical. 

The  immediate  connection,  in  every  concrete  experience,  of 
the  agreeable  activity  of  senses  and  imagination  with  the  in- 
tuition of  the  beautiful  is  of  great  influence  upon  the  princi- 
ples of  all  art.  It  is  the  aim  of  art  to  produce  the  peculiar 
pleasure  which  belongs  to  the  appreciation  of  beauty.  Vary- 
ing standards  of  excellence  there  are  in  aesthetics  as  well  as 
in  ethics.  The  principles  of  true  art  are  tested  by  an  appeal 
to  those  natures  that  carry  within  themselves  the  highest 
standards  of  judgment.  But  the  appeal  made  by  the  beau- 
tiful object  to  those  choicest  and  most  artistically  cultivated 
souls  seeks  to  evoke  in  them,  also,  a  state  of  pleasurable  appre- 
ciation. And  nothing  can,  by  any  stretch  of  courtesy,  be  called 
"  beautiful "  which  does  not  only  aim  at,  but  also  succeed  in 
attaining,  the  production  of  this  state. 

In  architecture,  for  example,  the  main  lines  which  limit  the 
form  of  the  whole,  or  manifest  the  related  arrangement  of  the 
parts,  must  be  capable  of  being  traversed  by  the  eye  with 
pleasurable  ease ;  otherwise  they  violate  the  principles  of  beau- 
tiful construction.  No  part  of  the  structure  must  be  so  visi- 
bly lacking  in  support  as  to  evoke  the  distressing  imagination 
that  it  may  fall.     The  porch  must  not  be  so  large  as  to  com- 


326  ESTHETICS, 

pel  the  beholder,  from  the  point  of  view  he  is  expected  to 
take,  to  make  the  difficult  effort  to  fill  out  the  picture  of  the 
buildinc  it  conceals.  Colors  must  not  violate  the  laws  of  rela- 
tion recognized  by  physiological  optics ;  ornamentation  must  not 
be  suggestive  of  low  and  disagreeable  associations,  so  that  it 
can  be  called  "  vulgar "  and  "  loud,"  or  of  equally  disagreeable 
over-refinement,  so  that  it  must  be  called  "  finical."  Curved 
lines  and  straight  lines  must  not  be  brought  into  such  rela- 
tions as  that  the  former  will  distort  or  disorder  the  latter,  and 
produce  in  us  a  sympathetic  pain ;  etc.  All  the  arts  in  the 
same  manner,  not  even  excluding  poetry,  with  its  relation  to 
the  art  of  music,  are  compelled  to  observe  similar  principles, 
dependent  upon  the  pleasurable  or  painful  activity  of  senses 
and  sensuous  imagination. 

In  judging  of  the  beauty  of  natural  objects  we  find  the  same 
direct  reference  to  a  standard  which  measures  their  power  to 
produce,  in  the  very  act  of  being  intuitively  contemplated,  the 
gesthetical  pleasure.  Nor  can  we  except  those  natural  objects 
and  phenomena  which,  by  reason  of  their  awful  vastness  or 
their  threatening  of  human  interests,  fill  the  beholder  with  the 
vague  but  sweet  pain  that  is  characteristic  of  our  appreciation 
for  much  that  we  call  grand  and  sublime.  This  inseparable  re- 
lation of  the  beautiful  to  the  immediate  production  of  a  peculiar 
pleasure  in  the  sensitive  soul  is  implied  in  the  most  primary 
facts  of  experience.  In  an  indefinite  and  preliminary  way  we 
therefore  define  "  the  beautiful "  as  that  which  produces  in  us 
a  peculiar  kind  of  pleasurable  feeling.  The  peculiarity  of  the 
pleasurable  feeling  produced  by  beautiful  objects  cannot  be 
defined,  but  must  be  known  as  felt.  Nor  is  this  description  any 
more  indefinite  than  that  we  are  obliged  to  give  in  speaking  of 
any  form  of  feeling.  Those  objects  are  called  beautiful  which 
excite  this  peculiar  pleasurable  feeling.  The  pleasurable  feel- 
ing of  beauty  is  that  which  arises  in  connection  with  the  in- 
tuition of  such  objects  as  we  call  beautiful.  This  circle  in 
definition  corresponds  to  the  movement  of  the  mind. 


.ESTHETICS.  327 

But  experience  enters  a  protest  if  we  try  so  to  interpret  the 
facts  as  throughout  to  identify  the  agreeable  and  the  beautiful. 
Nothing,  indeed,  can  be  called  beautiful  which  is  not,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  beautiful,  aesthetically  agreeable.  Moreover,  the  judg- 
ments of  men  differ  as  to  what  should  be  called  beautiful  even 
more  than  they  differ  concerning  the  morally  good  and  the 
sensuously  pleasant.  But  of  the  beautiful  —  like  the  morally 
good  and  unlike  the  agreeable  —  we  affirm  a  universal  and 
objective  value  and  validity.  The  agreeable  is  a  state  of,  or  an 
event  in,  some  sentient  mind.  Its  objective  correlate  consists 
in  nothing  but  a  certain  peculiar  arrangement  and  mode  of 
change  of  material  molecules,  both  within  and  without  the 
nervous  organism  of  the  sentient  being  which  has  the  agree- 
able feeling.  This  fact  is  a  matter  of  scientific  knowledge, 
rather  than  of  ideal  significance. 

The  beautiful  is  distinguished  from  the  agreeable  by  the  pos- 
session of  two  characteristics  in  which  the  latter  is  deficient. 
These  are  objective  validity,  and  ideal  worth.  By  use  of  these 
terms  we  designate,  in  a  preliminary  way,  the  most  marked 
differences  between  the  beautiful  and  the  agreeable.  That 
differences  corresponding  in  some  sort  to  these  terms  do  exist, 
we  may  confidently  appeal  to  experience  to  show.  We  know 
that,  strictly  speaking,  the  agreeable  exists  only  as  a  state  in 
us.  We  believe  that  the  beautiful  really  exists,  in  nature,  in 
art,  in  spiritual  character  and  life.  Scientific  knowledge  asserts 
that  the  objective  correlate  or  cause  of  the  agreeable  feeling 
in  us  is  not  necessarily  something  agreeable  in  that  which  is 
other  than  ourselves.  On  the  contrary,  aesthetic  faith  affirms 
that  the  objective  correlate  of  the  peculiar  pleasurable  feeling 
with  which  we  greet  the  apprehension  of  the  beautiful  is  itself 
beautiful. 

Moreover,  the  conviction  is  invincible  that  the  beautiful  has, 
in  some  sort,  a  right  to  be ;  and  also  that  it  ought  to  be  appre- 
ciated. The  proof  for  such  statements  as  these  is  abundant. 
The  way  in  which  the  old-time  saying,  Be  gustibus  non  clis- 


328  ^ESTHETICS. 

putandum,  must  be  understood  if  the  interpretation  is  true 
to  the  dictates  of  sesthetical  reason,  is  in  proof  hero.  When, 
for  example,  one  contends  with  one's  friend  that  he  ought  to 
like  olives,  or  ought  not  to  like  onions,  the  seriousness  of  one's 
contention  is  the  measure  of  one's  departure  from  a  truly 
rational  procedure.  But  it  requires  a  stretch  of  charity  that 
seems  to  carry  it  beyond  reason  for  one  not  to  feel  that  the 
failure  in  one's  friend  to  recognize  and  admire  the  beauties 
of  nature  or  of  the  choicest  art  witnesses  to  a  defect  in  his 
rational  constitution.  To  differ  about  the  merely  agreeable 
can  end  only  in  stating  the  fact  of  difference ;  and,  perhaps,  the 
causes  (aesthetically  indifferent)  in  the  constitution  and  habits 
of  the  organism  that  explain  the  fact.  But  dispute  about  the 
beauty  of  this  or  that  object,  implies  an  appeal  to  reasons  that 
have  an  objective  and  universal  application  and  value. 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  it  is  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  draw  a  fixed  line  of  separation  between  the  agree- 
able and  the  beautiful.  This  difficulty  is  partially  due  to  the 
fact  that  human  nature  is  so  thoroughly  sesthetical.  Indeed, 
the  suffusing  of  all  pleasures  of  sense  and  imagination  with 
the  distinctions  and  estimates  of  sesthetical  reason,  must  be 
regarded  as  a  chief  characteristic  of  human  nature.  It  is 
more  than  doubtful  whether  the  idea  of  beauty,  and  the  pecu- 
liar and  pleasurable  approbation  which  the  intuition  of  the 
beautiful  evokes,  belong  to  any  of  the  lower  animals.  The 
phenomena  to  which  evolution  points  in  justifying  its  use  of 
this  principle  of  natural  selection  prove  either  too  much  or 
nothing  at  all.  They  prove  —  if  anything  regarding  the  char- 
acteristic idea  of,  and  feeling  for,  the  beautiful  —  that  rela- 
tively brainless  birds  or  even  insects  have  a  far  higher  sesthetical 
development  than  belongs  to  the  more  cultivated  classes  of  the 
human  species.  It  is  probably,  then,  the  agreeable,  and  not 
the  beautiful  at  all,  which  influences  the  life  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals. But  in  man's  case,  regard  for  the  beautiful  may  become 
so  predominating  an  influence  as  to  suffuse  all  the  life  of  appe- 


^ESTHETICS.  329 

tite  and  sense.  Hence  the  indulgence  of  any  of  the  forms 
of  gratifying  human  appetites  or  desires  may  come  to  have  an 
sesthetical  significance  and  worth.  Man  is  capable  of  "  eating  " 
rather  than  "  feeding ; "  of  lifting  the  intercourse  of  the  sexes 
above  the  level  of  a  bestial  pleasure ;  of  substituting  for  the 
animal's  instinctive  washing  and  plucking,  or  licking,  of  hairs 
or  feathers,  that  careful  self-adornment  which  approaches  the 
"beauty  of  holiness." 

Moreover,  it  should  never  be  forgotten  that  pleasurable  feel- 
ing itself  may  become  an  object  of  sesthetical  appreciation.  The 
song  of  birds  and  the  hum  of  insects  are  not  beautiful  simply, 
or  chiefly,  because  as  sounds  they  follow  the  laws  of  musical 
art,  and  produce  in  the  hearer  an  appreciation  of  their  sesthe- 
tical quality  as  sounds.  They  are  rather  beautiful  because  they 
lead  the  imagination  at  once  to  depict  the  joyous  psychical 
life  which  calls  them  forth.  These  states  of  pleasure  them- 
selves, imagined  to  be  so  innocent  and  free  from  care  and 
blame,  are  the  beautiful  objects.  The  laughter  and  carols  of 
children  are  beautiful  for  the  same  reason.  Undoubtedly  a 
large  part  of  our  appreciation  of  the  beauty  of  events  in  nature 
is  due  to  a  similar  activity  of  the  imagination.  Even  our  own 
pleasures  of  gratified  appetite  and  desire  we,  on  reflection,  es- 
teem very  differently,  if  they  have  been,  in  the  having  of  them, 
touched  with  true  sesthetical  qualities.  Especially  true  is  this 
of  the  happiness  which  actually  goes  with  the  morally  good 
disposition  and  its  right  choice  of  fitting  forms  of  conduct. 
This  form  of  pleasure  (ethical  approbation)  in  ourselves  or  in 
others,  is  itself  an  object  of  sesthetical  appreciation.  Morally 
right  states  of  soul,  whether  contemplated  as  actual  or  only 
possible,  appear  beautiful.  To  sesthetical  reason  the  agreeable, 
as  a  condition  of  the  subject  of  psychical  states,  may  appear  as 
also  beautiful. 

The  relation  in  which  the  ideal  of  beauty  stands  to  the  con- 
crete sesthetical  judgments  of  men  may  also  be  compared  with 
the  relation  of  the  moral  ideas  to  ethical  judgments.     As  to 


330  ^ESTHETICS. 

what  is  beautiful,  and  as  to  whether  any  particular  claimant 
for  the  name  "  beautiful "  is  entitled  to  receive  it  or  not,  there 
is  a  well  known  divergence  of  current  opinions.  Probably  the 
uncertain  character  of  sesthetical  standards  is  far  greater  than 
that  which  prevails  in  the  sphere  of  morals.  For  this  two 
principal  reasons  are  to  be  assigned ;  the  two  are,  however,  con- 
nected in  the  evolution  of  the  human  race.  The  influence  of 
unreasoned  feeling  —  of  feeling,  indeed,  for  which  it  is  difficult 
or  impossible  to  assign  any  reasons  —  is  much  greater  in  deter- 
mining the  standards  of  sesthetical  than  of  ethical  judgment. 
The  majority  of  men  are  indeed  unable  -to  assign  sound  rea- 
sons for  their  judgments  respecting  much  which  they  pro- 
nounce right  or  wrong  in  morals.  Even  experts  in  the  applica- 
tion of  that  one  standard,  "  the  tendency  to  promote  happiness," 
which  Utilitarianism  proposes,  more  frequently  than  otherwise 
fail  strictly  to  justify  all  the  general  rules  they  propose  for  the 
control  of  conduct.  Yet  on  the  whole  rules  of  conduct  in  ethi- 
cal matters  are  far  less  dependent  upon  unreasoning  feeling  for 
their  justification  than  are  rules  for  judging  the  beautiful  in 
nature  or  in  art.  For,  in  the  next  place,  the  important  practi- 
cal interests  of  men  may  be  said  to  have  compelled  a  more 
forward  stage  of  the  race  in  the  formulating  of  general  moral 
judgments.  That  the  unwarranted  use  of  another's  signature, 
or  the  cruel  abuse  of  his  person,  or  the  slanderous  mention  of 
his  name,  should  be  promptly  and  uniformly  judged  to  be 
wrong,  may  be  said  to  be  a  necessary  of  human  social  devel- 
opment. That  certain  combinations  of  colors  and  lines  should 
be  in  like  manner  condemned  as  ugly,  may  be  said  to  belong 
rather  to  the  luxuries  of  the  race's  development. 

Indeed,  the  relation  of  judgment  and  feeling  in  the  contem- 
plation of  beauty  is  such  as  to  prevent  an  early  maturity  of  the 
former,  whether  on  the  part  of  the  individual  or  of  the  race. 
We  feel  that  to  be  obligatory  which  we  judge  to  be  right.  We 
judge  that  to  be  beautiful  which  evokes  a  certain  feeling  in 
us  when  we  contemplate  it.     The  education  of  judgment  in 


^ESTHETICS.  331 

matters  of  aesthetics  can  neither  begin  nor  proceed  through  the 
communication  of  rules  for  correct  judgment.  You  may  tell  me 
that  this  or  that  object  is  beautiful,  and  assure  me  that  I  ought 
to  know  and  feel  it  to  be  beautiful ;  but  if  I  assent,  and  say, 
"It  is  indeed  beautiful,"  when  as  yet  the  object  has  aroused 
in  me  no  pleasurable  appreciation  of  its  aesthetical  qualities,  I 
mean  nothing  of  which  aesthetics  takes  account.  I  mean  some- 
thing different  from,  and  far  less  than,  what  you  wish  me  to 
say.  The  only  recognized  right  standard  of  judgment  in  mat- 
ters of  aesthetics  is,  therefore,  the  pleasurable  feeling  of  appre- 
ciation in  those  who  have  most  cultivated  this  feeling. 

Accordingly,  we  scarcely  hesitate  to  say  that  the  same  object, 
whether  in  nature  or  in  art,  may  fitly  be  pronounced  beautiful 
or  not  beautiful  according  as  it  does,  or  does  not,  arouse  aestheti- 
cal  feeling  in  those  who  behold  it  from  different  points  of  view. 
Such  an  admission  of  the  indeterminate  character  of  beauty  can- 
not be  brought  under  the  same  category  with  the  uncertainties 
which  belong  to  the  judgments  of  different  persons  respecting 
some  particular  form  of  disposition  or  of  conduct.  If  a  care- 
less, false,  or  malign  disposition,  or  some  form  of  conduct  pro- 
ceeding from  such  disposition,  is  judged  right  by  any  one,  we 
do  not  admit  that  the  judgment  may  possibly  be  a  correct  judg- 
ment. We  do  not  for  a  moment  think  of  conceding  that  to 
him  who  judges  such  disposition  and  its  forth-putting  right,  and 
finds  complacency  in  it ;  to  him  it  is  right.  To  the  pathologist, 
from  his  professional  point  of  view,  we  can  yield  the  right  to 
call  "beautiful"  a  preparation  of  cancerous  tissue,  or  of  an 
organ  filled  with  destructive  microbes.  But  to  the  surgeon 
who  indulges  the  morally  wrong  disposition,  and  thereby  deter- 
mines his  acts  in  possessing  himself  of  this  beautiful  object, 
we  make  no  similar  concessions.  This  distinction,  which  is 
clearly  enough  made  in  practice,  is  doubtless  largely  due  to 
difference  in  stages  in  development.  It  may  be  possible  for 
philosophical  analysis  to  formulate  rules,  defensible  on  grounds 
of  aesthetical  reason,  for  the  determination  of  our  appreciation 


332  ESTHETICS. 

of  the  beautiful.  But  apparently  it  is  also  true  that  the  ra- 
tional relation  of  assthetical  feeling  to  the  judgment  regarding 
what  is  beautiful  is  such  as  to  make  the  latter  always  depend- 
ent upon  the  former. 

The  relation  of  the  ideal  of  aesthetics  to  disposition  and  to 
choice  is  also  of  interest  to  the  student  of  this  branch  of  philos- 
ophy.    The  ethical  ideal  makes  a  demand  for  action  upon  the 
practical  reason  of  man.     Each  one  realizes  it  in  himself  as 
best  he  may  by  shaping  after  it  his  own  character  and  con- 
duct.   In  respect  of  this  ideal  every  one  is  summoned  to  artis- 
tic endeavor.     Something  of  the  same  thing  is  indeed  true  with 
respect  also  to  the  sesthetical  ideal.     For  character  and  conduct 
that  are  conformed  to  the  ideal  of  the  morally  good  are  entitled 
to  the  regard  of  the  beholder  as  examples  also  of  the  ideal  of 
beauty.     To  strive  in  this  manner  of  artistic  endeavor  is  there- 
fore, indirectly,  a  matter  of  moral  obligation  for  every  man. 
Nor  can  the  student  of  life  fail  to  notice  the  fact  that  the 
shame  at  being  found  ugly,  in  person  as  well  as  behavior,  is 
closely  akin  to  a  moral  feeling.     The  striving  to  be,  and  to  pro- 
duce, that  which  is  beautiful  may  be  said,  therefore,  to  appeal 
to  our  voluntary  powers  on  both  ethical  and  sesthetical  grounds. 
Every  realization  of  the  ideal  of  beauty,  whether  in  the  form 
of  the  pleasurable  appreciation  of  what  is  beautiful  in  nature, 
art,  and  spiritual  experience,  or  in  the  form  of  that  which  seems 
plainly  fitted  to  produce  such  appreciation,  is  in  itself  an  ob- 
vious increase  of  the  well-being  of  things  and  of  minds.     So 
sure  are  we  of  this  that  we  say  of  the  beautiful,  as  of  the  mor- 
ally good,  it  ought  in  reality  to  be,  and  it  ought  to  be  admired 
and  sought  by  all  rational  beings.    We  feel  also  a  certain  sense 
of  being  wronged,  or  of  disgust  that  is  closely  allied  to  moral 
.disapprobation,  when  we  contemplate  anything  which  appears 
ugly  and  is  at  the  same  time  regarded  as  remediable  by  human 
conduct.    Indeed,  we  feel  competent  to  pass  judgment  on  Nature 
and  on  Deity  with  reference  to  the  sesthetical  character  of  the 
objects  for  which  we  consider  the  one  or  the  other  responsible. 


^ESTHETICS.  333 

Nevertheless,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  voice  of  beauty  comes 
to  the  soul  in  the  form  of  a  categorical  imperative.  Indeed, 
whatever  hortatory  or  mandatory  character  the  aesthetical  ideal 
possesses  appears  to  belong  —  in  part,  at  least — to  the  intricate 
and  wonderful  relations  which  it  sustains  to  the  ideal  of  the 
morally  good.  "  The  possession  of  beauty  "  is  a  phrase  some- 
times employed  to  describe  the  end  of  that  impulsive  longing 
which  the  contemplation  of  beautiful  objects  arouses  within 
the  sensitive  soul.  But  the  phrase  is  too  figurative  strictly  to 
define  a  psychological  or  philosophical  truth.  Strictly  speak- 
ing, beauty  is  something  which  cannot  be  "  possessed,"  or  en- 
joyed as  possessed.  The  aesthetical  enjoyment  evoked  by  the 
contemplation  of  beautiful  objects  is,  indeed,  a  state  in  us ;  that 
is,  it  is  our  state,  and  so  may  be  said  to  be  a  possession  of  ours. 
The  right  or  opportunity  to  use  the  objects  for  the  purpose  of 
producing  this  effect  may  be  sought  and  gained  or  lost ;  it  is 
a  matter  of  money,  of  marriage,  of  proximity,  of  friendship, 
etc.  But  these  are  indirect  ways  of  appealing  to  choice  and 
of  influencing  conduct.  The  direct  and  proper  significance  of 
the  appeal  which  beauty  makes  to  the  voluntary  powers  of  man 
is  not  a  command  or  an  exhortation  to  choose ;  it  is  rather  a 
challenge  to  admire.  The  answer  to  the  challenge  is  the  feel- 
ing of  admiration.  When  we  experience  or  fail  to  experience 
the  feeling  for  beauty,  and  when  we  in  consequence  judge  the 
object  to  be  beautiful  or  to  be  not  beautiful,  we  know  of  noth- 
ing to  do  in  consequence  of  such  feeling  and  judgment,  —  except 
to  seek  or  to  avoid  the  further  contemplation  of  the  object. 

And  yet  indirectly  the  feeling  for  the  beautiful  is  a  very  pow- 
erful stimulus  and  guide  of  human  conduct.  The  attraction  of 
natural  beauty  is  one  of  the  secondary  and  yet  potent  facts  in 
the  distribution  of  the  race,  and  in  the  determination  of  the 
times  and  rates  and  directions  of  its  development  in  civiliza- 
tion. The  beauty  of  the  morally  good  disposition,  and  of  those 
forms  of  conduct  which  flow  from  it  (especially  in  the  more 
heroic  and  sublime  types  of  character  and  action),  is  a  not  un- 


334  ^ESTHETICS. 

important  additional  reason  for  cultivating  such  a  disposition. 
And  true  art  has  its  impulse  in  that  vague  and  indefinite  but 
passionate  longing  which  follows  the  suggestions  derived  from 
contemplation  of  beautiful  objects,  and  chooses  to  shape  some 
kind  of  an  artistic  product  for  itself.  Thus  in  the  realm  of  dis- 
position and  choice  the  ideal  of  beauty  and  the  ideal  of  the 
morally  good,  without  losing  themselves  in  each  other,  com- 
bine to  allure  and  ennoble  mankind. 

It  is,  however,  in  its  relation  to  the  constructive  imagination, 
as  guided  more  or  less  by  rules  derived  from  observation  by  the 
relating  faculty,  that  the  aesthetic  ideal  is  most  peculiar.     This 
fact  has  been  implied  in  all  that  has  hitherto  been  said.     It  is 
doubtful,  indeed,  whether  the  feeling  for  beauty  can  be  aroused 
by  an  object  which  does  not  set  the  imagination  at  work  in  its 
effort  at  the  synthesis  of  manifold  elements  under  the  unifying 
control  of  an  idea.    All  aesthetical  feeling,  except  the  vaguest 
and  lowest,  implies  that  the  subject  of  the  feeling  is  actively 
engaged  in  constructing  the  object  to  which  the  feeling  corre- 
sponds.    This  is  the  truth  of  our  meaning  when  we  pronounce 
devoid  of  "  imagination  "  those  in  whom  the  feeling  of  a?sthet- 
ical  approbation  is  not  aroused  by  beautiful  objects.     In  all  the 
higher  forms  of  beauty,  at  least,  the  imagination  of  the  beholder 
must  make  beautiful  the  object  which  the  taste  of  the  beholder 
feels  to  be  beautiful.     He  who  is  incapable  of  the  requisite  syn- 
thetic activity  of  imagination,  to  keep  pace  with  the  developing 
glow  of  aesthetical  emotion,  is  also  incapable  of  "  sensing  "  and 
admiring  the  object  presented.     The  object  to  be  admired  is  not 
existent  for  one  thus  deficient.     In  saying  this  we  do  not  deny 
that  single  notes  or  masses   of   uniform  color   may  awaken  a 
genuine  aesthetical  feeling.     On  the  contrary,  we  affirm  again 
that  man  is  aesthetically  distinguished  by  the  whole  diameter 
of  his  being  from  the  other  animals  by  his  capacity  to  give  a 
quality  and  a  value  to  all  his  sensuous  experiences  that  are 
unknown  to  them.    But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  single 
note  of  common  musical  speech  is  really  always  a  "clang,"  a 


.ESTHETICS.  335 

harmonious  whole  composed  of  many  psychical  elements ;  and 
that  no  color-mass  can  be  perceived  as  such  without  the  activ- 
ity of  the  mind,  in  the  orderly  synthesis  of  otherwise  discrete 
elements,  being  called  into  play.  If,  however,  we  should  admit 
that  the  separation  of  the  testhetical  from  the  sensuously  agree- 
able may  be  made  without  the  activity  of  the  constructive  im- 
agination, at  least  in  the  case  of  certain  relatively  simple  and 
low  forms  of  beauty,  we  could  not  claim  the  same  admission 
for  any  of  its  higher  and  more  complex  forms,  whether  in 
nature  or  in  art.  The  simplest  landscape,  or  melody,  or  picture, 
that  is  to  appear  beautiful,  requires  this  free  movement  of  the 
constructive  imagination. 

The  peculiar  play  of  the  imagination  to  which  beautiful  ob- 
jects appeal  is  not  simply  constructive  of  these  objects.  It  is 
"  projective  "  of  the  life  of  the  soul  affected  with  the  testhetical 
feeling  into  the  life  of  the  object.  The  beautiful  in  any  high 
degree,  intelligently  appreciated,  implies  a  communism  of  life, 
a  sympathy  of  being  between  its  life  and  the  life  of  the  soul. 
Nothing  dead,  or  conceived  of  as  dead,  can  appear  beautiful  to 
the  living  contemplating  mind.  Whether  the  tacit  affirmation 
of  the  imagination,  that  it  correctly  represents  to  itself  the  life 
of  that  which  is  an  object,  a  not-self,  be  scientifically  and  phi- 
losophically defensible,  or  not,  is  a  question  to  be  settled  on 
its  own  grounds.  But  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  soul's  act  in 
making  the  affirmation  there  can  be  no  doubt.  For  this  we  go 
to  the  experience  of  the  artist,  or  of  the  person  appreciating 
the  beautiful  in  nature  and  in  art,  for  our  true  account.  When 
Emerson  asks, — 

"Is  it  that  my  opulent  soul 
Was  mingled  from  the  generous  whole  ? " 

or  when  Byron  exclaims,  — 

"  Are  not  the  mountains,  waves,  and  skies  a  part 
Of  me  and  of  my  soul,  as  I  of  them  ?  " 

we  find  in  the  words  of  each  a  testimony  to  the  common  and 
necessary  experience  of  aesthetical  human  nature.     What  we 


336  ESTHETICS. 

cannot,  by  imagination,  project  ourselves  into  as  sharing  with 
us  a  common  life,  that  we  cannot  regard  as  beautiful :  so  essen- 
tial is  sympathetic  activity  of  the  imagination. 

Considerations  like  the  foregoing  are,  of  course,  too  vague  and 
indefinite  fully  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  ;esthetical  science  or 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  beautiful.  A  certain  vagueness  must 
be  expected  in  regions  where  feeling  (ordinarily  unanalyzed  and 
in  its  very  nature  difficult  or  impossible  of  analysis)  holds  such 
powerful  sway.  But  even  such  considerations  are  not  with- 
out philosophical  interest  and  importance.  It  is  a  most  signif- 
icant fact  that,  on  being  brought  into  the  presence  of  certain 
objects,  human  nature  responds  with  a  peculiar  feeling  of  pleas- 
urable approbation.  It  cannot  be  claimed  that  the  approbation 
is  given  to  the  objects  because  they  are  useful,  —  not  even  if 
we  extend  the  meaning  of  the  term  "  useful "  to  that  utility 
which  serves  as  a  means  of  evoking  the  pleasurable  feeling. 
The  candid  testimony  of  all  lovers  of  beauty  is  that  it  is  the 
"  beauty  "  they  admire  and  enjoy ;  it  is  not  the  utility  of  the 
object  in  producing  the  joyful  admiration  which  they  call  its 
beauty.  This  fact  of  experience  cannot  be  gainsaid,  and  should 
not  be  distorted  or  overlooked  by  associational  or  evolutionary 
theories  of  aesthetics. 

On  the  other  hand,  why  we  call  certain  objects  rather 
than  others  beautiful,  and  with  pleasure  approbate  them  as 
such,  an  examination  of  the  sesthetical  phenomena  does  not 
enable  us  immediately  to  tell.  When  we  are  assured  by 
some  expert  in  art  that  we  are  wrong  in  our  sesthetical 
judgment,  we  find  great  difficulty  in  alleging  satisfactory 
reasons  for  the  judgment.  It  appears  to  be  an  irrational  out- 
come of  a  state  of  feeling,  and  to  express  little  more  than  the 
fact  of  feeling.  More  careful  psychological  analysis  of  the  men- 
tal conditions  produced  by  the  intuition  of  the  beautiful  shows, 
moreover,  that  this  intuition  produces  strivings,  and  tendencies 
to  action,  which  are  akin  to  the  excitement  of  the  soul  in  the 
presence  of  the  morally  good.     But  this  analysis  also  shows 


AESTHETICS.  337 

that  a  spontaneous  constructive  activity  of  the  imagination  is 
the  natural  support  of  sesthetical  feeling.  This  play  of  the  soul 
is  awakened  by  the  presence  of  beauty.  It  is  a  joyful  and 
beautiful  psychical  life.  And,  furthermore,  in  appreciating  all 
beauty,  the  mind  projects  its  own  life  of  joyful  and  worthy 
activity  into  the  object  appreciated  as  beautiful.  If  the  object 
be  a  natural  object,  the  imagination  considers  the  soul-life  of 
nature  to  be  revealed,  in  some  form,  in  the  object.  The  same 
thing  is  true  of  every  beautiful  object  of  artistic  production. 
This  sympathetic  projection  of  imagination  is  then  character- 
istic of  the  activity  of  the  mind  in  the  presence  of  those  objects 
which  it  calls  beautiful. 

Is  then  that  .Unity  of  Eeality  in  which,  if  at  all,  the  more 
perfect  realization  of  the  eesthetical  as  well  as  of  the  moral 
Ideal  is  to  be  found,  itself  a  psychical  Life  ?  Is  every  object, 
called  beautiful  as  the  imagined  participant  in  a  living  com- 
munity —  that  is,  sympathetically  imagined  as  a  partner  in  a 
psychical  and  ideal  totality  of  existence  —  actually  what  it  is 
imagined  to  be  ?  We  are  not  yet  ready  to  attempt,  even  by 
way  of  hypothesis,  the  completer  answer  to  this  question.  It 
is,  however,  a  question  which  the  philosophy  of  aesthetics 
makes  inevitable.  And  to  raise  it  in  this  definite  form  requires 
that  a  further  attempt  at  analyzing  the  nature  of  the  beautiful 
should  be  made. 

If  sesthetical  reason  instinctively,  as  it  were,  postulates  the 
objectivity  or  reality  of  the  beautiful,  it  would  seem  that  we 
should  be  able  further  to  determine  this  ideal  by  analyzing  the 
nature  of  those  objects  which  we  esteem  beautiful.  The  an- 
alysis of  the  states  of  consciousness  which  such  objects  evoke 
succeeds,  indeed,  in  only  vaguely  suggesting  certain  factors 
assumed  to  belong  to  the  beautiful  in  reality.  It  thus  accounts 
for  and  justifies  the  mysticism  which  surrounds  all  artistic 
endeavor,  and  which  restricts  the  attempts  made  by  the  ad- 
mirers of  nature  and  art  to  explain  the  powerful  impressions 
which  they  experience.     But  the  objects  themselves  have  an 

22 


338  .ESTHETICS. 

existence  not  determined  by  the  states  of  feeling  which,  they 
call  forth.  The  objects  belong  to  the  world  of  really  existent 
beings  and  events.  By  examining  their  common  character- 
istics, may  we  not  succeed  in  dispelling,  at  least  partially,  this 
somewhat  provoking  mysticism  ?  The  history  of  the  science 
of  art,  and  the  history  of  so-called  sesthetical  philosophy,  is 
full  of  endeavors  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  the 
beautiful.  The  rules  for  producing  what  ought  to  be  appre- 
ciated as  beautiful,  and  the  principles  determined  by  reflective 
analysis  as  belonging  to  whatever  really  is  beautiful,  constitute 
two  forms  of  the  attempted  solution. 

The  science  belonging  to  each  form  of  art  is,  of  course,  a 
subject  of  development.  But  the  different  forms  of  art  differ 
greatly  in  their  apparent  susceptibility  to  those  definite  state- 
ments of  law  at  which  all  science  aims.  They  also  differ  in 
respect  to  the  stage  already  reached  by  the  science  correspond- 
ing to  them.  Thus  we  may  arrange  the  different  arts  in  the 
order  of  their  so-called  intellectual  character,  —  meaning  by 
this  character  either  the  amount  of  clear  conceptions  commu- 
nicable by  them,  or  the  amount  of  agreement  already  reached 
as  to  the  principles  of  judgment  which  should  rule  in  them. 
Music,  for  example,  may  be  called  the  least  intellectual  of  the 
arts,  because  it  is  capable  of  embodying  and  conveying  the 
least  amount  of  clear  conception.  It  originates  and  moves 
most  effectively  in  the  realm  of  vague  and  mystical  feeling. 
It  is  degraded,  as  music,  when  it  becomes  imitative  of  "  things 
according  to  their  external  appearance,"  or  of  definite  forms 
of  ideation  and  thought.  But  for  this  very  reason  in  part,  it 
is  the  most  "  interior  "  and  spiritual  of  all  the  arts,  the  truest 
representative  and  artistic  stimulus  to  all  degrees  and  kinds  of 
emotional  life. 

But  judged  by  the  amount  of  scientific  knowledge  already 
attained  concerning  the  laws  regulating  the  nature  of  the 
artistic  products  which  ought  to  be  admired,  music  is  the  most 
highly    developed  and   intellectual  of   all  the   arts.     No  other 


^ESTHETICS.  339 

art  can  more  profitably  employ  the  highest  culture  given  to 
the  best  talent.  At  the  other  end  of  the  scale,  as  respects 
the  intellectual  nature  of  the  product,  stand  poetry  and  the 
dramatic  art.  Their  characteristic  mode  of  expression,  in  lan- 
guage, compels  them  to  be  the  medium  of  more  or  less  definite 
descriptions  of  the  external  forms  of  nature,  or  of  the  thoughts 
and  purposes  as  well  as  of  the  emotions  of  men.  But  the 
science  of  poetry  —  considered  as  a  system  of  defensible  rules 
for  the  construction  and  estimate  of  what  is  aesthetically  good 
poetry  —  is  scarcely  more  mature  than  that  of  other  less  "  in- 
tellectual "  arts.  Yet  this  "  science "  has  been  diligently  and 
intelligently  cultivated  for  more  than  two  thousand  years. 

In  all  forms  of  art  we  shall  find  artists  themselves  indis- 
posed to  regard  highly  the  attempts  of  science  to  lay  down 
rules  for  either  artistic  production  or  for  the  estimate  of  beau- 
tiful objects.  Even  so  the  artists  agree  not  with  one  another. 
But  how  shall  "  science "  exist,  except  upon  a  basis  of  induc- 
tion ?  And  upon  what  shall  the  science  of  the  arts  base  its 
inductions,  if  it  be  not  upon  such  existing  products  of  artistic 
endeavor  as  do  actually  produce  states  of  pleasurable  ajsthetical 
appreciation  in  the  minds  of  those  contemplating  them  ?  How, 
then,  shall  material  for  inductive  science  be  secured  except  by 
securing  actual  agreement  in  respect  to  the  experience  of  this 
appreciation  ? 

In  every  form  of  art  there  are  certain  examples  which  by 
almost  universal  consent  of  those  regarding  them  from  appro- 
priate points  of  view  are  possessed  of  this  power  to  awaken 
festhetical  appreciation.  These  are  the  acknowledged  master- 
pieces in  music,  architecture,  sculpture,  painting,  poetry,  and  the 
drama.  It  is  to  the  contemplation  of  them,  and  to  the  analysis 
of  their  characteristics,  that  the  teachers  of  art  are  accustomed 
to  direct  their  pupils,  —  often  in  decided  and  intelligent  prefer- 
ence to  the  mere  impartation  of  ready-made  rules.  Yet  here 
again,  when  the  attempt  is  made  to  state  the  results  of  this 
analysis  as  the  reasons  why,  in  their  judgment,  they  are  com* 


340  ESTHETICS. 

pelled  to  call  these  acknowledged  masterpieces  beautiful,  the 
spirit  of  the  beauty  which  the  masterpieces  really  possess 
seems  to  have  departed  from  them.  For  the  best  authorities 
and  most  trustworthy  judges  of  what  is  really  beautiful,  and 
therefore  ought  to  awaken  the  peculiar  approbation  due  to  the 
beautiful,  even  when  they  agree  in  the  feeling  of  approbation, 
do  not  agree  in  their  analyses. 

If  every  art  had  its  set  of  universally  accepted  rules  for  the 
production  and  estimate  of  its  own  form  of  the  beautiful,  it 
would  by  no  means  follow  that  sesthetical  science,  as  estab- 
lished upon  an  inductive  basis,  could  satisfactorily  solve  the 
problem  of  the  nature  of  the  beautiful.  Every  art  would,  in- 
deed, have  its  own  science.  Students  of  music  might  then  be 
definitely  informed  what  rules  determine  the  characteristics  of 
the  beautiful  in  their  particular  art.  Students  of  architecture, 
sculpture,  painting,  or  poetry  might  enjoy  the  same  important 
advantage.  The  teaching  of  the  science  of  art  might  then  be 
compared,  for  its  scientific  character,  to  the  teaching  of  physics, 
or,  at  least,  of  physiology  or  psychology.  But  would  such  a 
state  of  development  of  the  science  of  thj  arts  solve  our  phi- 
losophical problem  ?  Would  it  tell  us  what  is  that  in  every 
form  of  artistic  beauty,  and  also  in  every  beautiful  natural 
object,  which  carries  the  secret  of  its  beauty.  Some  music  is 
confessedly  beautiful ;  so  also  is  some  architecture,  some  sculp- 
ture, etc. ;  so  also  are  many  objects  in  nature,  and  certain  con- 
ditions of  soul.  But  what  is  that  which  is  common  to  them 
all,  by  virtue  of  the  possession  of  which  we  call  them  all  by 
the  common  term  "  beautiful "  ?  It  is  in  this  common  char- 
acteristic, or  common  set  of  characteristics,  that  we  must  seek 
and  find  (if  anywhere)  the  essence  of  the  sesthetical  ideal. 

Moreover,  an  examination  of  the  rules  (or  so-called  science) 
of  every  form  of  art  shows  that  in  two  other  respects  they 
are  found  unable  to  suggest  the  solution  of  the  philosophical 
problem.  They  are  to  a  large  extent  negative  only.  They  tell 
•svhat  combinations  of  tones,  lines,  colors,  words,  etc.,  must  be 


AESTHETICS.  341 

avoided  in  order  to  escape  giving  offence  to  cultivated  sestheti- 
cal  taste.  The  difficulty,  the  impossibility  even,  of  telling 
precisely  what  combinations  shall  be  made  in  order  to  secure 
the  approbation  of  this  taste,  especially  in  all  the  higher  forms 
of  art,  is  too  obvious  to  need  argument. 

We  are  far  from  wishing  to  underestimate  the  present  at- 
tainments of  the  critics  of  the  beautiful  in  art  or  in  nature. 
We  would  be  much  more  cautious  even  about  speaking  dis- 
paragingly of  what  definite  science  can  do  toward  training,  to 
intelligent  judgment  and  feeling,  the  practisers,  the  patrons, 
and  the  admirers,  of  every  form  of  art.  Let  it  be  admitted 
that  a  complete  set  of  rules,  for  the  due  admiration  of  the 
natural  scenery  of  any  particular  region,  may  at  some  time 
be  formulated  by  experts  and  posted  in  the  neighboring  inns 
and  railroad-stations,  for  the  benefit  of  travellers  aesthetically 
inclined.  Let  it  be  admitted  that  Tyndall  is  right  in  suppos- 
ing his  sesthetical  pleasure  in  the  Alps  to  have  its  roots  in  the 
pleasant  gambols  of  his  ape-like  ancestors  ;  and  that  Grant  Allen 
has  hit  the  mark  with  the  high-sounding  declaration  that  all 
ffisthetical  pleasure  is  "  the  subjective  concomitant  of  the  normal 
amount  of  activity,  not  directly  connected  with  life-serving 
function,  in  the  peripheral  end-organs  of  the  cerebro- spinal 
nervous  system."  With  all  this  admitted,  it  is  hard  to  see 
wherein  the  problem  of  philosophical  aesthetics  has  been  made 
clearer  or  easier  of  solution.  This  problem  inquires :  What 
that  is  Universal  (common  to  all  objects)  and  Eeal  (actually 
existent  in  the  objects)  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  Beautiful  ? 

When  we  consider  the  treatment  which  philosophy  has  ac- 
tually given  to  the  resthetical  Ideal,  we  are  obliged  at  once  to 
admit  its  indefinite  and  unsatisfying  character.  The  results 
of  reflective  analysis  attained  by  none  of  the  so-called  systems 
of  aesthetics  can  be  said  to  be  beyond  reasonable  doubt  in  re- 
spect to  important  particulars.  This  is  perhaps  in  part  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  analysis  has  been  imperfect.  But  it  is  also 
largely  due  to  the  very  nature  of  the  subject  with  which  the 


;>42  ESTHETICS. 

analysis  attempts  to  deal,  and  to  the  attempt  to  explain  more 
than  it  is  right  even  to  hope  to  explain.  That  certain  combin- 
ations of  real  elements,  in  every  form  representative  of  life,  do 
produce  in  the  human  mind  emotions  of  the  peculiar  kind  and 
value  which  we  call  aesthetical,  is  an  ultimate  fact.  If  philos- 
ophy can  tell  what  those  elements  are,  and  under  what  rela- 
tions they  must  combine  in  order  in  fact  to  produce  this 
emotion,  it  has  done  all  that  it  can  expect  to  do  in  defining  the 
essence  of  the  beautiful.  In  perception  by  the  senses  we  find 
that  when  certain  syntheses  of  sensations,  differing  in  quantity 
and  quality,  take  place,  then  the  knowledge  of  a  real  object, 
not-me  and  having  space-form,  arises  in  the  mind.  Why  the 
reality  and  space-qualities  of  the  object  are  given  in  the  course 
of  development  and  as  the  result  of  certain  syntheses  of  sensa- 
tions, is  a  question  to  which  descriptive  and  explanatory  science 
furnishes  no  answer.  So,  too,  it  may  well  be  that  we  can  never 
tell  why  certain  combinations  of  certain  factors  of  real  being, 
when  perceived,  appear  beautiful  to  the  perceiving  mind.  The 
ultimate  fact  is  that  objects  thus  constituted  are  beautiful. 
They  are  in  fact  recognized  as  representative  of  the  peculiar 
form  of  well-being  which  is  the  assthetical  ideal  ;  and  are 
greeted  with  the  peculiar  emotion,  to  have  which  belongs  to 
the  very  constitution  of  aesthetical  reason. 

The  further  task  of  philosophical  aesthetics  is  set  before  it 
in  the  shape  of  a  more  satisfactory  analysis  of  the  characteris- 
tics of  all  beautiful  objects.  A  mere  sketch  of  the  lines  of 
determination  which  it  seems  to  us  necessary  to  follow  must 
for  the  present  suffice.  The  lines  mark  out  those  factors,  or 
momenta,  which  enter  into  the  being  of  every  object  that  is 
beautiful.  The  factors  cannot,  however,  be  called  qualities  of 
the  object,  in  so  far  as  their  sesthetical  character  is  concerned. 
Moreover,  the  lines  must  also  mark  out  the  characteristic 
forms,  or  laws,  of  combination  which  the  factors  have  in  every 
beautiful  object. 

That  which    is  "  beautiful "  in  any  object  can  never   be  a 


^ESTHETICS.  343 

single  element  of  its  being,  or  a  simple  quality  or  state.  The 
true  artist  is  indeed  fond  of  regarding  simplicity  as  characteris- 
tic of  all  genuine  art.  But  the  term  "  simplicity  "  must  here 
be  understood  in  a  qualified  way ;  it  is  not  the  synonym  for 
what  is  single  and  unrelated,  but  the  opposite  of  what  is 
strained,  or  artificial,  or  excessively  ornate.  Change  is  involved 
as  necessary  to  the  characterization  of  every  beautiful  object. 
But  since  the  object  which  is  to  appear  beautiful  must  always 
present  itself  in  some  concrete  form,  this  change  belongs  to 
the  object  under  the  conditions  of  space  and  time.  The  change 
is  then  recognized  as  suggestive  or  representative  of  movement. 
Nothing  that  is  apprehended  as  incapable  of  change,  of  motion 
in  time  or  space,  and  so  of  the  successive  realization  of  different 
moments  of  physical  or  psychical  being,  appears  beautiful  to 
the  human  mind.  But  not  all  movement  of  physical  or  psy- 
chical being  is  beautiful;  the  movement  which  is  beautiful 
must  have  two  characteristics.  It  must  have  spontaneity,  or  a 
certain  semblance  of  freedom;  and  it  must  use  this  spontaneity, 
as  it  were,  in  self-limitation  to  an  idea. 

Most  theories  of  the  nature  of  the  Ideal  of  aesthetics  as 
determined  by  an  analysis  of  beautiful  objects,  recognize  the 
above-mentioned  factors  in  some  form.  Change,  under  the 
conditions  of  space  and  time,  —  movement  in  the  ideal  frame- 
work which  supports  all  perception  through  the  senses  and  all 
representative  imagery,  —  is  manifestly  essential  to  the  beauty 
of  music  and  of  poetry.  The  same  category  must  be  concretely 
recognized  in  all  the  objects  deemed  beautiful,  even  by  those 
forms  of  art  that  appear  to  represent  rather  what  is  motionless. 
The  beautiful  in  architecture  and  sculpture  is  suggestive  of  the 
free  spontaneity  and  ideal  self-limitation  of  life  in  motion. 

The  Kantian  exhortation  for  the  intuition  of  the  a  priori 
character  of  geometrical  forms  runs  somewhat  as  follows  :  Con- 
struct them  by  mental  movement,  and  then  you  will  know  their 
real  nature.  The  exhortation  of  esthetics  for  the  intuition  of 
the   beauty   of   architectural  forms  is  similar.     They   must   be 


344  ^ESTHETICS. 

swept  by  the  moving  eye,  actively  constituted  by  synthetic 
imagination.  Only  in  this  way  can  the  outlines  of  a  building, 
or  the  arrangement  in  space  of  the  parts  within  its  outlines,  be 
intuited  as  beautiful.  Moreover  (to  anticipate  another  impor- 
tant consideration),  its  vertical  lines  are  perceived  in  their 
beauty  as  tending  "  upward  "  with  aspiration,  or  as  resisting 
with  dignity  and  self-poise  the  "  downward  "  pull  of  gravity. 
Under  the  moving  eye  and  active  imagination,  the  horizontal 
lines  and  portions  of  the  building  marshal  themselves  over 
against  one  another,  on  the  right  or  on  the  left. 

In  all  sculpture  a  yet  more  subtile  and  highly  intellectual 
use  of  the  category  of  change  is  necessary  to  the  beauty  of  the 
object.  The  particular  field  of  movement  here  represented  is 
that  of  human  or  animal  life ;  although  the  representation  of 
the  life  of  plants  is,  in  an  inferior  degree,  possible  for  sculpture. 
In  order  to  appear  beautiful  the  sculptured  object  must  suggest, 
either  the  motion  that  belongs  to  life,  or  the  dignified  resistance 
of  that  tendency  to  motion  against  the  vital  interests  of  which 
external  physical  forces  are  the  cause.  The  beautiful  statue, 
representing  an  animal  form,  stands  firmly  poised  and  easily 
resisting  gravity  ;  or  else  it  appears  as  itself  full  of  vital  move- 
ment in  response  to  some  emotion  of  the  soul.  The  intuition 
of  the  beautiful  in  the  forms  of  natural  objects  falls  under  the 
same  principle. 

Much  that  is  said  of  the  freedom  of  art,  as  applied  to  the 
spontaneous  play  of  the  artist's  feeling  and  imagination,  be- 
longs also  to  the  object  produced  by  his  free  artistic  activity. 
All  natural  objects,  too,  when  regarded  as  beautiful,  seem  to 
partake  in  the  same  spontaneous  and  expressive  psychical  life. 
The  imagination  of  the  beholder  must  recognize  them  as,  in 
some  sort,  free  beings,  active  spontaneously  and  out  of  their 
own  resources  rather  than  as  compelled  by  extraneous  force. 
The  object  which  is  apprehended  as  forced  by  another  to  change 
cannot,  so  far  as  it  is  regarded  as  thus  forced,  be  also  regarded 
as  beautiful.     It  is  indeed  true  that  there  is  beauty  in  a  painful 


AESTHETICS.  345 

struggle  for  noble  ends.  But  the  very  struggle,  although  sug- 
gestive of  painful  emotion  in  the  object,  is  also  suggestive  of 
strenuous  and  self-moved  resistance  to  external  forces,  in  the 
interests  of  aesthetical  or  ethical  ideals.  The  form  of  Laocoon 
reveals  only  too  clearly  the  frightful  agony  of  his  conflict  with 
the  huge  serpents  that  encircle  him  ;  and  we  know  that  the 
conflict  will  be  unavailing.  But  it  also  shows  us  a  higher,  be- 
cause a  human,  life  contending  against  a  lower  life  with  all  its 
resources  of  muscular  and  mental  energy,  in  the  behalf  of  an 
end  that  is  morally  approved.  The  supreme  and  ever-adorable 
examples  of  the  power  which  such  artistic  representations  have 
to  evoke  aesthetical  feeling,  where  exulting  joy  mingles  with  sym- 
pathetic pain,  are  the  ecce-homo  pictures  of  Jesus.  Such  beauty 
as  they  can  attain,  besides  its  source  in  ethical  considerations, 
acknowledges  the  principle  for  which  we  are  now  arguing. 
Spontaneity,  whether  in  active  exertion  or  in  the  endurance  of 
suffering  with  resignation,  belongs  to  every  object  which  is  to 
be  intuited  as  beautiful. 

The  philosophical  aesthetics  of  Hegel  and  his  school  insists 
upon  the  presence  of  some  recognizable  idea  in  every  beautiful 
object.  Theories  of  the  beautiful  in  general  are  accustomed  to 
note  the  truth  that  a  unity  in  variety  belongs  to  the  nature 
of  the  beautiful.  If  we  recur  to  the  results  of  analysis  in  the 
chapter  upon  Metaphysics,  we  find  that  these  two  forms  of 
statement  imply  essentially  the  same  experience  regarding  all 
reality.  The  only  rea'l  unity  is  obtained  by  the  self-limitation 
of  the  subject  of  change,  in  respect  to  the  series  of  changes 
through  which  it  passes,  by  some  immanent  idea.  Now,  no 
object,  whether  a  product  of  artistic  effort  or  a  natural  product, 
which  is  regarded  as  subject  to  unregulated  change,  can  be 
esteemed  beautiful.  Indeed,  strictly  speaking,  no  such  object 
can  really  exist ;  no  such  assumed  being  could  become  an  ob- 
ject to  the  human  mind.  Chaos  is  not  beautiful,  —  would  not 
be  beautiful  if  it  were  conceivable.  Disorder  is  not  beautiful. 
The  beautiful  object  may,   indeed,  appear  lacking  in   perfect 


346 


^ESTHETICS. 


symmetry ;  it  may  appear  the  more  beautiful  on  account  of 
this  lack.  But  this  is  because  the  lack  itself  is  expressive  of  a 
natural  and  joyous  spontaneity  of  movement;  while  perfect 
symmetry  is  liable  to  appear  artificial  and  forced.  Moreover, 
we  have  already  seen  that  every  beautiful  object  must  appear 
capable  of  varied  life  ;  it  falls  under  the  category  of  change. 
But  the  change  cannot  be  unlimited  change,  with  no  idea  or 
end  in  view.  Finality,  or  the  self-limitation  of  the  object  ac- 
cording to  some  idea,  appears  then  to  be  a  necessary  factor, 
or  "  moment,"  in  every  beautiful  thing. 

A  more  careful  consideration  of  these  characteristics  of  all 
beautiful  objects  seems  to  show  that  they  are  such  as  can  be  pos- 
sessed —  at  least  in  that  form  and  fulness  which  is  necessary  to 
awaken  sesthetical  feeling  —  only  by  what  has  life.  Indeed,  if  we 
were  compelled  to  sum  up  in  a  word  those  characteristics  which 
entitle  certain  things  rather  than  others  to  be  called  beautiful,  we 
should  say  :  It  is  their  "lifelikeness,"  their  fulness  of  life.  Thus 
does  an  analysis  of  the  beautiful  object  lead  us  around  to  a  con- 
clusion similar  to  that  suggested  by  an  analysis  of  the  state  of 
feeling  for  the  beautiful.  This  state  of  feeling  was  found  to  be 
dependent  upon  an  activity  of  imagination  in  projecting  psychical 
life  into  the  object  contemplated.  We  now  find  that,  if  any  ob- 
jects are  to  be  regarded  as  really  beautiful,  they  must  in  reality 
possess  the  characteristics  of  psychical  life.  Either,  then,  the 
beautiful  is  merely  subjective,  is  only  a  state  of  pleasurable  feel- 
ing in  the  mind  of  the  beholder,  or  else  the  object  contemplated 
and  esteemed  beautiful  is  itself  possessed  of  such  characteristics 
as  entitle  it  to  be  called  a  form  of  life.  The  sympathetic  com- 
munion of  our  life  with  other  life  is  necessary  to  the  appreci- 
ation of  the  beautiful.  If  this  communion  is  only  a  fancy  of 
the  mind  with  respect  to  the  object,  and  if  the  object  is  not  in 
reality  possessed  of  these  characteristics,  then  we  cannot  speak 
of  the  objectively  beautiful,  whether  in  nature  or  in  art. 

The  foregoing  considerations  serve  to  indicate  the  unique 
nature  of  the  a?sthetical  Ideal.     The    feeling   for   it,  and  the 


^ESTHETICS.  347 

judgments  pronouncing  what  is  entitled  to  call  forth  this  feel- 
ing, are  all  relative  to  the  ideal.  They  are  states  of  mind  char- 
acterized by  vague  and  unsatisfied,  yet  pleasurable  and  noble, 
striving  after  something  not  yet  attained.  They  are  one  mode 
of  the  soul's  reaching  after  a  higher  and  unconditionally  worthy 
(an  ideal)  form  of  its  own  life.  But  this  activity  of  mind  im- 
plies its  own  objective  correlate.  No  particular  object,  no 
beautiful  work  of  art,  or  beautiful  natural  form,  or  beautiful 
state  of  the  self-conscious  mind,  represents  this  ideal  with  a 
complete  satisfaction  of  the  demands  of  sesthetical  feeling.  And 
yet  every  object  is  deemed  beautiful  only  on  the  mind's  as- 
sumption that  it  shares,  in  some  worthy  degree,  the  character- 
istics of  its  own  ideal  striving  and  satisfaction  in  such  striving. 
Every  form  of  life  that  appears  as  a  free  and  self-controlled 
approximation  to  its  own  idea  appears,  so  far  forth,  to  be  beauti- 
ful. But  the  degrees  of  approximation  are  infinitely  various ; 
the  life  attained  is  not  all  alike  worthy  in  the  estimate  of  the 
contemplating  mind.  The  noblest,  fullest  life  —  if  we  could 
only  perfectly  describe  it  —  would  correspond  to  the  Ideal.  If 
such  life  exists  in  reality,  then  the  perfectly  beautiful,  the 
ideally  beautiful,  exists.  But  the  shadowy  outline  of  such  a  life 
hovers  above  the  mind,  alluring  it.  The  objects  that  seem  to 
have  more  or  less  of  such  life  appear  in  their  several  degrees 
to  be  beautiful.  The  mind  that  experiences  this  life  responsive 
to  the  contemplation  of  such  objects  realizes  the  feeling  for  the 
beautiful.  And  above  it  and  them,  as  a  Somewhat  or  Some 
One,  that  may  serve  as  a  goal  of  all  the  striving,  is  placed  the 
Idea  of  the  Beautiful  realized,  — the  Being  that  experiences,  and 
is,  the  perfection  of  all  Life. 

It  is  only  in  some  such  confessedly  vague  way  that  philo- 
sophical ;esthetics  can  at  present  explicate  the  content  of  human 
experience  with  the  beautiful.  That  sesthetical,  like  ethical, 
reason  is  in  a  course  of  progressive  realization  of  its  ideal,  we 
have  every  reason  to  believe. 

The  different  forms  of  the  beautiful,  as  ordinarily  recognized 


348  ESTHETICS. 

by  the  language  of  art,  are  connected  with  the  different  com- 
binations of  those  characteristics  which  are  common  to  all 
beautiful  objects.  When  we  intuit  forms  of  change,  in  corre- 
spondence with  some  ideal,  that  are  rapid  and  imply  easy 
adaptation  to  environment,  we  have  the  testhetical  feeling  be- 
longing to  the  graceful  in  art  or  nature.  When  we  contemplate 
what  is  measureless  and  vague  in  outline,  in  impression  of 
strength,  what  can  be  attained  only  by  vast  exertion,  we  are 
stirred  to  the  feeling  for  the  sublime.  The  grand,  the  charm- 
ing, the  stately,  the  piquant,  etc.,  are  forms  of  beauty,  the 
analysis  of  which  leads  to  similar  results. 

The  fact  that  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  objects  which 
appear  beautiful  owe  their  beauty  to  association  is  doubtless 
of  great  scientific  and  practical  significance.  But  it  is  a  fact 
which  enables  us  neither  to  find  the  essence  of  the  feeling  for 
the  beautiful  in  the  laws  of  association,  nor  to  reduce  to  sim- 
pler terms  the  real  characteristics  which  belong  to  all  beautiful 
objects.  All  states  of  mind  fall,  as  a  matter  of  course,  under 
these  laws.  Yet  the  nature  of  human  reason  and  the  reality  of 
things  and  of  minds  are  not  explained  by  the  statement  of  the 
regular  forms  of  the  recurrence  of  particular  ideas.  This  is  as 
true  in  aesthetics  as  it  is  in  ethics,  or  even  in  metaphysics. 

An  intimate  and  interesting  relation  has  been  found  to  exist 
in  experience  between  the  ideal  of  beauty  and  the  ideal  of  the 
morally  good.  The  morally  good  disposition  is  naturally  re- 
garded as  beautiful.  But  we  can  say  this  only  on  the  sup- 
position that  we  do  not  accept  notions  current  in  certain  ethical 
systems  as  to  what  the  morally  good  disposition  really  is.  That 
the  beautiful  is  naturally  and  necessarily  regarded  as  also  mor- 
ally good,  we  are  forbidden  to  say.  Yet  the  feeling  that  all 
beauty  ought  to  he  united  with  moral  goodness,  is  strongly 
intrenched  within  the  human  mind.  The  contemplation  of 
beautiful  objects,  with  a  genuine  resthetical  feeling,  is  also 
ethically  purifying.  Important  psychological  reasons  may  be 
given  for   this   fact,   among  which   are    the   following  :    Such 


^ESTHETICS.  349 

feeling  is  opposed  to,  and  exclusive  of,  the  domination  of  appe- 
tite, avarice,  and  all  the  lower  forms  of  desire.  It  is  in  fact 
essentially  wwselfish,  —  the  admiration  and  love  of  the  beauti- 
ful being  as  unlike  the  seeking  and  love  of  self  as  are  the  love 
of  truth,  of  justice,  or  that  love  which  we  call  benevolence. 
It  may  be  said  to  have  the  characteristics  of  altruism,  or  of 
"  otherworldliness."  There  was,  therefore,  important  philosoph- 
ical truth  concealed  in  the  phrase  peculiar  to  the  Platonic,  and 
indeed  to  the  entire  Greek,  way  of  thinking,  which  united 
with  the  copulative  the  beautiful  and  the  good  (to  kcl\ov  k 
wyaOov).  In  the  present  development  of  morality,  and  under 
the  present  conditions  of  human  living,  it  will  not  do  so  to 
press  this  kinship  as  to  annihilate  ethical  distinctions.  In  cases 
of  practical  conflict  between  men's  notions  of  what  is,  aestheti- 
cally considered,  beautiful  and  what  it  is  agreed  by  the  great 
majority  to  call  morally  right,  the  latter  must  inevitably  pre- 
vail. The  evolution  of  judgment  in  ethics  is  further  advanced, 
and  has  reached  a  stage  of  consistency  and  rationality  that  is 
quite  beyond  anything  which  the  science  of  aesthetics  can  show. 
Society,  with  its  daily  life  and  conduct,  builds  itself  solidly  on 
a  moral  code  that  has  been  wrung  from  powers  of  darkness  and 
superstition  by  centuries  of  hardship  and  strife.  But  the  code 
of  artistic  feeling  and  judgment  is  yet  an  airy  and  somewhat 
evanescent  affair.  It  has  not  the  toughness  of  fibre  necessary 
to  contend  with  conceptions  and  judgments  which  are  so  clear 
and  prompt  in  most  men's  minds  that  they  seem  to  merit,  and 
do  widely  receive,  the  title  of  "  universal  and  necessary  truths." 
If,  however,  the  really  beautiful  and  the  really  good  were  found 
to  be  incompatible,  an  important  and  influential  schism  in  rea- 
son would  have  to  be  confessed.  From  the  confession  we  are 
doubtless  permanently  safe,  when  we  consider  that  both  the 
really  beautiful  and  the  really  good  appear,  to  the  mind,  in 
their  highest  and  ultimate  form,  as  Ideals.  The  confession 
which  the  two  ideals,  when  compared,  elicit,  is  not  one  of  their 
incompatibility  in  reality.     It  is  rather  itself  a  tendency  of  the 


350  ESTHETICS. 

human  mind  to  insist  that,  somehow  and  somewhere,  the  two 
shall  he  perfectly  realized  in  one  state  of  heing,  in  one  most 
"beautiful  and  most  righteous  form  of  Life.  To  be  sure,  every 
definite  and  concrete  object  of  which  we  have  experience  falls 
far  short  of  effecting  the  desired  unity.  Neither  do  we  find  the 
perfect  and  ideal  happiness  of  which  we  have  also  a  mental 
picture  associated  with  everything  —  or,  indeed,  with  any  one 
thing  —  which  we  call  beautiful  or  morally  good.  But  beauty 
and  the  morally  good  disposition,  nevertheless,  appear  to  us 
forms  of  well-being  that  have  an  absolute  significance  and  value. 
And  from  this  point  of  view  we  turn  again  to  that  Unity  of 
Eeality  in  which  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  of  mind  dis- 
cover the  "  Ground  "  of  all  things  and  of  all  souls,  and  inquire 
whether  we  may  not  at  least  cherish  the  fair  and  reasonable 
postulate  that  it  is  also  the  Eealization  of  the  ethical  and  the 
sesthetical  Ideals. 


CHAPTER   XIII. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   KELIGION. 


NOTHING  is  more  impressive  to  the  thoughtful  student  of 
human  nature  than  the  existence  of  certain  conceptions, 
emotions,  and  beliefs  of  that  peculiar  character  which  we  call 
"religion."  The  attempt  to  reduce  the  religious  elements  of 
man's  being  to  a  very  few  elementary  forms  is,  in  our  judgment, 
a  complete  failure.  The  sources  of  religion  in  human  nature  are 
both  varied  and  profound.  Religion,  says  Herbart,1  "is  much 
older  than  philosophy,  and  strikes  its  roots  much  deeper  in  the 
human  soul."  That  philosophy  is  older  and  more  deeply  rooted 
in  human  nature  than  is  science,  we  have  also  seen  to  be  true. 
If  then  we  arrange  the  forms  of  intellectual  striving  which  re- 
sult in  religion,  philosophy,  and  science,  in  the  order  of  the 
support  which  they  receive  from  the  constitutional  needs  of 
humanity,  we  must  place  science  last  of  the  three.  But  it  is 
religion  as  a  life,  with  its  more  or  less  naive  and  uncritical  con- 
ceptions, and  with  many  unjustifiable  beliefs,  that  has  outlasted 
all  the  changes  of  opinion  to  which  the  philosophy  of  religion 
has  been  subject.  No  fear  need  be  entertained  that  it  will  be 
unable  to  survive  the  modern  effort  to  bring  its  phenomena 
under  so-called  scientific  treatment. 

The  general  relation  between  philosophy  and  the  particular 
sciences  was  found  to  be  such  as  to  encourage  the  expectation 
that  the  philosophy  of  religion  might,  in  a  measure,  place  itself 
upon  a  secure  scientific  foundation.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  a  science  of  religion,  in  any  such  form  as  to  serve 

1  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  5th  ed.,  §  155. 


352  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

philosophy  for  a  teacher  and  guide,  can  be  said  to  exist.     All 
efforts  hitherto  made  to  subject  the  nature  and  growth  of  the 
complex  life  of  religion  to  a  descriptive  and  evolutionary  treat- 
ment have  been  sadly  lacking  in  scientific  quality.     Such  efforts 
are  even  less  hopeful  in  prospective  result  than  are  the  attempts 
at  a  physiological  and  evolutionary  science  of  ethics  or  aesthet- 
ics.    It  is  necessary  then  for  philosophy  to  go  straightway  — 
in  its  own  name  and  with  its  own  authority  —  to  those  sources 
which  lie  within  the  facts  of  human  life.     Within  the  sphere  of 
religion  there  exists  no  body  of  principles,  established  by  care- 
ful scientific  induction,  on  which  philosophy  can  safely  rely.    Its 
reflective  analysis  and  its  efforts  at  synthesis  derive  little  bene- 
fit indeed  by  stopping  to  consult  the  modern  theories  concern- 
ing the  origin  and  growth  of  religious  beliefs.      The  facts  upon 
which  these  theories  claim  to  have  established  themselves  must, 
of  course,  enter  into  its  account.     But  it  is  only  as  considered 
in  connection  with  a  great  number  of  other  even  more  impor- 
tant facts  (usually  quite  neglected  by  the  ardent  defenders  of 
an  inductive  and  objective  science  of  religion)  that  their  signifi- 
cance for  philosophy  can  be  realized. 

It  is  for  this  reason,  in  part,  that  philosophy  comes  into  such 
very  close  relations  with  religion.  Within  the  sphere  common 
to  both  there  is  no  recognized  standard  of  defensible  generaliza- 
tions to  which,  in  case  of  conflict  between  the  philosopher  and 
the  man  of  the  popular  religious  faith,  an  appeal  can  be  taken. 
A  genuine  science  of  religion  (corresponding  to  the  science  of 
physics  or  the  science  of  psychology)  does  not  exist.  Did  it 
exist,  it  would  constitute  such  a  recognized  standard  of  appeal. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  a  science  of  theology  exists,  and  that 
this  science  must  be  accepted  as  the  arbiter  between  popular 
belief  and  philosophical  thought  respecting  matters  of  fact  and 
law  in  religion.  Has,  then,  theology  so  succeeded  in  giving  sci- 
entific form  and  certification  to  the  phenomena  of  religious  belief 
and  knowledge  that  it  can  —  as  can  physics  or  psychology  — 
require  of  philosophy  to  accept  at  its  hands  a  body  of  princi- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION.  353 

pies,  not  simply  presupposed  by  it,  but  also  ascertained  by  its 
inductive  researches  ?  The  word  "  theology  "  is  variously  used. 
Sometimes  it  signifies  little  more  than  the  iteration,  in  more 
technical  and  uncouth  phrase,  of  the  popular  conceptions  and 
beliefs  respecting  religion.  But  it  cannot  retain  the  claim  to  a 
scientific  character  when,  through  fear  of  being  accused  of 
rationalism,  it  does  not  itself  lay  hold  upon  and  employ  the 
method  of  reason,  —  the  method  of  philosophy.  In  so  far  as 
theology  actually  employs  philosophic  method,  it  becomes  a 
philosophy  of  religion.  And,  in  fact,  by  far  the  greater  part  of 
what  has  been  called  the  science  of  theology  is  actually  philoso- 
phy of  religion,  though  the  method  of  reflective  analysis  and 
rational  synthesis  be  used  in  a  vacillating  and  inconsistent 
way. 

The  science  of  theology  has,  without  doubt,  a  high  place 
among  the  forms  of  systematic  and  certified  human  knowledge. 
As  a  science,  and  not  as  a  dogmatic  restatement  of  popular 
beliefs  or  a  fragmentary  attempt  at  the  philosophy  of  religion, 
theology  moves  in  a  narrow  and  restricted  sphere.  It  is  the 
critical  and  systematic  exposition  of  the  particular  tenets  held 
by  a  sect  or  branch  of  believers  in  some  more  or  less  definite 
form  of  religious  faith  and  life.  It  is  Calvinistic  or  Arminian ; 
it  is  the  Dogmatik  of  the  Lutheran  Church  or  of  the  Reformed 
Churches ;  it  is  the  theology  of  the  Westminster  Confession  or 
of  the  Thirty-nine  Articles ;  or  it  is  the  so-called  New  England 
Theology.  Each  of  these  forms  of  scientific  theology  may  fur- 
nish the  philosophy  of  religion  with  new  material  for  its  con- 
sideration. But  by  the  very  nature  of  that  definiteness  which 
they  have  as  partially  exclusive  systems,  none  of  them  is  a 
science  of  religion  fit  to  be  the  judge  over,  or  sole  guide  of,  the 
philosophy  of  religion.  In  so  far  as  they  involve  common  ele- 
ments, they  show  the  wide-spreading  character  of  the  concep- 
tions and  beliefs  with  which  they  attempt  to  deal.  In  so  far, 
however,  as  they  subject  these  conceptions  and  beliefs  to  thor- 
ough   reflective   analysis,  and  build  upon  the  results    of  this 

23 


354  PHILOSOPHY    OF   RELIGION. 

analysis  that  common  supreme  synthesis  which  all  religion 
Implies,  they  share  together  in  a  common  philosophy  of 
religion. 

It  may  be  claimed,  however,  that  the  method  by  which  the- 
ology arrives  at  its  truths  is  so  peculiar  as  to  place  it  above 
philosophy  in  the  position  of  authority  or  supreme  judge.  The 
"  device,"  Philosophia  est  ancilla  theologian,  prevailed  during  the 
Middle  Ages;  it  is  still  accepted  and  acted  upon  by  many 
thinkers  in  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  and  in  other  great 
branches  of  religious  belief.  But  it  is  the  characteristic  achieve- 
ment and  priceless  possession  of  modern  philosophy  to  have 
gained  freedom  from  the  power  signified  by  this  device.  In- 
deed, the  device  itself  is  a  denial  of  one  of  the  chief  character- 
istics of  all  philosophy.  It  cannot  be  the  "  handmaid "  of 
theology ;  to  resume  this  position  would  be  to  surrender  the 
birthright  and  title  of  modern  philosophy.  Neither  has  the- 
ology suffered  from  losing  her  handmaid. 

If,  then,  the  theologian  wishes  to  enter  the  fields  of  philoso- 
phy, he  is  heartily  welcome  therein ;  but  only  on  terms  consist- 
ent with  the  laws  of  the  domain.  If  he  do  not  become  a 
philosopher,  if  he  do  not  diligently  and  intelligently  cultivate 
the  knowledge  of  mind,  the  knowledge  of  knowledge,  the  knowl- 
edge of  moral  philosophy,  and  the  philosophy  of  religion,  he 
will  scarcely  attain  the  place  of  a  trustworthy  theologian.  But 
he  cannot  change  the  nature  or  the  methods  of  philosophy  by 
his  bare  presence  in  its  field. 

The  existence  of  various  claimants  to  the  privileged  place  of 
revealed  systems  of  religious  truth,  and  the  existence  of  some 
one  form  of  revelation  recognized  as  special  and  unique,  do  not 
change  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  religion  and  philoso- 
phy. All  the  several  claimants  must  appear  before  the  bar  of 
reason  and  present  the  grounds  on  which  their  claims  rest. 
And  if  the  alleged  truths  revealed  by  each  have  been  previously 
given  the  form  of  theological  science,  whether  in  a  critical  or 
in  an  uncritical  way,  this  science  can  contest  conflicting  claims 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION.  355 

before  no  other  arbiter  and  judge  than  philosophy  itself.  More- 
over, even  when  any  particular  form  of  revelation  has  been 
acknowledged  to  be  true,  this  does  not  do  away  with  the  neces- 
sity of  a  philosophy  of  religion,  or  even  greatly  abridge  the 
work  it  has  to  perform.  The  existence  and  the  recognition  of 
revelation  are  themselves  religious  phenomena,  which  imply 
most  important  truths  with  regard  to  the  nature  and  connec- 
tion of  all  reality  and  of  the  supreme  ethical  and  sesthetical 
ideals.  A  revelation  which  should  contradict  the  truths  im- 
plicated in  all  knowledge,  and  in  the  particular  principles  rec- 
ognized by  the  sciences  of  nature  and  of  mind,  of  ethics  and 
aesthetics,  is  unthinkable.  Of  what  could  it  be  a  revelation  ? 
To  whom  could  it  be  a  revelation  ?  What  could  it  reveal  ? 
Any  intelligible  answer  to  these  questions  is  quite  impossible 
without  admitting  the  right  and  the  duty  of  philosophy  to  deal 
with  all  the  phenomena  of  religious  conceptions  and  beliefs. 
It  is  only  a  philosophy  which  takes  a  shallow  view  of  experi- 
ence and  reality  that  refuses  to  consider  alleged  facts  and  prin- 
ciples that  are  too  vague  and  vast  for  clear  definition,  —  tokens 
of  the  feeling  of  the  human  heart  after  remote  and  ever  unat- 
tainable ideals.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  only  a  philosophy 
which  has  parted  with  its  crown  and  birthright  that  will 
receive  any  alleged  mysteries  of  faith  when  presented  in  terms 
that  defy  and  flout  at  the  clearest  ideas  and  choicest  convic- 
tions of  reason. 

All  rational  knowledge  is  suffused  with  conviction ;  and  the 
influence  of  the  ideals  of  the  morally  good  and  the  beautiful  is 
known  in  the  awakening  of  the  feelings  of  aspiration,  awe, 
admiration,  and  affection.  That  "  faith  "  and  "  feeling  "  should 
enter  into  the  very  essence  of  the  life  of  religion,  need  cause  no 
wonder  and  give  no  offence.  Neither  philosophy  nor  science 
succeeds  in  fully  satisfying  the  mind's  demand  for  explanation. 
And  some  of  the  mind's  most  imperative  demands  are  not  satis- 
fied by  explanation  at  all.  But  the  faith  which  religion  requires 
must  be  of  a  kind  to  comport  with  the  knowledge  which  sci- 


356  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

euce  and  philosophy  furnish,  although  this  is  a  far  different 
thing  from  saying  that  science  and  philosophy  must  furnish  an 
explanation  of  the  objects  to  which  the  faith  points,  or  else 
deny  the  rationality  of  the  faith  itself.  Conviction,  that  arises 
we  know  not  how,  attaches  itself  to  all  the  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. The  faith  which  is  inseparable  from  religion  is  not  a 
blind  and  arbitrary  defining  of  the  object  of  religion.  As  far  as 
it  approximates  this  condition,  whether  in  the  mind  of  individ- 
uals or  in  particular  systems  of  theology,  it  is  unreasonable, 
and  cannot  abide.  As  a  conviction  of  the  presence  and  power 
of  the  ideal  within  the  real,  —  in  that  particular  form  which 
is  required  not  only  for  the  life  of  dutiful  and  beautiful  con- 
duct, but  also  for  the  life  of  religious  devotion  and  bless- 
edness, —  faith  is  not  contradictory  of,  but  akin  to,  the 
most  primary,  invincible,  and  valuable  activities  of  reason 
itself. 

A  true  philosophy  can,  therefore,  never  contravene  or  mar 
the  life  of  true  religion.  Philosophy  strives  rather,  with  keen, 
loving  insight  to  discern,  and  with  tenderness  and  sympathy  to 
appreciate,  the  significance  and  value  of  this  life.  It  regards 
religion  as  a  witness  to  the  ultimate  Unity  of  the  Real  and  the 
Ideal.  And  if  science,  falsely  so-called,  wounds  religion,  or  spurs 
on  philosophy  to  wound  her,  the  cure  of  the  wounds  is  no  more 
to  be  found  in  irrational  religious  zeal  and  belief  than  in  irre- 
ligious science  and  philosophy.  The  only  cure  for  all  such 
wounds  is  more  of  knowledge,  —  of  knowledge,  with  its  blending 
of  intuition  and  inference  with  primary  convictions  of  truth. 
As  said  the  great  theologian,  Julius  Mliller :  "  Wounds  which 
have  been  inflicted  on  humanity  by  knowledge,  can  be  healed 
only  by  knowledge." 

In  case  of  an  apparent  conflict  between  the  two,  religion  has 
great  and  obvious  advantages  over  philosophy.  By  that  per- 
sistent faithfulness  in  conviction  and  devotion  toward  an  Ideal, 
which  is  her  essential  characteristic,  she  can  ultimately  compel 
the  respectful   consideration   of   philosophy  ;    while  her  grasp 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   KELIGION.  357 

upon  life  and  conduct  among  the  multitudes  of  mankind,  and 
even  with  the  leaders  of  reflective  thought,  is  by  far  the  more 
firm  and  unmistakable.  The  facts  of  experience  to  which  she 
invites  philosophical  analysis,  and  the  contributions  made  to 
the  final  synthesis  of  philosophy  by  the  principles  implicated  in 
the  experience,  are  of  the  most  enduring  character.  Moreover, 
they  make  the  irresistible  appeal  which  comes  from  objects  that 
awaken  the  strongest  and  profoundest  passions  and  emotions  of 
human  nature.  For  all  the  roots  of  our  physical  and  psychical 
life  are  bathed  in  the  hopes,  aspirations,  fears,  and  yearnings 
which  are  fed  from  the  springs  of  religion. 

A  recent  writer  1  on  a  branch  of  this  subject  raises  the  ques- 
tion, Which  of  several  tenable  but  rival  theories  to  account  for 
our  actual  experiences  is  to  be  believed ;  and  then  makes 
answer  as  follows :  "  That  will  be  most  generally  believed 
which,  besides  offering  us  objects  able  to  account  satisfactorily 
for  our  sensible  experience,  also  offers  those  which  are  most 
interesting,  those  which  appeal  most  urgently  to  our  aesthetic, 
emotional,  and  active  needs."  No  one  wise  in  reflective  think- 
ing, and  in  the  history  of  such  thinking,  can  fail  to  sympathize 
with  the  words  of  Mr.  Shadworth  Hodgson:2  "  Eeligion  I  saw 
was  like  an  expansive  force  which  would  shatter  any  man-made 
system  of  philosophy,  unless  that  system  were  a  true  image  of 
the  universe  itself.  Nothing  can  be  true  which  does  not  find  a 
place,  in  the  theory,  for  that  passionate  determination  of  the 
mind  to  God,  which  T  do  not  say  is  described  by,  but  which 
breathes  from,  the  writings  of  men  like  Coleridge.  And  the 
reason  is  this,  that  the  passionate  religious  tendency  is  not  a 
sentiment  fluttering  round  a  fancy,  but  is  a  feeling  rooted  deep 
in  the  structure  and  mechanism  of  consciousness." 

Those  facts  entering  into  all  the  life  and  growth  of  mind,  out 
of  which  the  life  of  religion  perennially  springs  and  by  nourish- 

1  Prof.  Win.  James,  on  the  "Psychology  of  Belief,"  in  Mind,  July,  1889, 
p.  346. 

2  Philosophy  of  Reflection,  vol.  i. ,  Preface,  p.  20  f. 


358  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

merit  from  which  it  grows,  may  be  mentioned  under  five  heads. 
These  are,  — 

1.  Certain  vague  but  powerful  feelings  which  impel  the  mind 
to  belief  in  the  presence  of  the  invisible  and  to  the  inquiry  as 
to  right  relations  toward  this  presence.  Among  these  is  the 
feeling  of  dependence  which,  as  absolute  and  equivalent  to  a 
consciousness  of  being  in  relation  to  God,  Schleiermacher  con- 
sidered the  source  of  all  religious  life.  This  feeling,  under  the 
influence  of  intelligence,  develops  from  the  primitive  fear  of 
unknown  forces  that  are  bevond  man's  control,  into  the  rational 
belief  in  Providence  as  "  other "  Being  than  the  beings  we 
immediately  know,  which  shapes  both  our  ends  and  theirs. 
Religious  rites  and  ceremonies,  as  well  as  the  rational  conduct 
of  life,  arise  from  the  pressure  of  this  motive  to  stand  right  with 
the  invisible  "  other  "  Being. 

2.  The  higher  and  more  distinctively  ethical  feelings  and 
ideas  furnish  also  a  principal  source  of  religion.  This  state- 
ment must  be  accepted  as  matter  of  fact,  whatever  theory  may 
be  held  as  to  the  possibility  of  separating  the  sanctions  and 
rules  of  ethics  from  the  tenets  of  religious  belief.  In  fact,  the 
feeling  and  idea  of  moral  obligation,  the  fear  of  retribution  and 
the  expectation  of  reward,  are  experiences  of  the  human  mind 
which  impel  it  to  the  belief  in  the  object  of  all  religion.  The 
peculiar  objectivity,  the  "  otherworldliness,"  of  the  so-called 
"  voice  of  conscience  "  has  been  recognized  in  connection  with 
all  degrees  of  ethical  development.  Who,  or  what,  that  is  with- 
in me  and  yet  does  not  appear  to  be  myself,  speaks  to  me  and 
declares,  "  Thou  oughtest,"  or  "  Thou  oughtest  not "  ?  The 
theological  argument  which,  from  the  i'w-equity  of  rewards  and 
punishments  as  empirically  determined,  infers  the  existence  of 
a  Being  who  will  right  this  f/i-equity,  may  not  be  acceptable  to 
the  mind  of  the  present  age.  But  that  the  expectations  which 
are  actually  awakened  in  the  ethical  consciousness  are  most 
powerful  factors  in  the  impulse  of  human  nature  toward  God, 
it  would  argue  inaccurate  observation  of  the  facts  to  deny.     In 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  359 

their  more  intelligent  form,  these  ethical  experiences  suggest 
and  guide  that  inquiry  after  some  certified  relation  of  the  real 
world  of  beings,  forces,  and  events,  with  the  ethical  Ideal,  which 
has  always  been  the  most  painful  and  burdensome  of  all  philo- 
sophical problems.  The  sense  of  justice  and  truth,  the  feeling 
that  goodness  and  the  well-being  it  brings  ought  to  exist  in 
reality,  the  persistent  conviction  that  the  kingdom  of  reality 
cannot  (in  spite  of  all  appearances  to  the  contrary)  be  a  region 
of  moral  negations,  much  less  a  kingdom  where  evil  is  supreme, 
have  driven  men  to  faith  in  God  during  all  the  dark  ages  of 
the  world's  history. 

3.  The  higher  and  more  distinctively  sesthetical  feelings  and 
ideas  are  also  a  powerful  motive  to  religion.  It  is  not  without 
reason  that  the  advocates  of  a  world  without  God  strive  to 
diminish  the  value  of  a?sthetical  feeling  and  the  amount  of 
beauty,  as  distinct  from  mere  utility,  to  be  found  in  the  objects 
of  human  experience.  In  its  most  vague  and  primitive  form 
the  susceptibility  to  testhetical  influences  is  akin  to  the  suscep- 
tibility to  religion.  It  has  been  the  "  beauty  of  holiness,"  quite 
as  much  as  its  utility,  which  has  attracted  the  minds  of  men. 
Without  this  susceptibility  it  is  difficult  to  tell  what  the  forms 
of  divine  service  would  have  been.  Many,  perhaps  most,  of 
those  religious  ceremonies  which  prevail  among  the  lowest 
peoples  are  lacking  in  qualities  which  appeal  to  our  testhetical 
feeling ;  some  of  them  are  positively,  and  in  a  high  degree, 
repulsive  to  a  refined  taste.  The  beliefs  of  religion,  too,  have 
been  too  largely  shaped  by  crude  ethical  conceptions,  to  the 
damage  of  the  asthetical  quality  they  might  otherwise  have 
possessed.  It  is  customary  to  inveigh  loudly  against  certain 
religious  practices  and  beliefs,  in  the  name  of  aesthetics  as  well 
as  of  ethics.  But  the  sympathetic  student  of  human  nature 
will  recognize,  here  as  everywhere  in  religious  phenomena, 
another  aspect.  He  will  be  ready  in  the  consideration  of  this 
subject  to  give  the  principle  of  evolution  all  its  rights.  The 
science  that  can  call  the  hideousness  of  a  cancer  "  beautiful," 


360  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

surely  might  enable  us  to  see  how  the  Aztec  priest,  who  lifted 
the  bleeding  heart  of  the  victim  to  his  idol's  mouth,  was  still  an 
aesthetical  as  well  as  a  religious  being.  In  the  Eoman  Catholic 
Church  the  beauty  which  untutored  minds  have  seen  speaking 
from  the  face  and  form  of  the  Madonna  and  her  Child,  has 
allured  them  toward  the  divine  life.  And  all  the  growth  of  devo- 
tion to  mere  fact  and  law  which  modern  science  demands  does 
not  serve  to  quench  the  rational  conviction  that  what  is  grandest 
and  most  beautiful  in  ideal  must  be  realized  in  the  Universe  as 
the  object  of  all  religion. 

4.  What  we  will  call  "  the  metaphysical  impulse,"  in  even  its 
most  instinctive  and  least  rational  form,  serves  in  the  interests 
of  religion.  As  the  otherwise  unknown  cause  of  the  perpetually 
recurrent  groupings  of  experiences  this  impulse  posits  a  Being 
actually  existent  in  the  world  of  reality.  We  may  call  that 
which  it  posits  by  the  name  X,  for  ought  we  know  about  it  to 
be  gathered  from  such  terms  as  "  substratum,"  "  substance,"  etc. 
But  no  "Thing  "  exists  without  this  X  ;  and  there  is  no  knowl- 
edge of  any  "  Thing  "  until  this  metaphysical  impulse  has  done 
its  wovk.  Science  proceeds  to  differentiate  its  experiences  under 
the  more  or  less  intelligent  rule  of  this  same  impulse.  The 
world  of  psychical  states,  as  instinctively  and  necessarily  organ- 
ized into  its  two  great  classes  and  assigned  to  its  two  kinds  of 
subjects  (things  and  self),  science  underlays  with  a  world  of 
postulated  realities,  called  "  atoms,"  "  forces,"  "  principles,"  and 
"  laws."  Thus  it  arrives  at  a  comprehensive  and  defensible  con- 
ception of  the  unity  of  the  world.  But  the  man  who  knows 
no  science  is  not  without  some  vague  conception  of  a  unity  in 
reality  to  all  that  of  which  he  has  experience.  Even  in  the 
lowest  forms  of  religion  the  multiplication  of  gods  many  and 
lords  many  has  not  been  wholly  unlimited.  In  fetichism  and 
the  most  debased  polytheism  there  are  fewer  deities  than  there 
are  things  and  men.  The  divinity  serves  as  some  kind  of  a  prin- 
ciple of  unification,  as  a  bond  in  reality  of  many  things  and  many 
men.     It  is  this  metaphysical  impulse  in  which  we  find  a  source 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION.  301 

of  religion.     Were  man  not  metaphysical,  lie  would  not  be  reli- 
gious.    There  is  no  religion  without  the  sense  and  belief  of  reality. 

5.  In  its  highest  form  the  foregoing  impulse  becomes  a  demand, 
definitely  conceived  and  more  or  less  completely  accomplished, 
for  the  unifying  of  all  experience  in  some  known  or  postulated 
Unity  of  Ideality.  But  the  instinctive  impulse  must  be  quick- 
ened and  broadened  by  a  many-sided  experience,  as  well  as 
guided  by  the  principles  of  the  particular  sciences,  in  order  to 
attain  this,  its  highest  form.  It  is  this  form  of  the  impulse 
toward  God  which  conceives  the  demand  for  Him  as  expressive 
of  the  most  profound,  varied,  and  lofty  life  of  reason  itself. 
The  truth  which  Tolstoi  makes  one  of  his  characters  utter  must 
be  so  interpreted :  "  It  is  not  the  mind  that  understands  God, 
it  is  life  that  makes  us  understand  Him." 

The  intimate  relation  of  philosophy  and  religion  is  thus  seen 
to  have  its  ground  in  the  very  nature  of  reason  itself.  Philoso- 
phy aims,  by  reflection  upon  all  the  many-sided  forms  of  its 
own  life,  to  comprehend  that  which  religion  accepts  as  con- 
cretely imaged  and  set  before  the  mind.  Eeligion  includes  the 
direction  of  conduct  with  reference  to  the  relations  in  which 
the  object  of  religious  faith  is  depicted  as  standing  to  the  indi- 
vidual mind  and  to  the  world  of  things.  It  regards  the  laws  of 
conduct  as  emanating  from  the  will  of  this  object;  the  mind 
is  therefore  regarded  as  determined  to  character  and  conduct  by 
the  expression  of  this  will.  Eeligion  therefore  regards  those  acts 
as  obedience  or  disobedience,  pleasing  or  displeasing,  to  Deity, 
which  ethics  regards  simply  as  in  accordance  with,  or  in  vio- 
lation of,  impersonal  laws.  It  considers  the  course  of  events  in 
the  physical  universe  as,  in  some  degree  and  manner  at  least, 
a  manifestation  of  the  presence  and  attributes  of  the  object  of 
its  faith,  and  of  its  affection  or  fear.  It  considers  rational  souls 
as  capable  of  existing,  and  indeed  as  actually  existing,  in  rela- 
tions with  this  object  which  imply  a  community  of  nature  and 
interests  between  the  two.1 

1  Coiii]>.  Lotze,  Outlines  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  2d  ed.,  §  80. 


362  PHILOSOPHY   OF   EELIGION. 

Philosophy  feels  the  obligation  to  treat  in  its  own  method 
the  phenomena  of  the  life  of  religion.  As  it  collates  and  re- 
flectively considers  these  phenomena,  it  notes  that  they  bear 
witness  to  an  origin  in  the  same  sources  as  those  in  which  it 
finds  its  own  impulse  and  guiding  principles.  To  the  vague 
feeling  of  dependence  in  which,  in  part,  religion  originates,  it 
attempts  to  furnish  such  grounds  in  a  knowledge  of  the  Nature 
of  all  Thought  and  all  Being  as  shall  convert  it  into  a  principle 
of  rational  life.  It  shows  that  it  is  true,  and  how  it  is  true,  of 
man,  as  of  all  other  known  or  knowable  beings,  "  In  Him  we 
.  .  .  have  our  being."  In  brief,  it  justifies  to  reflective  thinking 
the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  which  the  life  of  religion 
instinctively  cultivates. 

The  vague  feeling  after  a  unity  in  reality  between  the  different 
beings  of  the  physical  world,  and  between  us  and  these  beings, 
with  the  forces  and  laws  which  we  primarily  know  as  concerning 
them,  it  also  makes  the  subject  of  reflective  thinking.  It  thus 
undertakes,  in  a  critical  and  thorough  manner,  to  construct  — 
as  it  were  —  "  the  metaphysical  core  "  of  that  conception  to 
which  reason  is  entitled  in  answer  to  its  own  demands.  It 
summons  all  the  sciences  which  describe  the  nature  of  the 
world  and  the  nature  of  men,  as  realities  concretely  determined 
in  human  knowledge,  to  show  that  our  manifold  experience 
implies,  in  reality,  a  Unity  of  Being. 

The  philosophy  of  religion  further  undertakes  to  show,  in  the 
name  of  the  particular  sciences,  what  is  the  nature  of  this 
ultimate  Unity  of  all  real  Being,  and  what  are  the  more  definite 
relations  in  which  this  Being  stands  to  the  being  of  man.  In 
attempting  this  stupendous  problem  it  is  obliged  to  take  account 
of  those  facts  of  sesthetical  and  ethical  life  with  which  religion  is 
also  in  the  closest  connection.  What  religion  vaguely  believes 
and  yet  faithfully  feels,  philosophy  strives  to  make  a  matter  of 
certified  knowledge,  with  reference  to  the  character  of  the 
sesthetical  and  ethical  ideals.  The  supreme  synthesis  at  which 
it  aims  requires  that  —  if  it  be  possible  in  accordance  with  all 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION.  363 

the  facts  and  with  the  principles  ascertained  by  the  particular 
sciences  —  these  ideals  of  reason  shall  be  regarded  as  having 
their  realization  also  in  that  same  Unity  of  all  Reality,  in 
which  the  particular  beings,  called  things  or  minds,  have  their 
"  Ground." 

This  brief  analysis  of  the  relations  which  exist  between  re- 
ligion and  philosophy  is  the  rational  justification  of  the  facts  of 
history.  In  history,  philosophy  and  the  life  of  religion  have 
always  been  intimately  connected.  To  say  that  the  historical 
connection  of  theology  and  philosophy  has  always  been  one  of 
intimate  interdependence  is  scarcely  more  than  to  say  the  same 
thing  in  another  way.  Religion  as  a  faith  and  life  cannot  bear 
to  be  shown  to  be  irrational.  But  philosophy  too  is  not  thor- 
oughly and  consistently  rational  unless  it  take  —  with  all  the 
high  value  which  they  certainly  possess  —  the  facts  and  prin- 
ciples of  religious  faith  and  religious  life  into  its  final  view  of 
the  universe. 

The  claims  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  are  therefore  some- 
what unique.  They  are  not  based  simply  on  the  existence  of 
certain  persistent  and  special  phenomena,  called  the  beliefs  and 
life  of  religion.  They  are  also  based  on  the  fact  that  its  own 
existence  has  its  roots  largely  in  the  same  metaphysical,  ethical, 
and  assthetical  demands  as  those  which  religion  supplies.  Re- 
ligion believes  in,  and  worships,  and  shapes  conduct  with 
reference  to,  a  certain  Ideal-Real.  The  nature  of  the  Ideal 
of  religion  is  such  that,  if  the  existence  of  a  corresponding 
Reality  be  even  once  admitted  as  an  hypothesis,  it  changes 
materially  our  points  of  view  from  which  to  regard  all  the  chief 
philosophical  problems. 

The  first  problem  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  is  to  deter- 
mine the  reality  and  predicates  of  that  Being  whom,  under  the 
imagery  derived  from  its  experience  with  human  personality, 
religion  believes  in  and  worships  as  God.  In  fidelity  to  the  in- 
terests of  this  problem  the  so-called  "  arguments  "  for  the  being 
of  God  must  be  handled  critically.     Will  that  presupposition- 


3G4  PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION. 

less  reflection  which  philosophy  requires  justify  the  claim  of 
these  arguments  to  constitute  a  proof?  The  answer  to  this 
question  requires  the  making  of  distinctions,  some  of  which  are 
quite  too  apt  to  be  overlooked.  Of  proofs  for  the  being  of 
God,  in  the  sense  of  mathematical  or  other  forms  of  strictly  de- 
ductive demonstration,  we  cannot  properly  speak  in  this  con- 
nection. All  such  demonstration  proceeds  syllogistically  from 
acknowledged  principles  to  particular  applications  of  principles, 
either  singly  or  in  combination.  Its  type  is  the  mathematical 
argument  as  employed  in  the  Euclidean  geometry.  But  if  God 
is,  His  being  is  a  matter  of  fact ;  and  the  demonstration  of  mat- 
ters of  fact  can  follow  only  from  general  statements,  or  prin- 
ciples, expressive  of  matters  of  fact.  The  only  principle  from 
which  the  particular  fact  of  the  reality  of  any  being  called 
God  could  follow,  as  a  strict  logical  consequence,  is  the  princi- 
ple —  acknowledged  or  assumed  —  of  the  real  existence  of  God. 
But  this  is  the  very  fact  or  supposition  for  which  we  are  seek- 
ing proof.  On  the  other  hand,  the  result  of  the  philosophical 
denial  that  we  have  any  verifiable  or  defensible  knowledge  of 
an  absolute  and  real  Being  called  God  is,  in  logical  consistency, 
the  confession  that  philosophy  has  no  verifiable  or  defensible 
knowledge  of  reality  at  all. 

The  essential  element  in  all  the  arguments  for  the  beins  of 
God,  as  the  real  "  Ground  "  of  all  other  being,  is  metaphysical, 
or  ontological,  —  as  Kant  long  ago  pointed  out.  The  several 
"  arguments  "  are  indeed  one  ;  they  involve  the  same  process  of 
reasoning,  based  upon  all  the  facts  of  knowledge,  as  that  by 
which  philosophy  reaches  its  postulate  of  a  Unity  of  all  Eeality. 
The  ontological  argument,  customarily  so-called,  proceeds  from 
the  existence  in  human  minds  of  the  conception  of  a  "supreme" 
or  "  most  perfect  "  Being  to  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  such 
Being.  But  the  existence  of  the  conception  is  no  proof  of  the 
existence  of  the  reality,  unless  we  admit  that  postulated  faith 
in  the  highest  determinations  of  reason  itself,  upon  which  all 
metaphysics  relies. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION.  365 

The  cosmological  argument  proceeds  from  the  contingent 
nature  of  the  world  of  concrete  realities  and  events  to  the 
necessary  Being  of  their  Cause  or  "  Ground."  In  its  customary 
form  this  argument  makes — as  Lotze  and  others  have  pointed 
out  —  a  somewhat  strange  and  unwarrantable  use  of  the  words 
"  contingent  "  and  "  necessary  ;  "  and  therefore  loses  much  of 
the  cogency  which  it  might  otherwise  claim,  by  claiming  more 
than  it  can  maintain.  For,  strictly  speaking,  the  cosmological 
idea  —  that  is,  the  idea  of  an  orderly  totality  consisting  of  an 
indefinite  number  of  things  and  events  bound  together  under 
the  terms  of  universal  law  —  excludes  "  contingency."  Accord- 
ing to  this  idea,  every  thing  and  every  event  is  regarded  as 
"  constantly  conditioned  by  its  own  adequate  reasons  ;  "  its  real 
being,  if  it  be  entitled  to  be  called  really  existent  at  all,  gives 
it  a  right  to  the  title  of  "  necessary  "  existence  as  a  real  cause 
or  "  ground."  To  such  a  real  being  "  the  smallest,  meanest, 
and  most  insignificant  thing  has  just  as  good  a  claim  as  the 
most  perfect." 

The  telcological  argument  reasons,  from  the  fact  of  experience, 
that  things  and  events  in  the  world  appear  conformable  to 
ends,  to  a  single  designing  and  creative  reason  as  the  supreme 
cause  of  the  world.  It  is  of  this  proof,  which  he  calls  "physico- 
theological,"  that  Kant  remarks  :  It  "  will  always  deserve  to  be 
treated  with  respect.  It  is  the  oldest,  the  clearest,  and  the 
most  in  conformity  with  human  reason.  It  gives  life  to  the 
study  of  nature,  deriving  its  own  existence  from  it,  and  thus 
constantly  acquiring  new  vigor."  It  is  this  argument,  how- 
ever, which  has  been  most  stoutly  (and  to  a  certain  extent, 
most  successfully)  resisted  by  modern  physical  science.  That 
it  involves  many  gaps,  certain  inconsistencies,  and  several  sub- 
ordinate assumptions  which,  of  themselves,  need  verification, 
the  candid  inquirer  can  scarcely  have  a  doubt.  It  cannot  be 
said  to  amount  to  a  demonstration  of  the  conclusion  at  which 
it  arrives.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  at  least  equally  unfair,  as 
an  understatement  of  the  truth,  to  say  that  no  verifiable  knowl- 


366  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KELIGION. 

edge  of  the  "  World-Ground  "  is  to  be  reached  by  setting  forth 
from  the  experience  which  we  have  of  the  presence  of  manifold 
forms  of  being,  and  especially  of  life,  that  make  upon  the  mind 
the  irresistible  impression  of  a  reciprocal  arrangement  and 
operation  of  elements  in  the  realization  of  some  idea.  Indeed, 
the  more  widely  and  profoundly  the  conception  of  a  universal 
mechanism  is  explored,  the  more  widely,  profoundly,  and  in- 
telligently does  the  presence  of  Finality,  of  significant  ideas, 
come  to  be  discerned.  The  expanded  conception  of  mechan- 
ism extends,  instead  of  narrowing,  the  sphere  of  the  ideal 
interpretation  of  Nature. 

The  philosophy  of  religion  begins  its  attempt  to  render  ra- 
tional the  knowledge  and  faith  that  have  God  for  their  object 
by  recurring  to  those  fundamental  results  of  philosophical  re- 
flection which  belong  to  general  metaphysics  and  to  the  philos- 
ophy of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of  mind.  These  results 
show  that  all  developed  cognition  involves  the  postulated 
reality  of  its  object.  That  loosely  and  inadecpiately  organized 
system  of  knowledge,  which  is  possessed  by  every  mind  that 
has  become  rational,  implies  some  sort  of  a  real  unity  relating 
the  various  things  of  experience  to  one  another  and  to  the 
knowing  mind.  The  growth  of  all  science  is  in  the  direction  of 
substituting  for  this  imperfectly  organized  system  of  knowledge 
a  system  that  shall  be  elaborate,  exact,  universally  valid,  and 
complete.  Each  particular  science  proceeds  upon  the  hypothesis 
that  it  is  dealing  with  one  of  the  world's  subordinate  unities,  — 
a  particular  group  or  class  of  phenomena,  —  with  a  view  to  re- 
duce to  system  the  cognitions  pertaining  thereto.  Each  par- 
ticular science,  therefore,  presupposes  a  sort  of  fragmentary 
unity  in  reality  as  that  portion  of  Nature  with  which  it  is 
peculiarly  concerned.  But  the  growth  of  none  of  these  par- 
ticular sciences  is  possible  without  introducing  considerations 
that  bind  it,  as  a  particular  science,  to  others  of  a  common 
class.  One  of  the  most  notable  assumptions  made  use  of  by  all 
intelligent  students  of  nature  is  the  unity  of  all  science,  —  and 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  EELIGION.  367 

so,  by  immediate  inference,  of  the  objective  realities  in  whose 
cognition  as  related  the  science  itself  consists.  The  physical 
sciences  are  fast  binding  themselves  more  closely  together  by 
extending  over  the  particular  members  of  the  community  the 
conception  of  universally  existent  physical  entities  under  uni- 
versally controlling  laws.  Nor  does  the  scientific  mind  easily 
tolerate  the  belief  that  no  kind  of  unity  in  reality  exists  be- 
tween the  objects  of  the  physical  sciences  and  the  world  of 
minds.  Biology  and  psycho-physics  and  the  theory  of  knowl- 
edge agree  in  assuming  the  existence  of  such  a  unity. 

All  the  particular  sciences  are  penetrated  with  confidence  in 
the  validity  of  those  principles  which  are  of  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  reason  itself.  These  principles  are,  indeed,  the  presup- 
positions, whether  crudely  or  intelligently  made,  of  all  scientific 
cognition  as  well  as  of  all  the  knowledge  which  belongs  to  the 
more  ordinary  rational  activity  of  man.  It  is  possible  to  sum- 
mon these  principles  before  the  bar  of  the  critical  judgment. 
It  is  possible  to  be  sceptical  as  to  the  extra-mental  worth 
and  application,  so  to  speak,  of  even  these  most  universal 
and  necessary  presuppositions.  The  issue  of  such  scepticism, 
whether  in  irrational  agnosticism  or  in  its  own  self-limitation, 
and  the  return  to  reason's  inalienable  confidence  in  her  own 
forms  of  life,  the  discussion  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  has 
already  set  forth. 

The  philosophy  of  religion  may  confidently  rely  upon  all  the 
other  departments  of  philosophy  for  confirmation  of  some  such 
statement  as  the  following :  A  Unity  of  real  Being  is  the  pri- 
mal Subject,  the  ultimate  "  Ground"  of  all  those  related  changes 
which  human  cognition  apprehends  as  the  being  and  action  of 
the  empirical  system  of  minds  and  things.  The  alternative  of 
this  statement  is  not  knowledge,  but  a  denial  of  knowledge.  It 
is  such  a  denial  of  knowledge  as,  consistently  carried  out,  con- 
verts all  human  science  into  the  merely  subjective  and  unveri- 
fiable  play  of  ideas.  All  reasoned  scepticism  in  opposition  to 
this  positive  statement  ends  in  the  most  complete  Solipsism 


368  PHILOSOPHY  OF   RELIGION. 

On  this  conclusion  of  scepticism,  however  logically  drawn,  rea- 
son reacts  and  postulates  again  a  world  of  reality.  It  is  as 
rational  to  deny  real  existence  to  the  minds  of  others,  and  to 
the  things  and  events  of  the  world  of  our  common  experience, 
as  to  deny  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  the  one  Ground  of 
them  all.  But  all  these  forms  of  denial  are  alike  irrational.  If 
then  we  designate  by  the  convenient  but  indefinite  term,  "  the 
Absolute  "  (or  the  uncouth  but  expressive  term,  "  the  World- 
Ground  "),  this  unitary  Being  which  is  the  alone  real  subject  of 
all  the  concrete  and  individual  empirical  realities,  we  are  war- 
ranted in  affirming :  The  existence  of  the  Absolute  (or  the 
"  World-Ground ")  is  the  most  certain  of  all  philosophical 
truths. 

But  there  is  a  long  way  in  reflective  thinking  from  this  "  Ab- 
solute "  to  the  Being  whom  religious  faith  accepts  and  worships 
by  the  name  of  God.  And  it  would  be  uncandid  and  unwise  to 
affirm  that  all  the  steps  of  that  way  can  be  taken  with  a  like  con- 
fident appeal  to  the  accepted  results  of  philosophical  reflection. 
All  attempts  to  solve  the  great  problem  of  philosophy,  however 
agnostic,  may  be  shown  virtually  to  admit  the  necessity  of  this 
postulate  of  the  Absolute.  The  equivalent  of  the  statement  we 
have  just  propounded  in  the  name  of  metaphysics  is  made  by 
the  advocates  of  every  manner  of  philosophical  system,  — 
realistic  or  idealistic,  theistic,  pantheistic,  or  even  avowedly 
atheistic.  This  is  as  true  of  "  the  Unknowable  "  of  Herbert 
Spencer  or  "  the  Unconscious  "  of  Hartmann,  as  it  is  of  the 
"  Self-same  One  "  of  Neo-Platonism  or  the  "  I  Am  "  of  the  an- 
cient Hebrews.  It  is  as  true  of  Spinoza's  Infinite  Substance  or 
Schopenhauer's  "  Will  "  as  Ding-an-sich,  as  it  is  of  the  Triune 
God  of  Christian  theology.  All  these  and  similar  terms  imply 
that  ultimate  analysis,  and  that  supreme  synthesis,  which  finds 
the  fundamental  categories  recognized  by  metaphysics  to  have 
their  truest  application  to  the  Absolute,  to  the  one  real  Ground 
of  the  existence  and  action  of  all  particular  things  and  minds. 

It  is  at  this  point,  however,  that  the  most  profound  diffi- 


PHILOSOPHY  OF   RELIGION.  369 

culties  belonging  to  the  philosophy  of  religion  emerge.  May 
the  personality  of  the  Absolute  be  affirmed  as  a  proposition 
valid  in  synthetic  philosophy  ?  and,  if  so,  on  what  grounds  that 
are  recognized  by  the  consensus  of  philosophical  opinion  ?  The 
"  metaphysical  core  "  of  the  conception  of  God  is,  we  believe,  a 
principle  universally  recognized  by  all  serious  attempts  at  phil- 
osophical system.  But  the  fact  cannot  be  concealed  that  when, 
in  the  interests  of  religious  faith,  the  effort  is  made  further  to 
define  the  Absolute  as  personal,  much  tacit  dissent  and  even 
open  and  intelligent  opposition  is  encountered.  The  essence  of 
that  personality  which  Theism  desires  to  secure  for  the  Abso- 
lute or  World-Ground,  is,  first  of  all,  self-consciousness.  The 
next  inquiry  before  the  philosophy  of  religion  may  then  be  stated 
in  terms  somewhat  like  the  following:  Does  this  Unity  of  Pceal- 
ity,  the  so-called  Absolute,  present  itself,  as  objects  for  itself, 
with  those  changes  in  reality  of  which  it  is  the  ultimate  cause  ; 
refer  them  to  itself  as  the  one  real  Subject  of  them  all ;  and  so 
realize  in  a  mental  life  of  its  own  the  unity  which,  by  the  pos- 
tulate of  our  reason,  it  is  known  to  be  ?  Thus  much,  at  least, 
would  seem  to  be  implied  in  the  question :  Is  the  Absolute  self- 
conscious  Personality  ?  This  is  the  first  great  disputed  inquiry 
in  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

The  answer  which  the  philosophy  of  religion  proposes  to  the 
question  just  raised  involves  three  sets  of  considerations.  These 
are,  first,  the  objections  to  the  self-consciousness  of  the  Absolute; 
second,  the  arguments  for  the  self-consciousness  of  the  Abso- 
lute as  far  as  they  are  implied  in  the  essential  factors  of  the 
concept  of  the  Absolute ;  third,  the  affirmative  arguments  to  be 
derived  from  the  more  purely  emotional,  ethical,  and  assthetieal 
impulses  of  human  nature. 

The  objections  to  affirming  the  self-consciousness  of  the 
Absolute,  of  that  unitary  Being  which  philosophy  recognizes 
as  the  "  World-Ground,"  are  derived  from  two  principal  sources. 
Of  these  the  first  is  the  very  nature  of  self-consciousness.  It 
is  said  that  to  affirm  self-consciousness  and  absoluteness  of  the 

24 


370  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

same  Being  is  to  affirm  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Since  self- 
consciousness  is  essentially  a  limitation  and  implies  a  condi- 
tioning of  one  being  on  another,  the  Absolute  cannot  be 
self-conscious.  In  considering  this  objection  we  take  from 
descriptive  psychology  the  results  of  its  analysis  of  conscious- 
ness and  of  self-consciousness.  This  analysis  shows  that  all 
our  consciousness — that  is,  all  immediately  known  psychical 
or  mental  life — is  indeed  conditioned  on  other  being  than 
that  of  the  being  which  is  itself  conscious.  This  condition- 
ating  is  twofold.  Consciousness  as  an  act  implies  the  stimulus, 
or  occasioning  activity,  of  that  which  is  other  than  the  con- 
scious being ;  consciousness,  as  a  so-called  power  displayed  in 
every  conscious  act,  implies  a  nature  (derived  or  conditioned) 
of  the  being  that,  on  occasion  of  being  acted  upon  by  other 
being,  becomes  conscious 

As  to  self-consciousness,  too,  a  scientific  analysis  of  the 
process  shows  that  it,  in  fact,  occurs  only  as  a  reference  of 
some  concrete  and  individual  state  to  the  Ego  as  the  subject  of 
all  states;  and  that  the  states  thus  referred  are  generally,  if 
not  always,  conditioned  by  the  action  of  being  that  is  recog- 
nized as  non-ego ;  while  the  form  of  the  reference  is  always 
conditioned  upon  the  derived  and  conditioned  nature  of  the 
self-conscious  mind. 

Admissions  like  the  foregoing  do  not  prove,  however,  that 
self-consciousness  is,  essentially  considered,  possible  only  for 
dependent  and  conditionated  being.  They  simply  assert  that 
all  our  acts  of  self-consciousness  are  actually  states  of  such 
being.  In  other  words,  they  warrant  only  the  obvious  conclu- 
sion that  we  are  not  self-conscious  absolute  beings.  We  are 
self-conscious  ;  but  we  are  not  the  kind  of  being  that  is  entitled 
to  be  called  the  Absolute,  the  "World-Ground."  Self-con- 
sciousness per  se  requires  simply  the  conscious  reference  of 
those  changes  in  the  reality  of  mental  life  which  we  call 
"  states "  to  a  real  unity  of  this  mental  life,  to  the  so-called 
"  self,"  as  their  subject  or  ground.     Psychological  analysis  finds 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION.  371 

nothing  belonging  to  the  essence  of  self-consciousness  which  is 
incompatible  with  absoluteness  of  being.  On  the  contrary,  if 
the  Absolute  is  indeed  the  real  subject  and  ultimate  cause  of 
all  those  changes  which  in  reality  occur,  then  it  may,  for  that 
reason,  the  more  "  conveniently,"  —  if  we  may  so  speak,  —  and 
in  strict  truthfulness,  refer  them  to  its  self-hood  as  its  own 
consciously  cognized  states.  So  far  as  self-consciousness  con- 
stitutes personality,  we  may  even  affirm  with  Lotze :  "  Perfect 
personality  is  reconcilable  only  with  the  conception  of  an  In- 
finite Being ;  for  finite  beings  only  an  approximation  to  this  is 
attainable." 

The  second  class  of  objections  to  the  self-consciousness  of  the 
Absolute,  although  less  frequently  urged,  are  more  difficult  to 
answer.  They  arise  on  ethical  grounds.  They  concern  that 
most  difficult  of  all  philosophical  inquiries ;  namely,  the  true 
way  of  mentally  representing  the  relations  of  the  Absolute  to 
all  finite  and  limited  personal  beings.  How  shall  this  be 
done  so  as  to  conserve  the  essential  interests  of  moral  princi- 
ples ?  To  say  that,  in  one  aspect,  all  material  things  are  but 
dependent  phases  of  the  life  of  the  Absolute,  and  that  all  so- 
called  physical  forces  and  changes  are  to  be  ascribed  to  the  Will 
of  the  Absolute,  occasions  no  offence  to  our  ethical  ideals.  No 
important  ethical  objections  arise  when  we  postulate  the  self- 
consciousness  of  that  Unitary  Being  which  is  the  primal  sub- 
ject, the  ultimate  Ground,  of  the  physical  universe.  The  being 
and  changes  of  things  are  known  to  the  Absolute  as  its  own 
self-consciously  cognized  states  ;  the  life  of  the  world  of  things 
is  the  self-conscious  life  of  the  "  World-Ground." 

Ethics  does  not  object  to  statements  such  as  these.  But 
when  a  similar  affirmation  is  made  concerning  the  being  and 
action  of  self-conscious  minds,  our  ethical  conceptions  and  feel- 
ings must  be  tenderly  dealt  with,  or  they  feel  deeply  wounded 
in  vital  parts.  And  yet  how  can  we  avoid  that  affirmation,  to 
which  the  concurrent  investigations  of  all  the  branches  of  phi- 
losophy point  the  way  ?     The  being  and  action  of  the  mind  of 


372  PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION. 

man  has  its  Ground  in  that  same  Absolute  whose  self-conscious 
life  is  the  reality  of  things.  But  does  the  Absolute  lose  its  own 
self-consciousness  when  it  serves  —  so  to  speak  —  as  the  Ground 
of  the  world  of  self-conscious  finite  minds  ?  Are  not  the  states 
and  actions  of  these  finite  minds  necessarily  known  to  the 
Absolute  as  being  —  what,  if  the  Absolute  be  a  self-conscious 
Person,  they  certainly  are  —  modes  of  its  own  self-conscious 
life  ?  No  consistent  and  tenable  philosophical  position  is  open 
to  us  but  the  affirmative  answer  to  this  question. 

But  our  ethical  conceptions  and  feelings  at  once  raise  an  in- 
quiry as  to  the  consequences  of  the  position  which  philosophy 
feels  compelled  to  assume.  How  then,  it  inquires,  shall  we 
conceive  of  that  reality  of  moral  being,  of  responsibility  and 
character,  which  is  the  most  priceless  possession  of  finite  minds  ? 
Theology  is  also  apt  to  take  alarm  at  this  position,  and  inquire : 
Would  philosophy  then  make  God  the  only  sinner,  the  author 
of  all  sin  ?  Speculative  thinking,  whether  in  ethics,  theology, 
or  philosophy,  cannot  give  an  entirely  satisfactory  answer  to 
these  inquiries,  or  wholly  allay  the  feeling  of  alarm.  Philos- 
ophy cannot,  however,  retract  its  tenet  that  the  self-conscious- 
ness of  the  Absolute  must  be  a  consciousness  of  the  being  and 
action  of  all  things  and  all  minds,  —  as  having  their  life  and 
being  in  Itself,  the  universal  "  World- Ground."  Various  con- 
siderations soften  the  difficulties  and  allay  the  alarms  occa- 
sioned by  this  tenet  of  the  self -consciousness  of  the  Absolute. 

That  finite  minds  are  never,  and  in  no  wise,  independent  of 
God,  is  a  proposition  which  is  the  very  opposite  of  repugnant 
to  religious  belief.  "  In  Him  .  =  .  we  have  our  being,"  is  a 
tenet  of  religion,  as  well  as  of  philosophy.  Having  once  ac- 
cepted this  principle,  we  cannot  reasonably  refuse  to  continue 
it  in  good  faith,  and  in  a  comprehensive  application  of  its 
truth.  Of  the  constitution  and  activity  of  our  bodies  we  need 
not  hesitate  for  a  moment  to  admit :  it  is  all  constantly  and 
absolutely  dependent  upon  the  being  of  the  Absolute.  But  by 
the  postulate    of  religion,  this  being   is  a  self-conscious    life. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION.  373 

His  self-conscious  life  is,  then,  no  more  to  be  excluded  —  as 
respects  space,  time,  and  causation  —  from  the  molecules  of 
the  human  brain  than  from  the  interior  of  the  densest  lead 
ball.  These  molecules  "  live  and  move  and  have  their  being  " 
in  the  Absolute.  Nor  need  we  hesitate  to  deny  that  the  life 
of  conscious  sensation  and  ideation,  which  we  justly  call  our 
own,  is  as  truly  and  constantly  interpenetrated  by  and  depend- 
ent upon  this  universal  self-conscious  life.  The  conception  of  a 
co-etaneous  self-consciousness  of  the  Absolute  for  every  act  of 
our  self-consciousness  may  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  bring 
before  the  mind ;  but  we  are  not  justified,  for  that  reason,  in 
maintaining  the  impossibility  of  the  reality  to  which  the  con- 
ception aims  to  correspond.  On  the  contrary,  all  the  general 
defences  which  philosophy  builds  about  the  self-consciousness 
of  the  Absolute  are  also  defences  against  assaults  upon  this 
conception. 

It  is  only  when,  by  seemingly  unavoidable  inference,  the 
responsibility  for  human  choices,  and  for  their  result  in  human 
character,  is  removed  from  finite  minds  and  laid,  as  it  were, 
upon  the  universal  Will,  that  theology  and  ethics  more  posi- 
tively and  intelligently  object.  But  that  activity  of  its  own 
which  the  finite  mind  cognizes  in  self-conscious  volition  or 
free  choice  is,  like  every  other  activity,  dependent  on  the 
being  and  action,  in  the  finite  mind,  of  the  Absolute.  Such 
activity  is  therefore  known  to  the  Absolute,  if  known  at  all, 
as  being  what  it  really  is  ;  namely,  as  a  manifestation  of  its 
own  being  and  action,  a  self-consciously  recognized  change  in 
itself,  the  alone  primary  and  fundamental  cause  of  all  physical 
and  psychical  life.  But  how  can  this  be,  and  yet  the  finite 
mind  remain  "  free"  and  "responsible,"  in  the  meaning  of  those 
important  adjectives  which  ethics  seems  to  require?  This  is 
a  question  which  all  systems  of  philosophy  are  powerless  satis- 
factorily to  answer.  But  then  it  is  a  question  which  every 
form  of  theology,  and  all  religious  faith,  is  even  more  powerless 
to  answer.     It  is  the  old  and  ever-unsolved  problem:    How  can 


374  PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION. 

real  personal  and  ethical  finite  being  co-exist  in  the  same  uni- 
verse with  absolute  Personal  Being?  In  more  distinctively 
theological  form  :  How  can  God  be  infinite,  and  finite  man  be 
responsible  and  free  ? 

In  dealing  with  this  insolvable  problem  philosophy  may  take 
one  of  several  possible  courses.  It  may  deny  that  man  is  re- 
sponsible and  free,  that  he  is  indeed  a  really  ethical  being.  It 
is  difficult  briefly  to  sketch  the  consequences  upon  all  the  de- 
partments of  reflective  thinking  which  logically  follow  from 
this  denial.  It  must  suffice  to  say  that,  under  its  influence,  the 
whole  aspect  of  life  and  reality,  not  only  as  subjects  of  specu- 
lative treatment,  but  also  as  objects  of  practical  endeavor,  is 
profoundly  changed.  Those  branches  of  philosophy  which 
treat  of  the  Ideals  of  Eeason  —  the  philosophy  of  morals,  of 
esthetics,  and  of  religion  —  suffer  most.  The  change  involves 
their  theoretical  completeness  and  their  power  to  supply  ra- 
tional principles  for  conduct.  But  even  in  the  sphere  of  met- 
aphysics important  changes  become  necessary.  Moreover,  such 
a  denial  is  obviously  opposed  to  a  large  class  of  facts  which, 
although  they  have  that  indefinite  and  elusive  character  which 
belongs  to  all  facts  of  emotion,  aspiration,  and  belief  in  ideals, 
are  among  the  most  stubborn  and  influential  factors  of  human 
experience. 

In  its  endeavors  to  escape  the  intellectual  difficulties  which 
arise  from  admitting  the  co-existence  and  reciprocal  action  of 
finite  personality  and  a  self-conscious  Absolute,  philosophy 
may  deny  that  the  Absolute  is  self-conscious  personality.  The 
ultimate  philosophical  position  then  becomes  that  of  mate- 
rialism, pantheism,  or  agnosticism.  But  such  a  denial  is  ac- 
customed, and  indeed  almost  compelled,  to  include  also  the 
freedom  and  real  ethical  being  of  finite  minds.  In  the  interests 
then  of  a  supposed  speculative  consistency  it,  too,  sacrifices 
many  of  the  most  pressing  claims  of  the  ethical,  sesthetical,  and 
religious  nature  of  man.  Moreover,  it  may  be  convicted  of  a 
vicious  or  incomplete  metaphysics,  in  so  far  as  we  are  able  to 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  375 

show   that   there   are  positive  reasons  for  affirming  the  self- 
conscious  personality  of  the  so-called  "  World-Ground." 

In  the  face  of  these  supreme  difficulties,  the  only  course  re- 
maining for  the  philosophy  of  religion  is  the  only  defensible 
course.  It  consists,  first,  in  maintaining,  on  rational  grounds, 
both  the  reality  of  man's  ethical  personality  and  the  absolute- 
ness of  the  self-conscious  Life  in  which  this  finite  personality 
has  its  ground.  It  requires,  next,  the  effort  so  to  frame  the 
conception  and  statement  of  these  two  great  truths  as  to  free 
them  from  the  contradictions  which  they  seem,  at  first  sight, 
to  involve.  That  this  effort  is  accompanied  by  a  progress 
in  approximation  to  complete  success,  we  believe  the  history 
of  this  branch  of  philosophy  will  prove.  To  this  end  both 
descriptive  and  speculative  psychology  are  constantly  mak- 
ing certain  contributions ;  and  so  is  the  discussion,  current  in 
treatises  on  ethics  and  theology.  This  end  the  philosophy  of 
religion  will  more  nearly  attain  when  it  is  ready  faithfully  and 
candidly  to  avail  itself  of  the  conclusions  of  psychological 
science  and  of  the  indications  derived  from  the  history  of 
philosophy. 

But,  finally,  it  must  be  admitted  that  we  are  utterly  unable 
to  satisfy  the  demand  for  a  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the 
manner  of  that  reciprocal  action  which  constantly  takes  place 
in  reality  between  finite  personality  and  the  personal  Absolute. 
But  "  the  manner  "  of  all  ultimate  connection  between  the  really 
existent  beings  of  even  the  finite  world  is  hidden  from  our 
sight.  The  fact  of  any  connection  at  all  appears  to  us  an  ulti- 
mate and  incomprehensible  fact.  This  is  true  of  that  connec- 
tion which  physical  science  assumes  among  all  the  elements 
and  aggregations  of  elements  that  constitute  the  world  of  things 
with  which  it  deals.  At  least  equally  mysterious  is  the  con- 
nection between  things  and  finite  minds.  How  can  matter  act 
on  mind,  and  mind  on  matter  ?  This  is  a  question  which  has 
been  the  puzzle  of  the  ages.  Knowledge,  ordinary  or  scientific, 
does  not  depend  on  our  being  able  to  answer  the   question: 


376  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

How  is  any  action  of  one  real  thing  on  another  possible?  It 
rather  assumes  such  action  as  a  fact,  and  endeavors  to  discover 
the  terms,  or  uniform  sequences,  of  the  admitted  action. 

In  raising  the  inquiries,  How  the  self-conscious  Absolute  can 
act,  not  only  upon,  but  —  since  we  are  speaking  of  the  Absolute 
and  of  its  self-consciousness  —  also  in  and  through  finite  per- 
sonality ;  and,  How  this  Absolute  can  be  conscious  of  the  being 
and  action  of  finite  personality  as,  not  simply  the  being  and  ac- 
tion of  that  which  is  other  than  itself,  but  also  as  being  and 
action  of  which  it  is  itself  the  ultimate  "  Ground,"  —  we  have 
reached  the  utmost  limit  of  the  tether  of  human  reason. 
Properly  speaking,  neither  science  nor  philosophy  (but  then 
also  neither  theology,  nor  religious  imagination,  nor  revelation, 
nor  faith)  can  answer  these  inquiries.  In  the  conceptions  with 
which  the  inquiries  deal  lie  those  mysteries  which  are  part  of 
the  secret  of  the  Being  and  Life  of  the  Absolute.  The  effort 
of  philosophy  is  to  clear  from  contradictions  these  conceptions, 
and  definitively  to  limit  the  sphere  of  ultimate  mystery.  This 
effort  involves  the  handling  of  the  most  difficult  and  delicate 
of  all  philosophical  problems. 

Positive  arguments  for  the  self-consciousness  of  the  "  World- 
Ground,"  may  be  divided  into  two  classes.  These  are  the  more 
distinctively  metaphysical,  and  the  more  distinctively  ethical 
and  cesthetical.  The  former  endeavor  to  show  that  the  most 
rational,  if  not  the  only  intelligible,  determination  of  the  ad- 
mitted characteristics  of  the  .Absolute,  implies  self-conscious 
personality.  Such  characteristics  are  chiefly  those  expressed 
in  the  terms  Unity,  Eeality,  Subject  of  States,  Ground  of  activ- 
ity that  manifests  Finality,  etc.  Upon  this  question  we  find 
the  two  extreme  positions  taken,  on  the  one  hand  by  writers 
like  Hartmann,  and,  on  the  other,  by  those  who  sympathize  with 
the  metaphysical  conclusions  of  Lotze. 

The  predicate  of  "  Will,"  as  applied  to  the  Absolute,  seems  to 
imply  self-conscious  personality.  Xow,  Schopenhauer  and  Hart- 
mann both  affirm  that  the  word  "  Will "  is  far  better  fitted  to 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION.  377 

give  intelligible  expression  to  the  essence  of  the  Absolute  than 
is  the  word  "  Force."  What  it  is  really  to  will  —  say  they  — 
we  know  in  concrete  self-conscious  experience :  what  it  is  really 
to  be  a  "  force,"  or  to  exert  "  force,"  or  to  conserve  "  force,"  —  if  it 
be  somewhat  essentially  different  from  our  experience  in  being 
wills,  —  we  cannot  even  form  the  faintest  conception.  "  Will," 
then,  is  a  term  confessedly  representing  a  generalization 
from  concrete  self-conscious  experience.  Blind  or  unconscious 
Will,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  synonym  for  Force.  Accordingly, 
when  we  deny  to  this  "  moment "  in  the  life  of  the  Abso- 
lute the  determination  of  self-consciousness,  we  only  fall  back, 
under  a  new  and  illusive  term  (namely,  "  Will "),  upon  the 
same  confessedly  unrealizable  conception  (namely,  "  Force "). 
For  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  Unity  of  "  Force,"  which  the  uni- 
verse of  phenomena  manifests  to  us,  we  may  fitly  substitute 
a  Unity  of  "  Will ;  "  but  in  doing  this,  we  really  advance 
a  reason  for  affirming  the  self-consciousness  of  the  "  World- 
Ground." 

Somewhat  similar  must  our  conclusions  be  when  we  attempt 
clearly  to  analyze  what  is  meant  by  speaking  of  the  "  Unity  " 
of  the  Absolute.  Is  not  the  rational,  self-conscious  life  of  mind 
only  the  type  and  norm  of  all  unity,  the  form  inclusive  of  the 
essence  of  whatever  is  really  One  ?  In  what  conceivable  sense, 
we  may  ask,  can  things  be  unitary  beings  to  us,  unless  we  cog- 
nize them  as  such  in  the  uniting  act  of  self-conscious  life  ? 
How,  moreover,  do  we  become  "  one  "  to  ourselves,  and  set  our- 
selves as  unitary  beings  over  against  all  beings  not-ourselves 
(not  one  with  us),  except  in  and  through  the  same  process  of 
self-conscious  cognition  ?  If,  then,  by  the  Unity  of  the  Abso- 
lute we  mean  anything  more  than  the  unity  of  mental  repre- 
sentation for  ourselves  which  the  picture  of  the  Absolute  has 
must  not  this  Unity  realize  itself  in  the  only  conceivable  form 
of  an  actual  self-conscious  Life  ?  "  Transfigured  Realism,"  as  it 
seems  to  us,  must  either  be  so  transfigured  as  no  longer  to  be 
realism,  or  else  it  must  give  an  intelligible  character  to  the 


378  PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION. 

unity  in  reality  which  we  affirm  of  the  Absolute,  in  the  form, 
of  a  unity  of  self-conscious  Mind. 

It  is  the  contention  of  a  certain  development  of  German 
speculative  thinking  that  no  being  can  have  reality  (in  the  only 
highest  and  truly  defensible  meaning  of  the  term)  which  is  not 
capable  of  being  something  more  than  an  object  for  the  cog- 
nition of  other  being;  which  is  not  indeed  capable  of  being 
subject-object,  object  to  itself  (of  having  "  For-Self-Being,"  Fur- 
sich-sein).  Thus  Lotze  is  fond  of  affirming  that  self-conscious 
spiritual  Life  is  the  only  true  reality.  On  this  principle,  the 
only  real  being  which  "  Things  "  can  have,  is  their  being  in  the 
self-conscious  life  of  the  Absolute ;  and,  furthermore,  the  only 
satisfactory  claim  to  the  highest  reality,  which  the  Absolute 
can  make,  depends  upon  the  postulate  that  the  Absolute  is  an 
actual  Life  of  self-consciousness  in  an  eternal  self-realizing  as 
Spirit  and  Idea.  Views  concerning  this  contested  point  are 
among  those  which  the  philosophy  of  religion  borrows  from 
metaphysics.  In  this  connection,  then,  we  recall  how  philo- 
sophical analysis  shows  that  all  reality  is  given  to  us  only  as 
implicated  in  the  process  of  self-conscious  cognition.  Impli- 
cated in  this  process  are  those  obscure  beliefs  and  indefinable 
postulates  which  cluster,  as  it  were,  about  reality.  And  as 
separable  from  these  momenta  of  the  self-conscious  process  we 
can  attach  no  meaning  at  all  to  the  term  "  reality."  The  funda- 
mental choice  of  metaphysics  appears  then  to  lie  between 
affirming  the  self-consciousness  of  the  supreme  Reality,  and  the 
untenable  position  of  scepticism  toward  the  fundamental  postu- 
lates of  all  knowledge. 

That  the  conception  of  the  Absolute  as  the  real  Subject  or 
Ground  of  the  changes  which  happen  in  reality  compels  us  to 
affirm  the  self-consciousness  of  the  Absolute,  is  a  proposition 
required,  we  believe,  by  all  thorough  psychological  and  philo- 
sophical analysis. 

The  second  set  of  considerations  which  influence  us  to  con- 
clude that  the  "World-Ground"  is  self-conscious  and  personal. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION.  379 

are  more  difficult  to  put  into  the  form  of  argument.  They  are, 
however,  no  less  cogent  on  this  account.  They  are  derived  from 
the  ethical  and  lesthetical,  and  especially  from  the  more  dis- 
tinctively religious,  feeling  of  mankind.  Ethical  human  nature 
shrinks  back,  bewildered,  before  a  philosophical  system  which 
finds  the  World-Ground  in  blind,  unconscious  (and  therefore 
unfeeling  and  unethical)  Force.  ./Esthetical  human  nature 
seeks  to  realize  its  ideas  of  the  beautiful  in  that  act  of  imagina- 
tion which  projects  a  beauty  of  self-conscious  and  rational  life 
into  the  ultimate  Reality.  And  the  life  of  religious  faith  and 
conduct  finds  it  exceedingly  difficult,  if  not  quite  impossible,  to 
maintain  itself  at  all,  in  the  face  of  the  conclusion  that  its 
object  of  belief,  adoration  and  obedience,  is  devoid  of  all  which 
it  esteems  of  most  value,  —  in  brief,  of  self-conscious  life.  In 
this  sphere  of  feeling  —  ethical,  ajsthetical,  and  religious  —  lie 
many  considerations,  therefore,  which  carry  great  positive 
weight  in  determining  the  question :  Is  the  Absolute  an  uncon- 
scious Force,  or  a  rational  and  self-conscious  Life  ? 

On  these  and  similar  grounds,  and  in  spite  of  all  the  inherent 
difficulties  and  objections,  the  philosophy  of  religion  is  war- 
ranted in  affirming  the  self-consciousness  of  the  Absolute. 

The  grave  and  difficult  question  which  next  arises  concerns 
the  ethical  being  of  the  Absolute.  Is  the  "  World-Ground "  a 
moral  personality  ?  In  searching  for  an  answer  to  this  impor- 
tant inquiry,  the  appeal  to  the  physical  and  natural  sciences  is 
suggestive  but  unsatisfying.  Physical  nature  can  only  very 
imperfectly  be  shown  to  rest  upon  an  ethical  basis.  The  ap- 
pearance of  rational  order,  which  the  World  has  been  held  by 
the  majority  of  thoughtful  observers  to  possess,  is  indeed  sug- 
gestive of  a  quasi-mordX  "  World-Ground."  Nor  do  the  explan- 
ations of  a  mechanical  theory  as  to  how,  in  fact,  this  order  came 
to  establish  itself,  deprive  the  suggestion  of  its  force.  On  the 
contrary,  the  mechanical  theory,  even  in  any  one  of  the  several 
forms  given  to  it  by  the  disciples  of  evolution,  adds  certain  im- 
portant elements  to  the  general  suggestion.     It  hints,  at  least, 


380  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

at  the  possibility  that  further  knowledge  of  the  necessities  of 
the  case,  so  to  speak,  and  of  the  final  outcome  of  the  stern 
application  of  these  necessities,  when  made  to  all  sentient  life, 
would  remove  the  impression  of  the  w?i-morality,  or  the  immor- 
ality, of  much  of  nature's  action.  But  the  most  favorable 
interpretation  of  the  working  of  physical  forces  and  natural 
laws,  which  it  is  fair  or  rational  to  make,  leaves  much  that  is 
difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  ethical  being  of  the  "World- 
Ground." 

It  is,  therefore,  rather  to  human  nature  and  to  history  that 
we  turn  for  so-called  arguments  by  which  to  prove  the  ethical 
being  of  the  Absolute.  On  this  field,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
philosophy  can  make  out  a  much  clearer  case.  Yet  even  on 
this  field  disputes  arise  which  are  not  easy  of  settlement. 

All  satisfactory  philosophical  account  of  the  existence  of 
distinctively  ethical  human  nature  seems  to  us  definitely  to 
indicate,  if  it  does  not  completely  prove,  the  ethical  being  of 
the  One  in  whom  this  nature  has  its  explanation  and  ground. 
This  conclusion  can  be  maintained  after  candidly  weighing 
all  the  efforts  of  evolutionary  science  to  describe  the  stages 
by  which  man's  moral  nature  has  attained  its  present 
development. 

The  genesis  and  the  significance  of  those  unique  ideas  and 
feelings  which  we  call  "  moral "  seem  plainly  to  require  an 
ethical  and  —  as  it  were  —  a  sympathetic  "Ground."  How  a 
merely  physical  evolution,  or  an  orderly  play  of  blind,  uncon- 
scious forces,  can  result  in  the  manifestation  of  such  ideas  and 
feelings,  with  their  characteristics  of  universality  and  uncon- 
ditioned value,  it  is  quite  impossible  to_  conceive.  But  it  is  not 
less  impossible  to  conceive  how  an  Absolute,  that  is  essentially 
self-conscious  personality,  could  be  the  primal  cause  in  reality 
of  other  ethical  life  without  itself  being  an  ethical  Life.  Does, 
then,  the  Absolute,  as  the  admitted  ground  of  moral  nature  in 
man,  represent  to  itself  these  ideas  of  the  Right,  the  Ought, 
and   the   ethically  well-  or  ill-deserving,  as    universal   and    of 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  381 

unconditional  value,  without  manifesting  its  own  real  being 
therein  ?  An  affirmative  answer  to  this  question  seems  to  us 
inconceivable.  Probably  no  system  of  ethical  philosophy  has 
maintained  that  the  Absolute  is  the  self-conscious  and  primal 
source  of  all  ethical  ideating  and  feeling  in  man,  and  yet  is  itself 
devoid  of  ethical  life.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  denial  of  the 
self-conscious  personality,  and  the  denial  of  the  moral  person- 
ality of  the  Absolute,  stand  or  fall  together. 

This  more  distinctively  metaphysical  argument  may  be 
supplemented  by  considerations  drawn  from  the  phenomena  of 
ethical,  eesthetical,  and  religious  feeling.  That  ethical  finite 
being  should  be  dependent,  for  its  destiny,  upon  an  unethical 
ground,  can  never  be  otherwise  than  offensive  and  distressful 
to  ethical  feeling.  So  do  certain  strong  spontaneous  responses 
which  uesthetical  human  nature  makes  to  the  encitement  fur- 
nished by  the  perception  of  natural  objects,  by  the  intercourse 
of  society  and  the  contemplation  of  phenomena  of  history, 
impel  the  mind  to  belief  in  the  moral  personality  of  the  Abso- 
lute. The  feeling  of  genuine  awe,  as  distinguished  from  the 
feeling  of  personal  fear,  may  be  regarded  as  one  of  those  vague 
but  potent  sesthetical  bonds  which  exist  between  the  heart  of 
man  and  the  moral  being  of  the  "  World-Ground."  Nor  can 
that  limitless  capacity  for  admiration,  for  reverence,  for  affection, 
which  human  nature  develops  —  since  the  capacity  finds  its 
rational  correlate  in  no  finite  object  to  call  forth  its  full  measure 
—  fail  to  be  regarded  as  indicative  of  the  soul's  instinctive  feel- 
ing after  the  moral  personality  "  whom  faith  calls  God."  The 
tendency  of  men  to  adore  and  to  obey  that  which  they  conceive 
of  as  morally  good  and  great,  points  in  the  same  direction.  In 
fine,  the  threads  of  that  web  of  unformulated  arguments  which 
the  capacities  and  inclinations  of  man's  emotional  nature  weaves 
around  the  concept  of  an  ethical  Absolute,  are  invisible  and 
delicate,  yet  tenacious  and  effective.  As  craving  is  the  spur 
which  nature  thrusts  into  the  side  of  all  living  beings,  from  the 
amoeba  to  the  highest  of  the   mammals,  so   insatiable  longing 


382  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

after  good,  and  unceasing  dissatisfaction  with  the  finite,  are  the 
cry  of  the  human  soul  after  an  ethical  and  resthetical  "  World- 
Ground." 

"  In  die  Welt  hinausgestossen 
Stent  der  Mensch  verlassen  da." 

An  impersonal  and  unethical  Cosmos  furnishes  cold  food  for  this 
craving.  This  "  deep-seated  craving  "  it  was  which  led  Augustine 
to  the  true  knowledge  of  God,  when  he  had  been  for  some  time 
"  hunting  after  the  emptiness  of  popular  praise,  down  even  to 
theatrical  applauses,  and  poetic  prizes,  and  strifes  for  grassy 
garlands,  and  the  follies  of  shows,  and  the  intemperance  of 
desires."  "Justice,"  says  George  Eliot,  "is  like  the  kingdom 
of  God,  —  it  is  not  without  as  a  fact,  it  is  within  us  as  a  great 
yearning."  "  Justice,"  and  all  the  other  moral  predicates  which 
religion  ascribes  to  the  Absolute,  are  esteemed  to  be  without  as  a 
fact,  because  in  fact  they  are  within  us  as  a  "  great  yearning." 

It  is  without  doubt  difficult  to  formulate  reasons  for  conclusions 
reached  under  pressure  from  the  ethical,  sesthetical,  and  religious 
feelings.  It  is  none  the  less  true,  however,  that  these  feelings 
in  fact  exist,  and  do  actually  impel  men  to  faith  in  the  real 
existence  of  God  as  an  object  needed  for  their  completer 
satisfaction. 

That  self-conscious  and  ethical  personal  Absolute,  which 
philosophy  postulates  as  the  "  Ground  "  of  other  nature,  but 
especially  of  human  nature,  we  are  entitled  to  call  God.  When 
this  supreme  synthesis  as  to  the  being  of  the  Absolute  is  reached, 
the  so-called  "  proofs  "  for  the  existence  of  God  have  done  their 
appointed  work.  We  cannot,  however,  attain  the  same  rational 
confidence  with  regard  to  all  the  definite  ethical  predicates 
which  theology  is  wont  to  ascribe  to  God.  Here  emerges  in 
the  path  of  the  progress  of  religious  philosophy  the  fierce  and 
dreadful  conflict  between  Pessimism  and  Optimism.  The  most 
cautious  analysis  and  the  boldest  but  wisest  synthesis  prevent 
the  student  of  philosophy  from  rashly  handing  in  his  adherence 
to  either  of  these  conflicting  parties.      Certainly  none  of  the 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  383 

many  forms  of  an  easy-going  Optimism  can  find  acceptance 
with  penetrating  and  thoughtful  minds.  The  profound  reality 
and  mysterious  significance  of  physical  and  moral  evil  hang  like 
a  thick  cloud  over  every  direct  path  by  which  we  try  to  reach 
the  proof  that  perfect  justice  and  perfect  goodness  belong  to 
God.  The  discoveries  of  modern  science  peremptorily  reject  the 
traditional  argument  of  theology  by  which  the  entire  weight  of 
the  world's  physical  evil  is  hung  upon  the  sinful  choice  of  finite 
minds.  That  wrong-doing  necessarily  produces  misery,  and  that 
much  of  the  misery  of  men  is  actually  produced  by  their  wrong- 
doing, are  propositions  from  which  no  system  of  ethics  dissents. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  phenomena  appealed  to  by  pessimis- 
tic systems  like  those  of  Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann  are  unmis- 
takable enough  ;  and  the  domain  covered  by  such  phenomena 
is  probably  being  increased  rather  than  diminished  by  the  dis- 
coveries of  modern  physiology  and  psychology.  Every  new 
form  of  disease-producing  microbe,  with  its  distribution  of  its 
products,  like  the  rain,  upon  the  just  and  the  unjust,  is  a  start- 
ling additional  fact  thrown  into  the  scale  which  Pessimism  is 
interested  in  weighting  heavily.  Nor  is  the  depressing  evidence 
confined  to  the  sphere  of  physics  alone.  That  manifestation  of 
the  Power  not-ourselves  "  which  makes  for  righteousness "  in 
human  history  is  far  from  being  such  as  to  enable  the  holders 
of  optimistic  views  readily  to  triumph  over  their  opponents. 

On  the  other  hand,  Hartmann's  elaborate  attempt  to  raise 
the  widespread  pessimistic  feeling  and  judgment  of  the  age 
to  the  dignity  of  a  philosophical  system,  on  the  compound  basis 
of  psychological  analysis  and  induction  from  facts  of  history,  is 
a  failure  ;  and  —  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case  —  a  dismal 
failure.1  It  overestimates  the  relative  number  and  significance 
of  the  facts  on  which  it  relies ;  it  underestimates  the  number 
and  significance  of  those  facts  to  which  the  opposed  theory  can 

1  Comp.  Hartmann,  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  Coupland's  translation, 
vol.  iii.;  and  Zur  Geschichte  und  Begriindung  des  Pessimismus,  Berlin,  1880,  by 
the  same  author ;  also,  Dor  moderne  Pessimismus,  by  Dr.  Ludwig  von  Golther, 

Leipzig,  1878  ;  and  Sully,  Pessimism  :  A  History  and  a  «  riticism,  London,  1877. 


384  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

point.  It  fails  to  show  —  as  it  aims  to  do  —  that  pain  is  a 
necessary  factor  of  all  conscious  life,  and  an  increasingly  large 
factor  as  the  development  of  the  higher  and  more  rational  forms 
of  life  goes  on,  rather  than  a  temporary  condition  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  these  higher  forms.  It  treats  far  too  cavalierly  (and 
therefore  unphilosophically)  those  fears,  faiths,  and  hopes,  which 
extend  the  continuity  and  significance  of  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual, and  of  the  community,  into  other  times  and  spheres 
than  those  whose  facts  can  be  made  the  basis  of  a  scientific 
induction  ;  and,  finally,  it  loses  much  of  its  support  from  other 
more  fundamental  principles  in  the  philosophical  system  of 
which  it  forms  a  part,  when  its  proposition  that  the  being  of 
the  Absolute  is  imconscious  and  unethical,  is  successfully  dis- 
proved. Historically  considered,  Hartmann's  views  on  this 
subject  are  a  fleeting  product  of  the  worst  temper  of  the  present 
age.  On  this  point  we  agree  with  the  observation  of  Dr. 
Edmund  Pfleiderer.1  "  We  should  honor  too  highly  that  mode 
of  wisdom  called  Pessimism,  if  we  assented  to  the  multitude 
and  considered  it  as  anything  more  than  an  apparent  systema- 
tizing of  that  bad  humor  which  afflicts  the  many  blase  minds  of 
our  highly  nervous  century, —  as  being  a  really  new  and  epoch- 
making  view  of  the  Universe  at  large.  The  moral  disease  to 
which  our  age  is  subject,  an  indolent  eudsemonism,  has  found 
expression  in  it.  This,  and  this  alone,  is  the  reason  for  that 
wealth  of  applause  from  a  multitude  of  like-minded  men,  of 
which  this  tendency  in  thinking  loves  complacently  to  boast." 

In  the  face  of  two  contradictory  conclusions  suggested  by 
induction  from  two  sets  of  facts,  it  is  not  of  the  nature  of  human 
reason  to  remain  at  rest.  The  philosophy  of  religion,  from  a 
survey  of  all  the  phenomena,  does  not  confidently  derive  the 
conclusion  that  the  world  is,  ethically  or  aesthetically,  the  best 
conceivable  or  the  best  possible  ;  or  that  the  "  World-Ground  " 
is  perfectly  wise,  just,  and  good.     Much  less,  however,  does  it 

1  Die  Aufgabe  der  Philosophie  in  unserer  Zeit,  Rede  zur  Feier  des  Geburts- 
tages  seiner  Majestat  .  .  .  "Wilhelm  I.,  etc.     Kiel,  1874. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  335 

derive  in  this  way  the  contradictory  of  these  conclusions.  In 
the  conflict  of  mental  tendencies  which  is  occasioned  by  the 
attempt  to  make  a  rational  choice  between  the  two  conflicting 
systems  of  philosophical  conclusions,  the  ancient  principle  of 
Becoming,  or  rather  the  more  modern  principle  of  a  rational 
evolution  of  the  world,  is  a  helpful  resource.  As  the  vastness 
—  in  respect  to  space,  time,  and  complexity  and  number  of 
objects  and  interests  —  of  the  application  of  this  principle  be- 
comes apparent,  the  lesson  of  that  patient,  wise,  and  cautious 
spirit  which  philosophy  should  cherish,  is  enforced  by  the  most 
tremendous  sanctions.  Philosophy  finds  little  satisfaction  in 
the  current  theological  theodicies,  whether  they  consider  the 
facts  of  the  present  and  the  past,  and  predict  the  future,  from 
the  predominatingly  optimistic,  or  the  predominatingly  pessi- 
mistic point  of  view.  Even  more  unsatisfactory,  however,  seem 
all  the  recent  attempts  to  explain  the  world's  being  and  progress 
without  attributing  it  to  an  ethical  and  self-conscious  "Ground." 

At  this  point  those  facts  with  which  the  study  of  the  history  of 
civilization  makes  us  familiar  offer  their  assistance  to  the  syn- 
thesis of  philosophy.  On  the  whole  they  show  —  we  believe - 
some  firmly  secured  progress  of  the  race  toward  the  supreme 
ethical  and  sesthetical  Good.  In  spite  of  all  that  the  pessimism 
of  Hartmann  has  to  offer,  the  claims  to  an  increase  of  every 
important  form  of  well-being  by  the  struggles  of  the  race 
through  the  centuries  can  be  established  on  historical  grounds. 

It  is,  however,  only  when  we  contemplate  the  phenomena  of 
the  religious  life,  and  especially  of  Christianity  —  that  most 
historical  and  inherently  progressive  of  all  religions  —  that  the 
more  convincing  form  of  obtainable  evidence  is  presented  to  the 
mind.  The  conceptions  of  a  progressive  redemption  of  the  race, 
of  the  final  triumph  of  the  supreme  Good  over  all  that  we  call 
evil,  and  of  the  union  of  all  ultimate  forms  of  the  Good  —  hap- 
piness, beauty,  and  righteousness  —  in  the  blessed  life  of  a  com- 
munity known  as  the  perfected  "Kingdom  of  God,"  largely 
determine  our  attitude  toward  the  debated  question  of  Optimism 

25 


386  PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION. 

or  Pessimism.  That  these  conceptions  originate  and  flourish 
chiefly  in  the  domain  of  one  form  of  religion  called  "  revealed  " 
constitutes  no  reason  whatever  why  philosophy  should  refuse  or 
hesitate  to  make  use  of  them. 

The  proposition  that  the  Absolute  is  a  perfect  self-conscious 
ethical  life --that  One  who  is  not  only  all-wise  but  infinitely 
just  and  good  exists  as  the  "  World-Ground  "  —  does  not  admit 
of  "  proof,"  in  the  stricter  sense  of  this  word.  It  may  be  said, 
however,  to  be  the  most  reasonable  hope  and  faith  of  the  sanest 
and  ethically  and  aesthetically  most  symmetrical  minds.  It  is  a 
proposition  which,  received  as  a  postulate,  is  far  indeed  from 
explaining  everything,  or  even  from  immediately  introducing  the 
appearance  of  harmony  among  all  the  facts.  It  is  a  proposition, 
the  truth  of  which  seems  to  be  progressively  accumulating  as 
the  advance  of  the  race  affords  more  and  more  of  historical 
ground  on  which  the  proposition  may  be  based.  That  it  is  a 
proposition  which  the  ethical  and  resthetical  emotions  tend  to 
regard  with  a  high  degree  of  favor,  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
Indeed,  this  statement  falls  far  enough  below  the  truth.  It  is 
not  those  who  have  actually  suffered  most  who  have  found  in 
life,  and  in  their  reflections  thereon,  most  reason  for  the  pessi- 
mistic frame  of  mind.  The  tried  and  tortured  heroes  of  the  race 
have,  for  the  most  part,  ranged  themselves,  to  the  last  extremity 
of  personal  suffering,  on  the  side  of  optimistic  faith  and  hope. 
Only  a  philosophy  which  has  made  up  its  mind  from  the  be- 
ginning rigorously  to  exclude  some  of  the  choicest  facts  of 
human  experience,  because  it  cannot  explain  —  not  to  say  appre- 
ciate —  them,  will  fail  to  take  the  testimony  of  these  emotions 
into  its  account. 

From  the  moment  when  the  conclusion  is  reached,  that  the 
nature  of  the  "  World-Ground  "  is  the  highest  self-conscious, 
rational,  ethical,  and  aesthetical  Life,  the  progress  of  the  philos- 
ophy of  religion  becomes  comparatively  easy,  rapid,  and  sure. 
To  the  determination  of  this  great  and  inclusive  problem  all  its 
other  problems  are  subordinate.     If  reason  can  effectively  com- 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION.  387 

mand  the  light  of  this  Life  to  arise  upon  the  world's  system  of 
finite  things  and  minds,  then  how  great  is  that  Light !  Thus 
does  the  supreme  synthesis  of  philosophy  aim  to  give  a  pro- 
founder  interpretation  and  a  new  significance  to  all  the  particular 
facts  and  truths  of  the  positive  sciences. 

The  God  whom  philosophy  seeks  and  finds  is  not  a  Being  to 
be  described  by  the  fewest  and  most  abstract  terms  possible. 
The  rather  is  He  the  most  concrete,  real,  and  individual,  and 
yet  most  varied  and  comprehensive  Life.  To  that  Unity  of 
Eeality  which  He  is,  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the  philoso- 
phy of  mind  alike  ascribe  all  the  entities,  forces,  laws,  and  final 
purposes,  which  are  introduced  to  them  by  those  particular 
sciences  on  which  their  synthesis  is  built.  In  Him  is  the  being 
of  that  which  has  mass  and  extension,  and  which  displays 
manifold  immanent  and  transeunt  energies  of  various  degrees. 
In  Him  is  the  ground  of  the  permanency  and  unchangeableness 
of  the  quantum  of  the  world's  "  matter  "  so-called  ;  in  Him  the 
ground  also  of  the  conservation  and  correlation  of  energy.  It 
is  the  Unity  of  His  Eeality  that  explains  the  reciprocal  being 
and  action  of  all  things  ;  and  the  same  is  the  bond  in  reality 
between  all  bodies  and  their  correlated  minds.  In  His  own 
abounding  ethical  and  aesthetical  Life,  with  its  joy  in  all  the 
reality  of  the  beautiful  and  the  morally  good,  do  we  also  find 
that  ultimate  objective  basis  for  human  ethical  and  ai'Sthetical 
development  which  philosophy  seeks. 

The  degrees  of  confidence  with  which  we  make  these  and  other 
similar  statements  are  various;  and  the  grounds  for  the  exis- 
tence of  confidence  in  the  statements  themselves  are  not  all  alike 
secure.  But  the  analysis  which  provides  the  factors  for  this 
synthesis,  and  the  comprehensiveness  and  certainty  of  the 
resulting  synthesis,  are  both  —  we  believe — constantly  winning 
their  way  in  the  history  of  reflective  thought. 

Additional  evidence  for  the  necessity  of  postulating  self-con- 
scious and  ethical  personality  of  the  Absolute  may  be  derived 
from  the  failure  of  those  philosophical  systems  which  deny  the 


388  PHILOSOPHY   OF   RELIGION. 

truth  of  this  postulate.  Metaphysically  considered,  these  sys- 
tems may  all  be  said  to  be  lacking  in  a  sufficient  and  effective 
principium  individuationis.  This  is  manifestly  a  chief  fault  of 
Schopenhauer's  philosophy.  He  leaps  to  the  generalization  that 
the  world  as  "  Thing-in-itself  "  is  Will,  by  means  of  an  indescri- 
bable and  fictitious  psychological  process.  But  in  order  deduc- 
tively to  explain  the  world  from  this  principle  of  Will,  he  is 
obliged  to  introduce  into  his  philosophy  a  quite  unintelligible 
view  of  the  Platonic  ideas.  These  "  ideas  "  must  somehow  serve 
the  Absolute,  instead  of  its  own  self-conscious  personal  life,  as  a 
ground  of  diversifying  itself  into  the  world  of  phenomena.  So, 
too,  does  Hartmann,  by  an  elaborate  process  of  induction,  so 
called,  succeed  in  adding  —  so  he  thinks  —  "  Idea  "  to  Will,  as 
belonging  to  the  essence  of  the  Absolute.  But  Hartmann  also 
can  get  no  work,  no  actuality  of  a  world-being  and  a  world- 
process,  out  of  his  Absolute,  without  adding  thereto  at  least 
certain  elements  of  conscious  life.  Accordingly,  he  selects  these 
elements  from  the  lowest  and  least  worthy  forms  of  life.  The 
Absolute  is  a  "  clairvoyant,"  we  are  told ;  the  Absolute  needs, 
in  order  to  start  it  upon  the  process  of  self-manifestation,  at  least 
a  certain  amount  of  blind  but  painful  feeling  of  unrest.  The 
"single  transcendent  consciousness  of  the  All-One  .  .  .  has  for 
sole  content  the  absolutely  indefinite  transcendent  pain  or 
unblessedness  of  the  void  infinite  will."  1 

Similar  fault  might  justly  be  found  with  all  the  positive  con- 
clusions of  other  systems  of  philosophy  which,  like  the  systems 
of  Schopenhauer  and  Hartmann,  deny  to  the  Absolute  a  self- 
conscious  and  ethical  life.  Their  Absolute  fails  to  meet  the 
demands  of  reason  as  a  satisfactory  and  really  effective  "  World- 
Ground."  It  needs  some  other  transcendent  being  than  itself, 
or  some  actual  admixture  of  the  very  elements  theoretically 
denied  to  it,  in  order  to  make  it  capable  of  manifesting  itself 
after  the  fashion  of  the  world  of  our  experience,  —  not  to  say, 
capable  of  manifesting  itself  at  all.     What  is  true  of  Hart- 

1  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  Coupland's  Translation,  ii.  257. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  389 

mann's  "  The  Unconscious  "  is  —  as  has  frequently  been  shown 
—  true  as  well  of  the  "  Unknowable "  of  Mr.  Spencer. 

The  subordinate  problems  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  may 
be  divided  into  two  groups  ;  of  these,  one  concerns  the  predi- 
cates or  attributes  of  God,  and  the  other  concerns  His  relations 
to  finite  things  and  minds.  All  the  predicates  of  God  are  to 
be  more  precisely  determined  in  accordance  with  the  concep- 
tion which  has  already  been  established  ;  namely,  He  is  a  self- 
conscious,  rational,  and  ethical  Absolute.  His  Unity  is  to  be 
understood  as,  in  kind,  the  unity  of  a  personal  life  ;  and  since 
this  personal  life  is  that  of  the  Absolute,  we  affirm  that  God  is 
one  God,  the  "alone"  God,  and  besides  Him  is  no  other.  His 
Unchangeableness  is  not  "  the  monotony  and  rigidity  of  a  per- 
fect and  unchanging  self-likeness ; "  it  is  not  inconsistent  with 
the  being  subject  of  changeable  inner  states.  It  is  rather  that 
immanent  and  consistent  adherence  to  the  eternal  principles 
of  His  own  rational  and  ethical  life,  which  is  possible  for  the 
Absolute  alone. 

By  the  Omnipresence  of  God,  it  is  meant  to  maintain,  nega- 
tively, that  the  spatial  limitations  of  finite  being  and  action 
are  inapplicable  to  Him;  and,  positively,  that  in  the  unknown 
modus  of  God's  being  and  action  within  the  world  of  finite 
things  and  minds  lies  the  ground  of  the  space-forming  activity 
of  our  minds,  as  well  as  of  the  space-formed  1  icing  of  things. 

By  the  Omnipotence  of  God  it  is  meant  to  assert,  negatively, 
that  the  limitations  of  causal  activity,  both  in  intensity  and  in 
scope,  which  characterize  all  finite  beings,  have  no  applicability 
to  Him;  and,  positively,  that  all  the  action,  and  all  the  im- 
plied "power"  or  energy  of  things  and  minds,  has  its  ground 
in  Him  alone. 

By  the  Eternity  of  God,  it  is  meant  that  the  limitations  of 
being  and  action  in  time  which  belong  to  the  world  of  finite 
things  and  minds  do  not  affect  God;  as  well  as  that  He  is  not 
subject  to  those  conditions  of  the  finite  world  which  change 
in  time.     But  it  is  also  implied  in  the  eternity  predicated  of 


390  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

God  that  His  self-conscious  rational  life  is  the  permanent  and 
unchanging  Ground  of  all  the  being  and  action  of  things  and 
minds,  in  time.  Whether  the  predicate  of  "  time "  applies  (in 
any  meaning  of  the  words,  and,  if  at  all,  in  what  precise  mean- 
ing of  the  words)  to  the  life  of  the  Absolute  itself,  is  one  of  the 
most  interesting  and  yet  baffling  of  the  subordinate  problems 
of  philosophy  in  the  domain  of  theology  and  religion. 

By  the  Omniscience  of  God,  it  is  meant  to  deny  that  any  of 
the  limitations  of  knowledge  to  which  finite  minds  are  sub- 
ject apply  to  God ;  it  is  meant  also  to  affirm  that,  somehovj,  all 
that  is  knowable  is  immediately  and  certainly  known  by  God. 
Keference  has  already  been  made  to  the  many  and  great  diffi- 
culties which  encompass  every  attempt  to  form  a  clear  mental 
picture  of  the  modus  operandi  of  the  infinite  knowledge  of  the 
self-conscious  Absolute. 

Of  the  more  precise  relations  of  God  to  the  world,  it  is  cus- 
tomary for  philosophical  theology  to  emphasize,  chiefly,  these 
three :  creation,  preservation,  and  government.  Under  the  terms 
of  that  relation  which  the  word  "  Creation  "  signifies  we  are  jus- 
tified only  in  affirming  a  priori  the  essential  and  absolute  (*.  e., 
without  limitations  of  time,  space,  or  causal  action)  dependence 
of  the  world  upon  the  wisdom  and  will  of  God.  Under  this 
general  tenet  a  number  of  particular  problems  range  themselves, 
for  the  attempted  solution  of  which  philosophy  must  acknowl- 
edge its  dependence  upon  the  conclusions  of  the  particular  sci- 
ences. How  —  in  what  order,  by  what  stages  and  successive 
forms  of  the  appearance  of  existent  beings  —  did  God  create  the 
world  ?  Such  answer  as  can  be  given  to  an  inquiry  like  this 
must  rely  upon  the  consensus  of  those  sciences  which  describe 
the  evolution  of  all  non-living  and  living  beings,  in  their  order 
and  relations  of  dependence  toward  each  other,  in  time.  Are 
we  to  conceive  of  that  relation  between  God  and  the  world, 
which  the  word  "creation"  signifies,  as  eternal,  or  as  having 
had  a  beginning  in  time  ?  For  the  doubtful  answer  which  is 
alone  possible  to  this  question,  we  need  such  help  as  psychology 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  391 

can  furnish  by  an  analysis  of  the  concept  of  "  time,"  supple- 
mented by  such  contributions  as  physical  science  can  make 
touching  the  probable  past  duration  of  the  system  of  finite 
things.  Other  inquiries  —  such  as,  Why  did  God  create  the 
World  at  all  ?  or,  Why  create  it  at  some  particular  time  rather 
than  another  ?  or,  How  can  we  conceive  of  time  as  being  when, 
as  yet,  the  created  world  was  not  ?  —  are  speculative  puzzles 
which  belong,  most  fitly,  to  the  play-time  rather  than  to  the 
serious  work  of  the  student  of  philosophy. 

By  the  divine  "  Preservation  "  of  the  world,  it  is  meant  to  as- 
sert that  the  world  is  continuously  and  ceaselessly  dependent, 
for  all  its  being  and  action,  upon  the  immanent  being  and  un- 
ceasingly active  will  of  God.  The  more  precise  determination  of 
this  relation,  as  well  as  of  the  relation  of  creation,  will  be  differ- 
ently made  by  thinkers  belonging  to  different  schools  of  philos- 
ophy. What  sort  of  being  (of  so-called  reality  or  substantiality) 
does  God  impart  to,  and  maintain  in,  finite  things  and  finite 
minds  ?  It  is  plain  that,  in  the  attempt  to  answer  this  ques- 
tion, the  most  fundamentally  divergent  views  on  the  theory 
of  knowledge,  on  metaphysics,  ethics,  and  aesthetics,  will  make 
themselves  strongly  felt.  But  especially  will  the  resources  of 
speculative  thinking  be  taxed  to  their  utmost  capacity  in  the 
effort  to  frame  a  consistent  and  tenable  theory  of  the  divine 
relation,  in  both  creation  and  preservation,  to  finite  minds.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  "  creation  "  of  the  soul  cannot  consist  in  the 
planting,  as  it  were,  within  a  body,  of  some  undeveloped  "mind- 
stuff  "  ready  made  ;  nor  can  its  preservation  be  held  to  mean 
that,  having  been  constituted  "  substantial,"  it  continues  to  exist 
as  long  as  God  preserves  it  from  the  destructive  force  of  phys- 
ical agencies.  Doubtless,  it  is  as  really  true  of  minds  as  of 
things :  In  Him  they  live  .  .  .  and  have  their  being.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  principles  of  ethical  self-consciousness  cannot, 
safely  or  reasonably,  be  sacrificed  to  the  desire  of  philosophy 
for  a  perfectly  logical  and  deductive  system  of  modes  of  oper- 
ation, in  reality,  between  God  and  finite  minds.     Here  again 


392  PHILOSOPHY   OF  RELIGION. 

do  we  stand  on  a  field,  within  which  philosophy  can  do  little 
more  than  maintain  a  few  great  principles,  clear  their  appli- 
cation as  much  as  possible  from  the  semblance  of  contradiction, 
and  point  out  the  present  limitations  of  the  powers  of  human 
reason  itself. 

"  Government "  is  a  term  which  we  can  most  properly  apply 
only  to  God's  relation  to  finite  personalities.  At  this  point, 
then,  the  philosophy  of  religion  refers  to  psychology  and  to 
the  philosophy  of  mind  for  its  conception  of  the  personality 
of  man,  — the  one  who  is  to  be  "governed."  It  refers  also  to 
that  conception  of  God  as  an  ethical  personality,  which  it  has 
already  attained,  for  the  further  determination  of  the  nature 
of  the  relation  which  He,  the  "  Ruler,"  sustains  to  finite  per- 
sonality. But  it  is  especially  from  the  philosophical  study  of 
human  society  and  of  human  history  that  our  doctrine  of  the 
divine  government  is  to  be  derived.  It  is  God  immanent  in 
human  life,  in  its  fundamental  forms,  its  successive  stages  of 
development,  its  ideal  and  emotional  springs,  who  is  the  Gov- 
ernor of  men.  All  government,  in  the  only  true  meaning  of 
the  word,  implies  the  encitement,  discipline,  and  control,  of  one 
person  by  another  ;  and,  in  the  case  of  the  divine  government, 
of  course,  the  inspiration,  illumining,  and  discipline,  of  all  per- 
sons by  the  one  Personal  and  ethical  Absolute.  Here,  again, 
an  appeal  to  the  philosophy  of  the  Ideal  (the  perfectly  blessed, 
the  perfectly  beautiful,  and  the  perfectly  good)  must  be  taken 
in  order  to  suggest  the  nature  of  that  goal,  or  end  to  be  gained, 
which  government  implies. 

The  conceptions  of  revelation  and  inspiration  are  closely  con- 
nected with  the  conception  of  divine  government.  A  "mani- 
festation "  of  that  unity  which  the  "  "World-Ground "  is,  the 
most  pronounced  agnosticism  seems  to  find  it  necessary  to  sup- 
pose. But  a  manifestation  is  possible  only  between  minds. 
That  which  is  manifested  is  an  idea ;  that  to  which  the  mani- 
festation is  made,  is  an  ideating  mind.  Certainly,  then,  it  is 
not  a  long  or  difficult  step  from  the  more  indefinite  and  obscure 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  393 

conception  of  a  manifestation  of  the  Absolute  to  the  more  defi- 
nite and  clear  conception  of  a  revelation  of  God.  Nor,  if  we 
regard  God  as  the  source  of  all  life,  and  especially  of  all  that 
spiritual  life  which  is  the  essence  of  subjective  religion,  can 
the  conception  of  inspiration  fail  to  have  a  most  valid  and 
comprehensive  use.  As  the  objective  factor,  corresponding  to 
inspiration,  we  find  the  "  miracles  "  of  revealed  religion  claim- 
ing a  place  in  the  historical  manifestation  of  God.  But  the 
philosophy  of  religion  is  dependent  upon  metaphysics,  in  the 
two  forms  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the  philosophy  of 
mind,  for  determining  the  modus  operandi  of  the  miracle,  ■ — 
so  far  as  this  is  possible. 

The  more  precise,  detailed,  and  defensible  exposition  of  all 
the  predicates  of  God,  and  of  all  the  manifold  forms  of  rela- 
tion in  which  He  stands  to  the  world,  must  be  gained  by 
philosophy  in  constant  dependence  upon  the  positive  sciences. 
Among  these  sciences,  the  psychological  and  historical  will 
necessarily  hold  the  place  of  chief  importance. 

Whatever  be  his  personal  faith,  the  student  of  philosophy 
cannot  regard  as  unimportant  those  facts,  truths,  faiths,  and 
institutions,  as  well  as  that  type  of  ethical  and  a'sthetical  char- 
acter, which  belong  to  historical  Christianity.  Those  facts, 
truths,  faiths,  and  institutions  are  of  the  greatest  importance 
for  determining  the  synthesis  of  philosophy.  To  neglect  to  give 
them  in  philosophy  the  place  which  they  actually  have  in  the 
life  of  the  race,  is  to  be  guilty  of  an  almost  fatal  neglect.  By 
a  "  Christian "  philosophy,  we  do  not  understand  a  system  of 
dogmatic  theology  which  accords  with  the  prevalent  orthodox 
type  ;  we  understand  rather  such  a  view  of  the  world,  the  soul, 
and  God,  of  the  dignity  and  destiny  of  man,  and  of  the  goal 
of  history,  as  gives  to  the  Christian  truths  and  facts  the  place 
which  is  their  due.  In  this  way  can  philosophy  be  of  more 
real  assistance  to  the  progress  of  Christianity  than  by  timor- 
ous and  ill-considered  efforts  to  resume  its  mediaeval  position 
of  being  ancillary  to  the  dominant  theology.     Tn  so  far  only 


394  PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 

as  what  men  call  Christianity  is  accordant  with  the  deepest 
and  most  comprehensive  rational,  ethical,  and  sesthetical  life 
of  man,  will  it  continue  to  win  and  hold  the  allegiance  of  the 
race.  But  it  is  precisely  upon  this,  the  nature  of  true  religion, 
that  philosophy  most  fondly  and  confidently  dwells. 

The  value  of  that  supreme  synthesis,  which  the  philosophy 
of  religion  makes,  for  the  other  departments  of  philosophy,  and 
also  for  the  particular  sciences  upon  whose  principles  the 
synthesis  is  chiefly  dependent,  will  doubtless  be  differently 
estimated  by  different  minds.  Certainly,  from  the  conception 
of  God  —  His  being,  predicates,  and  relations  to  the  world  — 
we  cannot  deduce  the  principles  of  the  particular  sciences. 
But  it  is  our  firm  belief  that  they  all  gain  inexpressibly  in  sig- 
nificance and  value  when  they  are  considered  in  the  light  of 
this  synthesis.  This  certified  principle,  or  —  if  the  objector 
prefer  —  this  ennobling  and  captivating  postulate,  of  a  perfect 
ethical  and  a'sthetical  Life  as  the  "  Ground  "  of  the  world's 
being  and  progress,  illumines  and  elevates  the  entire  domain  of 
human  knowledge  and  human  life. 

It  is  only  in  the  reasoned  faith  in  such  a  principle  that  one 
can  find  that  relative  harmony  of  the  scientific  and  the  practical, 
the  side  of  thought  and  the  side  of  belief  and  emotion,  which 
is  the  security  of  the  religious  life.  Pure  thinking,  it  is  true, 
will  not  find  God  ;  neither  will  it  satisfy  conscience,  or  secure 
the  redemption  of  the  individual  and  of  the  race.  But  to  do 
this,  irrational  and  thoughtless  feeling  is  also  impotent, — 
whether  called  superstition  or  faith.  Nor  can  busy  doing  and 
works  done  accomplish  this  salvation.  For  it  is  the  life  of 
reason,  in  all  its  variety  and  richness  of  content,  which  is 
according  to  the  Life  of  the  ever-living  God. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

TENDENCIES   AND    SCHOOLS    IN    PHILOSOPHY. 

THEEE  have  been  diversities  of  opinion,  and  divisions  of 
thinkers  into  groups  according  to  the  character  of  their 
particular  conclusions,  from  the  beginning  of  speculative  think- 
ing until  the  present  time.  In  truth,  the  manifestation  of 
more  or  less  definite  tendencies  and  the  formation  of  schools 
follow  from  the  very  nature  of  philosophy.  The  freedom  of 
the  philosophical  spirit,  employing  the  subtlest  analysis  and 
the  most  comprehensive  synthesis  for  the  solution  of  the  ulti- 
mate problems  of  all  Being  and  all  Knowledge,  necessarily 
results  in  division.  The  spirit,  the  method,  and  the  character 
of  the  subject-matter,  are  all  responsible  for  that  variety  of 
systems  which  the  history  of  philosophy  reveals. 

The  spirit  of  philosophy  is  freedom.  From  this  it  follows 
that  each  man's  adherence  to  a  particular  tendency  in  philo- 
sophical discipline  is  largely  a  matter  of  choice.  Or  rather, 
the  selection  and  formation  of  one's  philosophical  system  are, 
in  a  peculiar  way,  the  expression  of  one's  whole  rational  and 
voluntary  being.  One  may  not,  indeed,  choose  one's  master 
or  school  in  philosophy,  and  receive  the  content  of  one's  specu- 
lative thinking,  "  ready  made,"  as  it  were.  On  the  contrary,  to 
do  this  —  however  unwittingly  —  is  to  forfeit  all  favor  from 
genuine  philosophy.  No  other  acquirement  of  the  human 
mind  is  so  improperly  received  without  questioning  from  the 
hands  of  another.  In  attaining  no  other  form  of  intellectual 
discipline,  in  reaching  no  other  class  of  rational  conclusions, 
are  caution,  patience,  and   willingness  to  await  the  growth  of 


396        TENDENCIES  AND  SCHOOLS   IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

thought,  so  indispensable.  At  the  same  time  philosophy,  espe- 
cially on  its  synthetic  side,  requires  the  commitment  of  the  en- 
tire man  as  does  no  other  form  of  reasoning  and  knowledge.  It 
requires  also  that  arousing  of  the  ethical,  oesthetical,  and  even  of 
the  religious  nature,  which  has  its  ground  in  the  life  of  the  will. 
The  dependence  of  schools  of  philosophy,  and  of  the  adhe- 
rence of  the  individual  thinker  to  any  particular  system  of 
philosophy,  upon  freedom  of  choice  has  been  frequently  ob- 
served. In  discussing  the  definition  of  philosophy  we  found 
that  it's  appeal  to  the  will  and  its  relation  to  character  have 
been  recognized  in  the  very  terms  applied  to  it.  This  is  true, 
not  only  of  the  figurative  descriptions  of  Plato  (see  page  9  f.), 
but  of  the  more  exact  and  critical  discussion  of  Kant.  "  The 
kind  of  philosophy  which  one  chooses,"  says  Fichte,1  "  depends 
on  the  kind  of  man  one  is.  For  a  philosophical  system  is  not  a 
dead  bit  of  furniture  which  one  can  take  to  one's  self  or  dispose 
of,  as  one  pleases  ;  but  it  is  endowed  with  a  soul  by  the  soul  of 
the  man  who  has  it."  "In  the  supreme  and  ultimate  instance," 
says  Schelling,2  "  there  is  no  other  Being  than  Willing.  This 
is  fundamental  being,  and  to  this  all  the  predicates  of  such 
being  conform.  .  .  .  The  one  effort  of  all  philosophy  is  to  find 
the  highest  expression  for  this."  Herbart 3  goes  so  far  as  to 
declare  that  "  the  study  of  philosophy  is  a  natural  offspring  of 
the  totality  we  call  '  the  good  Will ; '  this  good  Will  is  philos- 
ophy; only  we  must  not  confound  the  study  of  philosophy 
with  philosophy  itself."  And  less  well-known  names  have  in 
modern  times  declared  themselves  to  the  same  effect.  "  To 
know  the  truth  in  spirit  (by  thought,  or  speculatively),"  says 
one  writer,  "  and  to  live  in  confiding  intercourse  with  it,  —  this 
it  is  which  the  best  of  all  philosophers  have  called  '  to  philos- 
ophize.' "     The  same  view  is  expressed  by  another  writer  in 

1  Comp.  Lis  words  in  the   Darstellung  der  Wissenschaftslehre,   Werke   (ed. 
J.  G.  Fichte),  ii.  155  f. 

2  Philosoph.  Untersuchungen  der  meirschlichen  Freiheit,  Werke,  vii.  350. 

3  See  also  his  remarks  on  the  Practical  Need  of  Philosophy,  Kurze  Encyklo- 
padie,  pp.  3-29. 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        397 

the  following  language  :  "  We  have  to  distinguish  two  kinds  of 

philosophy  :  the  one  manifests  itself  by  the  speech,  and  the 
other  by  the  conduct,  of  the  man.  .  .  .  This  latter  it  is  —  the 
realization  of  wisdom  by  the  man  in  his  social  intercourse  — 
which  has  recently  been  brought,  as  philosophy  in  deed,  to 
more  general  recognition." 

However  much  allowance  be  made  for  exaggeration,  through 
noble  enthusiasm  for  one's  favorite  pursuit  and  through  laud- 
able desire  to  commend  it,  we  cannot  fail  to  recognize  in  the 
statements  just  quoted  a  most  important  truth.  At  bottom, 
philosophy  implies  the  freedom  of  rational  life.  That  diversity 
of  the  results  of  philosophizing,  in  which  the  different  so-called 
schools  of  philosophy  have  their  source,  is  due  to  this  inherent 
freedom. 

The  necessary  method  of  philosophy  is  also  such  as  to  occa- 
sion the  rise  in  its  general  domain  of  diverging  tendencies  and 
of  different  systems  of  thought.  Philosophy  results  from  the 
movement  of  rational  life,  by  more  searching  reflective  analysis 
and  progressively  more  complete  synthesis,  toward  a  harmony 
of  the  principles  of  all  Being  and  all  Knowledge.  In  this 
movement  three  characteristic  attitudes  of  mind  toward  exist- 
ing philosophical  views  are  successively  taken.  Scepticism 
calls  in  question  the  tenets  of  the  prevalent  dogmatism ;  criti- 
cism strives  to  detect  the  errors  or  defects,  and  also  the  factors 
of  truth,  which  are  combined  in  these  tenets ;  by  a  new  syn- 
thesis, on  the  basis  of  this  improved  analysis,  a  new  form  of 
positive  or  dogmatic  conclusions  is  obtained. 

In  the  use  of  this  indispensable  "  method  "  of  all  philosophy 
is  to  be  found  a  reason  for  the  origin  of  more  or  less  well 
defined  philosophical  systems  or  schools.  The  reflective  analy- 
sis of  different  thinkers  will  vary  in  the  degrees  of  its  penetra- 
tion and  comprehensiveness,  —  whether  its  application  refer  to 
the  whole  round  of  current  philosophical  problems  or  to  some 
particular  problem  among  them  all.  The  analysis  of  no  one 
thinker  will  be  able  to  penetrate  all  the  depths,  or  to  extend 


398         TENDENCIES  AND  SCHOOLS  IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  all  the  confines,  of  the  world  of  things  and  minds.  For  the 
human  mind  is  limited ;  but  science  is  capable  of  unlimited 
growth,  and  reality  is  diversified  and  extended  beyond  all 
assignable  bounds.  It  follows,  then,  that  each  adherent  of  a 
particular  philosophical  system,  or  of  a  particular  solution  to 
any  great  philosophical  problem,  will  be  one-sided  or  incom- 
plete in  his  analysis.  He  will  be  compelled  to  stop  short  of  the 
point  where  he  can  hold  all  the  factors  and  principles  of  Being 
and  Knowledge  firmly  in  his  mental  grasp.  Accordingly,  and 
as  a  matter  of  necessity,  his  synthetic  philosophy  will  be 
one-sided  and  defective.  It  will  relatively  exaggerate  some 
thoughts  ;  it  will  depress  unduly,  or  wholly  pass  by,  other  im- 
portant thoughts.  Finally,  the  impetus  toward  system-making 
which  belongs  to  the  spirit  and  mission  of  philosophy  will 
cause  a  further  exaggeration  of  those  limitations  of  human 
thinking  that  are  expressed  in  the  very  existence  of  philo- 
sophical schools.  The  progress  of  reason  in  self-knowledge 
cannot  be  made  secure  by  obtaining  the  common  consent  of 
thinkers  to  defer  all  system-making  in  philosophy  until  the 
analysis  of  the  factors  shall  be  complete.  Each  system,  when 
broken  into  fragments  by  the-  blows  of  scepticism  and  criticism, 
affords  some  "  rough-hewn  ;'  stones  for  the  structures  that  are 
to  follow.  By  its  necessary  method,  philosophy  is  compelled 
never  to  attain  the  complete 'realization  of  the  idea  which  it 
pursues.  This  is  its  glory,  and  not  its  shame.  It  is  a  never- 
finished  rational  life. 

How  variously  might  the  foregoing  reflections  be  illustrated 
by  an  appeal  to  the  history  of  philosophical  systems  and 
tendencies  !  At  one  time  a  synthesis  of  principles,  obtained 
by  so-called  "  pure  thinking "  and  independently  of  empirical 
generalizations,  has  dominated  philosophy.  Dialectic  has 
thus  been  identified  with  reality ;  and  a  philosophical  system 
consisting  of  abstractions  has  been  the  result.  Deductive 
demonstration  has  at  another  time  been  employed  as  the  only 
true  philosophical  method.     Separated  from  all  the  constantly 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        399 

diversifying  life  with  which  inductive  science  deals,  the  most 
monstrous  conclusions  have  thus  been  held  to  be  "proved" 
beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt.  The  heart  of  living  and  con- 
crete realities  has. been  cruelly  crushed  under  the  heel  of  these 
despots  in  the  use  of  the  demonstrative  methods.  But  new 
systems  of  so-called  inductive  philosophy  have  sprung  forth 
from  the  bosom  of  modern  science  itself.  And  now  all  the 
problems  of  the  universal  life  and  the  ultimate  reality  are  to  be 
solved  —  if  solved  at  all  —  by  observation  and  tabulating  of 
phenomena.  Then  we  are  given  to  understand  that  the  nature 
of  the  soul,  and  even  of  the  Absolute,  may  be  inductively 
established  by  considering  how  decapitated  frogs  and  bisected 
insects  behave ;  or  how  the  vis  mcdicatrix  operates  for  the 
healing  of  a  wounded  crab  or  salamander.  Then  all  analysis  of 
psychological  problems  by  introspection,  and  all  effort  to  substi- 
tute tenable  for  untenable  metaphysical  views,  are  discredited. 
They  are  said  to  see  "  with  the  eyes  of  Peter  Bell,  which,  seeing, 
see  not,"  who  fail  to  consider  reflection  and  thought  as  means 
for  penetrating  the  mysteries  of  the  universe  inferior  to  the 
study  of  the  phenomena  of  "  knee-jerk,"  or  of  the  excited  gan- 
glionic nerve-cells  of  a  cat  or  a  dog.1 

It  is,  however,  the  character  of  the  subject-matter  in  philos- 
ophy which  is  chiefly  responsible  for  the  division  of  the  tenets 
established  into  rival  systems  and  schools.  Psychology  is,  in- 
deed, the  indispensable  propaedeutic  of  philosophical  discipline. 
But  all  the  particular  sciences  also  offer  their  presuppositions 
and  discovered  principles,  in  the  form  of  problems,  to  the 
student  of  philosophy.  The  goal  toward  which  he  strives  is 
the  rational  system  of  them  all.  But  they  all  are  constantly, 
and  to  a  large  extent,  undergoing  a  process  of  development. 
How  then,  since  they  all  furnish  material  to  philosophy,  can 
it  escape  the  limitations  and  the  necessity  of  change  which 
they  impose  ? 

Yet  more  potent  reasons   for  the  occurrence  of  schools  in 

1  Comp.  Am.  Journal  of  Psychology,  Nov.,  1887,  p.  162. 


400        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy  may  be  derived  from  the  consideration  of  the  nature 
of  its  subject-matter.  This  consists  wholly  of  problems,  —  of 
problems  of  the  most  profound  and  perplexing  kind.  All  the 
more  serious  problems  of  each  of  the  particular  sciences  concern 
that  system  of  thinking  which  is  philosophy.  Even  the  prin- 
ciples which  these  sciences  may  take  for  granted  become  diffi- 
cult problems  for  the  student  of  philosophy.  The  clearest  and 
most  satisfactory  solution  of  some  of  these  problems  may  seem 
to  involve  conclusions  directly  contradictory  of  equally  clear 
and  satisfactory  solutions  of  other  problems.  Witness  the  task 
which  biology  sets  to  philosophical  ethics  when  it  attempts  to 
bring  the  psychical  processes,  including  the  process  of  choice, 
under  the  principle  of  a  vital  mechanism.  How  easy  would 
the  task  of  philosophical  system  become,  if  only  one  could 
pass  by  those  presuppositions  or  unverified  generalizations  of 
the  particular  sciences  which  seem  especially  to  need  its  har- 
monizing agency  !  One  can  frame  a  "  system  "  in  philosophy,  if 
one  will  not  be  too  particular  about  admitting  unpleasant  indi- 
vidual inquiries  into  membership  in  this  system.  We  should 
all  doubtless  be  of  one  school,  if  only  Reality  were  not  so 
varied  and  —  shall  we  say  ?  —  inconsistent  in  its  forms  of 
manifestation. 

Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  the  ultimate  problem  of  phi- 
losophy is  no  other  than  the  problem  of  the  Infinite,  —  the 
inquiry  into  the  being,  relations,  and  modes  in  manifestation,  of 
God.  Surely  He  is  a  great  deep,  and  who  can  fathom  Him  ? 
We  obscurely  feel  the  Presence,  and  hear  the  movement  of  His 
garments  ;  but  His  hand  veils  our  eyes.  And  when  the  hand 
is  removed,  we  can  see  no  more  than  the  vesture  which  clothes 
His  retreating  form.  Little  wonder  need  be  felt,  then,  if  the 
approaches  which  are  made  toward  the  place  where  this  prob- 
lem can  be  clearly  envisaged  (not  to  say  solved)  are  along  di 
verging  lines  ;  or  if  the  travellers  on  their  way  stop,  in  weariness 
or  self-satisfaction,  or  because  night  has  come,  at  places  that 
lie  distant  from  each  other,  and  far  removed  from  the  goal. 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        401 

The  classification  of  the  actually  existing  schools  of  philoso- 
phy follows  from  the  very  nature  of  philosophy  and  of  its 
method.  These  may  all  ,be  described  under  three  most  general 
heads.  They  are  Realism,  Idealism,  and  Dualism.  Some  of 
the  other  so-called  schools  or  systems,  such  as  dogmatism, 
scepticism,  and  criticism,  are  not  (as  has  already  been  shown) 
properly  to  be  so  entitled  at  all.  These  are  rather  "moments  " 
or  tendencies  in  the  spirit  and  method  of  all  philosophy.  And 
the  undue  emphasis  of  any  of  them,  to  the  relative  exclusion  or 
suppression  of  the  others,  does  not  result  in  the  formation  of  a 
school  or  system  of  philosophical  tenets.  Schools  and  systems, 
in  philosophy  as  elsewhere,  are  to  be  classified  —  if  at  all  —  ac- 
cording to  the  divergent  character  of  the  positive  tenets  which 
constitute  them.  This  is  as  true  of  those  critical  or  sceptical 
propositions  which  sum  up  the  results  derived  by  the  corre- 
sponding method  of  philosophical  inquiry,  as  it  is  of  the  most 
extreme  dogmatism. 

Much  less  are  agnosticism  and  eclecticism  to  be  classed  with 
idealism,  realism,  and  dualism,  as  co-ordinate  schools  or  systems 
of  philosophy.  Agnosticism,  in  so  far  as  it  remains  agnostic,  is 
not  to  be  distinguished  from  the  sceptical  or  critical  attitude 
of  mind.  So  far  as  the  agnostic  becomes  positive,  he  is  to  be 
classified  as  an  idealist,  a  realist,  or  an  adherent  of  dualism. 
And  the  positive  conclusions  which  enable  us  to  classify  him  — 
if  such  conclusions  are  to  be  discovered  in  his  thinking  —  may 
be  tinged  with  more  or  less  of  either  the  dogmatic,  the  sceptical, 
or  the  critical  spirit  and  method.  Thus  Mr.  Spencer  has  the 
undoubted  right  to  classify  himself  among  the  realists  (with 
the  distinction  that  his  realism  is  evolutionary  and  "  trans- 
figured"),—  albeit  his  position  seems  to  many  dogmatic  rather 
than  critical. 

What,  however,  is  the  natural  and  necessary  relation,  as  to 

position    and   development,    which    exists   amongst   the    three 

schools  or  systems  of  philosophical  thinking  ?     In  the  attempt 

briefly   to  answer  this  question  we  shall  expect   to  gain   fur- 

20 


402        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS  IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ther  verification  for  the  conclusions  which  have  already  been 
reached,  when  considering  the  several  principal  problems  in 
analytical  and  synthetic  philosophy. 

"  Wherever,"  says  Von  Hartmann,1  "  we  may  look  among  the 
original  philosophical  or  religious  systems  of  the  first  rank, 
everywhere  do  we  meet  with  the  tendency  to  Monism ;  and  it 
is  only  stars  of  the  second  or  third  magnitude  which  find  satis- 
faction in  an  external  dualism  or  still  greater  division."  The 
same  writer  thinks  that  in  all  philosophies  of  the  modern  epoch 
we  see  "  this  tendency  to  Monism  more  or  less  perfectly  realized 
in  one  fashion  or  another."  2  As  an  inquiry  in  the  history  of 
philosophy,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  a  general  assent 
must  be  accorded  to  these  statements  of  Hartmann.  The 
Unity  of  all  Reality  is,  in  some  sort,  a  postulate  of  all  modern 
philosophy ;  and  this  postulate,  as  a  silent  and  sometimes  slug- 
gish assumption,  enters  into  the  organization  of  all  experience 
as  the  task  is  attempted  by  the  particular  sciences.  Moreover, 
that  growing  conviction  as  to  the  unity  of  the  universe  of 
phenomena,  which  expresses  itself  in  the  assumption  of  a  uni- 
versal "  reign  of  law,"  in  admitted  principles  of  all  physical 
science,  in  the  attempt  to  establish  on  scientific  grounds  a 
theory  of  psycho-physics  and  of  the  general  relations  of  body 
and  mind,  and  in  the  gradual  drawing  together  of  all  the 
sciences,  affords  support  to  a  monistic  philosophy.  Dualism,  as 
a  claimant  for  the  position  of  a  rational  and  consistent  system 
of  thinking,  is  undoubtedly  being  discredited  by  the  progress  of 
the  age. 

Tt  is  further  to  be  noted  that  Dualism  arises  —  at  least  in 
modern  times  —  almost  altogether  as  a  protest  against  some 
form  of  Monism,  which  is  deemed  extreme  or  dangerous.  It  is 
chiefly  fear  of  the  logical  consequences  of  monistic  conclusions 
which  induces  the  modern  student  of  philosophy  even  to  consider 
the  dualistic  hypothesis.     In  the  ancient  times  the  world,  from 

1  Philosophy  of  the  Unconscious,  Coupland's  Translation,  ii.  234. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  239. 


TENDENCIES  AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        4Q3 

lack  of  scientific  knowledge,  seemed  to  men  too  diverse  to  be  ac- 
counted for  as  the  manifestation  or  revelation  of  a  single  prin- 
ciple. The  search  after -a  unity  of  the  "  World-Ground/'  which 
belongs  to  the  very  nature  of  reason  itself,  was  therefore  lim- 
ited in  its  range.  Knowledge  was  limited  as  regards  the  laws 
and  modes  of  energy  which  connect  together  the  world  of  real 
beings.  Imagination  was  limited  in  its  flight.  But  it  was 
those  peoples  who  felt  most  keenly,  though  in  a  naive  and  un- 
reasoning way,  certain  great  divergencies  in  the  manifestations 
of  reality,  among  which  the  first  dualistic  systems  arose.  Two 
fundamental  and  irremovable  distinctions,  on  which  indeed  all 
our  experience  is  based,  gave  occasion  to  these  systems.  They 
are  the  distinction  between  matter  and  mind,  and  the  distinction 
between  moral  good  and  moral  evil. 

It  is  the  fear  that  these  two  distinctions  will  be  lost  or 
marred,  and  the  fear  of  the  theoretical  or  practical  consequences 
of  such  an  event,  which  impels  many  minds  even  now  away 
from  philosophical  Monism.  On  the  contrary,  all  the  instincts 
of  the  philosophical  mind,  all  the  tendencies  of  modern  scien- 
tific discovery  and  modern  speculative  thinking,  all  the  influ- 
ences from  the  example  of  the  greatest  thinkers  (materialistic, 
idealistic,  pantheistic,  theistic),  are  committed  to  the  cause  of 
monistic  philosophy.  Every  attempt  to  establish  two  ultimate 
principles  of  all  Knowledge  and  all  Being,  and  every  attempt 
to  deal  with  any  of  the  subordinate  philosophical  problems 
in  a  manner  implying  the  existence  of  two  such  principles,  is 
opposed  to  our  modern  thought.  In  conflict  with  the  most 
tenable  of  the  dualistic  systems  no  fairly  consistent  monistic 
system  can  fail  to  secure  the  "  prejudice "  of  philosophical 
thinking.  In  conflict  with  all  dualistic  systems,  some  form  of 
a  monistic  system  will  ultimately  maintain  the  supremacy. 

But  why,  it  may  be  asked,  if  this  is  so,  does  Dualism  con- 
tinue (at  least —  if  we  accept  Hartmann's  estimate  —  "among 
the  stars  of  the  second  or  third  magnitude  ")  so  persistently  as 
a  third  system  opposed  to  both  of  the  other  two  ?     Chiefly  be- 


404        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

cause  of  the  failure  of  current  systems  of  Monism  so  to  answer 
the  problems  of  philosophy  as  to  avoid  contradicting  certain 
apparently  obvious  facts  and  important  truths.  These  facts 
and  truths  —  we  repeat  —  concern,  first,  the  nature  and  rela- 
tions in  reality  of  the  body  and  the  mind;  and,  second,  the 
nature  and  relations  of  the  morally  good  and  the  morally 
evil,  as  well  as  the  ground  which  good  and  evil  have  in 
ultimate  reality.  Forms  of  Monism,  which  virtually  contra- 
dict the  distinction  between  the  reality,  me,  and  the  reality 
that  is  not- me,  cannot  succeed  in  preventing  the  persistent 
recurrence  of  rival  dualistic  schemes.  Monism  must  so  con- 
struct its  tenets  as  to  preserve,  or,  at  least,  as  not  to  contradict 
and  destroy  the  truths  implicated  in  this  distinction  ;  otherwise, 
it  cannot  remain  in  possession  of  the  rightful  domain  of  phi- 
losophy. But  even  more  imperative,  and  far  more  difficult,  is 
the  task  imposed  upon  Monism  by  those  dualistic  considerations 
which  emerge  on  ethical  grounds.  To  blur,  or  reduce,  or  deny, 
valid  ethical  distinctions  is  to  furnish  an  elixir  of  life  to  an 
expiring  Dualism ;  it  is  even  to  equip  it  with  an  all-conquer- 
ing sword.  No  form  of  Monism  can  persistently  maintain  itself 
which  erects  its  system  upon  the  ruins  of  fundamental  ethical 
principles  and  ideas. 

The  science  of  mind,  whether  pursued  from  the  experimental 
and  physiological,  or  from  the  more  purely  philosophical  point 
of  view,  has  during  the  last  half-century  made  rapid  progress. 
A  new  form  —  if  not  of  a  science,  at  least  of  scientific  research 
looking  toward  the  establishment  of  a  verifiable  body  of  science 
—  has  been  originated  and  purs^^ed  with  ardor  and  brilliant 
results.  This  is  psycho-physics,  or  physiological  psychology. 
The  very  existence  of  such  an  attempt  at  science  is  indicative 
of  a  strong  monistic  tendency.  Its  conclusions,  so  far  as  it  can 
be  said  to  have  established  conclusions,  favor  a  monistic  phi- 
losophy. But  what  kind  of  a  monistic  philosophy  ?  Not  such 
a  kind,  we  believe,  as  denies  the  derived  and  dependent  reality 
of  either  the  body  or  the  mind.     Certainly  not  that  modern  and 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        405 

most  captivating  form  of  materialism,  which  refuses  to  recog- 
nize a  real  subject  of  the  psychical  states,  but  regards  them  all 
as  only  phenomenal  and  expressive  of  the  complicated  molecular 
and  chemical  relations  and  changes  that  belong  to  the  atoms 
of  the  material  organism.  Against  this  form  of  Monism,  psy- 
chology and  philosophy  will  continue  to  erect  the  barriers  of  a 
scientific  Dualism.  13ody  and  mind, --both  will  continue  to 
hand  in  their  irresistible  claims  to  recognition  as  belonging  to 
the  world  of  finite  reality.  Nor  will  the  scientific  comprehen- 
sion of  the  nature  and  laws  of  either  one  of  these  two  kinds  of 
reality  be  furthered  by  refusing  to  recognize  the  facts.  Each 
of  the  two  is  real,  because  each  of  the  two  maintains  its  place 
as  capable  of  that  reciprocally  conditionating  change  of  states 
which  is  indicative  of  all  finite  reality. 

But  some  form  of  philosophical  Monism  is  indicated,  we  have 
already  said,  by  the  researches  of  psycho-physics  and  by  that 
philosophy  of  mind  which  builds  upon  the  principles  ascer- 
tained by  these  researches.  Realities  correlated  as  are  the  bod} 
and  the  mind  must  have,  as  it  were,  common  "  ground."  This 
conclusion  is  not  based  upon  the  false  expectation  that  some 
one  bond  or  connection  between  them  will  ever  be  envisaged 
-as  really  existing.  It  is  rather  a  conclusion  constantly  strength- 
ened by  increasing  information  as  to  how  infinitely  varied, 
subtle,  and  comprehensive  are  the  ties  of  reciprocal  action  which 
unite  the  two.  They  have  their  reality  in  the  ultimate  One 
Reality ;  they  have  their  interrelated  lives  as  expressive  of  the 
one  Life  which  is  immanent  in  the  two.  Only  by  this  suppo- 
sition can  we  satisfy  all  that  the  antiquated  theories  of  Occa- 
sionalism or  Pre-existent  Harmony  were  invented  to  explain,  as 
well  as  all  the  wondrous  facts  which  modern  psychology  is 
bringing  to  the  light. 

Doubtless  the  most  difficult  and  serious  work,  which  any  true 
monistic  system  will  have  to  achieve  in  overcoming  the  incon- 
sistencies of  a  dualistic  philosophy,  lies  on  ethical  ground.  We 
have  already  indicated  what  some  of  these  difficulties  are.     All 


406        TENDENCIES   AND    SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

attempted  solutions  of  them  end  largely  in  a  confession  of  igno- 
rance and  of  mental  inability  to  explain.  But  then  this  is  a 
confession  which  Dualism  has  to  make  no  less  than  Monism. 
We  do  not  the  better  explain  the  genesis  of  moral  evil  —  real, 
and  in  a  world  of  reality  —  either  by  positing  an  eternal  Prin- 
ciple of  such  evil  over  against  God,  or  by  denying  the  constant 
dependence  of  all  finite  personality  upon  the  Life  of  God.  On 
the  contrary,  Dualism  increases  our  difficulties  ;  for  it  either 
admits  an  eternal  schism  in  the  very  Being  of  Absolute  Good, 
or  else  it  attributes  to  the  creature  such  an  independence  as 
sacrifices  the  infiniteness  of  the  Divine  Personality. 

Dualism  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  the  guardian  of  the 
interests  which  are  jeoparded  by  either  a  materialistic  Eealism 
or  an  Idealism  that  resolves  the  extra-menial  reality  of  the 
world  of  things  into  merely  a  series  of  objectifying  psychical 
processes.  It  has  a  certain  use  and  value  in  defending  the 
rights  of  scientific  physics  against  an  incomplete  philosophical 
analysis.  It  may  also  defend  the  rights  of  psychology  against 
the  unwarrantable  encroachments  of  a  materialistic  view  of 
nature.  Whenever  we  are  inclined  to  hasty  generalizations 
concerning  the  relations  of  the  "  World-Ground  "  to  finite  minds, 
in  the  supposed  interests  of  its  unity  and  absoluteness,  Dualism 
interposes  grave  objections  derived  from  universal  and  valid 
ethical  distinctions.  It  is  thus  both  a  warning  and  an  incite- 
ment to  philosophical  Monism.  But  it  contributes  nothing  of 
positive  and  lasting  value  to  a  true  solution  of  cosmothetic 
problems ;  nor  can  it  ever  so  shape  itself  as  to  become  a  satis- 
factory philosophical  system.  In  being  consistently  and  per- 
sistently philosophical  we  are  always  seeking  some  form  of 
monistic   system. 

We  give  credence  to  Dualism,  accordingly,  only  in  order  to 
be  more  cautious  and  penetrating  in  all  our  philosophical  analy- 
sis, more  patient  and  comprehensive  in  our  attempts  at  a  final 
philosophical  synthesis.  But  as  itself  a  claimant  for  adherence 
it  can  meet  with  little  intelligent  favor.     It  is  scarcely  too  much 


TENDENCIES  AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        4Q7 

to  say  that  in  the  development  of  rational  self-knowledge,  and 
in  the  growth  of  philosophical  system,  this  form  of  thinking  is 
constantly  being  relegated  to  an  inferior  position.  Doubtless 
its  extinction  will  come  when,  but  only  when,  Monism  shall 
have  made  full  room  in  its  syntheses  for  those  facts  and  prin- 
ciples upon  which  Dualism  has  hitherto  maintained  its  partial 
conclusions. 

But  if  we  are  to  look  for  a  satisfactory  philosophy  in  some 
form  of  Monism  alone,  to  which  of  its  two  principal  forms 
shall  it  be,  —  to  Eealism,  or  to  Idealism  ?  The  answer  from 
history  seems  to  us  inevitable.  To  neither  of  these  two  forms, 
with  exclusion  of  the  considerations  upon  which  the  other  is 
based.  So  often  as  Eealism  rears  its  structure  of  philosophical 
tenets  in  disregard  of  idealistic  principles  and  postulates,  so 
often  does  Idealism  find  it  easy  to  pull  this  structure  —  with 
scorn  for  its  shallow  analysis  and  its  ignorance  of  psychology 
and  the  history  of  philosophy  —  down  to  the  ground.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  so  often  as  Idealism  pushes  its  conclusions  to 
their  logical  issue  in  disregard  of  the  principles  and  postulates 
to  which  Eealism  appeals,  so  often  does  it  find  itself  confuted 
by  the  "  common-sense "  of  mankind,  by  the  presuppositions  of 
all  science,  and  by  the  plainest  ethical  and  sesthetical,  as  well  as 
metaphysical,  principles.  Only  some  form  of  Monism  that  shall 
satisfy  the  facts  and  truths  to  which  both  Eealism  and  Ideal- 
ism appeal  can  occupy  the  place  of  true  and  final  philosophy. 

An  analysis  of  the  primary  act  of  knowledge  has  shown  us 
the  reality  of  knowing  subject  and  of  object  known  as  impli- 
cated in  that  act.  The  actuality  of  the  act  of  knowledge,  with 
all  that  is  implicated  in  it,  is  the  common  point  of  starting  for 
both  Eealism  and  Idealism.  But  the  disregard  or  relative  de- 
preciation of  either  of  these  two  sets  of  factors  is  the  source  in 
which  these  rival  views  originate.  The  extreme  conclusions  of 
both  constitute  a  call  to  a  new  and  more  fundamental  analysis 
of  knowledge ;  and  to  another  and  more  successful  attempt  to 
treat,  by  the  process  of  reflection,  all  that  knowledge  implicates. 


408        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Each  extreme,  moreover,  contains,  to  some  extent,  the  corrective 
for  the  other.  The  history  of  speculative  thinking  and  of  its 
results  in  the  formation  of  philosophical  system,  shows  this 
process  of  reciprocal  limitation  and  correction  constantly  going 
on.  The  clear  self-conscious  effort  of  modern  philosophy  is 
directed  toward  a  re-examination  of  the  ground  so  as  to  secure, 
in  a  more  complete  and  tenable  form,  the  statement  of  the 
results  of  analysis.  But  it  also  aims  at  ultimately  combining 
and  systematizing  these  results  so  as  to  attain  a  true  and  com- 
prehensive view  of  the  principles  of  all  Knowledge  and  all 
Being.  Some  form  of  Monism  which  shall  incorporate  both 
Eealism  and  Idealism  is,  therefore,  at  present,  the  intelligent 
and  avowed  aim  of  philosophy.  The  tendency  of  modern 
thought  toward  a  form  of  speculative  thinking  that  is  (if  the 
compound  may  be  pardoned)  a  "  Eeal-Idealism  "  or  an  "  Ideal- 
Eealism,"  is  unmistakable. 

This  tendency  may  be  enforced  and  illustrated  by  consider- 
ing how  the  realistic  and  the  idealistic  conclusions  supplement 
and  correct  each  other  at  every  stage  of  philosophical  develop- 
ment. The  same  thing  may  also  be  accomplished  by  showing 
how  both  Realism  and  Idealism,  as  two  exclusive  systems,  con- 
ceal each  other's  postulates  within  themselves  and  perish  by 
having  their  inner  life  consumed  thereby. 

Eealism  in  its  most  primitive  and  crude  (its  boorish  or  sav- 
age) form  assumes,  without  reflection  or  criticism,  the  existence 
of  "  Things  "  ready  made.  With  this  form  of  thinking,  knowl- 
edge of  things  is  likened  to  some  sort  of  copying-off,  by  impres- 
sions made  and  received  of  these  ready-made  things.  Only 
scanty  reflection  is  needed  to  show  that  the  so-called  "impres- 
sions "  of  some  of  the  senses  cannot  possibly  stand  the  test  of 
this  assumed  correspondence  to  extra-mental  reality.  Thus 
crude  natural  Eealism  is  forced  to  permit  of  an  important 
change.  Idealism  then  establishes  itself  in  possession  of  a  cer- 
tain field  won  from  its  rival  view  of  the  world  of  things. 

But  Eealism  next  retreats  upon  the  proposition  that  some  at 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS    IN   PHILOSOPHY.        4u9 

least  of  the  senses  convey,  under  all  ordinary  and  normal  con- 
ditions, impressions  which  are  truly  representative  of  the  quali- 
ties and  relations  of  things,  as  these  things  exist  external  and 
ready  made.  The  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  of  matter  is  therefore  introduced.  This  distinction, 
instead  of  simply  being  recognized  as  helpful  in  psychological 
analysis  and  in  the  organization  of  experience  with  a  world  of 
phenomena,  is  assumed  to  be  inherent  in  the  very  extra-mental 
reality  of  things.  It  is  then  said  that  "  Things "  may  seem 
sweet  or  sour,  ill-smelling  or  of  pleasant  odor,  high  or  low  in 
pitch,  colored  with  this  shade  or  that ;  but  they  are  really  ex- 
tended and  impenetrable,  ponderous,  etc.  For  the  assurance 
that  this  statement  is  true,  the  last  appeal  may  be  made  to 
touch  and  muscular  "impressions."  But  the  distinction  in 
qualities,  as  immediately  and  indubitably  involving  the  claims  of 
this  form  of  Eealism,  is  dissolved  at  once  by  the  conclusions 
both  of  physical  and  of  psychological  science.  Physics  shows  us 
—  so  it  thinks  —  that  the  only  real  and  extra-mental  things  are 
the  atoms  ;  and  the  impressions  of  things  —  the  "  Things " 
hitherto  assumed  to  be  in  some  sort  immediately  known  as 
they  really  are  —  come  far  short  of  representing  the  reality, 
even  as  respects  its  so-called  primary  qualities.  While  psy- 
chology points  out  on  what  conditions  and  by  what  processes 
the  immediate  cognition  of  extended  and  impenetrable  and  ex- 
ternal things  is  developed,  under  the  laws  of  the  mind's  life. 
Thus  is  new  territory  brought  within  the  conquests  of  Idealism. 
Just  at  this  point  realistic  thinking  is  accustomed,  being 
hard  pressed  by  idealistic  truths,  to  make  a  kind  of  dash  side- 
ways, and  take  refuge  in  the  thinnest  shell  of  a  critical  conclu- 
sion. To  change  the  figure  of  speech,  it  mixes  a  smattering 
of  physiology  with  an  imperfect  psychological  and  philosophical 
analysis,  and  so  compounds  a  new  kind  of  Realism.  But  this 
new  tenet  can  make  no  successful  appeal  to  "  common-sense," 
for  it  has  departed  too  far  along  the  sceptical  and  critical  road 
from  the  accepted  beliefs  of  unreflecting  mankind.     And  it  also 


410        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

lacks  justification  from  science  and  philosophy,  because  it  has 
prematurely  and  unwarrantably  called  a  halt  in  the  journey 
along  this  road.  Eealism  now  admits  that  we  have  no  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  any  really  external  thing.  But  what  we  do 
immediately  know,  it  claims,  is  our  own  excited  and  sentient 
organism.  Here  physiology  and  psychology  combine  to  show 
that  the  excited  organism  is  precisely  what  no  man  ever  imme- 
diately knows.  By  sight,  for  example,  the  external  parts  of  our 
own  bodies  are  no  more  immediately  known  than  are  the  objects 
separable  from  our  bodies.  And  by  sight  no  man  ever  immedi- 
ately knew  his  own  sentient  retina,  or  the  organism  concerned 
in  vision  (optic  nerve-tracts  and  chiasm,  corpora-quadrigemina, 
and  upper  occipital  lobe)  posterior  and  superior  thereto.  How 
far  we  are  from  such  immediate  knowledge  through  the  skin  is 
made  perfectly  obvious  by  the  modern  experimental  researches 
into  the  development  of  that  wonderful  organ  and  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  which  it  is  the  organ.  And  yet  this  kind  of  Bealism 
characterizes  all  of  the  modified  Scotch  school,  including  even 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  who  vacillated  between  it  and  another 
equally  untenable  view.  It  is  now  practically  driven  from  the 
field  by  the  appropriate  idealistic  considerations. 

And  now  a  yet  more  lordly  form  of  Bealism  appears,  and  in 
the  name  of  physical  science  claims  to  erect  itself  upon  founda- 
tions quite  unassailable  by  philosophical  Idealism.  It  calls 
itself  "  physical  Bealism,"  in  honor  of  its  assumed  derivation 
from  the  kind  of  science  whose  name  it  bears.1  It  consists  of  a 
system  of  inferences,  from  "data  of  sense,"  to  "physical  objects 
of  science."  It  authoritatively  describes  the  world  of  extra- 
mental  reality  in  the  well-known  terms  of  "  atoms,"  "  energy  " 

1  See,  for  example,  a  work  bearing  this  title:  "Physical  Eealism:  Being  an 
Analytical  Philosophy  from  the  Physical  Objects  of  Science  to  the  Physical  Data 
of  Sense,"  by  Thomas  Case,  M.A.  London,  1889.  The  author  of  this  volume 
seems  to  hold  both  the  last  two  realistic  hypotheses  as  to  the  nature  of  the  object 
known  as  really  existent,  by  the  mind.  A  new  philosophy  is  proposed  by  this 
author,  which  infers  plrysical  objects  without  from  "  physical  data  within  ;  "  and 
the  physical  data  within  are  the  known  physical  parts  of  the  nervous  system. 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        41 1 

potential  and  kinetic,  physical  "  causation "  and  "  law,"  etc. 
Thus  is  disclosed  to  us  a  world  that  really  is  widely  and  won- 
derfully different  from  the  world  that  appears  to  us.  It  even 
involves  many  assumed  realities  that,  judging  by  all  the  data 
of  sense  only,  cannot  possibly  have  being  at  all. 

But  the  considerations  upon  which  the  rival  idealistic  view  re- 
lies follow  pitilessly  this  form  of  Piealism  as  it  retreats  from  the 
natural  and  universal  interpretation  of  the  data  of  sense  into  a 
sphere  of  imagination  and  inference  where  only  expert  students 
of  the  particular  sciences  have  any  success  in  the  attempt  to  fol- 
low. Idealism,  by  a  further  process  of  analysis,  dissolves  these 
"  objects  of  science  "  into  a  content  and  a  form,  both  of  which  are 
ascribed  to  the  constitution  of  the  mind,  but  cannot  be  represen- 
tative of  ready-made  and  extra-mental  reality.  For  the  content 
—  namely,  the  "  data  of  sense  "  —  is  to  be  regarded  as  states  of 
the  conscious  mind ;  and  by  calling  it  "  physical "  or  "  objective  " 
we  do  not  escape  this  conclusion.  And  "  inferences  "  from  these 
data  to  "  physical  objects  of  science "  are  subjective  activities 
which,  in  themselves,  can  never  take  us  out  of  the  realm  of 
mental  form  and  mental  law.  But  if  scientific  Realism  falls 
back  upon  the  immediate  cognition  or  belief,  which  is  attached 
to  the  "  data  of  sense,"  it  becomes  of  all  forms  of  Realism  the 
most  difficult  to  defend  against  the  attacks  of  Idealism.  For 
what  is  "  given  "  in  the  "  data  of  sense,"  whether  in  the  form 
of  knowledge  or  belief,  is  as  far  as  possible  removed  from  the 
world  of  realities  in  which  physical  science  lives  and  moves. 
TJiis  world  is  distinctly  not  immediately  known  by  any  one; 
nor  is  it  believed  in  with  certainty  of  conviction  by  every  one. 
It  is  rather  a  hypothetical  world,  resulting  from  the  trained 
imagination  and  from  the  subtle,  difficult,  and  often  exceed- 
ingly doubtful,  inferences  of  a  very  few  minds. 

It  may  be  said,  to  be  sure,  that  the  knowledge  of  the  world 
is  constantly  being  more  firmly  established  by  the  exercise  of 
all  that  power  of  prediction  and  explanation  in  which  physical 
science  rejoices.     But  of  itself — Idealism  may  answer  —  this 


412        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

only  proves  the  logical  consistency  of  the  scientific  ideas,  the 
well-grounded  but  still  subjective  validity  of  the  propositions 
we  have  learned  to  make  concerning  certain  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. Of  itself,  it  does  not  answer  any  of  our  inquiries  con- 
cerning the  genesis,  nature,  and  validity  of  our  so-called  per- 
ceptions, representative  images,  and  conceptions  of  "  Things." 

The  debate  between  these  two  great  schools  of  philosophy 
cannot  be  settled  by  an  appeal  to  physical  science.  The  legiti- 
mate conclusions  of  physical  science  will  remain  unchanged 
within  their  own  sphere,  whether  Idealism  or  Eealism  shall 
obtain  the  upper  hand  in  the  domain  of  philosophy.  Nor  can 
a  "  new  "  third  philosophy  of  the  realistic  order  be  founded,  in 
the  name  of  physical  science,  which  shall  resist  with  peculiar 
success  the  attacks  of  the  subtler  forms  of  the  idealistic  theory. 

Finally,  Eealism  —  perhaps  growing  desperate  and  losing  some 
of  the  semblance  of  self-control  —  may  rest  its  case,  as  against 
Idealism,  upon  moral  and  religious  faith.  It  may  cry  out : 
"  What !  would  you  do  away  with  the  reality  of  moral  distinc- 
tions ?  Would  you  resolve  God  into  a  shadowy  mental  image, 
or  into  a  mere  conception  somewhat  more  consistently  and 
elaborately  formed  ?  That  there  is  force  and  meaning  in  this 
outcry,  however  much  it  resembles  the  confession  of  a  cause 
that  is  lost  in  the  field  where  the  cold  steel  of  ratiocination 
carries  the  day,  we  do  not  doubt.  But  Idealism,  in  its  turn, 
may  reply  with  a  similar  appeal  to  prejudice.  It  may  cry  out 
against  Realism  as  materialistic.  For  it,  too,  has  not  infrequently 
appeared  in  history  as  the  champion  of  orthodoxy  of  morals  and 
religion. 

In  spite  of  the  prevalence  of  Aristotelianism,  as  the  author- 
ized philosophy  of  the  Church  in  the  Middle  Ages,  there  were 
not  wanting  occasions  when  Platonism  gained  the  ascendency 
in  ecclesiastical  circles.  The  extreme  Idealism  of  the  disciple? 
of  Descartes  was  propounded  in  the  interests  of  religious  faith. 
Berkeley  avowedly  promulgated  his  theory  of  sense-perception, 
and  then  extended  his  conclusions  from  it  into  the  realm  of  the 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        413 

philosophy  of  nature,  as  an  antidote  for  the  prevalent  material- 
ism of  his  day.  By  far  the  greatest  of  all  American  theologians, 
Jonathan  Edwards,  seems  obviously  to  have  been  in  philosophy 
a  "  cosmothetic  Idealist "  of  the  most  pronounced  sort.  If  the 
dangers  of  Idealism  are  great,  and  lie  in  the  direction  of  Panthe- 
ism, no  less  great  are  the  dangers  of  Eealism  in  the  direction 
of  Materialism. 

In  every  form  of  Eealism,  then,  the  considerations  on  which 
Idealism  relies  can  be  effectively  used  to  annul  all  the  conclu- 
sions which  leave  these  considerations  out  of  the  account.  The 
history  of  philosophy,  and  the  very  nature  of  the  philosophical 
method,  evince  the  truth  of  this  remark. 

On  the  other  hand,  something  similar  may  be  shown  to  hold 
true  of  all  the  "  pure  "  or  extreme  positions  of  Idealism.  They, 
too,  may  be  proved  either  to  have  been  taken  in  disregard  of 
certain  primary  facts  and  indubitable  principles,  or  else  to 
hold  concealed  within  them  certain  realistic  postulates  which 
finally  work  the  change  of  the  positions  themselves. 

"We  have  already  seen  how  even  the  most  primary  act  of 
knowledge,  on  analysis,  postulates  among  the  "  data  of  sense  " 
the  reality  of  that  object  which  is  given  as  not-rae,  to  the  know- 
ing mind.  To  insist,  as  Idealism  rightly  does,  upon  the  truth 
that  the  object  cannot  be  given  to  the  mind  without  an  activity 
of  the  being  to  whom  it  is  given,  according  to  constitutional 
laws  of  its  being,  does  not  destroy  the  bearing  of  the  supple- 
mentary fact.  It  is  impossible  for  the  mind  to  regard  this  object, 
thus  given,  otherwise  than  as  an  extra-mental  being.  Nor  is 
this  "  impossibility "  to  be  satisfied  by  resolving  it  into  an 
Impotency.  The  knowledge  of  the  not-me  is  rather,  primarily, 
a  potency  of  the  mind  to  apprehend  being  other  than  itself, 
-  a  potency  of  the  knowledge  of  the  reality  of  the  "  Thing  " 
known. 

Furthermore,  the  fact  that  the  knowledge  of  things,  when 
compared  with  the  mere  having  of  sensations  or  other  mental 
states,  must  be  regarded  as  a  complex  and  later  development 


414        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  mind,  does  not  annul  or  weaken  the  force  of  the  postu- 
lates that  are  implicated  in  all  knowledge.  This  process  of 
becoming  able  to  know  belongs  to  the  growth  of  reason  itself. 
AVhat  reason  is,  however,  and  what  it  guarantees,  —  these  are 
questions  that  cannot  he  settled  merely  by  giving  an  historical 
description  of  the  factors  and  stages  of  its  growth.  The  pos- 
tulated reality  of  the  "  Thing  "  known  is  a  result  of  rational 
activity  that  cannot  be  left  out  of  the  account.  And  so  often 
as,  in  the  effort  to  account  for  this  result,  Idealism  refers  to  the 
admitted  fact  that  the  mind,  which  is  active  in  perceiving,  is 
also  active  in  postulating,  so  often  will  Eealism  have  occasion 
to  refer  to  the  other  fact,  that  the  object  perceived  is  postulated 
as  a  reality  no^-myself. 

It  is  only  by  recognizing  a  similar  postulate,  already  in  force, 
that  Idealism  itself  can  reach  any  knowledge  of  a  mind,  which 
may  serve  as  the  subject  of  changing  psychical  states.  Every 
claim  to  dispense  with  this  postulate  and,  at  the  same  time, 
secure  an  immediate  and  sure  knowledge  of  mental  reality,  is 
psychologically  indefensible.  Thus  the  scepticism  which  Ideal- 
ism displays  toward  the  extra-mental  reality  of  the  external 
object  is  turned  against  the  ideating  mind.  It  is  equally  pow- 
erful there.  As  to  the  actuality  of  the  individual  mental  state, 
there  can  be,  of  course,  no  doubt.  As  little  doubt  can  there  be 
that  every  mental  state  is  necessarily  thought  of  as  referable  to 
a  subject  of  all  the  states,  —  to  a  mind.  But  the  reference  is 
itself  a  mental  act ;  and  the  necessity  of  thinking  all  mental  acts 
and  states  as  referable  to  a  subject  of  them  all,  may  itself  be 
called  by  the  sceptical  critic  an  impotency  of  thought.  Thus  is 
Idealism,  after  it  has  denied  the  e^r<z-mental  reality  of  the  exter- 
nal object,  forced  by  scepticism  to  question  also  the  &r£ra-mental 
reality  of  the  so-called  subject  of  the  ideas.  Nothing  but  absolute 
Solipsism  (the  bare  affirmation  of  the  truth,  As  I  think,  I  am 
thinking,  and  there  is  nothing  known  to  be  actual  besides  my 
thinking)  seems  inevitable.  But  reason  cannot  thus  abjure  its 
confidence  in  itself.     It  revolts  from  this  extreme  conclusion  of 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN  PHILOSOPHY.        415 

a  sceptical  Idealism.  It  affirms  again  its  original  postulate,  as 
implicated  in  its  own  act  of  knowledge,  and  as  applicable  both 
to  itself  and  to  its  own  external  object.  This  is  equivalent  to 
the  realistic  affirmation  ;  in  some  sort,  both  "  I "'  and  the 
"  Things  "  of  my  knowledge  are  real.  But  it  belongs  to  further 
metaphysical  analysis  to  tell,  if  possible,  precisely  how  much 
must  be  included  in  this  statement. 

The  progressive  organization  of  experience  involves  a  con- 
stant application  and  extension,  as  it  were,  of  the  same  realistic 
postulate.  In  one  sense  of  the  words  it  may  be  said  that,  as 
we  gain  experience,  we  more  clearly  and  certainly  know  that 
things  really  and  extra-mentally  are,  and  that  we  ourselves  are 
real  psychical  existences,  subjects  of  a  developing  psychical  life. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  must  also  be  admitted  that  the  progressive 
organization  of  experience  gives  us  no  new  means  of  knowing 
the  truth  of  our  fundamental  postulate.  We  certainly  can  be 
said  to  gain  vastly  in  knowledge  of  the  modes  of  action  and  the 
changing  relations  of  real  beings.  Perhaps  there  is  no  objection 
to  saying  that  our  conviction  of  the  extra-mental  reality  of 
things,  and  of  other  minds,  is  deepened  and  confirmed  with  the 
progressive  organization  of  experience.  But  neither  ordinary 
knowledge  nor  accumulations  of  scientific  truth  can  serve  to 
"prove"  anew  such  a  reality  for  that  which  is  given  to  my 
mind  as  not-me, —  whether  material  things  or  other  minds. 
Inferences  cannot  get  behind  or  beneath  the  postulate,  to  con- 
firm or  to  support  it.  Inferences  all  imply  the  postulate.  They 
can  only  apply  it.  By  the  application  the  self-conscious  reason 
becomes  more  familiar,  as  it  were,  with  its  own  fundamental 
laws.  When  we  reason  up  to  it,  or  down  to  it,  we  find  the 
postulate  there. 

Accordingly,  any  form  of  Idealism  which  leaves  the  realistic 
factors  and  postulates  out  of  the  account  ends  in  conclusions 
which  reason  deems  absurd.  It  fails  in  the  attempts  to  explain 
the  progressive  organization  of  experience.  This  organization 
of  experience  necessarily  implies  the  existence  of  other  minds 


416         TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

than  inine.  In  whatever  sense  I  am  real,  in  that  same  sense 
they  are  equally  real.  Thus  much  is  implied  in  all  intercourse 
of  man  with  his  fellows,  —  intellectual,  social,  political,  religious. 
The  most  "  Egoistical  Idealism  "  will  not  venture  to  deny  to 
you  that  you,  in  some  sort,  really  exist. 

But  the  only  bridge  of  knowledge  I  have  from  myself  to  the 
reality  of  other  minds  is  laid,  as  it  were,  over  their  material 
bodies.  By  inferences  —  subtle,  repeated,  remote,  and  often 
doubtful  —  one  mind  may  be  said  to  know  that  other  minds 
are  ;  that  they  as  really  are  as  it  is  itself,  and  are  really,  in 
essential  qualities,  as  itself.  All  of  these  inferences  are  based 
upon  the  knowledge  of  the  "  Things  "  which  we  call  the  bodies 
inhabited  by  other  minds.  If,  then,  Idealism  will  not  fling 
itself  out  upon  this  realistic  postulate,  it  cannot  logically  arrive 
at  the  conclusion  that  other  minds  have  an  existence  extra- 
mental  to  its  own.  The  postulate  makes  a  safe  and  logical 
passage  only  when  it  includes  the  extra  -mental  reality  of  the 
bodily  things,  from  whose  changes  the  existence  of  the  minds 
is  inferred. 

It  would  be  quite  too  absurd,  however,  to  hold  that  no  other 
minds  than  ourselves  exist,  —  that  there  is  nought,  even  of  that 
sort  of  being  we  call  a  soul,  except  our  own  poor  example  of 
such  being.  For  at  this  point  Idealism  seems  to  cut  ethics, 
esthetics,  and  religion,  up  by  the  roots.  Without  real  minds, 
existing  in  relations  of  intercommunication  through  really  exis- 
tent material  means,  no  conduct  or  ethical  law  of  conduct  is  pos- 
sible. In  other  connection  (page  186  f.)  we  have  seen  how  the 
postulate  of  practical  reason  which  Kant  proposes  implies  the 
existence  in  extra-mental  reality  of  a  whole  scheme  of  metaphy- 
sical entities  and  relations.  "  Pure  "  Idealism  cannot  even  say, 
in  the  language  attributed  to  Omar  Khayyam,  — 

"  We  are  no  other  than  a  moving  row 
Of  Magic  Shadow-shapes  that  come  and  go  ; " 

for  there  is  no  knowledge,  or  chance  for  knowledge,  that  we 
exist,  except  as  an  imaging  process  of  the  individual  Ego. 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        417 

Doubtless  the  successful  appeal  of  polemical  liealisni  to 
sesthetical  or  religious  prejudices  rests  upon  a  certain  basis  of 
truth.  The  only  perfectly  "  pure  "  and  logical  form  of  Idealism 
is  a  sceptical  Solipsism  which  has  gone  to  the  lengths  of  deny- 
ing all  cognition  of  reality  except,  or  beyond,  the  actuality  of 
the  self-consciously  recognized  psychical  state  belonging  here 
and  now  to  the  individual  subject.  Such  Idealism  is,  of  course, 
inconsistent  with  the  recognition  of  any  real  beauty  in  nature, 
or  of  any  really  beautiful  and  good  Absolute  One,  whom  we 
may  worship  as  wo^-ourselves,  as  indeed  God. 

Those  devoted  to  the  pursuit  of  the  physical  sciences  are 
accustomed  to  imagine  that  they  are  dealing  with  objects  which 
have  some  peculiar  claim  to  escape  from  the  ravages  of  a 
thorough  idealistic  construction  of  philosoph}'.  There  could 
not  well  be  a  greater  mistake.  To  be  sure,  such  a  philosophy 
would  reduce  the  body  of  physical  science,  and  the  universe 
which  is  its  object  of  research  and  discovery,  to  the  similitude 
of  a  dream.  But  why  should  any  peculiarly  strong  objection 
be  felt  to  this  ?  If  our  own  bodies  are  dreams,  we  need  not 
mourn  the  dream-like  and  phantasmagorical  character  of  the 
heavenly  bodies.  We  know  nothing  of  the  latter  except  through 
changes  in  the  former.  We  need  care  nothing  as  to  their  reality 
except  as  they  affect  the  happiness  of  our  dream.  As  dream- 
objects  they  serve  their  purpose  as  well  as  they  would  were 
they  those  vast  and  distant  e<tr  a -mental  realities  which  science 
assumes  them  to  be.  If  we  are  to  lose  from  knowledge  the 
reality  of  friend  and  foe,  of  wife  and  mother  and  child,  and  yet 
the  dream  continues  pleasant,  we  can  easily  dispense  with  the 
reality  of  the  fixed  stars.  All  that  physical  science  can  claim, 
or  aim  to  secure,  as  compared  with  ordinary  knowledge,  is  a 
superior  consistency  and  comprehensiveness  for  its  dream. 

And,  indeed,  the  reasons  why  we  recoil  from  regarding  all 
external  nature  as  purely  phantasmagorical  are  not  scientific 
at  all.  Besides  the  one  metaphysical  reason,  they  are  rather 
ethical,  ajsthetical,  and  religious.     The  mind,  indeed,  insists  on 

27 


418        TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

carrying  this  postulate  which  enters  into  the  more  primary  acts 
of  cognition  over  into  the  complex,  inferential,  and  derived 
knowledge  of  the  physical  sciences.  Idealism,  as  well  as  Real- 
ism, feels  itself  compelled  to  recognize  the  force  of  this  impulse. 
It  therefore  takes  the  form  sometimes  called  cosmothetic  ;  or  it 
becomes  of  the  absolute  and  metaphysical  kind.  It,  too,  affirms 
as  the  final  conclusion  of  all  philosophical  searching  the  exist- 
ence, extra-mentally,  of  a  Unity  of  Reality.  Only  it  considers 
this  alone  real  Being  that  is  not-me,  to  be  some  Ideal,  some 
frankly  or  secretly  assumed  spiritual  Unity. 

The  conclusion  derived  from  the  foregoing  brief  sketch  of  the 
antagonistic  positions  of  Idealism  and  Realism,  as  inherent  in 
the  contrasted  solutions  which  they  give  to  the  different  philo- 
sophical problems,  might  be  confirmed  by  an  appeal  to  the 
history  of  philosophy.  History  shows  the  two  engaged  in  the 
process  of  correcting  each  other's  faults,  and  supplying  each 
other's  deficiencies,  from  the  beginning  of  speculative  thinking 
until  now.  The  process  has  resulted  in  enriching  the  content 
of  the  ideas  held  by  both  classes  of  schools.  It  has  impelled 
each  of  the  two  onward  in  the  effort  to  be  more  comprehensive, 
so  as  to  admit  into  itself  all  the  true  data. and  conclusions 
of  the  other.  History,  therefore,  shows  the  two  rival  systems 
approaching  a  common  ground  of  standing.  And  that  ground 
of  standing  can  be  no  other  than  such  a  monistic  philosophy  as 
shall  hold  in  harmony  all  the  truths  upon  which  both  Eealism 
and  Idealism  rely. 

In  fact,  a  purely  realistic  or  a  purely  idealistic  system  of 
philosophy  cannot  be  maintained.  Any  position  approaching 
more  or  less  nearly  that  of  complete  and  uncompromising 
Realism,  or  the  same  kind  of  Idealism,  is  tenable  only  as  a 
point  of  momentary  standing.  It  is  reached  and  held  only  as  a 
step  in  the  larger  progress  of  synthetic  philosophy.  Every  such 
position,  whether  taken  in  the  name  of  Realism  or  in  the  name 
of  Idealism,  is  but  a  point  marked  in  the  progress  of  the  human 
mind  toward  a  final  and  satisfactory  Monism.     This 'Monism 


TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS  IN   PHILOSOPHY.        419 

must  find  the  Unity  of  all  Being  and  Knowledge,  the  World- 
Ground,  in  an  ideal  Reality,  a  realized  Ideal.  Such  an  One  is 
nothing  else  than  some  rational,  self-conscious,  and  personal 
Life. 

But  —  it  may  be  asked  —  after  we  have  come  to  this  some- 
what barren  conclusion,  what  remains  for  philosophy  to  do  ? 
And  in  case  we  accept  the  conclusion,  what  better  off  are  we  in 
respect  to  affording  a  solution  of  the  separate  philosophical 
problems,  —  those  "  riddles  by  which  our  mind  is  oppressed  in 
life,  and  about  which  we  are  forcibly  compelled  to  some  view  or 
other,  in  order  to  be  able  really  to  live  at  all  "  ?  The  answer  to 
the  last  of  these  two  questions  is  :  "  Much  every  way ;  "  and  the 
answer  to  the  first  of  them  is  :  "  Much  in  many  ways." 

After  the  supreme  task  of  philosophy  has  been,  as  it  were 
provisionally,  performed,  every  particular  problem  in  the  domain 
of  philosophy  requires  the  same  detailed  examination  upon  an 
inductive  basis  and  by  the  method  which  is  peculiar  to  philoso- 
phy, as  before.  But  the  significance  of  every  problem  is  en- 
larged and  heightened  by  our  possession  of  the  truth  of  this 
supreme  synthesis.  Every  problem  also,  as  it  becomes  more 
clearly  understood,  contributes  something  new  and  persuasive 
toward  the  proof  of  the  synthesis  itself.  To  speak  from  the 
point  of  view  of  religion,  all  things  have  their  meaning  made 
deeper  and  broader  by  a  rational  faith  in  God ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  understanding  of  all  things  else  adds  support 
and  clearness  to  our  faith  in  God. 

Even  of  the  detailed  problems  of  psychology  and  philosophy 
the  remark  just  made  holds  true.  It  is  true,  for  example,  of 
the  problem  of  sense-perception.  The  vision  of  the  Absolute  is 
not,  indeed,  to  be  attained  through  the  eye  of  sense  ;  neither  is 
it  the  ear  of  flesh  and  bone  which  hears  and  recognizes  His 
voice.  But  to  one  who  considers  the  experience  of  knowledge 
by  the  senses,  from  the  higher  philosophical  point  of  view,  the 
presence  of  the  Absolute,  the  real  Being  that  is  the  reality  of  all 
things  and  the  validation  of  all  knowledge,  is  to  be  recognized 


42U         TENDENCIES   AND   SCHOOLS    IN   PHILOSOPHY. 

even  here.  From  the  beginning  of  philosophical  speculation 
upon  this  problem  until  the  present  time,  the  infinite  mystery 
of  existence  which  it  involves  has  been  recognized.  And  what 
is  true  of  this  problem  of  sense-perception  is  certainly  true  of 
all  the  problems  of  philosophy. 

We  find  then  a  proof  of  the  substantial  truthfulness  of  the 
conclusions  reached  by  our  examination,  in  the  continued 
recurrence  and  constant  but  gradually  softening  antagonisms 
of  the  main  philosophical  schools  and  tendencies.  Dualism  is 
yielding,  in  history  and  in  the  judgment-halls  of  reason,  to  a 
monistic  philosophy.  Eealism  and  Idealism  are — starting  from 
divergent  points  of  view  and  contesting  all  along  the  way  a 
series  of  antagonistic  positions  —  approaching  the  goal  of  such 
a  Monism  as  shall  include  the  truth  of  both.  It  is  this 
philosophy  to  which  the  physical  and  the  psychological  sciences 
point  the  way.  In  the  same  direction  we  are  urged  by  the 
necessities  that  flow  from  our  ethical,  resthetical,  and  religious 
ideals. 

The  cry  has  recently  been  raised  in  our  ears  for  the  forming 
of  a  distinctively  "  American  "  philosophy.  Such  a  cry  can 
never  be  understood  as  other  than,  in  large  measure,  ad  captan- 
dum.  Yet  its  existence  as  a  fact,  and  the  audience  it  receives, 
are  most  encouraging  to  those  engaged  in  the  study  of  philoso- 
phy. The  cry  is  a  recognition  of  an  awakening  interest, 
throughout  our  land,  in  philosophical  pursuits.  But  this 
awakening  of  interest  is  not  peculiar  to  us.  The  earnest  pur- 
suit and  rapid  progress  of  those  particular  sciences,  on  which 
philosophy  depends,  have  not  been  without  result  in  behalf  of 
her  larger  interests  and  higher  development.  A  hand,  held  out 
to  philosophy  by  the  students  of  these  sciences,  is  plainly  visi- 
ble in  every  land  where  it  and  they  have  been  dwelling  together, 
—  not  always  in  unity.  But  a  real  unity  of  interests  belongs 
to  both.  And  by  the  combined  and  persistent  efforts  of  investi- 
gators in  these  sciences,  and  of  those  who  have  felt  that  impulse 


TENDENCIES  AND   SCHOOLS   IN   PHILOSOPHY.        421 

toward  philosophy  which  Plato  called  Eros,  a  wonderful  devel- 
opment in  the  self-knowledge  of  reason  may  be  expected  to 
result.  But  an  "  American  "  philosophy  we  may  no  more  seek 
than  an  American  science  or  an  American  theology.  A  true 
and  lofty  philosophical  thinking,  based  upon  all  the  results  in- 
ductively established  by  all  the  world's  science,  and  "  ancillary  " 
to  theology  in  another  than  the  scholastic  way,  shall  be  our 
aim.  That  it  can  scarcely  lead  to  a  new  form  of  Dualism,  the 
teaching  of  historical  tendencies,  and  the  very  profoundest  call 
of  reason,  should  make  sufficiently  plain. 


I  N  D  E  X. 


Absolute,  the,  iu  philosophical  discus- 
sion, 5,  368  1,  387  f. ;  unity  of  the, 
77  1".,  405  f.  ;  as  "World-Ground," 
368  f.,  374  f.,  388  f.  ;  self-conscious- 
ness of,  369  !'.,  374  f.,  376  f .  ;  ethical 
being  of,  379  f.,  386  f. 

^Esthetics,  a  branch  of  philosophy, 
174  f.,  324-350;  the  end  in,  315  f., 
348  f.  ;  the  Ideal  of,  329  1',  334  f., 
346  f. ;  use  of  imagination  in,  335  f., 
344. 

Agnosticism,  not  a  philosophy,  121,  14<). 
the  Spenceriau,  141  f. 

Aristotle,  his  conception  of  philosophy, 
4,  10  f.,  18  f.  ;  the  founder  of  sciences, 
12  f.,  149;  influence  of,  149  E. 

Art,  different  forms  of,  339  I'  :  freedom 
of,  344. 


Beautiful,  the,  appreciation  of,  324  f., 
331  t'.,  34S;  distinguished  from  the 
agreeable,  327  ;  judgment  of,  329  f , 
336  f. ;  relation  of,  to  conduct,  333  f. ; 
essential  nature  of,  337  1'.,  342  t'.,  346. 

Being,  the  Hegelian,  L95  f. ;  identity 
of,  with  knowledge,  226  !'.,  231. 

Ueneke,  bis  view  of  psychology,  90. 

relation  of,  to  philosophy,  34  f., 
60  I'.,  68  1'.,  271  I'.;  nature  of,  71  I'.. 
271  f. 


Categories,  the,  227  l'.,  311  f. 
Causalitj ,  category  of,  236  f. 
Chalybaus,  on  t  he  met  hod  of  philosophy, 

122  r. 

Change,  category  of,  239  f.;  realitj   of, 
245  f.  ;   subject  of,  245  !'..  258  1'. 


Cognition.     See  Knowledge. 

Comte,  Auguste,  his  view  of  philosophy, 

25. 
Criticism,  in  philosophy,  14S,  151  f .  ;  of 
Kant  and  since,  153  f. 


Descartes,  his  view  of  philosophy,  13; 

method  of,  124  f.,  224  f. :  the  maxim 

Of,  224  f. 
Dogmatism,  as  a  method  in  philosophy, 

I  16  f.,  150  f. 
Dualism,   a   form    of   philosophy,   402, 

406  f. 


Eclecticism,  not  a  method  in  phi- 
losophy,  132  f.,  140. 

Ego.     See  .Mind. 

Energy,  definition  of,  75,  262  ;  as  predi- 
cate of  matter,  262  f .  ;  kinds  of,  263. 

Epicurus,  his  view  of  philosophy,  12. 

Epistemology.     See  Noetics. 

Ethics,  relation  of,  to  philosophy,  43  f., 
173  I'.,  203  f. ;  nature  of,  I00f.,  288  f., 
293  ;  philosophy  of,  288-323  ;  method 
of,  2'.i4  f. :  the  eudaemonistic,  318  E., 
322  f. 


Ferrier,  on  the  divisions  of  philosophy, 
166  1'. 

Fichte,  his  view  of  philosophy,  21  1'..  396. 

Finality,  the  category  of,  248  E. ;  inhe- 
rent in  matter.  266  f. 

Fischer,  Kuno,  his  definition  of  phi- 
losophy, 22. 

Force.     .s>'.    Energy. 


424 


INDEX. 


Gob,  as  "  World-Ground,"  364  f .,  372  f., 
378  ;  ontological  argument  for,  364  f ., 
387  f. ;  eosinological  argument  for, 
365  ;  teleological  argument  for,  365  f. ; 
a  self-conscious  Life,  370  f.,  382  f . ; 
386  f.,  418  f. ;  predicates  of,  389  f. ; 
relations  of,  to  the  world,  390  f . 


Hakris,  Wm.  T.,  his  view  of  philoso- 
phy, 23,  29. 

Hartmann,  on  induction  in  philosophy, 
136 ;  and  the  nature  of  the  Absolute, 
388  ;  on  Monism,  402. 

Hegel,  on  the  English  conception  of 
philosophy,  14  1'.;  his  own  view,  19, 
179;  on  the  divisions  of  philosophy, 
164  f.;  theory  of  knowledge,  179  f.; 
and  doctrine  of  Being,  195  f. 

Helinholtz,  on  the  conception  of  science, 
66. 

Herbart,  on  the  nature  of  the  Ego,  41  f., 
281  f. ;  his  view  of  psychology,  88  f., 
2811'.,  396;  on  the  neglect  of  philo- 
sophy, 129 ;  the  divisions  of  philoso- 
phy, 165;  and  religion,  351. 

Hobbes,  his  view  of  philosophy,  14. 

Hodgson,  Shadworth  H.,  his  view  of 
philosophy,  22  f. ;  on  distinction  of 
science  from  philosophy,  56,  also 
psychology,  104  f . ,  on  consciousness, 
225  f. ;  on  philosophy  aud  religion, 
357. 

Huxley,  on  biological  sciences,  271  f. 


Idea,  the  Platonic,  4,  8,  18  f. 

Idealism,  a  fundamental  form  of  philo- 
sophy, 401  f.,  407  f.,  411,  414. 

Ideals,  the,  of  reason,  173 f. ;  the  philo- 
sophy of,  290  f. ;  the  moral,  305  f., 
312  f. ;  the  aesthetical,  334  f.,  341  f., 
349  f. 

Identity,  the  principle  of,  206  f. 

Immortality,  the  question  of,  38  f. 

Inertia,  conception  of,  265  f. 


Kant,  his  view  of  philosophy,  16 f.,  24, 
153, 164  f. ;  problem  of  his  "Critique," 
87,  124,  178,  185;  criticism  of,  153  f.; 
on  the  divisions  of  philosophy,  164f. ; 
on  the  theory  of  knowledge,  1 78  f., 
185  f.;    criticized    by   Hegel,    179  f.; 


categorical  imperative  of,  187  f.;  on 
doctrine  of  Ding-an-sich,  203  f.,  234  f . 
Knowledge,  stages  of,  59  f.,  193,  200  f  , 
211;  systematizing  of,  67  f. ;  problem 
of,  159,  170  1',  182  1'.,  188  1'.,  192  f.; 
theory  of,  178-217  ;  sceptical  view  of, 
188  f. ;  the  scientific,  200  f. ;  elabora- 
tion of,  211  f. ;  limitations  of,  2131'.; 
certification  of,  216  f.;  identity  of, 
with  Being,  226,  231. 


Leibnitz,  his  view  of  philosophy,  13  f. 

Lewes,  his  view  of  philosophy,  25,  51  f ., 
56  ;  and  of  metaphysics,  143  f. 

Life,  problem  of  its  origin,  33  f . ;  and 
nature,  60  f .,  68  f . 

Locke,  his  view  of  philosophy,  13  f., 
125  ;  nature  of  the  philosophy  of,  85  f. 

Logic,  nature  of,  99  f . ;  in  philosophical 
method,  112. 

Lotze,  on  the  need  of  philosophy,  23 ; 
and  its  aim,  128;  view  of  Meta- 
physics, 222  f. ;  on  the  reality  of 
change,  240  f. ;  on  the  self-conscious- 
ness of  the  Absolute,  378. 


Mass,  conception  of,  261  f. 

Matter,  nature  of,  73  f.,  258  f. ;  as  sub- 
ject of  change,  258  f . ;  constitution 
of,  267  f. 

Maxwell,  Clerk,  on  nature  of  matter, 
260. 

Mechanics,  relation  of,  to  philosophy, 
73. 

Metaphysics,  relation  of,  to  psychology, 
88  f  ;  as  a  branch  of  philosophy, 
172  f.,  218-253,  254  f. ;  the  problem 
of,  220  f .,  254  f . ;  the  two  branches  of, 
254  ,  in  philosophy  of  religion,  360  f . 

Mill,  J  S.,  his  view  of  philosophy,  86; 
definition  of  substance,  232  f. 

Mind,  the  nature  of,  38  f.,  277  f.,  279  f. ; 
the  cognition  of,  98  f.,  194,  230;  the 
philosophy  of,  274-287 ;  unity  of, 
279  ;    relation  of,  to  matter,  284  f. 

Monism,  the  neo-Platonic,  150;  the 
leading  form  of  modern  philosophy, 
402  f 


NatijkE,  unity  of,  247  ;   philosophy  of, 
254-274. 


INDEX. 


425 


Newton,  his  view  of  philosophy,  14. 

Noetics,  founded  by  Kant,  17  f.,  171  ; 
as  a  branch  of  philosophy,  171  f., 
178  f.,  182  f.;  relation  of,  to  psy- 
chology, 192  f.,  197  f. 

Number,  category  of,  239,  243  f. 


Optimism,  the  arguments  for,  384  f. 

Ought,  conception  of  the,  307  f.  ;  feel- 
ing of  the,  308  f. ;  relation  of,  to  the 
idea  of  Right,  311  f.,  314  f. 


Perception,  problem  of,  93  f.,  155  f., 
195  f. 

Pessimism,  of  Schopenhauer  ami  llart- 
mann,  383  f. 

Philosophy,  definition  of,  1  f.,  6  f.,  13  f., 
16f.,27;  Plato's  view  of,  4,  8  f. ;  Aris- 
totle's view  of,  4,  10  f.  ;  relation  of,  to 
theology,  4  f.  ;  kindred  terms  among 
the  Greeks,  6  f.  :  relation  to  science, 
8  f.,  26,  32,  55-83  ;  called  "  First  " 
by  Aristotle,  10  f.  ;  Roman  view  of, 
12;  view  of,  in  Middle  and  Modern 
eras,  13  f. ;  divisions  of,  16,  163-177  ; 
sources  of,  29  f.,  38  f.,  45  f.  ;  relation 
of,  to  psychology,  40  f.,  82,  84-111. 
273  f. ;  problem  of,  49  f.,  273  f . ; 
spirit  and  method  of,  112-139,  395, 
397;  analytic,  119,  134;  synthetic, 
120  f.,  135,  137  f.,  154,  276,  399; 
freedom  of,  123  f.  ;  progressiveness 
of,  132,  190;  history  of,  133  f.  ;  of 
the  Ideal,  290  f.,  314  f.,  394;  schools 
of,  395,  412;  fundamental  forms  of; 
401  ;  proposal  to  Americanize,  420f. 

Philosophy  of  Religion,  nature  of,  161  f., 
351  f . ;  a  department  of  philosophy, 
175  f.,  351-394. 

Plato,  his  view  of  philosophy,  4,  8  f., 
18  f. ;  use  of  the  terms  "philosophy," 
etc.,  7  f. 

Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason,  209  f. 

Psychology,  relation  of,  to  philosophy, 

40  f.,  63  f ..  82,  84  f.,  102  I'..  109, 
275  f.  ;  since  Kant  in  Germany,  86; 
the  Herbartian,  88  f.  ;  "without  a 
soul,"  91  f  :  includes  logic  and  ethics, 
99  f.,  293  f.  ;  peculiar  domain  of, 
108  f.;  method  of,  114;  (postulates 
Of,    120. 


Quality,  category  of.  235  f. 

Realism,  the,  of  Herbert  Spencer,  141  f., 
401  ;  a  fundamental  form  of  philo- 
sophy, 401 .  407  f. ;  that  called  "  phys- 
ical," 410. 

Reality,  philosophical  knowledge  of, 
9  f.,  18  f.,  45  f.,  220,  362  ;  the  unity 
of,  52,  276  f.,  337,  362,  367  f.,  392, 
402;  a  postulate  of  philosophy,  121  1. ; 
metaphysical  problem  concerning, 
223  I'. 

Relation,  category  of,  238  f. 

Religion,  philosophy  of,  351-394  ;  rela- 
tion of,  to  philosophy,  356  f. ;  the  life 
of,  357  ;  sources  of,  358  f. ;  the  prob- 
lem of,  363  f. 

Right,  the  idea  of,  a  category,  309  f. ; 
the  content  of,  316;  same  as  the  mor- 
ally Good,  317. 


Scepticism,  as  a  method  in  philosophy, 
146,  150  f.;  in  Greece,  149;  since 
Kant,  153  f.,  156;  as  respects  knowl- 
edge, 184  f. 

Schelling,  on  the  aim  of  philosophy, 
396. 

Schleiermacher,  his  view  of  philosophy, 
1  9  f . 

Schopenhauer,  his  view  of  philosophy, 
20;  of  the  nature  of  "the  Ought," 
44  f.  ;  of  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason,  209  f.  ;  on  the  Absolute  as 
Will,  388. 

Science,  relation  of,  to  philosophy,  10  f., 
55  f.,  200;  essential  nature  of,  65  f., 
80  f.  ;  spirit  of,  118;  the  knowledge 
belonging  to,  200  l\,  258  f. 

Self.      See  Mind. 

Self-consciousness,  the  problem  of,  97, 
157. 

Seneca,  his  view  ,<(  philosophy,  12. 

Setb,  Professor,  on  distinction  of  psy- 
chology and  philosophy,  106. 

Space,  category  of,  249  f. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  on  nature  of  science. 
65  f.  ;  the  Realism  of.  ui. 

Spinoza,    his    view    of    philosophy.    13: 

dogmatism  of,  152. 
Socrates,  the  philosophy  of,  148  f 
Stuckenherg,  on  distinction  of  psych 

logy  and  philosophy,  107  f. 


426 


INDEX. 


Substantiality,     category     of,     228  f.,  I  Volkmann  von  Volkmar,  his  view  of 
232  f. ;  J.  S.  Mill's  definition  of,  232  f.         psychology,  89 ;  and  its  method,  1 1 5. 


Theology,  relation  of,  to  philosophy, 
4f.,  354  f. ;  science  of,  353  f. 

Theory  of  Knowledge.     See  Noetics, 

"  Thing,"  the  conception  of,  95,  230  f., 
240  f.,  246  f. 

Time,  the  category  of,  249  f.,  252  f. 

Trendelenburg,  his  view  of  philosophy, 
20. 


Uebeeweg,    his    definition    of    philo- 
sophy, 28. 


Weight,  conception  of,  265  f. 

Will,  the  freedom  of,  296  f„  376  ;  fac- 
tors in  an  act  of,  298  ;  the  Absolute 
as,  376,  388. 

Wolff,  his  view  of  psychology,  °~. 

Wundt,  his  view  of  philosophy,  26,  52, 
93 ;  and  its  divisions,  167  f  ;  on  na- 
ture of  the  soul,  282  f. 

Zeller,  on  philosophy  among  the 
Greeks,  12  ;  on  the  problem  of  philo- 
sophy, 23. 


THE    END. 


A  A      000  277  587 


